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Article Dans Une Revue Theoretical Computer Science Année : 2017

Mechanism design for aggregating energy consumption and quality of service in speed scaling scheduling

Résumé

We consider a strategic game, where players submit jobs to a machine that executes all jobs in a way that minimizes energy while respecting the given deadlines. The energy consumption is then charged to the players in some way. Each player wants to minimize the sum of that charge and of their job's deadline multiplied by a priority weight. Two charging schemes are studied, the proportional cost share which does not always admit pure Nash equilibria, and the marginal cost share, which does always admit pure Nash equilibria, at the price of overcharging by a constant factor.

Dates et versions

hal-02074089 , version 1 (20-03-2019)

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Christoph Dürr, Łukasz Jeż, Óscar Vásquez. Mechanism design for aggregating energy consumption and quality of service in speed scaling scheduling. Theoretical Computer Science, 2017, 695, pp.28-41. ⟨10.1016/j.tcs.2017.07.020⟩. ⟨hal-02074089⟩
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