Selfish Transportation Games - Archive ouverte HAL
Communication Dans Un Congrès Année : 2017

Selfish Transportation Games

Résumé

We study a natural strategic situation arising from the selection of shared means of transportation. Some clients (the players) are located on different nodes of a given graph and they want to be transported from their location to a common destination point (e.g. school, airport). A fixed number of resources (also called buses) is available and each client has to choose exactly one. Individual costs depend on the route chosen by the buses and the distance between the nodes. We investigate the case where each bus has a static permutation which prescribes the order by which the clients are visited. We identify the cases admitting a pure strategy equilibrium and consider the construction of an equilibrium, via a dedicated algorithm, or a dynamics. We also determine the price of anarchy and the price of stability for two natural social functions.
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Dates et versions

hal-02104866 , version 1 (19-04-2019)

Identifiants

Citer

Dimitris Fotakis, Laurent Gourvès, Jérôme Monnot. Selfish Transportation Games. 43rd International Conference on Current Trends in Theory and Practice of Computer Science (SOFSEM 2017), Jan 2017, Limerick, Ireland. pp.176-187, ⟨10.1007/978-3-319-51963-0_14⟩. ⟨hal-02104866⟩
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