A winner’s curse in the bidding process for broadcasting rights in football? The cases of the French and UK markets - Archive ouverte HAL
Communication Dans Un Congrès Sport in Society Année : 2019

A winner’s curse in the bidding process for broadcasting rights in football? The cases of the French and UK markets

Résumé

The winner’s curse is a well-known phenomenon in the auction theory. The main aim of this article is to verify its existence in football broadcasting rights. The underlying objective is to assess whether some indices of this situation are verified and can cause a winner’s curse. The methodology is based on the application of Andreff (2014)’s six indices and a seventh index(disappointment)to the domestic markets for broadcasting rights of the French and English football leagues. These two markets have seen an increase in the number of packages offered to broadcasters, with the possibility of several ‘winners’. The paper shows that the winner of the major packages in the auction is not cursed. The curse is more likely to happen for the second mover. As such, the paper suggests a practical recommendation for broadcasters interested in football rights: win the best package or keep away.
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Dates et versions

hal-01935541 , version 1 (05-12-2019)

Identifiants

Citer

Antoine Feuillet, Nicolas Scelles, Christophe Durand. A winner’s curse in the bidding process for broadcasting rights in football? The cases of the French and UK markets. EURAM 2017 : Making Knowledge Work, Jun 2017, Glasgow, Scotland, United Kingdom. pp.1198-1224, ⟨10.1080/17430437.2018.1505869⟩. ⟨hal-01935541⟩
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