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Article Dans Une Revue Managerial and Decision Economics Année : 2016

The impact of monitoring and sanctions on cheating: experimental evidence from Tunisia

Résumé

Using a laboratory experiment in a developing country (Tunisia, North Africa), we investigate whether the level of monitoring and both the nature (monetary versus moral) and magnitude of sanctions influence cheating levels. Our findings show that the introduction of weak monetary sanctions and monitoring is likely to increase cheating. However, a perfect monitoring is found to decrease the level of cheating. Moreover, when combined with a perfect monitoring, moral sanctions matter and may be even more effective than strong monetary sanctions in reducing cheating. We draw some policy implications regarding cheating in various domains.
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hal-01994852 , version 1 (13-09-2023)

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Insaf Bekir, Sana El Harbi, Gilles Grolleau, Naoufel Mzoughi, Angela Sutan. The impact of monitoring and sanctions on cheating: experimental evidence from Tunisia. Managerial and Decision Economics, 2016, 37 (7), pp.461-473. ⟨10.1002/mde.2731⟩. ⟨hal-01994852⟩
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