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Conference Papers Year : 2019

Simultaneous Elicitation of Committee and Voters' Preferences

Abstract

Social choice deals with the problem of determining a consensus choice from the preferences of different voters. In the classical setting, the voting rule is fixed beforehand and full information concerning he preferences of the voters is provided. Recently, the assumption of full preference information has been questioned by a number of researchers and several methods for eliciting preferences have been proposed. In this paper we go one step further and we assume that both the voting rule and the voters’ preferences are partially specified. In this setting, we present an interactive elicitation protocol based on minimax regret and develop several query strategies that interleave questions to the chair and questions to the voters in order to attempt to acquire the most relevant information in order to quickly converge to optimal or a near-optimal alternative.
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Dates and versions

hal-02160455 , version 1 (20-06-2019)

Identifiers

  • HAL Id : hal-02160455 , version 1

Cite

Beatrice Napolitano, Olivier Cailloux, Paolo Viappiani. Simultaneous Elicitation of Committee and Voters' Preferences. Rencontres des Jeunes Chercheurs en Intelligence Artificielle 2019, Jul 2019, Toulouse, France. pp.59-62. ⟨hal-02160455⟩
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