



HAL
open science

Public debt versus Environmental debt: What are the relevant Tradeoffs?

Mohamed Boly, Jean-Louis Combes, Pascale Combes Motel, Maxime Menuet, Alexandru Minea, Patrick Villieu

► To cite this version:

Mohamed Boly, Jean-Louis Combes, Pascale Combes Motel, Maxime Menuet, Alexandru Minea, et al.. Public debt versus Environmental debt: What are the relevant Tradeoffs?. 2019. hal-02165453

HAL Id: hal-02165453

<https://hal.science/hal-02165453>

Preprint submitted on 25 Jun 2019

HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of scientific research documents, whether they are published or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in France or abroad, or from public or private research centers.

L'archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire **HAL**, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d'enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés.

Public debt versus Environmental debt: What are the relevant Tradeoffs? [☆]

Mohamed Boly^a, Jean-Louis Combes^a, Pascale Combes-Motel^a, Maxime Menuet^{a,1},
Alexandru Minea^{a,b}, Patrick Villieu^c

^a*Université Clermont Auvergne, CERDI, CNRS, IRD, F-63000 Clermont-Ferrand, France.*

^b*Department of Economics, Carleton University, Ottawa, Canada*

^c*Univ. Orléans, CNRS, LEO, UMR 7322, FA45067, Orléans, France*

Abstract

The article explores the relationship between public debt and environmental debt. The latter is defined as the difference between the "virgin state" which is the maximum stock of environmental quality that can be kept intact with natural regenerations and the current quality of the environment. A theoretical model of endogenous growth is built. We show that there is a unique well-determined balanced-growth path. The public debt and the environmental debt are substitute in the short-run but complementary in the long-run. Indeed, budget deficit provides additional resources to finance pollution abatement spending, but generate also unproductive expenditures (the debt burden). This hypothesis is tested on a sample of 22 countries for the period 1990-2011. The environmental debt is measured by the cumulative CO₂ emissions per capita. We use panel time-series estimators which allow for heterogeneity in the slope coefficients between countries. It appears mainly that, in the long term, an increase of 100% in public debt ratio leads to an increase of 74% in cumulative CO₂ per capita. In addition, this positive long-run relationship is still present at the country and the sub-sample level, despite some differences in the short-term dynamics.

Keywords: environmental debt, public debt, heterogenous panel data model

JEL codes: O44, Q52, Q58

1. Introduction

Sustainable development has long been considered being backed on three pillars. Recent history, however, shed light on two distinguishing features of unsustainable development. They stem from global environmental degradation and especially from climate change and rising sovereign indebtedness. On the one side, energy-related CO₂ emissions rose a historic high of 33.1 Gt CO₂ in 2018 ([International Energy Agency, 2019](#)). This raised once more the issue of the environmental i.e. climatic debt that will be borne by future generations ([Azar and Holmberg, 1995](#)) with a major shift in responsibilities from developed to developing countries ([Botzen et al., 2008](#)). On the other side, indebtedness has been soaring, especially in the aftermath of the 2007-2008 crisis. Fast increase

[☆]This is a preliminary draft. Please do not cite or distribute without permission of the authors.

¹Corresponding author: maxime.menuet@univ-orleans.fr

in public indebtedness is seen as “the most enduring legacies of the 2007-2009 financial crises” especially when it comes as a major impediment to economic growth ([Reinhart and Rogoff, 2010](#); [Eberhardt and Presbitero, 2015](#)). Several authors, therefore, urged for both reforms of the fiscal and financial systems, which are deemed to prompt the right incentives to green growth ([Aglietta and Hourcade, 2012](#)). This is all the more necessary in the face of increasing concerns on the ability of NDCs, even if fully implemented, to meet the climate targets agreed in the 2015 Paris Agreement. For instance, promoting renewable energy is the most common mitigation strategy while agriculture and transport are seldom considered as key sectors for mitigation though, along with energy and industry, they are the largest contributors to GHG emissions ([Pauw et al., 2018](#)).

This paper contributes to the sparse literature on the interaction between environmental and macroeconomic policies while scrutinizing the relationship between sovereign and environmental debt.² One could argue that higher public indebtedness is legitimate for financing investments in low-carbon technologies or environmental R&D activities which will mainly benefit to future generations. This assertion can, however, be challenged when the government has run deficits for many years. Hence, one can wonder about the consequences of public debt stabilization on environmental policies and outcomes. Under the assumption that public debt initiates additional pressure on the environment, debt for nature swaps can generate positive environmental outcomes. This possibility has been explored in the case of deforestation.³ It can also be argued that debt servicing crowds out private expenditures that can entail abatement expenditures. [Fodha and Seegmuller \(2014\)](#) show that public abatement partly financed by debt emission may even lead the economy to an environmental poverty trap under a stabilizing debt constraint.

This paper theoretically and empirically explores further the interdependencies between environmental and sovereign debt in a long term perspective. In [Section 3](#), relaxing the balanced-budget rule assumption, a simple endogenous growth model establishes a *complement effect* between public and environmental debt along the balanced growth path of the economy. Unproductive public expenditures, i.e. the debt burden, crowd out pollution abatement expenditures. Relying on cumulative per capita consumption-based CO₂ emissions as a proxy of environmental debt in [Section 4](#), our results show that in 22 countries increasing the debt-to-output ratio has a statistically and economically significant impact on the environmental debt in the long run.

² See for a brief review e.g. ([Combes et al., 2015](#)).

³ [Kahn and McDonald \(1995\)](#) provided econometric support for this hypothesis while [Cassimon et al. \(2011\)](#) cast some doubts on the possibility of scaling up debt for nature swaps.

2. The model

We consider a simple continuous-time endogenous-growth model with a representative individual, who consists of a household and a competitive firm, and a government. All agents are infinitely-lived and have perfect foresight.

2.1. Environmental debt

In the economy, environmental quality (Q_t) determines nature's capacity to grow and absorbs wastes from economic activity. Following [Tahvonen and Kuuluvainen \(1991\)](#) and [Bovenberg and Smulders \(1995\)](#), the evolution of environmental quality, or equivalently the evolution of the stock of environmental goods is modeled as a renewable resource

$$\dot{Q}_t = E(Q_t) - P_t, \quad (1)$$

where a dot over a variable represents a time derivative.

In Eq. (1), P_t represents reduction in environmental quality, or natural resources, from the net flow of emissions (say pollution), and $E(\cdot)$ is an environmental regeneration function and reflects the capacity of the environment to absorb pollution. We consider several standard assumptions.

Assumptions.

- (i) $E(Q_t) \in C^1(\mathbb{R}_+)$
- (ii) $E'(Q_t) < 0$ (*the law of entropy*)
- (iii) there is a critical level $\bar{Q} > 0$, such that $E(\bar{Q}) = 0$ (*virgin state*)

Assumption (i) states that the regeneration process is a smooth function. Assumption (ii) means that the higher the stock of natural resources, the higher the difficulties to maintain or increase this stock through natural regeneration processes (which is an implication of the entropy law from physics, see [Smulders, 1995](#)). Assumption (iii) states that, without pollution ($P_t = 0$), environmental quality reaches its highest possible (finite) level – the “*virgin state*” \bar{Q} – which is the maximal stock of natural resources that can be kept intact by natural regeneration. However, this virgin-state cannot be sustained, because economic activity incurs polluting emissions; namely the production process uses inputs (Z_t) that pollute the environment, such as, e.g., pesticides in agriculture, fossil fuels resulting in emissions of carbon. Such adverse effect of production can be (at least partially) neutralized by abatement spending. As usual, we assume that this abatement activity is provided by the public sector through government's expenditure (G_t). Consequently, the net flow of emission is

$$P_t = \left(\frac{Z_t}{G_t} \right)^\mu, \quad (2)$$

where $\mu > 0$ measure the elasticity of emissions to the polluting input.⁴

We define the gap between the virgin-state stock and the current environmental quality as the environmental debt (D_t), namely

$$D_t = \bar{Q} - Q_t. \quad (3)$$

In the long-run, would the economy reach the virgin state ($Q^* = \bar{Q}$, where a star denotes steady-state values), the environmental debt would be zero ($D^* = 0$). Owing to economic activity, however, environmental quality is perpetually damaged, such that $Q_t < \bar{Q}$, even in the long-run. We can then define the gap $\bar{Q} - Q_t$ as the obligations of the ecosystem towards nature.

2.2. Households

The representative household starts at the initial period with a positive stock of capital (K_0), and chooses the path of consumption $\{C_t\}_{t \geq 0}$, and capital $\{K_t\}_{t > 0}$, so as to maximize the present discount value of its lifetime utility

$$U = \int_0^{\infty} e^{-\rho t} u(C_t, Q_t) dt, \quad (4)$$

where $\rho \in (0, 1)$ the subjective discount rate. The instantaneous utility is assumed to be separable

$$u(C_t, Q_t) = \log(C_t) + \eta \log(Q_t),$$

where $\eta > 0$ captures environmental preferences.

The household enters period t with initial (predetermined) stocks of private capital (K_t) and government bonds (B_t), whose returns are respectively q_t (the rental rate of capital) and r_t (the real interest rate). He perceives wages ($w_t L$), pays taxes (where $\tau_w \in (0, 1)$ is the proportional wage income tax rate), and decides how much to consume (C_t) and save during the period. The only forms of asset accumulation are capital (\dot{K}_t , we omit capital depreciation, without loss of generality) and government bonds (\dot{B}_t); hence the following budget constraint

$$\dot{K}_t + \dot{B}_t = r_t B_t + q_t K_t + (1 - \tau_w) w_t L - C_t. \quad (5)$$

The first-order conditions give rise to the familiar Euler equation (with $q_t = r_t$ in competitive equilibrium)

$$\frac{\dot{C}_t}{C_t} = r_t - \rho, \quad (6)$$

⁴ Z_t is the flow of effective pollution, which depends both on emissions and on the abatement spending: $Z_t = P_t^{1/\mu} G_t$. Thus, the same Z_t can be achieved with less emissions if the economy has access to more abatement. The exponent μ denotes a pollution-conversion parameter: a lower μ makes pollution more effective, or equivalently, makes abatement relatively less effective.

and the optimal path must verify the set of transversality conditions

$$\lim_{t \rightarrow +\infty} \{\exp(-\rho t) K_t/C_t\} = 0 \text{ and } \lim_{t \rightarrow +\infty} \{\exp(-\rho t) B_t/C_t\} = 0,$$

which ensure that lifetime utility U is bounded.

2.3. Firms

Output of the representative firm (Y_t) is produced using three inputs: a man-made private capital (K_t), labor (L_t), and a polluting input (Z_t), according to the following Cobb-Douglas production function

$$Y_t = \tilde{A} K_t^\alpha Z_t^\beta (\bar{K}_t L_t)^{1-\alpha-\beta}, \quad (7)$$

where $\alpha \in (0, 1)$ and $\beta \in (0, 1)$ are the elasticity of output to the private capital and polluting input, respectively. $\tilde{A} > 0$ is a scale parameter, and \bar{K}_t is the economy-wide level of capital that generates positive technological spillovers onto firms productivity (Romer, 1986).

The firm i chooses private factors (K_t , L_t and Z_t) to maximize its profit

$$\Pi_t = Y_t - r_t K_t - w_t L_t - \tau_p Z_t,$$

where τ_p is a constant environmental tax on the polluting input. The first-order conditions give rise to

$$r_t = \alpha \frac{Y_t}{K_t}, \quad (8)$$

$$w_t = (1 - \alpha - \beta) \frac{Y_t}{L_t}. \quad (9)$$

$$\tau_p = \beta \frac{Y_t}{Z_t}. \quad (10)$$

with, at equilibrium, $L_t = L$. We henceforth normalize $L = 1$. The production function (7) depicts a constant return-to-scale technology relative to private factors (rival inputs); hence constant output-shares of each factor.

2.4. The government

The government provides abatement public expenditures G_t , receives taxes on labor income (τ_w) and on the polluting input (τ_p), and borrows from households. Fiscal deficit is financed by issuing debt (\dot{B}_t); hence, the following budget constraint

$$\dot{B}_t = r_t B_t + G_t - \tau_p Z_t - \tau_w w_t. \quad (11)$$

To study the relationship between environmental debt and public debt we need to escape from the balanced-budget rule hypothesis, even in the long-run. To this end, we

introduce the possibility that public deficits are permanently financed by public debt accumulation.⁵ At this stage the model is not closed, because there is one free variable in the government budget constraint (11). To close the model, the government must fix either the public abatement spending or the public debt path. In our endogenous growth setup, public spending is an endogenous variable, so we consider that the public debt path follows a simple rule that links the debt-to-output ratio ($b_t := B_t/Y_t$) to a long-run target (θ), namely⁶

$$\dot{b}_t = \eta(\theta - b_t), \quad (12)$$

where $\eta > 0$ is the speed of adjustment of the debt ratio to its long-run value. This rule serves our purpose for two reasons. First, it reflects stylized facts: many fiscal rule implemented since the 1980s require an exogenous target of debt-to-output ratio (see IMF, 2017).⁷ Second, it allows assessing the effects of the target θ on the time profile of environmental debt.

3. Equilibrium

At symmetric equilibrium, we have $\bar{K}_t = K_t$, and using (7),

$$Y_t = AK_t,$$

where $A := [\tilde{A}(\tau_p\beta)^\beta]^{1/(1-\beta)}$. Thanks to constant-returns at the social level, endogenous growth can emerge, despite decreasing returns of private capital from the individual firm's perspective. Therefore, using (8), the real interest rate becomes

$$r_t = \alpha A. \quad (13)$$

To obtain long-run stationary ratios, we deflate variable by output and we use lower-case characters to depict ratios, namely: $c_t := C_t/Y_t$, $g_t := G_t/Y_t$.

The path of the capital stock is given by the goods market equilibrium

$$\frac{\dot{K}_t}{K_t} = A(1 - g_t - c_t). \quad (14)$$

The government's budget constraint (11) leads to

$$g_t = \eta(\theta - b_t) + \frac{\dot{K}_t}{K_t}b_t + \beta + \tau_w(1 - \alpha - \beta) - \alpha Ab_t. \quad (15)$$

⁵Effectively, many papers show that endogenous growth setups are compatible with the existence of a growing public debt in the long-run (Minea and Villieu, 2012; Boucekine et al., 2015; Menuet et al., 2018). The only requirement for the transversality condition to be verified is that the rate of growth of public debt must be less than the real interest rate at equilibrium.

⁶Another way is to assume a deficit rule, as discussed in Menuet et al. (2018).

⁷Such as, e.g., $\theta = 60\%$ in the Maastricht treatise.

hence,

$$g_t = \frac{1}{1 + Ab_t} [\lambda + \eta(\theta - b_t) + Ab_t(1 - c_t - \alpha)], \quad (16)$$

where $\lambda := \beta + \tau_w(1 - \alpha - \beta)$.

From (10), it follows that $Z_t/Y_t = \tau_p/\beta$. Using (1), (2) and (3), the law of motion of the environmental debt then writes

$$\dot{D}_t = \left(\frac{\tau_p}{\beta g_t} \right)^\mu - E(Q_t). \quad (17)$$

From (6), (13), (14), and (17), the reduced-form of the model is

$$\begin{cases} \dot{b}_t = \eta(\theta - b_t), \\ \frac{\dot{c}_t}{c_t} = \frac{\dot{C}_t}{C_t} - \frac{\dot{K}_t}{K_t} = \alpha A - \rho - \frac{A}{1 + Ab_t} (1 - c_t - \lambda - \eta(\theta - b_t) + \alpha Ab_t), \\ \dot{D}_t = \left(\frac{\tau_p}{\beta g_t} \right)^\mu - E(\bar{Q} - D_t). \end{cases} \quad (18)$$

3.1. Steady state

We define a balanced-growth path (BGP) as a path on which consumption, capital, output, and public debt grow at the same (endogenous) rate, namely (we henceforth omit time indexes)

$$\gamma^* := \dot{C}/C = \dot{K}/K = \dot{Y}/Y = \dot{B}/B,$$

and environmental debt is constant ($\dot{D} = 0$). The following proposition computes the steady-state by setting $\dot{c} = \dot{b} = \dot{D} = 0$ in system (18).

Proposition 1. (*Existence and Uniqueness*) *If $\rho < \min(\alpha A, \lambda/\theta)$, there is a unique BGP with positive economic growth, environmental debt, and consumption and public spending ratios.*

Proof: Using (6) and (13), the long-run economic growth rate is $\gamma^* = \alpha A - \rho$, which is positive under the mild condition $A > \rho/\alpha$ (that is verified for small discount rate). From (15.b), the public debt ratio reaches its long-run target, i.e. $b^* = \theta$. Using (15.a), $\dot{c} = 0$ leads to $1 - c^* = \frac{(\alpha A - \rho)(1 + \theta A)}{A} - \alpha A \theta + \lambda$, hence,

$$c^* = (1 - \tau_w)(1 + \beta - \alpha) + \rho(1 + \theta A)/A > 0. \quad (19)$$

From (16), we derive

$$g^* = \lambda - \rho\theta, \quad (20)$$

which is positive as ρ is small. Finally, using (15.c), at the steady state, the environmental debt ratio D^* is

$$D^* = \bar{Q} - E^{-1} \left(\left(\frac{\tau_p}{\beta g^*} \right)^\mu \right) > 0. \quad (21)$$

□

To complete the characterization of the equilibrium, we must ensure that the unique BGP is well determined, i.e. saddle-path stable, as state the following proposition.

Proposition 2. *(Stability) The unique BGP is saddle-path stable (well-determined).*

Proof: By linearization, in the neighborhood of steady state, the system (18) behaves according to $(\dot{b}_t, \dot{c}_t, \dot{D}_t) = \mathbf{J}(b_t - b^*, c_t - c^*, D_t - D^*)$, where \mathbf{J} is the Jacobian matrix. As the reduced-form includes one jump variable (the consumption ratio c_0) and two pre-determined variables (the environmental debt D_0 and the public-debt ratio $b_0 = B_0/AK_0$, since initial levels of public debt and capital are predetermined), for the BGP to be well determined, \mathbf{J} must contain two negative and one positive eigenvalues. Using (18), we compute

$$\mathbf{J} = \begin{pmatrix} -\eta & 0 & 0 \\ CB & CC & 0 \\ DB & DC & E'(\cdot) \end{pmatrix}$$

where $CC = c^*A/(1 + \theta A) > 0$. As \mathbf{J} is a triangular matrix, the eigenvalues are: $\lambda_1 = -\eta < 0$, $\lambda_2 = CC > 0$ and $\lambda_3 = E'(\cdot) < 0$. □

Proposition 2 states that the model is locally well determined. From any pre-determined values b_0 and D_0 , the initial consumption ratio (c_0) jumps to put the economy on the unique saddle path that converges towards the BGP. The following subsection addresses the relationship between the public debt ratio and the environmental debt in the short-run and the long-run.

3.2. Environmental Debt vs Public Debt

Based on the preceding dynamics analysis, the following proposition establishes the main result of the theoretical section by assessing the effect of changes in the public-debt target (θ) on public debt (b_t) and environmental debt (D_t).

Proposition 3. *Following a change in the debt target (θ), public debt and environmental debt are (i) complement in the long-run, and (ii) substitute in the short-run, provided that $b_0 < \underline{b}_0 := \eta/A\rho$.*

Proof: From (20), in the long-run ($b^* = \theta$), we observe that $\partial g^*/\partial \theta < 0$. At the initial time, the consumption ratio immediately jumps to its steady-state value ($c_0 = c^*$). Hence, using (16) and (19), for a given $b_0 > 0$, we derive that $\partial g_0/\partial \theta > 0 \Leftrightarrow b_0 < \underline{b}_0$.

Consequently, from (21), we have $\partial D^*/\partial\theta > 0$, since $\text{sgn}(\partial D^*/\partial\theta) = -\text{sgn}(\partial g^*/\partial\theta)$. At the initial time, using (18), it follows that $\partial \dot{D}_0/\partial\theta = -\mu(D_0/g_0)\partial g_0/\partial\theta < 0$. As D_0 is predetermined, there is $\bar{t} > 0$, such that $D_t < D_0, \forall t \in (0, \bar{t})$. \square

Proposition 4 reveals that the time profile of environmental debt basically depends on the behavior of government abatement spending. An increase in the debt target generates new deficit that produces two opposite effects: there are (i) a permanent flow of new resources for abatement activity (\dot{B}_t), and (ii) a permanent flow of new unproductive expenditures (the debt burden $r_t B_t$). In the long-run, the transversality condition ($r^* > \gamma^* = \dot{B}/B^* \Leftrightarrow r^* B^* > \dot{B}$) means that the latter dominates the former, hence public debt has an adverse effect on abatement expenditure in steady-state. In the short-run, in contrast, the first effect outweighs the second, and the new deficit provides additional resources for abatement (net from the debt burden). Provided that $b_0 < \underline{b}_0$, these resources serve to increase environmental quality, reducing the ecological debt.

Figure 1 illustrates the behavior of environmental debt (the upper graph) and the public debt ratio (the lower graph) for a baseline calibration⁸, following an increase in the debt target from $\theta = 50\%$ to $\theta = 100\%$. We observe that the two variables are substitute until $\bar{t} = 40$, and complement from \bar{t} onward.




Figure 1: Dynamic adjustment of environmental debt and public debt following an increase in θ

⁸Parameter values are:

4. Empirical Methods

4.1. Data

Environmental Debt. We rely on cumulative carbon emissions to measure environmental debt. We calculate cumulative historical carbon emissions, using annual data from the Global Carbon Project. We use consumption-based emissions which have the advantage of incorporating emissions from international transportation as well as carbon leakages. The data are available from 1990 and are measured in million tonnes of carbon (MtC)⁹. We convert annual carbon emissions in tonnes of CO₂ before reporting them to population. Thus, the environmental debt for country i at year t is given by

$$D_{it} = \sum_{j=1990}^t (CO_{2i})_j$$

Where CO₂ stands for per capita CO₂ emissions. We take the natural logarithm of D_{it} for the econometric analysis.

Public Debt. Data on Gross public debt come from the IMF Historical Public finance dataset which is used in [Mauro et al. \(2015\)](#) and which goes back far into the past. Public debt is measured in percent of GDP. The data on debt-to-output ratio go up to the year 2011 for each country, therefore limiting our maximum time period length to 22, when combined to emissions data which start from 1990. Moreover, there were some gaps for both variables in some countries; since our sample consists in high income and upper-middle income countries¹⁰ and because of data limitations, we end up with a balanced panel of 22 countries over the period 1990-2011. Summary statistics of our variables, as well as the list of countries, are reported in appendix B.

4.2. Methodology

In line with [Pesaran et al. \(1999\)](#), let's assume an autoregressive distributed Lag model (ARDL), with p lags for Environmental debt and q lags for our RHS variable, namely public debt

$$\text{Log}D_{it} = \sum_{j=1}^p \alpha_{ij} \text{Log}D_{i,t-j} + \sum_{j=0}^q \delta'_{ij} \theta_{i,t-j} + \mu_i + \epsilon_{it}, \quad (22)$$

with $i = \overline{1, N}$ countries, $t = \overline{1, T}$ periods, D environmental debt, θ the debt-to-output ratio, μ_i country-specific effects, and ϵ_{it} the error term. If we assume that the variables

⁹1MtC= 3.664 million tonnes of CO₂

¹⁰Income groups defined according to the World Bank definition. We also consider CO₂ emissions as an issue of less importance in developing countries, which motivates our choice to work on countries of the upper-middle and high income groups.

are I(1) and cointegrated, equation 12 can be reparameterized into the following error correction model (Pesaran et al., 1999)

$$\Delta \text{Log}D_{it} = \Phi_i(\text{Log}D_{i,t-1} - \beta'_i \theta_{it}) + \sum_{j=1}^{p-1} \alpha_{ij}^* \Delta \text{Log}D_{i,t-j} + \sum_{j=0}^{q-1} \delta_{ij}^{*'} \Delta \theta_{i,t-j} + \mu_i + \epsilon_{it}, \quad (23)$$

where

$$\Phi_i = -(1 - \sum_{j=1}^p \alpha_{ij}), \quad \beta_i = \sum_{j=0}^q \delta_{ij} / (1 - \sum_k \alpha_{ik}), \quad \alpha_{ij}^* = - \sum_{m=j+1}^p \alpha_{im}, \quad \text{and} \quad \delta_{ij}^{*'} = - \sum_{m=j+1}^q \delta_{im}.$$

The second part in differences of Eq. (23) illustrates the short-run adjustment to the long-run equilibrium, while the first part- in levels- captures the long-run relationship. The speed of adjustment is given by the error-correcting term ϕ_i , which should be negative and significant to validate the presence of a long-run relationship.

There are three main approaches in the literature to estimate Eq. (23): (i) the dynamic fixed effects estimator (DFE) that allows only different intercepts across units but which turns out to be inconsistent if the common slope assumption fails to hold; (ii) the pooled mean group estimator (PMG) which assumes common long-run coefficients across units while allowing short-run coefficients to differ across units, and (iii) the mean group estimator (MG) which allows slope coefficients, intercepts and errors variances to be different across groups (Pesaran and Smith, 1995).

We start using the DFE estimator in a first stage, since we are interested in capturing long-run dynamics, and further use the PMG estimator to also assess the short-run dynamic while still controlling for the long-run relationship between our variables. Following AIC, we use an ARDL(1,1) meaning that we set $p = 1$ and $q = 1$ in Eq. 12.

4.3. Results

4.3.1. Stationarity and cointegration

To assess the stationarity of our variables, we rely on the Fisher-ADF and IPS unit root tests. The results are reported in Table 1. In the auto-regressive specification of each test we include both the trend and the intercept and we remove cross-sectional means to mitigate the effects of cross-sectional correlation. As we see in table 1, irrespective of the test, we cannot reject the null hypothesis of the presence of a unit root for our variables. Moreover, we also see that there are stationary in first-difference, meaning that there are I(1). Since they are integrated of the same order, we therefore look for potential cointegration relations among them.

For this purpose, we draw upon Westerlund (2007)'s tests. In these tests, the null hypothesis of no cointegration is assumed against four different specifications of the alternative hypothesis: the group mean test and its asymptotic version, that both consider the

Table 1: Unit root tests

Variables	ADF		IPS	
	Statistic	p-value	Statistic	p-value
Log(Environmental Debt)	Z: 1.65 Pm: -0.05	0.95 0.52	W-T-bar: 1.38	0.92
Δ (Log Environmental Debt)	Z: -7.60 Pm: 13.68	0.00 0.00	W-T-bar: -6.63	0.00
Gross Public Debt	Z: 2.31 Pm: -1.04	0.99 0.85	W-T-bar: 2.68	0.99
Δ (Gross Public Debt)	Z: -2.21 Pm: 2.79	0.01 0.00	W-T-bar: -5.26	0.00

Note: Pm represents the modified inverse chi-squared and Z is the inverse normal statistic. The null hypothesis is "all panels contain unit roots". We use 1 lag following AIC. We include both trend and intercept.

alternative assumption that there is cointegration for the panel as a whole, and the panel mean test with its asymptotic version, which consider that the variables are cointegrated for at least one cross-section unit in the alternative assumption. We carry out these tests using bootstrap with 400 replications, in order to preserve size accuracy as well as consistency in the case of cross-sectional dependence. The results of testing a potential cointegration between environmental debt and public debt are provided by table 2. The low p-values support the presence of cointegration between our variables in level.

Table 2: Westerlund (2007) cointegration tests

Statistic	Value	Z-value	P-value
Gt	-6.223	-18.384	0.000
Ga	-47.487	-20.205	0.000
Pt	-10.324	-2.450	0.007
Pa	-31.742	-14.408	0.000

Note: Gt and Pt correspond respectively to the group mean test and the panel mean test. Ga and Pa are their respective asymptotic versions. The null assumption is "no cointegration". 3 lags determined by AIC.

Since they are I(1) and co-integrated, in the following we draw upon an error correction model to assess the effect of public debt on environmental debt.

4.3.2. Public Debt and Environmental Debt: Full sample

Table 3 reports the results of the error correction model; the first column presents the results of the dynamic fixed effects (DFE) estimator. The error correction term is negative and significant, thus justifying our modelling choice.

As we previously mentioned, the DFE estimator rests on an assumption of both

common long-run and short-run dynamics for all countries. The assumption of a common short-run dynamic seems unrealistic, insofar as the increase of public debt in the short-run, resulting from higher expenditure, does not necessarily lead to the same level of abatement expenditure among countries with different environmental policies. However, for the long-run, it is possible to assume a common path since an increase in public debt leads to lower spending, including abatement expenditure, which in turn results in higher environmental debt.

Table 3: Environmental Debt response

Dependent Variable	Log (Environmental Debt)	
	DFE	PMG
Error correction term	-0.180*** (0.0033)	-0.193*** (0.0061)
<i>Long run coefficients</i>		
Gross public debt	0.0028** (0.0011)	0.0074*** (0.0004)
<i>Short run coefficients</i>		
Δ (Gross public debt)	-0.0009*** (0.0003)	-0.0017** (0.0007)
Constant	0.844*** (0.0112)	0.840*** (0.0341)
Observations	462	462
Countries	22	22
Log likelihood		724
Hausman Test p-value		0.5246

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

We therefore decide to allow for different short-run dynamics while still assuming a common long-term path: to do so we rely on the Pooled Mean Group (PMG) estimator, which results are presented in column 2 of table 3. We test its common long-term coefficient assumption against the alternative hypothesis of different coefficients, using the Hausman Chi-2 test which p-value is reported in the bottom of table 3. Since we are not rejecting the null hypothesis of a common long-run path for countries in our sample (p-value=0.5246), we keep the specification using the PMG as our baseline for the following.

The error correction term is also negative and significant, and the results in column 2 are consistent with our theoretical predictions: more public debt results in higher environmental debt in the long run. To illustrate, an increase of 100 units in the debt-to-output ratio leads to an increase of 74% in cumulative per capita CO₂ in the long-run. More public debt leads to higher environmental debt in the long run, since it implies lower abatement expenditure in the long run. But in the short run, since higher public debt

is linked to higher expenditure, we have a negative effect on cumulative CO₂ because of higher abatement expenditure. We see that a 100 units increase in public debt leads to a reduction of 17% in cumulative emissions.

4.3.3. Public Debt and Environmental Debt: country evidence

Beyond full sample estimates, it could also be interesting to look at country estimates of the short-run impact of public debt, given that it might differ across countries. Thus, using PMG estimates from table 3, we report short-run impacts for each country in table 4 and table 5. Regarding sign differences, most of our short-run coefficients are negative even though many of them are non-significant. We even have a positive effect in United States, suggesting a positive short-run relationship between public debt and environmental debt in this country.

Table 4: Heterogeneity in short-run coefficients

	Short run coefficients by country											Long run
	Argentina	Austria	Brazil	China	Colombia	Finland	France	Germany	Greece	Italy	Japan	
Public Debt												0.0074*** 0.0004
Error correction term	-0.1979*** 0.0206	-0.1775*** 0.0155	-0.1943*** 0.0138	-0.1563*** 0.0168	-0.2126*** 0.0126	-0.1655*** 0.0218	-0.2099*** 0.0165	-0.1968*** 0.0151	-0.1997*** 0.0155	-0.1724*** 0.0174	-0.3042*** 0.0130	
Δ(Public Debt)	-0.0013** 0.0005	-0.0028 0.0052	-0.0019 0.0016	-0.0011 0.0033	-0.0054** 0.0025	0.0026 0.0029	-0.0022 0.0039	-0.0052 0.0033	-0.0004 0.0015	0.0019 0.0033	-0.0016* 0.0008	
Constant	0.7202*** 0.0614	0.8764*** 0.0652	0.5910*** 0.0325	0.6184*** 0.0504	0.6652*** 0.0319	0.8909*** 0.1020	0.9568*** 0.0653	1.0016*** 0.0657	0.8682*** 0.0569	0.7688*** 0.0663	1.2242*** 0.0333	
Observations												462
Countries												22
Log likelihood												724

Table 5: Heterogeneity in short-run coefficients (continued)

	Short run coefficients by country											Long run
	Korea, Rep.	Norway	Portugal	Romania	Spain	Switzerland	Thailand	Turkey	Un. Kingdom	United States	Uruguay	
Public Debt												0.0074*** 0.0004
Error correction term	-0.1804*** 0.0132	-0.2048*** 0.0137	-0.1892*** 0.0140	-0.1781*** 0.0186	-0.1738*** 0.0168	-0.2006*** 0.0170	-0.1887*** 0.0142	-0.1898*** 0.0198	-0.1913*** 0.0153	-0.1841*** 0.0126	-0.1756*** 0.0148	
Δ(Public Debt)	-0.0074 0.0064	-0.0033 0.0021	0.0026 0.0024	0.0006 0.0030	-0.0012 0.0025	-0.0080** 0.0033	-0.0031** 0.0015	-0.0023 0.0017	0.0005 0.0025	0.0040* 0.0021	-0.0020** 0.0009	
Constant	0.9263*** 0.0543	0.9741*** 0.0562	0.8182*** 0.0485	0.7986*** 0.0711	0.7988*** 0.0646	1.0063*** 0.0738	0.7004*** 0.0412	0.7358*** 0.0635	0.9528*** 0.0648	0.9890*** 0.0589	0.5943*** 0.0383	
Observations												462
Countries												22
Log likelihood												724

We also find differences in terms of magnitude across short-run impacts: for instance, the short-run negative effect for Switzerland is four times more important than the Uruguay's. These findings shed light on possible short-run heterogeneities across our sample: for some countries, the results are in line with the theoretical predictions of substitution in the short run and complementarity in the long-run between the two debts. However, for some countries, we find no significant impact for the short-run relationship. Even more, for a country like United States, we find a positive relation suggesting that more public debt does not necessary lead to higher abatement expenditure in the short run.

Thus, even if we expect countries in our sample to converge toward a common steady state in the long run, one could assume that the short-run dynamic of their environmental

debt can differ. Such findings invite us to explore more closely particularities at play in our sample.

4.3.4. Public Debt and Environmental Debt: conditionality upon structural characteristics

Short-run differences we emphasized in the previous section could be linked to countries' economic and structural differences. Thus, in the following we analyze the sensitivity of our short-run coefficients to such differences. We consider four structural characteristics; first we capture differences in terms of environmental preferences through income (Grossman and Krueger, 1995) by considering alternatively upper-middle income and high income countries. Second, we also consider the fiscal stance and so the leeway in terms of public debt, using the average debt to GDP ratio over the period. We take a 60% threshold (as suggested by the Maastricht Treaty) to split countries.

Third, we take the openness degree into account through average trade in percentage of GDP; we therefore split our countries into groups with relatively low and high openness, based on the sample median. Finally, we also look at the average environmental debt over the period ¹¹ and we use its sample median to divide the sample into countries with low and high environmental debt. Tables in appendix B present descriptive statistics and the countries for each group.

Table 6: Environmental Debt response (conditionality upon structural characteristics)

Dependent Variable	Log(Environmental Debt)								
	Full Sample	Income group		Public Debt		Openness		Env. Debt	
		Upper-Middle	High	Low	High	Low	High	Low	High
Error correction term	-0.193*** (0.0061)	-0.189*** (0.0079)	-0.195*** (0.0079)	-0.186*** (0.0043)	-0.203*** (0.0150)	-0.198*** (0.0108)	-0.188*** (0.004)	-0.180*** (0.0057)	-0.197*** (0.0094)
Long run coefficients									
Gross public debt	0.0074*** (0.0004)	0.0084*** (0.0022)	0.0073*** (0.0004)	0.0069*** (0.0017)	0.0074*** (0.0004)	0.0073*** (0.0004)	0.0081*** (0.0025)	0.0039*** (0.0014)	0.0076*** (0.0004)
Short run coefficients									
Δ (Gross public debt)	-0.0017** (0.0007)	-0.0023*** (0.0008)	-0.0015* (0.0009)	-0.0024*** (0.0008)	-0.0004 (0.0011)	-0.0011* (0.0007)	-0.0024** (0.0012)	-0.0018*** (0.0006)	-0.0015 (0.001)
Constant	0.840*** (0.0341)	0.684*** (0.0314)	0.898*** (0.0358)	0.802*** (0.0404)	0.908*** (0.0569)	0.794*** (0.0545)	0.892*** (0.0312)	0.685*** (0.0269)	0.932*** (0.0311)
Observations	462	126	336	294	168	252	210	168	294
Countries	22	6	16	14	8	12	10	8	14
Log likelihood	724.0	192.9	531.2	445.9	278.2	400.7	323.3	253.2	473.1

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table 6 presents the results obtained for the different country groups. As we can see, the positive long-run relationship between our variables remains robust among the different sub-samples. Concerning the magnitudes of the long-run coefficients, we find no significant differences between the sub-groups for income, public debt and openness.

¹¹It is worth to mention that since we are considering averages, some of the biggest contemporary polluters like China could appear in the group of countries with low environmental debt. This because their emissions started increasing strongly only over recent periods; moreover, environmental debt is calculated using consumption-based emissions rather than production-based emissions.

These coefficients are very similar to the long-run impact we found for whole sample. However, we find that the long-run effect for countries with an important environmental debt is about twice the one we obtain for countries with a low environmental debt. As in the baseline result, we also find negative and significant short-run coefficients for most of the sub-samples, except for countries with high levels of debt, both public and environmental.

4.3.5. Additional Robustness Checks

Table 7 provides additional robustness checks of our relation. In the first column, we control for the level of economic activity through GDP per capita¹², while in column 2 we alter our sample to remove the aftermath of the 2007-2008 crisis during which there was an important increase in public debt.

Table 7: Additional robustness checks

Dependent Variable	Log(Environmental Debt)		
	PMG		MG
Estimator			
Period	1990-2011	1990-2006	1990-2011
Error Correction term	-0.280*** (0.0205)	-0.304*** (0.0243)	-0.383*** (0.0142)
<i>Long-run coefficients</i>			
Gross public debt	0.0065*** (0.0003)	0.0071*** (0.0004)	0.0019** (0.0009)
Log GDP per capita	2.236*** (0.0530)	2.569*** (0.0615)	0.545** 0.231
<i>Short-run coefficients</i>			
Δ (Gross public debt)	-0.0021** (0.0009)	-0.0049*** (0.0017)	-0.0018** (0.0008)
Δ (Log GDP per capita)	-0.636*** (0.160)	-0.668*** (0.139)	-0.580*** (0.186)
Constant	-5.032*** (0.365)	-6.510*** (0.505)	-7.670*** 2.8401
Observations	462	352	462
Countries	22	22	22
Log likelihood	923.8	745.0	-
Ajd. R^2	-	-	0.81

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

To do so, we consider the period prior to 2007. Even though the Hausman test in table 3 suggests us to prefer the common long-run path assumption i.e to rely on PMG estimates, we however run a specification using Mean-group estimator in column 3. This,

¹²We checked again for the existence of cointegration before running estimates

to test whether its results are qualitatively different from PMG estimates. It also includes cross-sectional averages to account for potential cross-sectional dependence. The results we obtain are again similar and support the presence of a complement effect in the long-run and a substitution effect in the short-run.

5. Conclusion

Hartwick (1997) rightly argued that paying down the environmental debt is a similar process than paying down public debt: both tasks mobilize billions of dollars to be disbursed over decades to meet targets either agreed in multilateral environmental agreements or set by fiscal rules. This paper builds on this idea while theoretically and empirically showing that public debt and environmental debt are complements in the long run. Our econometric results, however, evidenced some differences in short run environmental debt dynamics. In the USA for instance, there is a positive link between environmental and public debts in the short run. Given the fact that the USA is a still major CO₂ emitter, the sharp increase in the US public debt results in higher CO₂ emissions in the short run. In the long run, however, our results support the idea that stricter climate policies can generate environmental benefits but can also correlate to better macroeconomic performance, as measured by debt stabilization.

Our results support the idea that, in the long run, there is no-trade-off between debt stabilization that is a major concern, especially since the 2007-2008 crisis, and environmental performance. Our findings can, however, have some theoretical and econometric limitations. First, we have only taken public debt and public abatement expenditures. Private debt is not accounted for despite the fact that several emerging countries already seem to exhibit high levels of private indebtedness. Second, we assumed no composition effect of public expenditures. One could argue that the complementarity between environmental and public debt is conditional on the relative importance of investment and abatement expenditures. Third, we focused on global pollution as measured by cumulative past CO₂ emissions because of data limitations. Other global environmental degradation measures should also be taken into account, as well as local pollution with huge health consequences.

References

- Aglietta, M., Hourcade, J.C., 2012. Can indebted Europe afford climate policy? can it bail out its debt without climate policy. *Intereconomics - Review of European Economic Policy* 3, 159–64.
- Azar, C., Holmberg, J., 1995. Defining the generational environmental debt. *Ecological Economics* 14, 7–19. doi:[10.1016/0921-8009\(95\)00007-V](https://doi.org/10.1016/0921-8009(95)00007-V).
- Botzen, W.J., Gowdy, J.M., Van Den Bergh, J.C., 2008. Cumulative CO₂ emissions: shifting international responsibilities for climate debt. *Climate Policy* 8, 569–576. doi:[10.3763/cpol.2008.0539](https://doi.org/10.3763/cpol.2008.0539).
- Boucekkine, R., Nishimura, K., Venditti, A., 2015. Introduction to financial frictions and debt constraints. *Journal of Mathematical Economics* 61, 271–275. doi:[10.1016/j.jmateco.2015.10.003](https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmateco.2015.10.003).
- Bovenberg, A.L., Smulders, S., 1995. Environmental quality and pollution-augmenting technological change in a two-sector endogenous growth model. *Journal of Public Economics* 57, 369–391. doi:[10.1016/0047-2727\(95\)80002-Q](https://doi.org/10.1016/0047-2727(95)80002-Q).
- Cassimon, D., Prowse, M., Essers, D., 2011. The pitfalls and potential of debt-for-nature swaps: A US-Indonesian case study. *Global Environmental Change* 21, 93–102. doi:[10.1016/J.GLOENVCHA.2010.10.001](https://doi.org/10.1016/J.GLOENVCHA.2010.10.001).
- Combes, J.L., Combes Motel, P., Minea, A., Villieu, P., 2015. Deforestation and seigniorage in developing countries: A tradeoff? *Ecological Economics* 116, 220–230. doi:[10.1016/J.ECOLECON.2015.03.029](https://doi.org/10.1016/J.ECOLECON.2015.03.029).
- Eberhardt, M., Presbitero, A.F., 2015. Public debt and growth: Heterogeneity and non-linearity. *Journal of International Economics* 97, 45–58. doi:[10.1016/j.jinteco.2015.04.005](https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jinteco.2015.04.005).
- Fodha, M., Seegmuller, T., 2014. Environmental Quality, Public Debt and Economic Development. *Environmental and Resource Economics* 57, 487–504. doi:[10.1007/s10640-013-9639-x](https://doi.org/10.1007/s10640-013-9639-x).
- Grossman, G., Krueger, A.B., 1995. Economic growth and the environment. *Quarterly Journal of Economics* 110, 353–375. doi:[10.2307/2118443](https://doi.org/10.2307/2118443).
- Hartwick, J.M., 1997. Paying down the Environmental Debt. *Land Economics* 73, 508. URL: <http://www.jstor.org/stable/3147242?origin=crossref>, doi:[10.2307/3147242](https://doi.org/10.2307/3147242).
- International Energy Agency, 2019. Global Energy & CO₂ Status Report 2018 - The Latest Trends in Energy and Emissions in 2018 URL: <https://webstore.iea.org/global-energy-co2-status-report-2018>.
- Kahn, J.R., McDonald, J.A., 1995. Third-world debt and tropical deforestation. *Ecological Economics* 12, 107–123. doi:[10.1016/0921-8009\(94\)00024-P](https://doi.org/10.1016/0921-8009(94)00024-P).
- Mauro, P., Romeu, R., Binder, A., Zaman, A., 2015. A modern history of fiscal prudence and profligacy. *Journal of Monetary Economics* 76, 55–70. doi:[10.1016/J.JMONECO.2015.07.003](https://doi.org/10.1016/J.JMONECO.2015.07.003).
- Menuet, M., Minea, A., Villieu, P., 2018. Deficit, Monetization, and Economic Growth: A Case for Multiplicity and Indeterminacy. *Economic Theory* 65, 819–853.
- Minea, A., Villieu, P., 2012. Persistent Deficit, Growth, and Indeterminacy. *Macroeconomic Dynamics* 16, 267–283.
- Pauw, W.P., Klein, R.J.T., Mbeva, K., Dzebo, A., Cassanmagnago, D., Rudloff, A., 2018. Beyond headline mitigation numbers: we need more transparent and comparable NDCs to achieve the Paris Agreement on climate change. *Climatic Change* 147, 23–29. doi:[10.1007/s10584-017-2122-x](https://doi.org/10.1007/s10584-017-2122-x).
- Pesaran, M., Smith, R., 1995. Estimating long-run relationships from dynamic heterogeneous panels. *Journal of Econometrics* 68, 79–113. doi:[10.1016/0304-4076\(94\)01644-F](https://doi.org/10.1016/0304-4076(94)01644-F).
- Pesaran, M.H., Shin, Y., Smith, R.P., 1999. Pooled Mean Group Estimation of Dynamic Heterogeneous Panels. *Journal of the American Statistical Association* 94, 621. doi:[10.2307/2670182](https://doi.org/10.2307/2670182).
- Reinhart, C.M., Rogoff, K.S., 2010. Growth in a Time of Debt. *& Proceedings* 100, 573–578. doi:[10.1257/aer.100.2.573](https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.100.2.573).
- Romer, P.M., 1986. Increasing returns and long-run growth. *Journal of political economy* 94, 1002–1037.
- Smulders, S., 1995. Entropy, environment, and endogenous economic growth. *International Tax and Public Finance* 2, 319–340.
- Tahvonen, O., Kuuluvainen, J., 1991. Optimal growth with renewable resources and pollution. *European Economic Review* 35, 650–661.
- Westerlund, J., 2007. Testing for error correction in panel data. *Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics* 69, 709–748. doi:[10.1111/j.1468-0084.2007.00477.x](https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0084.2007.00477.x).

Appendix A. Empirical analysis

Table B.1: Descriptive statistics

Variable	Observations	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
Cumulated CO ₂ (tonnes per capita)	484	91.5038	80.1105	1.5847	417.2603
Gross public debt (% GDP)	484	56.2993	35.1934	1.0267	229.61
Trade (% GDP)	484	54.067	24.3395	13.7531	140.437

Table B.2: Summary statistics of cumulated CO₂ in tonnes per capita (by category)

	Mean	Std. Dev
Full model	91.5038	80.1105
Upper-middle Income	32.9866	24.9241
High Income	113.4477	82.6358
Low Debt	74.8888	69.5637
High Debt	120.5799	88.8118
Low Openness	76.4705	79.2713
High Openness	109.5436	77.5130
Low Env. Debt	32.45173	23.5689
High Env. Debt	125.2478	81.4784

Table B.3: Summary statistics of public debt in % of GDP (by category)

	Mean	Std. Dev
Full model	56.2993	35.1934
Upper-middle Income	31.4658	19.4508
High Income	65.6118	35.2743
Low Debt	40.3523	19.8290
High Debt	84.2065	38.7023
Low Openness	66.1645	41.5005
High Openness	44.4611	20.1304
Low Env. Debt	37.9689	25.1961
High Env. Debt	66.7738	35.8338

Table B.4: Summary statistics of trade in % of GDP (by category)

	Mean	Std. Dev
Full model	54.067	24.3395
Upper-middle Income	52.923	30.4532
High Income	54.496	21.6426
Low Debt	58.2233	24.6436
High Debt	46.7934	22.0468
Low Openness	38.1846	12.9786
High Openness	73.1258	20.8637
Low Env. Debt	48.9801	28.0558
High Env. Debt	56.9738	21.4485

Table B.5: List of countries

Argentina	Greece	Switzerland
Austria	Italy	Thailand
Brazil	Japan	Turkey
China	Korea, Rep.	United Kingdom
Colombia	Norway	United States
Finland	Portugal	Uruguay
France	Romania	
Germany	Spain	

Table B.6: List of countries by characteristics

Income group	Public Debt		Openness		Env. Debt		
	High	Low	High	Low	High	Low	
Brazil	Argentina	Brazil	Argentina	Argentina	Austria	Argentina	Austria
China	Austria	China	Austria	Brazil	Finland	Brazil	Finland
Colombia	Finland	Colombia	Germany	China	Germany	China	France
Romania	France	Finland	Greece	Colombia	Korea, Rep.	Colombia	Germany
Thailand	Germany	France	Italy	France	Norway	Romania	Greece
Turkey	Greece	Korea, Rep.	Japan	Greece	Portugal	Thailand	Italy
	Italy	Norway	Portugal	Italy	Romania	Turkey	Japan
	Japan	Romania	United States	Japan	Switzerland	Uruguay	Korea, Rep.
	Korea, Rep.	Spain		Spain	Thailand		Norway
	Norway	Switzerland		Turkey	United Kingdom		Portugal
	Portugal	Thailand		United States			Spain
	Spain	Turkey		Uruguay			Switzerland
	Switzerland	United Kingdom					United Kingdom
	United Kingdom	Uruguay					United States
	United States						
	Uruguay						