Game-Theoretic Decision Making for the Resilience of Interdependent Infrastructures Exposed to Disruptions
Résumé
This chapter addresses the challenges associated with assessing and improving the resilience of interdependent critical infrastructure systems under potential disruptive events. A specific set of analytical tools are introduced based on quantitative models of infrastructure systems operation and their functional interdependencies. Specifically, the game-theoretic attacker-defender and defender-attacker defender modeling techniques are applied to assessing the resilience of interdependent CI systems under worst-case disruptions, and advising policymakers on making pre-disruption decisions for improving the resilience of interdependent infrastructures. A case of interdependent power and gas systems is presented to show the proposed model and highlight the significance of protecting interdependent CIs.
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