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Taking the Measure of Gender Equality Policy Implementation and Impact: A Longitudinal, Cross-Sectoral, and Multi-Level Approach

Panel Number

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Implementing Parity Sanctions in Political Parties A Multi- Level Analysis

Catherine Achin et Sandrine Lévêque

DRAFT VERSION

The implementation of the French parity law provides a particularly interesting case for testing the extent to which formal rules can change political behaviour (Bailey, 1971). The law – passed in 2000 and strengthened several times since – aims to ‘promote equal access of women and men to electoral mandates and elected office’ and has established more or less stringent measures depending on the institutional level concerned. For assemblies elected by proportional representation (municipal councils of more than 1000 inhabitants, regional councils, the French delegation to the European Parliament), lists have to respect strict parity. At the departmental level, an unprecedented way of appointing candidates has been introduced: the so-called ‘*binome paritaire*’ or mixed gender pair. In 2015, this allowed 50% of women to be elected to departmental councils. Alongside these radical measures (which did not, however, concern the presidency of these assemblies), those adopted to favour men and women’s equal representation in the lower house of parliament were only *incentives*. And, in point of fact, the higher one looks within the traditional hierarchy of the political game, the stronger the social and gendered selection at work (Achin & Lévêque, 2014). Following this logic, the Senate (upper house) and National Assembly (lower house) are the last male strongholds in the French political field (25% of women in the Senate and 26.7% in the National Assembly in 2017). The 2000 law introduced financial penalties for political parties failing to field an equal number of male and female candidates in legislative elections (see box 1). These penalties were increased

in 2007 and again in 2014; they now correspond to a potentially heavy cut in public funding for political parties that give strong precedence to candidatures by men (or women).

Traditionally, measures in favour of the equality of the sexes in politics tend to involve three types of mechanisms: incentives put in place internally by political parties, legal quotas or reserved seats, and, finally, actions aimed at favouring women's empowerment in civil society (Verge & De la Fuente, 2014). The parity law in France is therefore particularly original and interesting insofar as it combines legal quotas and financial penalties for political parties, and has also been extended to other spheres such as large corporations and high-ranking public office (Lépinard, 2016).

Links between money and politics have mainly been studied from the point of view of the moralisation of political life and the fight against corruption (Lascoumes & Le Haye, 2013; Mossuz-Lavay, 2010) or in terms of the impact that campaign funding and candidates' ability to raise private funds have on results (Stratmann, 2005; Seabrook, 2010). In France, the legislation passed since 1988 (see box 2) to 'clean up' political funding by prohibiting donations by companies and by allocating new resources to candidates and party organisations has been the focus of research analysing its effects on electoral mobilisation and on how the party system functions (Treille, 2002; Phélippeau, 2013). The new modes of party and campaign funding have proved to have a direct impact on how representatives are elected and on their activities, as well as on party organisations and their strategies. The dominant parties have moved towards being 'societies of elected officials' (Lefebvre & Sawicky, 2006) or even 'cartel parties' (Katz & Mair, 1995): semi-public, professional, and centralised agencies aiming to maintain a symbiotic relationship with the State, drawing resources and legitimacy from it, and favouring collusion among themselves (Aucante et al., 2008). In this context, material and financial factors play an important role in determining the choices made by political parties (particularly in terms of dispersing candidates from different sides in the first round). This is particularly true of the legislative elections, which serve as a reference point for calculating party funding for the whole legislative term, depending on the proportion of votes garnered in the first round and the number of seats won in the second round (Lehingue, 2008).

Our aim here is therefore to take seriously the economic side to political activity and look at the impact of financial penalties on the gendered recruitment of parliamentarians. Our goal is to enter the 'secret garden' of nominations for legislative elections (Gallagher & March, 1988) and show the weight of financial constraints on the informal rationales underpinning decisions by the gate-keepers of party organisations (Bjarnegard & Kenny, 2015; Bjarnegard, 2013).

2017 is the first time the heavier financial penalties regarding parity have been implemented and the question of their efficiency remains open. Will they reverse the male monopoly in the National Assembly? Will money become a means through which

to *genuinely* convert political parties to parity? More broadly, will these formal rules generate a renewal of both politicians and their practices?

Our study of the 2017 French legislative elections is difficult insofar as this reform of financial penalties relating to parity has coincided, on the one hand, with another fundamental reform concerning dual mandates (box 3) and, on the other hand, with an unprecedented political context in which the governing political parties and their alliances have seen dramatic changes due to the rise of new political forces.

The law of February 16, 2014 that has come into effect for the 2017 legislative elections ended the French exception of dual national and local mandates (Back, 2012; François & Navarro, 2013). Henceforth, members of parliament (deputies) can no longer concomitantly hold positions as Mayor, Deputy Mayor, or president/vice-president of any public establishment for cooperation between local authorities, of a departmental or regional council, or of a '*syndicat mixte*' (joint venture between public authorities of different types). Bearing in mind that 78% of deputies elected in 2012 also held at least one local mandate – Mayor, in 42% of cases (Boelart et al., 2017) – it is clear that the choices made by incumbent deputies will be another decisive factor in the distribution of nominations in 2017.

This choice has been further complicated by the strong uncertainty surrounding the political majority that will emerge from the ballot boxes in June 2017. The electoral cycle that began with the right-wing primaries in 2016 has seen dramatic changes to many of the constants in French political life. Both of the 'usual' governing parties were eliminated in the first round of the presidential election. The two candidates who qualified for the second round (Marine Le Pen for the Front National and Emmanuel Macron for the centrist movement 'En marche') both framed themselves as being 'outside the system' and yet have both, in their own way, led political careers resembling those of politicians under the Fifth Republic (through parties or high-ranking public office). Will this unprecedented context call into question the rationales of political recruitment? Will it have consequences for national representation? And will it, as certain candidates claim, renew the political game?

These questions and these difficulties have led us to develop a two-level investigative framework, linking together the local and national scales. We take a monographic approach to the French 2017 elections, however comparison with cases studied elsewhere by others will also allow us to evaluate the specific impact of financial penalties on selection processes (Krook, 2014).

We will begin by evaluating the extent to which institutional changes have weighed on national rationales for political recruitment. With a view to this, we will look back over the limited effects of the parity law on women's parliamentary representation since 2002. In order to analyse decision-makers' priorities when selecting candidates, this overview will be supplemented with interviews conducted after the event with members of national selection committees for the main political parties.

While the financial penalties of parity policies have important consequences for the future operation of political organisations, in reality, they have less of an impact on the selection and auto-selection of politicians than other legal mechanisms such as the restriction of dual mandates. Moreover, the ‘normalised’ systems of recruitment in place in political parties prove powerless when it comes to regulating the political power struggles influencing candidate selection in a context of strong uncertainty.

Secondly, we will conduct a more micro-sociological analysis of how the selection of politicians takes place in three constituencies. We will conduct a local study of the political issues at stake, drawing on the press, campaign materials, and interviews conducted with activists from the main political parties.

Our hypothesis is that, on a local level, the political power struggles, social and gendered rationales, and informal rules governing the selection of politicians play a greater role than the formal rules regulating political competition. Analysis of how direct instructions from parties interweave with local power relations shows what forms of capital are decisive for winning nominations, depending on the party and on the characteristics of the constituency in question.

In conclusion, we will argue that the specific context of the 2017 French presidential and legislative elections – due to their uncertainty and the radical changes affecting the party system – is likely to prove conducive to selecting political outsiders and, consequently, to more women entering parliament. More than the fear of financial penalties, the determining factor is in fact ‘displaying parity’ as an argument for political renewal. These practices differ, however, according to political organisation and paradoxically give added weight to male leadership in both local and central candidate selection processes. This ‘regression to habitus’ in a critical context testifies to the fact it is difficult for formal rules, including financial ones, to modify ingrained political behaviour.

I - Money, the law, and women’s place in the parliamentary arena. Can financial rules impact political behaviour?

Studies on parity in politics have shown so far that changing the formal rules of the game is not enough to challenge the gendered rationales of political recruitment (Achin et al., 2007; Murray, Krook & Opello, 2012). They have highlighted the mechanisms through which political parties twist parity norms. The arsenal deployed by political actors to limit the progression of gender equality in the political space includes controlling the creation of lists, generating fake dissidence, or even forcing certain female candidates to resign after they are elected. Despite the stringent requirements governing elections under proportional representation, no assembly currently has genuine parity. In some cases, the proportion of women has even decreased, for example, when the European Parliament was renewed in 2015. The other limitation of

the law concerns its lack of impact on the presidency of assemblies, overwhelmingly still male (Achin & Léveque, 2014).

Regarding the legislative elections, legislators chose an incentive-based system. In the context of a two-round single-member plurality election, the law of June 6, 2000 makes provision for financial penalties to encourage parties to field female candidates but imposes no constraints regarding their actual election (see box 2). In 2000, the deputies considered that reducing public funding for parties that failed to field enough female candidates would suffice to increase the proportion of women in the National Assembly. According to the initial version of the law, when the '*difference between the number of candidates of each sex [...] exceeds 2% of the total number of candidates*' the sum of the first fraction of public funding granted decreases by '*a percentage equivalent to half that difference, out of the total number of candidates*'. In practice, these rules resulted in the main political parties giving up a substantial share of their public funding.

1) The limited effects of financial penalties between 2002 and 2012

The proportion of women's candidatures stagnated over this period, rising from 38.9% to 40.1%, while the proportion of female deputies rose from 12% to 27%, with the last progression in 2012 linked to the victory of left-wing parties who fielded more women. In reality only the Verts, the Front de Gauche, and the Front National respected the law and avoided financial penalties.

Parti Politique	% de candidates en 2002 % parmi les élu.es	% de candidates en 2007 % parmi les élu.es	% de candidates en 2012 % parmi les élu.es
EXTG	48,8%	45,6%	47,4%
PCF/FG	44 % (23,8% des élu.e.s)	46,5% (20% des élu.e.s - 3F)	48,2% (20% des élu.e.s - 2F)
PS	36,3 % (16,4 % des élu.e.s)	45,2 % (25,8% des élu.e.s - 48 F)	43% (37,5% des élu.e.s - 105F)
PRG	26,9%	31,8% (57,1% des élu.e.s - 4F)	38,6% (33,3% des élu.e.s - 4F)
EELV	49,8%	50,4% (25% des élu.e.s - 1F)	49,4% (52,9% - 9F)
UDF/MODEM/CEN	19 ,6%	36,9% (0 F sur 3)	37,2% (0 F sur 2)
UMP/LR	20,6% (10,1% des élu.e.s)	26% (14,4% d'élu.e.s - 45F)	25,6% (13,9% des élu.e.s - 27F)

FN	48,4%	48,8%	49% (50% des élu.e.s, - 1F)
Total / Candidatures et élu.e.s	38,9% 12,3%	41,6% 18,5%	40,1% 26,9%

Tableau 1. Pourcentage de femmes candidates et élues par parti politique depuis 2002. Source : Rapport du Haut Conseil à l'égalité, http://www.haut-conseil-egalite.gouv.fr/IMG/pdf/opfh_eleleg_rapt1-250712.pdf

In 2012, the parties continued to field women in constituencies that were difficult to win, as evidenced by the discrepancy between the proportion of female candidates and the proportion of women elected (25.6% against 13.9% for LR – Les Républicains – and 43% against 37% for the PS – Parti Socialiste). LR lost 6 million euros of public funding between 2012 and 2017, against 700 000 euros for the PS.

The financial penalties for which the law provided had not, therefore, challenged the social and political rationales excluding women from the most prestigious arenas of power. However, legislators did not give up on this lever. The 2014 law doubled the rate of funding deducted. For the legislative elections, this rate stands at 150%. If political parties, and particularly LR, field the usual percentage of women (approximately 25%), the penalty could equate to more than 10 million euros per year over the next term.

2) Beyond parity norms: politics in the hands of the law?

Several types of norms frame the recruitment processes for electoral candidates. Some are legal and set out conditions of eligibility. In the face of what is usually referred to as a 'crisis in representative democracy', for several years now these norms have also aimed to allow the renewal of politicians, particularly through feminisation and through the way 'gender has been made into a tool of the law' (Boucobza & Girard, 2014).

Alongside these legal norms, political parties also implement internal procedures for appointing candidates aimed at ensuring – and showcasing – the internal democracy of each organisation. At play here is a form of competition between different formal rules and their interaction with informal rules of selection according to party organisations and specific institutional configurations (Kenny & Verge, 2005).

The law on dual mandates: more powerful than parity?

No less than 12 reference texts (constitution, organic laws, laws, decrees) regulate candidatures for the legislative elections. Candidates must enjoy full civil and political rights and meet conditions of age and nationality. Other texts set out the conditions under which candidatures are valid, but also stipulate rules for electoral propaganda and campaign spending. Among the incompatibilities affecting candidates on an individual level, the rule concerning dual mandates is the most spectacular (box 3). In

2017, deputies will have to choose between being a deputy and holding another seat on a local executive; furthermore, they will have to decide before the election, as they are required to maintain the last mandate they receive.

In a context where voluntarily leaving the National Assembly is extremely rare, and although they have not stated this is due to the law on dual mandates, many nationally renowned parliamentarians have relinquished the idea of running for re-election (Gaxie, 2003). 78 socialist deputies out of 292 have announced they will not be standing again in 2017.¹ On the right, several figures such as Dominique Bussereau, Jean-François Copé, Benoist Apparu, and Pierre Lelouche have also decided not to run again.² Many, often older, men, who are real ‘notables’ in politics, seem to have stood down, without necessarily being replaced by women.

Only systematic analysis of the characteristics of the deputies not running again can reveal the intersecting effects of the dual mandate law and the parity law. While legal measures constrain candidatures and frame the recruitment of politicians, each party has its own internal systems for appointing candidates.

Party procedures that leave little room for parity issues

While candidates are usually subject to rules concerning minimum length of party membership or being up to date with their fees, some parties lay out more original conditions indicating a strategic desire to differentiate themselves. Emmanuel Macron’s ‘En marche’ movement, for example, stipulates that candidates must have a clean police record and never have been deprived of the right to run for office. The candidature regulations also state that ‘at least half of nominees will be first-time parliamentary candidates and a large proportion will come from civil society’.³ Emmanuel Macron has also insisted on his desire to establish ‘real parity’ with a balanced number of candidates of each sex in constituencies that are equally winnable.⁴

Candidate selection has to meet two, sometimes contradictory, rationales: a rationale of rewarding activism (and maintaining local leaderships), which respects the organisation’s political balance, and a rationale surrounding what to display, aimed at showing that the party respects democratic rules and is contributing to renewing political practices (thus avoiding accusations of playing into the hands of extremist stances).

With the exception of the ‘En marche’ movement, which made its selection committee’s criteria into one of its distinctive features, such criteria are usually ill defined, particularly when it comes to parity, which can be used both to set aside and

¹ <http://lelab.europe1.fr/legislatives-au-moins-78-deputes-ps-ne-se-representent-pas-2967320>

² http://www.lexpress.fr/actualite/politique/elections/bartolone-cope-lellouche-mamere-ces-deputes-qui-passent-la-main_1902973.html

³ <https://en-marche.fr/article/construire-majorite-de-projet>

⁴ https://www.lesechos.fr/30/01/2017/lesechos.fr/0211749512401_macron-a-la-recherche-de-femmes-pour-les-legislatives.htm

to appoint particular candidates.⁵ Indeed, this condition is taken into account to varying degrees by the organisations' statutes and internal regulations.

In practice, candidates for legislative elections are mainly appointed at a central level by bodies closely tied to the leadership of each of the parties in question. The national negotiations finalising these choices do, however, have to taken into account local preserves insofar as the initial choice is made at constituency level and bringing in an external candidate is rare and often contested.

Impenetrable committees and selection criteria

The nominee selection committees are strategic bodies and their composition varies according to the internal political balance of each organisation. The PS and LR do not indicate their committee members' names. The PS states that the committee includes both ex officio and elected members and respects parity. The 'En Marche' movement made its committee public on February 9, 2017.⁶ It includes 9 members and three deputy members, mainly men.

The workings of the committee are also highly impenetrable and generally seem to be subject more to political rationales than to formally established rules, as revealed by the uncertain circumstances of the 2017 electoral cycle. Mainly previously established procedures were challenged, first by the right- and left-wing primaries and then by the unexpected results in the presidential election.

In LR, the committee apparently includes 83 people and respects gender equality. At the FN, there are 20 people on the committee who also belong to the party's national executive. On the right-wing, an abiding feature emerges: the members of the selection committee – or at least those known to us – are national leaders, men of a certain age with a well established position in the party (and in life in general). And while the names might change, the profiles do not, as illustrated by Jean-François Lamour replacing Christian Estrosi, a man with whom he shares an extraordinarily similar political career path. Both are heavyweight politicians, both are former high-level sportsmen who moved over to politics, and both have combined elected, party, ministry, local, and national positions.

Framed by legal mechanisms and party norms, the choice of nominees is first and foremost a process that controls political power struggles inside each organisation. Far from being democratic – and this also goes for the organisations that are most attached to demonstrating their commitment to democratic governance – these processes are entrusted to prominent political actors, mainly men, who have accumulated different types of political capital. These gate-keepers therefore promote

⁵ Marc Lafineur, a supporter of Alain Juppé, a member of the committee and an elected official in the Maine et Loire *département* declared on 22/06/2016 to the newspaper *20 minutes*: 'Arguments vary very broadly for selecting one candidate or another: in one department, there's supposed to be two-thirds women among the candidates, but in another, that's no longer the case'.

<http://www.20minutes.fr/politique/1870435-20160622-legislatives-2017-fin-investitures-sous-haute-tension-chez-republicains>

⁶ <http://www.bfmtv.com/politique/en-marche-presente-sa-commission-d-investiture-en-vue-des-legislatives-1099331.html>

politicians after their own image, which can explain in part the low progression of feminisation at the most prestigious levels of the political space.

This 'national' approach is not exhaustive when it comes to the rationales underpinning selection of parliamentary candidates. A local approach to these selection processes affords a better understanding of how different types of political resources combine in political contests and which of these prove most efficient for establishing oneself in a competitive space.

II – From the national to the local, diluting the parity imperative: the gender of local leadership

More than ever, the rationales nationalising the political game influence the recruitment of politicians and the issues that will be discussed on the ground (Gaxie & Lehingue, 1984). The official appointment of candidates still hangs on the results of the presidential election and the alliances that can be forged before or after the vote. The list of candidates is only official once the legal submission period has ended: Friday May 19, 2017 at 6pm.

Beyond legal dispositions, rules specific to each party, and ways of respecting national political balances, local-level analysis of candidatures shows that the most decisive political resources remain the local base and activist capital. At constituency level, the elected officials currently in place have the strongest hold and limit any renewal of politicians, even when this renewal is being actively showcased as with the 'En Marche' movement.

1) Three socially and politically contrasting constituencies

We chose three contrasting constituencies for our study: the 3rd constituency in the Yonne department, and the 14th and 17th constituencies in Paris. The first two are held by the right wing and the third by the left wing. The Parisian constituencies are also socially divergent: one is located in the smart districts of the city, while the other is in a more working-class area currently undergoing gentrification. The 3rd constituency in Yonne is a more rural area and its main town, Sens, is medium sized with 25 000 inhabitants.

The Parisian political space is particularly competitive and, given its proximity to the centre of the party, a space where party rationales and the influence of national balance have the strongest sway. Our chosen Parisian constituencies are also respectively strongholds of the Left or the Right, in the hands of political barons (Claude Goasguen for LR and Daniel Vaillant for the PS). This means that the candidate selected by the party or political family holding the constituency has every chance of being elected. Conversely, the Yonne constituency is much more uncertain politically. While it was long held by the right wing, given the results of the Front National over the

last few voting rounds, it may well move to the far right. In the second round of the Presidential election, Marine Le Pen garnered 48.5% of votes there (see box 6). From September onwards, we will conduct interviews with aspiring candidates, candidates, and elected officials in all three constituencies.

2) 'Out with the outgoing' (or not?)

In the three constituencies in question, the incumbent deputies have a clear advantage when it comes to standing for re-election. This 'incumbent advantage' has been a constant feature of processes for selecting legislative candidates under the Fifth Republic (Guedé & Rozneblum, 1981). The principle was reaffirmed by the LR party in June 2016 and seems to be a common feature right across the political spectrum: if 'En marche' has stated it will limit the number of incumbent deputies it fields, this has been part of a deliberate strategy setting itself apart from the norm. Elsewhere, incumbent deputies who request to stand again can do so unopposed. In the 3rd constituency in the Yonne department, the incumbent, Marie-Louise Fort (LR), was therefore selected in June 2016 as the party representative for the legislative elections. Having enjoyed a long local career, her legitimacy was not challenged until she herself decided to give up her place to an 'inheritor'. In the 14th constituency in Paris, despite rumours he would fall back on his role as Mayor of the 16th arrondissement, Claude Goasguen, now aged 72, ultimately decided to stand in a contest where the right-wing is sure to win (in 2012, he was elected in the first round with more than 58% of votes, leaving the PS candidate trailing behind at 16%).

It is only when there is a handover that competition becomes stronger. In the 17th constituency in Paris, the decision by the incumbent, 68-year-old Daniel Vaillant, to step down (having been promised a Senate post by 'the party') opened up the struggle to inherit his nomination. In a safe left-wing constituency (he was elected with over 72% of the vote in the second round of the 2012 legislative elections), the choice of candidate saw many twists and turns, which in part escaped the PS's formal rules. Initially the only candidate – Colombe Brossel, a 40-year-old woman, deputy to the PS Mayor of the 18th arrondissement – saw her victory 'stolen' by Daniel Vaillant himself, despite the fact that, according to the statutes, he was ineligible to run again. When he failed to obtain the Senate candidature he wanted, he decided to fall back on 'his' constituency. He therefore organised a play for power by distributing voting bulletins in his name, allowing activists to vote for him, with the support of Christophe Careshe, also a Paris deputy.⁷ Although ultimately the law re-established Colombe Brossel's candidature, a symbol of political renewal, her legitimacy remains tainted today by this coalition that tried to re-elect a 68-year-old deputy, Mayor of a Parisian arrondissement, an elected official since 1988, and senior party officer at the PS, supported by the national apparatus against the wishes of activists.

⁷ <https://www.marianne.net/politique/investitures-du-ps-daniel-vaillant-gagne-paris-alors-qu-il-n-avait-pas-le-droit-de-se>

Marie-Louise Fort and Claude Goasguen are considered ‘natural’ candidates for the Right and Centre. They have been established in their constituencies for a long time and the alliances forged nationally by their parties with other organisations have never called into question their candidatures. It is only their personal choices that will (perhaps) allow for a renewal.

In the 3rd constituency in the Yonne department, this handover opened up a phase of uncertainty.⁸ Four applications were put forward by departmental party authorities: Clarisse Quentin, Véronique Frantz, Eric Gentis, and Paul-Antoine De Carville. Ultimately, the incumbent’s choice – a woman who is both a departmental councillor and deputy Mayor – won the nomination but will perhaps have to face various right-wing candidates.

In the FN, the appointment of 31-year-old Julien Odoul has been official since January 2017. A former member of the UDI centrist party, he was assistant to a deputy then General Secretary of the centrist group in the Seine-Saint-Denis department. In 2014, he joined Marine Le Pen’s staff. He was appointed Departmental Secretary for the Front National in the Yonne on June 1, 2015 and led the regional election campaign for the department’s list. He also holds national roles as a member of the Standing committee and the Finance committee.

More generally, the elimination of François Fillon (LR) and Benoit Hamon (PS) in the presidential elections and the ultimate victory of Emmanuel Macron (En marche) have weighed heavily on nominations. Many figures from the PS and the centre-right have rallied to join the new president’s ranks. While Manuel Valls’ candidacy has not been officially accepted by ‘En Marche’, no candidate is being fielded against him. The negotiations that took place before the first round (and between the two rounds) have also dealt a new hand. The agreement Benoit Hamon signed with the EELV (Europe Ecology-the Greens) party – under which its candidate, Jadot, stood down from the presidential election – included leaving 40 constituencies to the EELV party.

Ultimately, the process for appointing and nominating candidates – over which political organisations currently have the monopoly – is a complex phenomenon, involving rationales that can only be understood in the context of multi-level analysis. It is important to take into account institutional rationales (the formal rules of the political game), the weight of party rationales, the interaction between the local and the national, and also the candidates’ trajectories and resources. It is only by varying these different points of view that we can better understand how new recruitment rationales are unfolding today in the selection of parliamentarians and how the mechanisms maintaining a closed male community in politics continue to exist.

⁸ http://www.lyonne.fr/sens/politique/2017/01/27/marie-louise-fort-lr-je-ne-renonce-pas-je-fais-le-choix-de-sens-et-de-l-agglomeration_12260458.html

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ENCADRE 1 : *Les dispositifs des lois sur la parité concernant les élections législatives*

- Modifiant la loi n° 88-227 du 11 mars 1988 relative à la transparence financière de la vie politique, la loi n° 2000-493 du 6 juin 2000 vise à instituer une modulation de l'aide publique aux partis en fonction de la proportion respective de femmes et d'hommes présentés.
- En application de l'article 9-1 de la loi n° 88-227 du 11 mars 1988 modifié par la loi n° 2000-493 du 6 juin 2000, la première fraction de cette aide publique est diminuée, lorsque l'écart entre le nombre de candidats de chaque sexe ayant déclaré se rattacher à ce parti dépasse 2 % du nombre total de candidats. Le taux de diminution de cette aide publique est égal à la moitié de cet écart rapporté au nombre total de candidats. Ainsi lorsqu'un parti présente 30 % de femmes et 70 % d'hommes, l'écart étant de 40%, l'aide publique est diminuée de 20 %.
- La loi n° 2007-128 du 31 janvier 2007 porte le taux de diminution de l'aide publique aux trois quarts de l'écart rapporté au nombre total de candidats. Pour reprendre l'exemple précédent, l'aide publique est diminuée de 30 % si un parti ne présente que 30 % de femmes. Ce nouveau taux s'est appliqué aux législatives de juin 2012.
- La Loi du 4 août 2014 (dite loi Vallaud-Belkacem) pour l'égalité réelle entre les femmes et les hommes comprend un titre entier « visant à mettre en œuvre l'objectif constitutionnel de parité ». Il prévoit le doublement des pénalités à l'encontre des partis politiques ne respectant pas la parité aux élections législatives. En cas de dépassement de ces 2%, le montant de la première fraction qui est attribuée à un parti est diminué d'un pourcentage égal à 150% de l'écart rapporté au nombre total des candidat.e.s. Pour reprendre l'exemple précédent, un écart de 40% des candidat.e.s des deux sexes conduit à une réduction de 60% du financement public du parti.

La part des femmes élues à l'Assemblée nationale progresse lentement au fil des élections législatives et de l'accentuation des pénalités financières : 12,3 % de femmes élues à l'Assemblée nationale en juin 2002 ; 18,5 % en juin 2007 ; 26 % en juin 2012 (avec 40,1% des candidatures de femmes).

ENCADRE 2 : *Le financement des partis politiques en France*

La Constitution de la Ve République confie deux missions aux partis politiques : concourir à l'expression du suffrage et, désormais, favoriser l'égal accès des femmes et des hommes aux fonctions électives. Les partis se plaçant sous ce régime peuvent bénéficier d'un financement public.

Les lois du 11 mars 1988, du 15 janvier 1990, du 19 janvier 1995 et du 11 avril 2003 ont fixé les règles de financement des partis, de manière à éviter les financements occultes et les pressions des puissances financières. Depuis 1995, les pouvoirs publics ont interdit définitivement aux personnes morales de prendre part au financement de la vie politique. Les dépenses électorales sont également désormais plafonnées, pour assurer plus d'égalité entre les candidat.e.s et éviter la surenchère médiatique.

L'État propose un dispositif d'aide financière aux partis politiques et de prise en charge des dépenses de campagne, en contrepartie du strict respect de la législation ainsi définie. La mise en œuvre des règles de financement des partis et des campagnes électorales est confiée à une commission indépendante (la commission nationale des comptes de campagne et des financements politiques, dite CCFP), sous le contrôle des juridictions administratives. Enfin, le patrimoine des élus est contrôlé en début puis en fin de mandat. Ce contrôle est assuré par une seconde instance, la commission pour la transparence financière de la vie politique (ou CTVP).

Le régime actuel de financement des partis politiques est donc celui-ci :

- Interdiction des dons des personnes morales (à l'exception des autres partis politiques)
- Financement public :
 - *Première fraction* : proportionnelle au nombre de voix obtenues au premier tour des dernières élections législatives. Condition : présenter des candidats ayant obtenu chacun au moins 1% des suffrages exprimés dans au moins cinquante circonscriptions.
 - *Seconde fraction* : proportionnelle au nombre de parlementaires. Condition : être bénéficiaire de la première fraction
 - Sanction financière en cas de non-respect de la loi sur la parité hommes-femmes
 - Remboursement des frais de campagne : si leur compte est approuvé par la CCFP, l'État accorde aux candidat.e.s ayant recueilli au moins 5 % des suffrages exprimés au premier tour, un remboursement forfaitaire pouvant atteindre 50 % du montant du plafond des dépenses dans la circonscription considérée, dans la limite des sommes effectivement dépensées.

Financement privé :

- Cotisations des adhérents et des élus, qui étaient traditionnellement la source de financement des partis de masse.
- Dons des personnes privées, limités à 7 500 euros par an et par personne. Ils sont généralement obtenus au moment des élections et non dans le cadre normal du fonctionnement des partis.

ENCADRE 3 : Lois sur le cumul des mandats

Le cumul des mandats a toujours été la norme pour les députés en France avant mais également pendant l'exercice de leur mandat parlementaire. Le régime de la Cinquième République a introduit des incompatibilités entre la fonction de ministre et le mandat de député et entre la présidence d'un conseil général et celle d'un conseil régional.

Les deux lois du 30 décembre 1985 ont posé de nouvelles limitations : interdiction de cumuler mandat de député et plus d'un autre mandat choisi dans une liste exhaustive (Parlement européen, Conseil de Paris, Maire d'une commune de plus de 20 000 habitants, Conseil général, Conseil régional, adjoint au maire d'une commune de plus de 100 000 habitants). Seul un troisième mandat de conseiller municipal, d'adjoint ou de maire de villes de moins de 20 000 habitants peut donc être ajouté aux deux premiers.

La loi du 5 avril 2000 pose que les mandats de député et de parlementaire européen sont incompatibles, et qu'un seul autre mandat peut être cumulé avec celui de député (conseiller régional, général, ou municipal d'une ville de plus de 3500 habitants (1000 désormais)). Enfin, il reste possible de cumuler un mandat parlementaire et une fonction de chef d'un exécutif local (Président de conseil régional ou départemental, ou maire).

Les règles d'incompatibilité sont les mêmes pour les parlementaires européens que pour les députés. Les détenteurs de mandats locaux, ne peuvent exercer plus de deux des mandats suivants (conseiller régional, conseiller général, conseiller de Paris, conseiller municipal), et sont également incompatibles les fonctions de président de conseil régional, de président de conseil général, et de maire – y compris d'arrondissement.

Enfi, la Loi organique du 16 février 2014 interdit le cumul de fonctions exécutives locales avec le mandat de député, de sénateur ou de député européen.

Après le 31 mars 2017, un parlementaire ne pourra plus, notamment, être : maire, adjoint, président ou vice-président d'un établissement public de coopération intercommunale, d'un conseil départemental, d'un conseil régional, d'un syndicat mixte.

Par ailleurs, le texte autorise qu'un député ou sénateur démissionnaire pour cause de cumul de mandats soit remplacé par son suppléant. Jusque-là, une élection partielle devait être organisée.

Le ou la parlementaire ne peut plus choisir entre son mandat de parlementaire et son mandat local en cas de cumul : il ou elle conserve le mandat le plus récemment acquis et est démissionnaire d'office du mandat le plus ancien (avant l'entrée en vigueur de la loi, un parlementaire en situation d'incompatibilité pouvait choisir le mandat qu'il souhaitait abandonner pour mettre fin à cette situation aux termes d'un délai de trente jours).

Au niveau local : Nul ne peut cumuler plus de deux mandats électoraux d'assemblée délibérante locale : conseiller régional, conseiller à l'Assemblée de Corse, conseiller départemental, conseiller de Paris, conseiller à l'Assemblée de Guyane, conseiller à l'Assemblée de Martinique, conseiller municipal.

Le chef d'un exécutif local ne peut pas exercer un autre mandat de chef d'exécutif local (maire, maire d'arrondissement, président de conseil départemental, président de conseil régional ou de l'Assemblée de Corse)

ENCADRE 4 : La désignation des candidat.e.s - ce que disent (ou ne disent pas) les statuts des partis politiques

Au **Parti Socialiste**, c'est le chapitre 2 des statuts qui prévoit la désignation des candidat.es. Une commission d'investiture qui comporte des membres élus et des membres de droit (et qui respecte le recrutement paritaire) établit une liste qui est ensuite soumise au conseil national. En cas de candidatures multiples, une élection est organisée localement selon les modalités fixées par le règlement intérieur.

Au parti **Les Républicains**,

Au **Front national**, la commission d'investiture est formée de 20 personnes principalement des élu.es et des cadres du parti. Rien dans les nouveaux statuts adoptés en juin 2015 ne concerne les règles relatives au fonctionnement de cette commission.

Pour **En Marche**, procédure originale, un appel au dépôt de candidatures en ligne a été lancé pour représenter le mouvement aux élections législatives. La condition est d'être adhérent.e, avec un casier judiciaire vierge et de déposer une lettre de motivation et une photo d'identité. Emmanuel Macron a défini le 19 janvier 2017 cinq critères de sélection des candidats pour la Commission Nationale d'Investiture : « le renouvellement et l'appel à la société civile ; La parité réelle ; La probité ; Le pluralisme politique ; La cohérence ».

Encadré 5 : biographies politiques comparées des deux présidents successifs de la commission d'investiture de LR

Christian Estrosi (né en 1955) et Jean François Lamour (né en 1956) sont tous les deux sportifs de haut niveau. L'un est champion de motocyclisme, le deuxième est un champion d'escrime. Ils ont tous les deux une assise locale, cumulant plusieurs mandats.

Leur carrière politique est longue. Christian Estrosi est député depuis 1988. Ils ont tous les deux été ministres.

Ils occupent par ailleurs des positions stratégiques au sein du parti tant au niveau local que national.

Encadré 6 : Résultats des précédents scrutins dans les trois circonscriptions sélectionnées

Paris 14^{ème} circonscription, 16^{ème} arrondissement

Législatives 2012 : élection du député sortant, Claude Goasguen (LR), au premier tour.

Claude Goasguen*	UMP	23 012	58,11
Annie Novelli	PS	6 385	16,12
David Alphan	UMP diss.	3 504	8,85
Marc de Jossineau	FN	2 172	5,49
Béatrice Lecouturier	MoDem	943	2,38
Antoine Beauquier	PCD	875	2,21
Catherine Ribes	EELV	858	2,17
Valérie Sachs	DVD	543	1,37
Laura Pailler	FG (PCF)	508	1,28
Serge Rader	DLR	271	0,68
Véronique Vermorel	PP	243	0,61
Virginie Bouilliez	DVD	131	0,33
Loïc Baverel	AR	86	0,22
Jean-Pierre Dalmas	LO	44	0,11
Anta Sylla	DVD	22	0,06
Alexandra Lupin	PLD	1	0,00
Inscrits		69 895	100,00
Abstentions		30 038	42,98
Votants		39 857	57,02
Blancs et nuls		259	0,65
Exprimés		39 598	99,35

Second tour élection présidentielle 2017

Emmanuel Macron	87,15%
Marine Le Pen	12,85%

PARIS 17[°] circonscription

Résultats des élections législatives des 10 et 17 juin 2012 de la 17^e circonscription de Paris :
élection du député sortant Daniel Vaillant (PS) au second tour

[4:](#)

Candidat	Parti	Premier tour		Second tour	
		Voix	%	Voix	%
Daniel Vaillant	PS	13 174	46,11	19 152	72,84
Roxane Decorte	UMP	5 225	18,29	7 140	27,16
Ilan Brossat	FG (PCF)	3 769	13,19		
Barbara Feledziak	EELV	2 379	8,33		
Vanessa Lancelot	FN	1 714	6,00		
Guillaume Ancelet	MoDem	558	1,95		
Guillaume Floris	NPA	418	1,46		
Hervé Breuil	PP	393	1,38		
Arnaud Vincent	AEI	178	0,62		
Stéphane Le Goff	LO	166	0,58		
André Tilloy	PCD	150	0,53		
Sophie Goldszal	DLR	124	0,43		
Margaux Gandelon	PR (NC)	120	0,42		
Clarisse Delalondre	POI	115	0,40		
Ronald Jean-Baptiste	SP	87	0,30		
Franois Bechieau	MUP	0	0,00		
Inscrits		55 057	100,00	55 056	100,00
Abstentions		26 174	47,54	27 944	50,76
Votants		28 883	52,46	27 112	49,24
Blancs et nuls		313	1,08	820	3,02
Exprimés		28 570	98,92	26 292	96,98

Second tour élection présidentielle de 2017

Emmanuel Macron : 89,6%

Marine Le Pen : 10,4%

Yonne circonscription n°3

Elections législatives de 2012

Election de Marie-Louise Fort (UMP) au second tour

FORT (UMP) - **55,28 %** (27304 voix) Nicolas SORET (Soc) - 44.72%

1^{er} tour :

Mme Marie-Louise FORT (Ballotage)

Union pour un Mouvement Populaire **36,71 %** (18837 voix)

M. Nicolas SORET (Ballotage)

Socialiste **28,05 %** (14393 voix)

M. Edouard FERRAND

Front National **19,26 %** (9883 voix)

M. Daniel PARIS
Radical de Gauche **8,40 %** (4311 voix)

Mme Elodie DELION
Front de gauche **3,10 %** (1592 voix)

M. Gérard SERRÉ
Divers droite **1,03 %** (526 voix)

M. Michel GOLLIARD
Extrême droite **0,94 %** (482 voix)

M. Jean ROUSSEL
Ecologiste **0,66 %** (341 voix)

Mme Maryse SANGUINET-TONNERRE
Ecologiste **0,63 %** (323 voix)

M. Michel LEME
Extrême gauche **0,49 %** (249 voix)

Mme Jocelyne PUGET
Extrême gauche **0,45 %** (233 voix)

Mme Annie SCANIGLIA-KERMIN
Extrême gauche **0,28 %** (142 voix)

Inscrits : 89161 Abstentions : 37082 (41,59%) Votants : 52079 (58,41%) Blancs ou nuls : 767 (0,86%) Exprimé : 51312 (57,55%)

Second tour élection présidentielle







Emmanuel Macron	51,5%
Marine Le Pen	48,5%

Encadré 7 : biographie des trois député.e.s sortant.e.s

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












Encadré 8 : liste des candidat.e.s investi.e.s pour les législatives de 2017 dans les trois circonscriptions

Paris 14° circonscription :

 Diane de Bourguesdon ⁸⁰	PCD
 Valérie Bougault ²⁸	EM!
 Olivier Bouigue ¹¹	FI
 Laura Dernani ²⁰	UPR
 Claude Goasquen ^{*26}	LR - UDI
 Michel Gobillon ^{25.12}	M100% (PFE)

Ghislain Lafont ¹³	577IDC
Marlène Ley ⁹	LO
Flore Madelin ⁷	PCF
Vanessa Wagner ¹⁹	PA
Pierre-Alain Weill ²¹	PS

[Paris 17° circonscription](#)

Candidat	Parti
 Catherine Aubert ²⁰	UPR
 Ian Brossat ^{66,67}	PCF - EELV
 Colombe Brosse ²¹	PS
 Stéphanie Bruhière ⁸	ND
 Bernadette Chabanet ¹⁷	AR
 Chloé Desfachelle ⁶⁸	MaVoix
 Béatrice Failles ⁵⁰	REM
 Sandrine Lastecouères ¹²	M100%
 Stéphane Le Goff ⁹	LO
 Danielle Obono ¹¹	FI
 Babette de Rozières ²⁶	LR - UDI
 Jade Rozenkran ¹⁵	Pirate
 Daniel Vaillant ⁶⁹	DVG

[Yonne 3° circonscription](#)

- Dominique Bourreau : PS (Parti socialiste) / Suppléant : Mani Cambefort
- Isabelle Corrado : UPR (Union populaire républicaine) /Suppléant : David Chesnel
- Michèle Crouzet : LREM (La République En Marche) / Suppléant : Yannick Villain
- Delphine Grémy : DVD (Divers-droite) / Suppléant : Pascal Legent
- Isabelle Michaud : FI (La France insoumise) / Suppléant : Yoann Toupet
- Julien Odoul : FN (Front national) / Suppléant : Lindsay Auduc
- Xavier Poinard : PCD (Parti chrétien-démocrate) / Suppléant : Agnès Thouvard
- Clarisse Quentin : LR - UDI (Les Républicains - Union des démocrates et indépendants) / Suppléant : Thierry Leau
- Sylvain Sifflet-Lafaverge : DLF (Debout La France) / Suppléant : Marie-Claire Wargnier
- Muslimé Sunar : PEJ (Parti Egalité Justice) / Suppléant : Mehmet Meral
- Patrick Blin : PCF-FDG (Parti communiste français-Front de Gauche) / Suppléant : Annick Baron
- Bernard Beherec : M100% (Mouvement 100%) / Suppléant : Christine Robert
- Simonne Pallant : LO (Lutte Ouvrière) / Suppléant : Laetitia Lefebvre
- Jean-Baptiste Dufay / Suppléant : Romain Creuwels
- Olivier Martin / Suppléant : Zakia Malek