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A Comprehensive Analysis of Quantum E-voting Protocols


Recent advances at Google, IBM, as well as a number of research groups indicate that quantum computers will soon be reality. Motivated by the ever more realistic threat quantum computers pose to existing classical cryptographic protocols, researchers have developed several schemes to resist "quantum attacks". In particular, for electronic voting, several e-voting schemes relying on properties of quantum mechanics have been proposed. However, each of these proposals comes with a different and often not well-articulated corruption model, has different objectives, and is accompanied by security claims which are never formalized and are at best justified only against specific attacks. In this paper, we systematize and evaluate the security of suggested e-voting protocols based on quantum technology. We examine the claims of these works concerning privacy, correctness and verifiability, and if they are correctly attributed to the proposed protocols. In all non-trivial cases, we identified specific quantum attacks that violate these properties. We argue that the cause of these failures lies in the absence of formal security models and in a more general lack of reference to the existing cryptographic literature.

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hal-02164606 , version 1 (25-06-2019)



Myrto Arapinis, Elham Kashefi, Nikolaos Lamprou, Anna Pappa. A Comprehensive Analysis of Quantum E-voting Protocols. 8th International Conference on Quantum Cryptography, Aug 2018, Shanghai, China. ⟨hal-02164606⟩
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