Indifference in the choice, in the twofold sense found in Letter to Mesland, 9 February 1645, is similar to akrasia or incontinence. The aim in this article is to provide an explanation of the Cartesian analysis of the choice against better judgement which has different faces: "irresolution," "extravagance," "resolution grounded on false opinion," the last two nowadays being called "megalomania." Just as Descartes emphasizes the representative function of idea and the resolution to follow the better judgement, his conception of incontinence is to be understood on the basis of lack of representation, rather than on deliberation, in the Fifth Responses to Gassendi. Nevertheless, indifference is not deemed "irrational" by Descartes. I give an interpretation of this Cartesian abstention and conclude with a discussion of Davidson's conception of paradoxes of irrationality. Dans Phistoire de la philosophie, Descartes est considere comme un intel-lectualiste, c'est-a-dire comme un theoricien qui considere que la raison est souveraine dans l'action. II soutient done qu'il suffit de bien juger pour bien faire 2 , et il reprend a son compte la these socratique selon laquelle nul ne commet le mal volontairement: Je ne crois point que, pour mal faire, il soit besoin de voir clairement que ce que nous faisons est mauvais [...]; car, si nous le voyions clairement, il nous serait impossible de pecher, pendant le temps que nous le verrions de cette sorte; e'est pourquoi on dit que omnis peccans est ignorans*. Dialogue XLII (2003), 725-48