



**HAL**  
open science

# The moral side of disaster: religion and post-quake recognition regimes in Java

Loïs Bastide

► **To cite this version:**

Loïs Bastide. The moral side of disaster: religion and post-quake recognition regimes in Java. Li Peilin; Roulleau-Berger, Laurence. Ecological Risks and Disasters - New Experiences in China and Europe, Routledge Taylor & Francis Group, 2016, China policy series. hal-02105850

**HAL Id: hal-02105850**

**<https://hal.science/hal-02105850>**

Submitted on 2 Jan 2021

**HAL** is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of scientific research documents, whether they are published or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in France or abroad, or from public or private research centers.

L'archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire **HAL**, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d'enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés.

Loïs Bastide

Postdoctoral Fellow

Department of Sociology, University of Geneva

### **The moral side of disaster: religion and post-quake recognition regimes in Java<sup>1</sup>**

(In: (2016). *Ecological risks and disasters – New experiences in China and Europe*, Li Peilin, Laurence Roulleau-Berger (eds), Oxon, Routledge)

#### **Introduction**

On May 27 2006, a magnitude 6.3 earthquake hit the centre of Java early in the morning. It left 6000 people dead, more than 30 000 injured, and about 1.5 million homeless. In a very densely populated area, where no proper anti-seismic design for buildings were implemented, it left the territory in rumbles. Thanks to a burgeoning stream of researches on disasters in the social sciences it is now a widely accepted premise indeed, that so called “natural disasters” are produced at the very intersection between social infrastructures and natural phenomena (Quarantelli 2005). In other words, vulnerabilities, which open the door to for disaster to occur, are produced by the conjunction between social organization and the natural environment. What we would like to do here is to delve precisely into the social organization of local communities in order to assess the part of cultural forms into the framing of the quake as a social fact : our hypothesis is that cultural patterns, in the region, brought people to develop a collective interpretation of the quake as a godly message. This shared meaning sustained the emergence of a moral economy of disaster which, in turn, affected local communities. Laying on a fieldwork conducted in 2013 in Karanglegi<sup>2</sup>, a hamlet sited in the region of Yogyakarta, the most heavily affected by the tremor, we will show how the cultural

---

<sup>1</sup> 1 This research is based on the Program PEPS 2012-2013 *Disasters and recreation of Society in China, Japan and Indonesia : traumatized identities, public arenas and moral economies* with the support of INSHS/CNRS, completed on the basis of cooperation of the CASS research members for which it is hereby appreciated.. Principal Investigator : Professor Laurence Roulleau-Berger, CNRS, Triangle, ENS Lyon in cooperation with Professor Luo Hongguang, CASS, Professor Liu Zhengai, CASS and Professor Zhao Yandong, CASS and Dr.Lu Yangxu CASS, Professor Toshio Sugiman, Kyoto University and Assistant Professor Motohiko Nagata, Kyoto University; Loïs Bastide, Postdoctoral Fellow, Department of Sociology, University of Geneva. Fieldwork was done in Indonesia in February 2013.

<sup>2</sup> The name of the hamlet has been modified.

negotiation of disaster and its meaning affected the social process during the reconstruction phase and until the present.

In the first section, we will introduce the site of investigation, and then we will analyse the emergence of a shared corpus of interpretations of the event in a second section. We will then rely on the concept of character, developed by Ervin Goffman, to show how a moral economy emerged out of disaster, which affected the social circulation of moral and symbolic goods among affected populations. In the last section, we will finally show how the post-disaster period, due to these social dynamics, provoked a revitalization of traditional values, yet in innovative ways.

### **Setting the scene**

Karanglegi, where fieldwork was conducted, is a hamlet located in Trimulyo, a municipality in Jetis District, Regency of Bantul, in the Special Region of Yogyakarta. As it is sited halfway between the city of Yogyakarta and the shores of the Indian Ocean, the municipality was hit very badly by the June 2006 earthquake, as it was at a mere distance of 10 kilometres from the epicentre, which was located a short distance southward, close to the sea. However, before we proceed to explore this event and its aftermaths, let us introduce the location in greater details: we will be better equipped to understand the social consequences of the earthquake if we have some knowledge of the ebbs and flows of everyday life in ordinary times.

Bantul regency is part of the very densely populated corridor running on a north-south axis between the Merapi volcano and the Indian Ocean through Yogyakarta in one of the most densely populated region of Java (after Jakarta's region), itself one of the most densely populated territory worldwide (Java). The municipality of Trimulyo has a population of approximately 17 000 inhabitants living throughout twelve hamlets. Among those, approximately 1 300 live in Karanglegi. The hamlet is further subdivided into eight *rukun tetangga* (RT) units, the smallest administrative cell in Indonesia.

Historically, as elsewhere in Java, village society was divided between “ordinary people” (*wong cilik*) and a communal lesser aristocracy more or less loosely related to the Sultan's Palace, in Yogyakarta. Economically, this symbolic hierarchy translated into unequal land tenure patterns such that strongmen were endowed with generous portions of agricultural land. It also translated

into political power, as most civil servants were recruited from among this petty nobility. However, this basic social structure is being altered by fast and far-reaching socio-economic changes.

Due to Yogyakarta's urban sprawl, Trimulyo, once a rural village, stands today on the outskirts of the city, just a few kilometres off its southern ring road, increasingly close from the urban center. This proximity means more employment opportunities, as commuting to the city is easy and allows for tapping into the urban labour market. As a consequence, if as recently as thirty years ago people largely relied on agriculture in order to fulfil their livelihood needs, currently, growing rice is very often supplemented by waged labour outside of the community.

In this respect, many ordinary men of the village work on construction sites, and many young women are employed in small and medium-size industries on Yogyakarta's southern industrial belt. Those endowed with social prestige, political power and wealth (in the form of land) were also able to take advantage of these evolutions: well-off families sent their children to universities, thus drifting away from the agrarian tradition; in a context of widespread clientelism, civil servant positions, usually highly rewarding both in terms of social prestige and economic wealth, were transmitted within families; others created small-scale enterprises, mainly in handicraft and wood processing.

However, even though its critical economic position has rapidly eroded, agriculture remains a deeply anchored socio-cultural device in terms of affective traction, economic activity, and social organization: social, economic and cultural interactions around agricultural practices still deeply shape "connectedness", "commonality" and "groupness" (Brubaker et Cooper 2000). Many household's economies thus rely both on agriculture, for personal consumption and as an economic buffer in case of unanticipated hardship (staples meant for family consumption can always be sold as an emergency expedient), and on waged labour (most often under the form of *contract labour*, for men at least); more wealthy families combine well paid jobs as self-entrepreneurs or civil servants with their economic status as land owners.

What is important to understand here is the intricacy between the symbolic order of social prestige and economic stratification patterns: basically, symbolic capital translates quite naturally into political power, which in turn opens access to all kind of social, economic and symbolic goods.

The quake hit the vicinity with a devastating violence, leaving twelve dead in Karanglegi, many wounded and approximately 90 % of all houses down to the ground or damaged beyond rehabilitation. Assistance started to arrive within forty-eight hours, with a local non-governmental organization (NGO) rapidly settling in the hamlet, soon followed by international NGOs such as IOM, different governmental institutions and foreign relief help under different guises.

Inhabitants also started to self-organize, mobilizing resources through family ties outside of the affected area which contributed labor and capital, hiring a workforce that came from the entire province, attracted by prospective employment related to reconstruction needs, and mobilizing local social structure and institutions to coordinate a collective endeavour to clear rubble and start building anew. In this respect, RT revealed the natural locus for self-organization, as people turned to the closest existing political and administrative unit, which is woven in dense social and affective (often kinship ties) networks to organize solidarity.

Because reconstruction focused on housing, the economy was badly affected: rice fields were left in a standstill; small village businesses were interrupted either due to physical collapse, to the involvement of shop holders in reconstruction or to the lack of customers; and workers quit their jobs in order to rebuild or rehabilitate their own houses.

Since the quake hit, a common question was arising within the village community: why this event?

### **Disaster as a divine sentence**

In Javanese popular beliefs, nothing occurs out of pure contingency; the world is a text which can be read and is susceptible to metaphysical interpretation: every event retains its own meaning and encapsulates a deeper significance related to mystical forces. When disaster struck, it was thus widely interpreted as “Nature’s” sentence, a godly message (*hukum Tuhan; hukum Allah*), which had already been the case after the 2004 earthquake and tsunami in Aceh (Wieringa 2010). After these disasters, many reports of holy manifestations surfaced. As reported in *Kedaulatan Rakyat*, a local paper, M. H. Hasan Basri, for instance, interpreted several cracks in his walls as spelling the Arabic sentence “Allah Allahu Akbar Kabira”, meaning Allah almighty, Allah the higher. Commenting on his finding in the article he explained that for him, this message was a godly call to the human community and, more specifically, to “those who acknowledge as Muslims”, in his

own terms, to return to a genuine monotheism. As for many people did, he saw the quake as a warning sent to redress a perceived dereliction in religious practices and dedication. In Gedungan Kepuh, a few kilometres away from Karanglegi, people were dumbfounded and found themselves collectively contemplating a small piece of poetry written by a local child about a coming quake, a few days before May 26. The child had died in the quake, and his intriguing writing was gaining popular momentum as a putative divinatory device.

This is not to say that controversies did not occur between scientific and esoteric or religious interpretations; of course they did, as local scientists and “rationlists” called for “reasonable” explanations, readily available in the corpus of earth science. However, in popular belief, the main question raised by the event, as it related to a superior will, seems to have been twofold: “why?” and “for what purpose?”. The issue was rendered particularly tricky by the fact that Aceh had been hit by a quake and tsunami two years earlier and with an incredible violence, although the territory is widely represented as the most pious part of the country, where the most rigorous Islam is practiced: why the heck would the Almighty strike *Mecca’s veranda in Indonesia*, as Aceh is often referred to? The issue of a superior intention behind the event was thus opened to a very broad array of interpretations: for instance, in Aceh, some inferred that Christian presence on a holly Muslim land was the real cause behind God’s furor and turned against local churches; others blamed a supposed decay of religious ethics and called for an *aggiornamento* of religious life in the Northern Sumatran provinces; others blamed the a decades-long civil war.

In Karanglegi as well, the quake was generally seen as a godly test. In this context, two different elements came to bear specific moral significance. First, one’s degree of ordeal and suffering was generally perceived as meaningful: if God had stricken unequally, this very inequality must have retained some significance, as it was seen to proceed from an overarching intentionality. Then, one’s courses of actions during and after the quake also seemed to suggest specific moral qualities (or lack thereof).

People in Karanglegi were diversely affected by the quake. A few families were badly affected. In two houses alone, seven people died, and many more were left injured. Those were not simple house units, however: as is frequent in Java, extended families tended to cluster on the same piece of land, due to the shrinkage in land tenure caused by demographic growth. What might have appeared to be a fairly large house from the outside was often the aggregate product of several

contiguous houses, the dwellings of nuclear families related by kinship ties. However, these two families were hit out of proportion. Most of the village businesses were also annihilated. Nevertheless, for others, the event was conceived as somehow beneficial. Because government compensations were distributed per house unit rather than per household, those endowed with large family houses received much less than those residing in smaller, scattered habitat. Similarly, the central government decided to grant newlywed couples the same compensation as those who had lost their house. Thus, couples who could not have afforded to acquire a house were able to build a home of their own. They gained a measure of freedom, whereas many had difficulties rebuilding their possessions. Compensations were small indeed, and had to be shared between affected households residing in the same building; thus big houses became fairly smaller. Those who benefitted conceive of this as a gift of god.

Thus, the quake produced both “winners” and “losers”. Nita, for instance, opened a small food stall: whereas longstanding food outlets were destroyed, she was able to gather a fair amount of capital by tapping into this “emergency market” selling chicken *satay*. This was enough to complement government compensations and build a two-storey house to replace her old home. Nurifa was recruited by a local NGO to cook for its volunteers. One thing lead to another and she became the NGO’s main intermediary in the village, thus gaining social status that she continues to enjoy. As her father puts it, it is to wonder, six years after the quake, all things considered, whether it was a painful blessing. However, what about those who were most viciously stricken? There is a sense among the community that they were not hard hit without good reason. Moreover, there is a common understanding that those most badly affected must have been hiding some dark sin, which only could explain God’s specific ferocity against them.

This kind of moral judgment as mentioned, was also believed to be caused by one’s behaviour in time of a crisis. Some local political and administrative personnel and cultural elites were thus reinforced in their position by showing courage and dedication. That was the case for Karanglegi’s hamlet chief (*pak dukuh*), who, although he felt deeply powerless in view of the extent of the devastation, was seen as strongly dedicated and attentive to his fellow villagers, even though he had lost most of his possessions. Others’ moral or political authority was undermined as the disaster situation revealed a lack of character. In Bunder Daryang, a municipality in the neighbouring district of Gunung Kidul, the mayor displayed such a lack of concern for his constituency and what

was perceived by the people as such an inappropriate selfishness that demonstrations commenced outside of the village council building. He had to engage in a ritualized reparation round to acknowledge his mistakes and to show regrets at his selfishness and lack of concern to restore public order.

Thus, the post-disaster emergency can be framed as a “fateful situation”, as Erving Goffman (2005) put it, to the extent that it put people to the test and clarified the character attributions between fellow villagers: in this game, what was at stake was the distribution of social prestige and moral goods. However, Goffman’s formulations, as insightful as they might be, need to be fitted in this specific context.

### **Disaster and character**

In the sociological literature on disaster, post-disaster crisis has often been conceptualized in the terms of Victor Turner’s “social drama” (i.e. Turner 1975; Turner 1964; Hilgartner 2007; Boscoboinik 2009), as a moment of high normative blurring and conflicts, related to the post-disaster crisis, before the social order is restored, whether in similar forms or under new configurations. As a first approach, framing the issue of post-disaster moral-economies in Erving Goffman’s terms helps distinguish patterns behind the apparent disorder of a critical situation: the post-disaster period indeed is a moment of trial and error, experimentation, the negotiation of meanings, social norms and values, and is a lengthy struggle to make sense of the event individually and collectively and to assess its impact on collective life. This is precisely where the concepts of “fateful situation” and “character” prove heuristic, provided that we take good note of contextual socio-cultural data which must be accounted for in our handling of this conceptual framework.

For Goffman, character is tied to *action*, and it is only *through* one’s course of action that it can be assessed. Indeed, the quake generated a specific social time-space where one’s courses of action affected one’s social status in significant and lasting ways – after all, this feature is the main characteristic of a “fateful situation”. Bad behaviours in this context were deemed particularly distasteful and lead to indelible stains on one’s reputation: if civil servants’ corrupted practices are considered usual in normal times, they became unforgivable in the quake’s aftermath. An opposite but telling occurrence can be found elsewhere: in Yogyakarta, a group of street musicians



(*pengamen*), usually disregarded as near beggars, gathered their efforts and donated more than 3 million rupiah (worth about 270 euros at the time) for the victims of the quake. Part of this money was offered through a local newspaper's relief account, giving visibility to their concern: this money, they said during a short ceremony where they handed over their contribution, had been gathered from passengers on the bus lines where they usually worked, and where they played music *for* the victims. By thanking these passengers through the media in a display of honesty (the money indeed ended-up where they promised it would), they demonstrated socially valued qualities of character. This was a way for them to claim that, as one of them phrased it: "street singers are also humans; they have love and caring" and to gain social recognition. Disaster opens up opportunities for that type of display of character.

This phenomenon is probably not peculiar to the region: as noted by Lee Clarke, disaster is a particularly fertile social moment for the creation of collective "heroes" (Clarke 2006), such as on September 11, 2001. However there is a specificity to our case: as we have seen, disaster has been perceived as a trial; as such, it contributed to the redistribution of economic, symbolic and moral goods within the village community. One's position in this rapid and intense trade off was the consequence of her or his specific situation in relation to the event, as it was seen as God's judgment. This heavenly verdict was extended to every single individual in the community, as their situations could all be compared in reference to the same event. Thus, the disaster worked much like a "fateful situation" where people's "real" selves were understood as being exposed by God's mighty gesture sometimes stripping off their shiny but undeserved outfits of strong men, or granting opportunities and social recognition to the deprived. Thus, in this context, action is not the only way to assess one's character: moral judgment can arise out of the situation, no matter how one performed during these deadly moments: affliction suggests hidden moral flaws, while an intact house or a spared family is not read as luck but as a sign of "election". In this context, action is displaced, as affected people are understood to be the *objects* of a godly gesture, which is believed to bear a lesson *sui generis*. The fateful situation, thus, is less one where judgements arises out of a *display* of character but more a situation where it results from the *revelation* of one's true character beneath one's social outfits.

Bandyana and Putri's stories are instructive in this respect: when her husband built their house, Putri, a young woman who runs a small village shop, insisted that he implement an anti-seismic

design; Bandyana, a civil servant in his forties who built his house after the 2004 tsunami in Aceh, followed the same path. At this time, both were gently mocked by their neighbours (and Putri by her husband) for their overzealous caution and were seen as mild eccentrics. After all, memories of the last significant earthquake in the vicinity had essentially vanished by 2006. After the disaster, however, their social reputation was obviously vastly changed, and people saw them as having been inspired.

Yet, the fallouts of these social dynamics are not as clear-cut as one could expect: the moral verdicts and symbolic redistributions generated in these momentous times have produced more questions than answers about the relational social statuses: when talking with informants in Karanglegi, most people suggested that those families most heavily affected by the quake “must have done something wrong” or “must have something to blame themselves for”; however, these verdicts are tempered by daily interactions, and people are often taken aback and disconcerted when the picture resulting from their own knowledge of fellow villagers is often at odds with the moral ascriptions resulting from the crisis. To phrase it in a more theoretical stance, the redistribution of symbolic and moral goods is modulated through existing social networks, due to the interplay of social distances and proximities between individuals and groups, as intimate reciprocal knowledge intersect with the picture of one’s self as resulting from the quake.

Thus, disaster did not produce a specific social order; rather, it blurred pre-existing patterns of social prestige, without providing any easy way to renegotiate social positions and social relations. What we need to understand, then, are the social processes which sustained the production of new social patterns out of this uncertainty.

### **Emerging moral economies: the example of *gotong royong***

In the struggle for reconstruction, people were beset with tensions between far-reaching social changes and innovations, introduced notably through foreign help and actors, and resorting to traditional values and inherited forms of social organization. These tensions were not distributed within the smaller community only; they raised controversies at the regional and national level. Let us start by discussing the latter.

For many Indonesian stakeholders, foreign help was indeed viewed with a good deal of sympathy; yet. However, it also raised anxieties, as is apparent from this quote from a volunteer of a student organization: *“I came to help because I felt a responsibility toward the nation and the country (...). This should be our elites and our riches who come here, not us. But they prefer to rely on foreign aid. And the media also incline to publish noisy stories about foreign aid. I am saddened to see the media reporting on a single Turkish public kitchen, rather than on the numerous ones ran by our own people.”* This feeling of dispossession was acute as foreign aid – bilateral and private, originating from international organizations and NGOs – and foreign actors rushed into the region (MacRae et Hodgkin 2011). In this context, concerns about existing social equilibriums were also expressed by public figures. Among them, the sultan of Yogyakarta, both a political figure, as acting governor of the region, and a cultural authority, ruled that reconstruction funds should be released in cash and handed over directly to local communities so that *“besides the economic dimension people are able to unite by reconstructing with their own hands according to their local culture, in order that traditional forms of solidarities within communities (gotong royong) can grow and reinforce”*.

This was in line with a fast-spreading concern among intellectuals and political personnel alike that foreign help could affect local communities in dubious ways. Dr. Kwartarini, from the Department of Psychology, Gadjah Mada University<sup>3</sup>, who helped in the relief effort by setting up a psychological response unit with student volunteers, phrased it aptly when she describes her program:

*“The Life Reconstruction program aims at helping our people to recover on a psychological level and to reconstruct their lives as they were before, by addressing both their psychological and physical needs. (...) Indonesian people have a strong collective culture and their individual resources are lower when compared to groups with a stronger individual culture, as can be found in the West. A decrease in self-sufficiency will impact people’s eagerness to live and lower their ability to make projects.”*

More generally, there was a widespread fear that the influx of foreign goods and personnel would undermine existing social organization and cultural patterns by installing a lasting dependency,

---

<sup>3</sup> The main higher education establishment in the city and one of the most prominent university nation-wide

destroying what was perceived as a local culture of hard work, and thus damaging communities' self-sustainability and autonomy, and even for some, threatening national sovereignty.

These concerns about “cultural goods” among political and intellectual elites were somehow attuned to people's experiences in Karanglegi. Six years later, there is a broad consensus among villagers that the recovery process was a success. The same consensus exists concerning the reasons behind this achievement, as people agree that their strength, in these turbulent times was due mainly to their ability to uphold traditional Javanese values. Thus, their shared commitment toward *gotong royong* (mutual assistance), a traditional way of organizing collective work and solidarity within Javanese society, is seen as the main reason for what villagers perceive as a quick recovery. In Karanglegi itself, however, and in contradiction with these perceptions, *gotong royong* did not actually play the pivotal role suggested by these claims; relief and reconstruction were rather organized through kinship networks, as people's relatives convened to the scene and provided manpower, capital and material help. The real social potency of these claims is thus to be found elsewhere. *Gotong royong* really is not only a work pattern or a regulated system of solidarity. It is a fundamental identification “device” among Javanese, which synthesizes common values of hard work and solidarity, and signifies an appropriate degree of individual dedication to the community (Bowen 1986; Gurniwan Kamil 2013).

The collective invocation of *gotong royong* can then be viewed as a means for affected people to hold on to a set of fundamental and shared values in a time when social norms were shattered, as were houses and families. It helped people preserve a sense of their individual and collective selves. Because it is a reputed “Javanese” cultural feature, people in Karanglegi see the values encapsulated in this social form as a cultural asset which, imbued in every Javanese individual, becomes a moral good. These assets, in turn, discriminate between Javanese and non-Javanese Indonesians. Aceh's lengthy and difficult recovery after the 2004 tsunami is for instance usually credited among villagers to the weak character of its people, when compared to Javanese. Many villagers drew a sense of pride and recognition from this perceived specificity as a hard-working, collective-minded ethnic community, and most of them agree that the path through destruction and recovery has revitalized collective involvement in *gotong royong*.

*Gotong royong*, interestingly, is not only a vivid ideology traded among local communities. It is also a particularly potent political device (Bowen 1986) which was used *ad libitum* to mobilize the

population after the quake: not only did politicians praised its achievements and called people to achieve resilience through traditional solidarities, it was also felt by many volunteers as a morally binding obligation which drew them toward the affected areas. Megawati Soekarnoputri, a former President of the Indonesian Republic urged the national community to “*raise the spirit of gotong royong to help the victims of the quake*”; calls were voiced for the reinvigoration of local knowledge (*kearifan local*) to achieve self-resiliency. *Gotong royong* was represented in the media and by politicians as a specific asset in terms of collective resilience and, as a cultural feature and as a motive of national pride. There was thus a reinforcing and mutually-elaborating relationship between popular perceptions in Karanglegi and public discourses saturated with calls to local and national values (Tambiah 1990).

In a larger perspective, this interplay between public discourses and local interactions contributed to reaffirm potent Javanese socio-cultural values such as “patience” (*sabar*), stoicism (*tabah*) and acceptance of one’s fate (*nrima*). Discourses on dignity defined acceptable displays of grief and suffering, following established “interaction rituals” (Goffman 2005), proper ways of giving, helping and receiving

## **Conclusion**

The interpretation of disaster as a meaningful message in Karanglegi thus contributed to frame specific moral economies tied to the event. God would not strike without reason; his message surely pointed toward wrongdoings within Yogyakarta society. There was something wrong for sure, but what was to be addressed was unclear until now; however, it had the effect of pushing people to reflect on their individual and collective behaviors and life patterns. The only clue that they had in order to make sense of this message was related to the patterns of destruction: for sure, God would not strike individuals and families randomly. Unequal patterns of suffering were thus generally interpreted as moral sentences. Moral and symbolic goods were then redistributed according to one’s capacity to return to and to uphold values that, it was felt, had been forsaken with the spread of a modern style of living. However, what could be interpreted as a conservative turn toward traditional values had an unexpected outcome: social stature, which was traditionally attributed according to formal social status, has become more sensitive to the morals of action. Thus those displays of character during these difficult time still return social verdicts to individuals.

It remains to be seen whether this moral economy is a moral economy of disaster, bound to vanish, or if it is part of deeper, lasting social dynamic.

## **Bibliography**

- Boscoboinik, Andrea. 2009. *Le processus catastrophe: vulnérabilités, discours, réponses*. LIT Verlag Münster.
- Bowen, John R. 1986. « On the political construction of tradition: gotong royong in Indonesia ». *The Journal of Asian Studies* 45 (03): 545–561.
- Brubaker, Rogers, et Frederick Cooper. 2000. « Beyond “Identity” ». *Theory and Society* 29 (1): 1-47.
- Clarke, Lee Ben. 2006. *Worst cases: terror and catastrophe in the popular imagination*. 1 vol. Chicago, Etats-Unis: University of Chicago Press.
- Goffman, Erving. 2005. *Interaction Ritual: Essays in Face to Face Behavior*. Aldine Transaction.
- Gurniwan Kamil, P. 2013. « Gotong Royong Dalam Kehidupan Masyarakat ». Consulté le mars 20. <http://sosiologi.upi.edu/artikelpdf/gotongroyong.pdf>.
- Hilgartner, Stephen. 2007. « Overflow and Containment in the Aftermath of Disaster ». *Social Studies of Science* 37 (1) (février 1): 153-158.
- MacRae, Graeme, et David Hodgkin. 2011. « Half Full or Half Empty? Shelter after the Jogjakarta Earthquake ». *Disasters* 35 (1) (janvier 1): 243-267. doi:10.1111/j.1467-7717.2010.01202.x.
- Quarantelli, Enrico Louis. 2005. « A Social Science Research Agenda For The Disasters Of The 21st Century: Theoretical, Methodological And Empirical Issues And Their Professional Implementation ». In *What Is A Disaster?: New Answers to Old Questions*, édité par Ronald W. Perry et Enrico Louis Quarantelli. Xlibris.
- Tambiah, Stanley J. 1990. « Presidential Address: Reflections on Communal Violence in South Asia ». *The Journal of Asian Studies* 49 (4) (novembre 1): 741-760.
- Turner, Victor. 1964. *Schism and continuity in an African society. A study of Ndembu village life...* Manchester, Royaume-Uni: Manchester U.P.
- . 1975. *Dramas, fields, and metaphors: symbolic action in human society*. Symbol, myth and ritual series. Ithaca (USA), Etats-Unis: Cornell University Press.

Wieringa, Edwin. 2010. « God Speaks through Natural Disasters, But What Does He Say? Islamic Interpretations in Indonesian Tsunami Poetry ». Édité par Arndt Graf, Susanne Schröter, et Edwin Wieringa. *Aceh: History, Politics and Culture*: 316-33.