What are the current frontiers of economic planning?

JULIEN VERCUEIL, CREE-INALCO


International workshop on structural policies and economic planning, INALCO, Paris, April 6th, 2018

Introduction: planning as a coordination mechanism of the economy

- Coordination mechanisms: Henry Mintzberg (1979) (microeconomics & management)
- Planning at the State level: vertical coordination by standardization of outputs (and, sometimes of procedures)
- Markets : horizontal coordination by mutual adjustments
- But: Markets are constituted of private organizations that are planning institutions
- J.R. Commons (1931) : « transaction » as a multifaceted coordination mechanism (market/hierarchy)



Consequence: economic actors confronted to a permanent trade-off between various coordination mechanisms




1. A political frontier for public planning: Legitimacy

- The legitimacy of the planning institutions: public and private
- Fundamental principle of legitimacy: rationality (legal-rational authority, M. Weber (1922))
- Two problems arise: 1. rationality of the political and bureaucratic elite vs. rationality of the market
- 2. Uncertainty => weakening legitimacy of longterm rationality- and its effect on planning
- The Participation / Accountability nexus as a way of re-legitimization of planning



2. An informational frontier: Complexity

- Complex interplay of contemporary challenges to (crises of) social systems
- Interaction of time horizons and levels of irreversibility
- Main problems of historical socialist planning: collecting and processing the relevant information
- New information technologies : Big data, AI: examples of solutions for modern planning?



3. A behavioral frontier: Enforcement

- Theory is not rule, rule is not decision, decision is not action, action is not result - & results are not theories
- Example: J. Kornai's (1981) vision of economic theories of perfect planning and perfect markets
- Choice between indicative and imperative planning? Adaptive behaviors always emerge from rules imposed to actors (Pierson, 1902)



4. A multidimentional frontier: Flexibility

- Planning is about organizing a form of order within chaos – & giving a longer time horizon to actors
- But (chaotic) innovation always emerges within the time horizon of planning
- How can economic planning provide some stability to economic actors while being reactive and flexible?
- Broader goals and fewer rules?



Conclusion: Paradoxical planning

- markets failures are increasingly blatant: ecology, health, income distribution, education, infrastructures, R&D.
- But markets forces have also weakened the capacity of public institutions to work out an effective planning (globalization, shorttermism, vested interests,...)
- Planning failures are numerous: public (Soviet Union, Tchernobyl), or private (Japan, Fukushima).
- Accountability of planners, checks & balances (voice) and markets remain absolutely necessary alongside public planning (cf. « dual track regime » of the transition period in Chinese agriculture)

THE CO-EVOLUTION OF MARKETS AND PLANNING: AN INSTITUTIONAL DESIGN



Source: adapted from M.C. Escher

Thank you!

References:

- Commons J. R. (1934). Institutional Economics. Its place in Political Economy. Transaction Publishers, 1934
- Kornai J. (1975). Anti-Equilibrium On economic systems theory and the tasks of research, American Elsevier
- Mintzberg H. (1979). The Structuring of Organizations. A synthesis of the research. Prentice-Hall.
- Pierson N. G. (1902:1935). « The Problem of Value in the Socialist Community », in Hayek F. (Ed.)(1935), Collectivist Economic Planning, Routledge and Kegan Paul, p. 41-86.
- Vercueil J. (2015). Les pays émergents. Brésil-Russie-Inde-Chine... Mutations économique et nouveaux défis. Bréal.
- Weber M. (1922). Economy and society. First edition in German, Johannes Winckelmann.