The stickiness of norms - Archive ouverte HAL
Article Dans Une Revue International Review of Law and Economics Année : 2019

The stickiness of norms

Résumé

In this paper we study the role of social context, as characterized by different informal norm-enforcement mechanisms, on the deterrence legacy of temporary external regulations. In a public goods game, we create conditions in which a prosocial norm of cooperation is enforced via either anonymous peer punishment or face-saving concerns. In two test treatments, we introduce to these social environments an external regulation that is implemented for a limited period of time and then removed. We observe a significant negative post-intervention effect of this removal in the context of peer disapproval, but no such effect in the context of face-saving concerns. Our findings reveal the importance of the type of norm-enforcement mechanism in determining the robustness of norm adherence in the long term.
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hal-02110601 , version 1 (21-10-2021)

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Katherine Farrow, Rustam Romaniuc. The stickiness of norms. International Review of Law and Economics, 2019, 58, pp.54-62. ⟨10.1016/j.irle.2018.12.010⟩. ⟨hal-02110601⟩
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