Institutionalisation of a participatory instrument: An explanatory model drawing on the theory of institutional logics

Céline Bourbousson

To cite this version:

Céline Bourbousson. Institutionalisation of a participatory instrument: An explanatory model drawing on the theory of institutional logics. 6th EMES International Research Conference on Social Enterprise, Jul 2017, Louvain-la-Neuve, Belgium. hal-01896800

HAL Id: hal-01896800
https://hal.science/hal-01896800
Submitted on 16 Oct 2018

HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of scientific research documents, whether they are published or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in France or abroad, or from public or private research centers.

L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés.
Institutionalisation of a participatory instrument: An explanatory model drawing on the theory of institutional logics

Céline Bourbousson
Doctoral student in management science
Aix Marseille University, CNRS, LEST, Aix-en Provence, France

Abstract

The phenomenon of banalisation, an advanced degree of institutionalisation of an instrument or of organisational practices, is frequently observed in the field of the social and solidarity economy (SSE), but is often analysed purely in terms of isomorphism. This article proposes a model for analysing the banalisation of an SSE instrument by examining the evolution of the institutional logics contributing to shaping it. It is based on a qualitative survey of the construction of the Pôle Territorial de Coopération Economique (“Territorial Cluster for Economic Cooperation”) policy. The analysis sheds light on the evolution of the institutional logics in play, in which the founding institutional logic of the instrument is effaced by a new institutional logic described as “imported.” Based on a Gioia-type coding operation, an explanatory model of this evolutionary process is put forward, around two central dimensions: the incompatibility of the institutional logics present and the hegemony of reference to the market. The results contribute both to questioning the Public Value Approach and to enriching the corpus of the institutional logics approach by examining the institutional orders–institutional logics relationship.

Keywords: Pôle Territorial de Coopération Economique, institutionalisation, institutional logics, public value approach
Introduction

This article is based on ongoing research which reveals an evolutionary dynamic of institutional logics (Thornton et al., 2012) in a hitherto little studied field – that of the construction of what is called a participative public policy. Whereas most previous work on the creation, articulation, hybridisation or evolution of institutional logics has been concerned with the organisational level (Battilana and Dorado, 2010; Pache and Santos, 2013), or the inter-organisational, sectoral level (Thornton, 2002, 2004), or the field level (Dunn and Jones, 2010; Nigam and Ocasio, 2010), the object of our study sheds new light on the institutional logics approach (ILA) by attending to the level of the co-construction of a public policy instrument.

By bringing together an inter-organisational network of SSE representatives and a network of administrations and senior civil servants working on SSE public policy, this particular and hitherto little studied level of analysis brings to light phenomena and processes that can enrich two theoretical corpora: that of the ILA and that of the Public Value Approach (PVA).

More precisely, we are interested in a public policy that is representative of a new mode of public intervention, which takes note of the weaknesses of the top-down model and state-centred approaches and is rooted in more open, participatory systems. This renewal of public intervention is seen not only in France (Lascoumes and LeGalès, 2003) but also and more widely in the majority of OECD countries. Theorised by Moore in 1995, it presents itself as an alternative to New Public Management (NPM) (Hood, 1995) and serves as a guide for action to "public managers." By definition, it associates public organisations and civil society networks in devising public programmes and instruments with the aim of creating "public value." It therefore brings together groups of heterogeneous actors and involves complex processes (O’Flynn, 2007; Alford, 2002; Kelly et al., 2002). This makes it even more interesting as an object for grasping the diversity, coexistence or conflict of plural institutional logics.

In recent years, a number of authors have examined the phenomenon of institutionalisation and banalisation, often using the idea of isomorphism (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983). This phenomenon is even more significant in the field of the social and solidarity economy (SSE) (Richez-Battesti, 2006), which is drawn into a spiral of globalisation and liberalisation of exchanges, often characterised by a context in which SSE organisations come into competition with those of the conventional economy, with no account being taken of their “social added value” (Draperi, 2007). Hence the phenomenon of banalisation, whether in the practices of the organisations or in the drawing-up of public policies, is generally explained by the need to copy the dominant behaviours in order to survive and is associated with the existence of exogenous constraints.

We propose to shed a different light on the phenomenon of banalisation by studying not isomorphism but the evolution of the institutional logics mobilised in the co-construction of a PVA instrument. Our aim is to explain the phenomenon of the banalisation of such instruments, which may distance them from the social needs for which they were conceived. More precisely, our work is motivated by the following research question:

How is it that, in the framework of development of a PVA-type instrument, the founding institutional logic can be effaced and give way to the domination of a new institutional logic?

This research question implies a particular procedure, that of “constructing mystery” (Alvesson and Kärreman, 2007): the empirical material is first mobilised to encourage critical reflection, to question, rethink and illustrate the theory. Theoretical development is facilitated by a focus on “what does not work in an existing theory” (Alvesson and Kärreman, 2007, p.1266); these authors also speak of theoretical development induced by "breakdowns."1 At the outset, we constructed a "mystery": the PVA is assumed

---

1 “A breakdown is a lack of fit between one’s encounter with a tradition and the schema-guided expectations by which one organises experience” (Agar, 1986: 21, quoted by Alvesson and Kärreman, 2007).
to construct participatory instruments which, as such, respond to social needs, and yet the instrument of that type which we are studying satisfies its main potential beneficiaries only up to a point.

More precisely, a survey was conducted on the construction of the policy of the Pôle Territorial de Coopération Economique (“Regional Economic Cooperation Cluster”). This concept was developed by the SSE to valorise and give visibility to the cooperation clusters in the SSE – i.e. the grouping of SSE organisations with enterprises, local authorities and research centres around sustainable local development projects – but was rapidly taken over by the public authorities and subjected to a process of institutionalisation. Between the two interdepartmental Calls for Proposals (CIP) in 2013 and 2015, the selection criteria for clusters worthy of financial support changed significantly and the number of applications dropped considerably, revealing the relative dissatisfaction of actors who could potentially have benefited from the instrument.

Based on our survey, we put forward a description of the evolution of the institutional logics present in the banalisation of a PVA instrument. Our results reveal that the process of banalisation has three main stages: (1) the domination of the founding institutional logic of the instrument, (2) conflict between this logic and the “imported logic,” (3) the domination of the “imported logic” and the persistence of the founding logic on the margin. It should be noted that this third stage corresponds to what Besharov and Smith (2014) call a logic of “estrangement”. Beyond the description of this process, we put forward an analytical model, based on our coding work, structured around two explanatory dimensions: the incompatibility of the institutional logics present and the hegemony of reference to the market.

Our research makes two main contributions to the literature on institutional logics: it offers an explanatory model of their evolution in the phenomenon of banalisation, and makes it possible to examine the relationship between institutional orders and institutional logics. The resolution of the “mystery” initially constructed in our work – a PVA-type instrument that meets the needs of its beneficiaries only very relatively – also gives rise to a contribution to the PVA by underscoring the preponderant role of the public actor. Our work thus relativises the possibility of automatically discovering “public value” through the construction of such instruments, since what makes value is ultimately determined in the eyes of the state rather than those of society.

The first part of this article gives a brief overview of the literature on the theory of public value, questioning its postulates and aiming to understand how an instrument of this type can undergo a process of banalisation and dissatisfy its founders. We then review the literature on institutional logics, underscoring the forms of organisation of their coexistence in the same field. The second part sets out the methodology and introduces the study. In the third part, we present our results, first describing the process of institutionalisation brought to light through our reading grid, and then put forward an explanatory model derived from our coding work and based on two explanatory categories: the incompatibility of the institutional logics present and the hegemony of reference to the market. In the final part, we discuss our contributions and suggest lines of future research.

1. Theoretical context

1.1. The theory of Public Value, an alternative to New Public Management?

To explain the phenomenon of banalisation of a participatory instrument that we seek to develop we must clarify the theoretical references that underlie this type of instrument. The last three decades have been marked by an ever-growing enthusiasm for public instruments for citizens’ participation, presented as a response to a “crisis of representative democracy.” Various disciplines have examined this, but each from a distinct angle, so that it is an object of study whose edges remain fuzzy. We have opted for one of the pioneering approaches in the field of management sciences which emerged in the USA in the mid-1990s – the theory of Public Value).

The initial aim of this approach, developed by Moore in 1995, was to provide a conceptual framework for public sector managers to counter the dominant practices of NPM, which brings private sector management practice into the public sector, relies on explicit standards of performance and emphasises output controls (Hood, 1991, p. 4).
Moore (1995) opens the way to an ideological turn that delineates a new “post-competitive” paradigm (O’Flynn, 2007). Moore conceives government no longer as a simple producer of rules and supplier of services and a system of social welfare, but as a potential creator of public value and a proactive actor in the public sphere. He believes that public managers have a fundamental role to play in defining public value and providing services that match the needs of the users and citizens by reference to a key principle: directly involving the citizenry in public action. To ensure that these public policy choices operate in the public interest, Moore requires these managers to act as “stewards of public assets with ‘restless value-seeking imagination’” (Benington and Moore, 2013, p. 3). He recommends above all that other actors and stakeholders be involved in working out public policies.

Public value is defined as “a reflection of collectively expressed preferences consumed by the citizenry, created not just through ‘outcomes’ but also through processes which may generate trust or fairness” (O’Flynn, 2007). It is also defined as “more than a summation of individual preferences of the users or producers of public services […] collectively built through deliberation involving elected and appointed government officials and key stakeholders” (Stoker, 2006, p. 42). The idea of collective preferences thus draws a clear demarcation line with NPM. Whereas NPM is based on the idea that individual preferences can be aggregated to express what the “public” expects from government, the PVA implies a collective decision by the citizens, relayed by public managers and political decision-makers and entailing much more complex processes (O’Flynn, 2007; Alford, 2002; Kelly et al., 2002).

The main features of the creation of public value are found in Moore’s (1995) conceptualisation of a “strategic triangle.” First, the strategies implemented must clarify and specify the expected public value results. Then, they depend on a legal framework for action and political legitimation, an “authorising environment” based on mobilising a coalition of public, private and third-sector stakeholders, whose support is necessary for the implementation of the strategic policy. The key political actors must be associated and enrolled, since public managers need a strong “mandate” from elected representatives. Finally, these strategies must be operationally and administratively feasible, i.e. supplied with the necessary financial, human and technological resources. The three elements – public value objectives, legal framework for action and political legitimation, and operational capacities (the three vertices of the triangle) – must be aligned and often require negotiations. For example, if the key political actors do not accept the aims, the public managers must either persuade them to modify their positions, or revise the value proposal to bring it closer to the wishes of these actors.

The last three decades have seen a growing appetite for public instruments for citizen participation, presented as a response to a “crisis of representative democracy.” At the same time, a number of works, such as those of Lacroix (1995), have seen these participatory instruments as a reinvention of the play of democracy that seeks to maintain belief in the capacity of political action to express collective preferences and in its orientation towards resolving public problems. So it is more a matter of “blame avoidance and the pursuit of political credit” (Weaver, 1986; Hood, 2011), and stakeholder participation is more present in discourses than in practices, which would amount to the banalising of instruments that are supposedly “bottom-up.”

Since we are seeking to understand how the banalisation of participatory instrument moves it away from how it was originally conceived by its founders, it is essential to examine the different logics of action that characterise the groups of actors who have a hand in it. For this purpose, we mobilise the institutional logics approach (Thornton and Ocasio, 1999), which sheds particularly useful light on the ideas of coexistence, conflict and compatibility among different institutional logics.

1.2. The institutional logics approach (ILA)

The ILA emerged in the 1970s as an offshoot of institutional theory. It seeks to analyse the interrelationships among institutions, individuals and organisations in social systems. It makes it possible to understand how individual and organisational actors are influenced by their situation in multiple social locations in an interinstitutional system (Thornton et al., 2012, p. 2). Institutional logics are defined by the founders of this approach as sets of “material practices and symbolic constructions” (Friedland and Alford 1991, p. 248) which guide actors’ behaviour in given field.
Thornton and Ocasio (1999, p. 804) later defined institutional logics as “the socially constructed, historical patterns of material practices, assumptions, values, beliefs, and rules by which individuals produce and reproduce their material subsistence, organise time and space, and provide meaning to their social reality.” In this definition, they assign three essential characteristics to institutional logics, reflecting a conception of institutions that is at once structural, normative and symbolic.

These logics are organised “around cultural systems and symbol systems within specific contexts, illustrating how culture is anchored in a set of elemental building blocks, not just (...) ‘floating out there in thin air’” (Thornton 2004, p. 42). They frame individuals’ behaviour; and organisational actors can also change and shape them (Thornton, 2004).

In contrast to the previous theoretical developments, which sought to understand the effects of institutional logics at the societal level on individuals and organisations (Friedland and Alford, 1991), the renewed approach of Thornton and Ocasio opens the way to a host of studies which grasp the phenomenon of institutionalisation at levels of analysis as varied as markets, industries, inter-organisational networks or organisations. It thus creates a bridge between macro-structural and micro-process perspectives.

To characterise the nature of the coexistence of several institutional logics, Besharov and Smith (2014) put forward a typology structured around the notions of compatibility and centrality. They define compatibility as the extent to which the interaction of logics reinforces or destabilises organisational actions. Compatibility is more concerned with the goals of these actions than the means mobilised to achieve them, since goals more accurately reflect the core values and beliefs underlying institutional logics. Centrality is defined as “the degree to which multiple logics are each treated as equally valid and relevant to organisational functioning. Centrality is [...] lower when a single logic guides core operations while other logics manifest in peripheral activities not directly linked to organisational functioning” (Besharov and Smith, 2014, p. 369). Moreover, the relative power of the members has an effect on the degree of centrality since an institutional logic is more likely to be adopted in organisational practices when the person who represents it has power within an organisation (Kim et al., 2007).

Besharov and Smith (2014) identify four ideal types: contestation, alignment, estrangement and domination (see Figure 1). They concentrate on the potentially conflictual dimension of institutional logics.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Degree of centrality</th>
<th>Contested</th>
<th>Aligned</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>High</td>
<td>Extensive conflict</td>
<td>Minimal conflict</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Moderate conflict</td>
<td>Dominant</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Degree of compatibility</th>
<th>Logics provide contradictory prescriptions for action</th>
<th>Logics provide compatible prescriptions for action</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Low</td>
<td>No conflict</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Figure 1**: Types of Logics multiplicity within organizations  
Source: Besharov and Smith, 2014, p.371

Contestation corresponds to a configuration which presents a low degree of compatibility among the different institutional logics present. It is the most conflictual ideal type since it brings together actors who have distinct goals, values and identities and all the logics coexist without a particular hierarchy. This configuration not only leads to permanent conflict but also “makes it difficult for the organisation to establish legitimacy with and attain support from critical external stakeholders” (Purdy and Gray, 2009,
in Besharov and Smith, 2014). Besharov and Smith cite for example Battilana and Dorado’s (2010) description of BancoSol, a microfinance firm which combined two distinct institutional logics: a banking logic and a development logic. The clash between the two led to “the emergence of two subgroups, each advocating an approach consistent with the logic in which they had been trained,” resulting in a context of major crisis: “while the former bankers sought to enforce standardised administrative procedures, the former social workers advocated a more flexible approach that accommodated the unique needs of BancoSol’s nontraditional clients” (Besharov and Smith, 2014, p.372).

Estrangement refers to a configuration which also brings together institutional logics that are not readily compatible, but the conflictual dimension is moderated by the domination of one logic. Although goals and values diverge between the institutional logics and give rise to conflict, one logic exerts primary influence over organisational functioning.

Alignment corresponds to a type of organisation in which different logics coexist with high compatibility. Each has a strong influence but their prescriptions are compatible.

2. Methodology

To answer the research question, a qualitative survey was conducted on the public policy instrument of the Territorial Cluster for Economic Cooperation (Pôle Territorial de Coopération Economique, PTCE, hereafter TCEC). This part describes how the empirical material was collected and analysed.

2.1. Data collection

The first data source was participant observation. Since 2014 work has been done on a doctoral thesis devoted to comparative case studies of two TCECs in the region Provence-Alpes-Côte d’Azur. In this context, the author took part in the national seminars (4), the working sessions (2), and the “national workshop days” devoted to TCECs. In particular we took part in the work of the group “Analysis and Knowledge,” organised by the SSE Lab (Labo de l’ESS) from 2014 to 2017. A thesis logbook was kept, with notes on informal conversations with members of the TCEC steering committee (SSE Lab, RTES, MES, COORACE), minutes of meetings and seminars, and other general observations.

These data were complemented with two series of semi-structured interviews conducted in Paris in January and March 2017 (after the two CfPs) with the actors who contributed to the institutionalisation of the TCEC. The interview guide together with the list of questions is reproduced in Appendix A. The interviews, lasting between 38 minutes and 125 minutes, were recorded and transcribed in their entirety. They were concerned with the respondents’ roles in the working-out of the TCEC policy and their perceptions of changes in the instrument.

In addition, the following external data were analysed: the legislative history of the Law on the SSE and in particular the changes made in Article 9 regarding TCECs, the documents accompanying the two CfPs, the grid of criteria regarding regional opinions on the selection of TCECs, the publications of the RTES, the SSE Lab and the COORACE on TCECs, the evaluation report by the SGMAP, and all the documents concerned with TCECs on the SSE Lab website. These documents provided important contextual information and partly contributed to the discursive analysis of the two institutional logics identified.

---

2 Réseau Territorial de l’Economie Sociale, Regional Network of the Social Economy.
3 Mouvement pour l’Economie Solidaire, Movement for the Solidarity Economy
4 Coordination des associations d’aides aux chômeurs pour l’emploi, the National Federation of the Social and Solidarity Economy.
5 Secrétariat Général de Modernisation de l’action public, General Secretariat for the Modernisation of Public Policies.
2.2. Data analysis

The method of analysis devised by D. A. Gioia (Gioia and Chittipeddi, 1991; Gioia et al., 1994; Corley and Gioia, 2004; Nag, Corley, and Gioia, 2007; Gioia et al., 2010) was used to identify the aggregated themes and dimensions of our empirical material. This method was chosen so as to be able to put forward a robust model composed of “overarching dimensions” that seek to articulate the various themes of the material with a view to understanding the research question.

Analysis of the data was organised in several stages. The accounts given by the interviewees were first compared with data from internal sources – the thesis logbook – and external sources – legislative documents, CfPs, publications of centres of the SSE networks, the evaluation report – to draw up a history of the construction of the TCEC policy. This is represented in particular by the timeline in Appendix B.

In a second stage, the data were re-examined with the aid of the NVivo software package (version 7) developed by QSR to group first-order concepts – verbatim in the transcripts – as second-order concepts through a process of open coding (Van Maanen, 1979). This relied on an inductive reasoning that aimed to group the similarities and differences in the material from the various sources.

In accordance with the methodology developed by Gioia, the third stage consisted in assembling the sixteen second-order concepts into six theoretical dimensions and applying an abductive approach. This process, based on an axial coding technique, was not linear but consisted rather in a to-and-fro between theory and empirical data to identify the major stages in the institutionalisation of the TCEC instrument. The aggregated theoretical dimensions did not appear spontaneously but were constructed through a systematic confrontation of the second-order concepts with the two fields of the literature examined here: the institutional logics approach and the public value approach.

It thus became clear that the process of institutionalisation of the TCEC instrument is explained by two main dimensions (the two central dimensions): the incompatibility of the institutional logics present and the hegemony of reference to the market. The coding work is made transparent by the table of representative data below. In the right-hand column are representative extracts from the table of transcripts, each of which corresponds to a second-order concept, set in a theoretical dimension that is part of a central dimension of the model (left-hand column).
**Figure 2**: Structured coding of the explanatory model
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Central dimensions, theoretical dimensions and second-order concepts</th>
<th>Representative data</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| **Central dimension:**  
*Incompatibility of the institutional logics present*  
**Theoretical dimension:**  
*Founding civic logic of the TCEC instrument*  
**Second-order concepts:**  
Collective national undertaking | “That’s to say that Claude Alphandéry – you really ought to meet him – his view when he left the presidency of the National Council of the IAE\(^6\) was that all the same the SSE of which IAE is a part is in a very bad way well there is something going on in there but there is no joining-up in other words they all work in isolation – the cooperatives in one corner, the associations in another – and so he thought we must bring the actors together, that was before the Estates General, it lasted almost two years between 2009 and 2010” (director of SSE Lab). |

| Goal of social change | “And this definition, which was drawn up collectively with the network coordinators and in particular the ones who set up what was known as the TCEC steering group, said well we need to be able to move forward, and after the Estates General, we launched a call for expressions of interest among all those who saw themselves as cooperation clusters saying we want to analyse you, we want to push this thing forward and we need to carry on characterising things so we’ve sent out this call for expressions of interest to be able to analyse you” (director of SSE Lab). |

| Pursuit of recognition of forms of cooperation in the SSE | “Claude said for these Estates General I want people to come not with lists of grievances but lists of aspirations [*espérances*], which may seem a bit naive but there was an idea behind it that we are not into complaining but aspiring, and aspiration is bottom-up.” |

|  | “Then it was a time when modernist institutional languages were greatly focused on technological development clusters, Silicon Valleys, and we had this idea that there could be clusters for social and not just technological innovation, counting on the capacity of people to come together and mobilise, and on their role in regional development” (Claude Alphandéry). |

|  | “In other words don’t see us as idle dreamers, everything we are talking about exists and has often been there for years, but people don’t know about it, don’t notice it so we need to raise the profile of those things. And so he said we’ll draw up lists of aspirations, in a great utopia, he said everyone will put down their ideas and we’ll draw up lists together.” |

---

\(^6\) *L’Insertion par l’Activité Économique*, “Integration through economic activity.”
**Second-order concepts:**
Embedding TCECs in law and state support

“They were asked to classify in three levels so to speak that was the way we went about it: take the first CfP, we received the 185 applications which are there I can show them to you, they are in a cupboard next door. So we received the applications, we first looked at them to see if they were eligible under the criteria and then we contacted the correspondents and said here are the x eligible applications in your region, you analyse them in the light of your knowledge of the area and you classify them as very good level A medium B or to be rejected C on the basis of the grids I sent you. So they were examined by the regional representatives of the state as it were and then there were mostly favourable opinions but still there some C’s that we looked at knowing that we already had a constraint which was the amount of money to be distributed so we knew straight away, in the light of the budget requests of each application, the range we were going to be working in, 10 to 25 applications, 10 very expensive applications or 25 less expensive ones. We looked at the annotations made by the regions, made our analysis and classified the applications according to the number of ministries involved so we each had 15 or 20 applications to look at then there were meetings to share our ideas and we carried on in the same way, ABC. The C’s were set aside, we divided the B’s according to the notes of the regions, if they were B or C we set them aside, and then for the A’s we looked at what the regions said if it was A there was a good chance that the application would be accepted, if it was B it was set aside and they were looked at again but then we reached the point where we had to say we’ve reached the limit of the funding. And if we said A and the region C, we tended quite naturally to eliminate” (head of Social Innovation and Experimentation taskforce of the DGCS⁷).

---

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>Theoretical dimension:</strong></th>
<th>Co-construction of a PVA-type instrument</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Second-order concept:</strong></td>
<td>Advocacy and lobbying</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Co-writing of the definition</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

“Let’s say that the various SSE networks had set up a real advocacy activity vis-à-vis the different cabinets etc. so as these were subjects that interested us we decided to go along, and we really took part, on the same footing as the others, in drawing up the specifications, defining the criteria, the selection and so on” (project officer, Caisse des Dépôts [CDC]⁸).

“No, in the end it was something they wanted to be very democratic, a very long process in which many expectations were added to the text and in a way too that diluted so to speak the political will that might have been embodied in some choices and it’s a text that while it stood out by its coherence and so on well its spirit of consensus, on the other hand there are several matters especially regarding TCECs that might have benefited from better definition, more work at the expense maybe of displeasing some people” (deputy director, cabinet of junior minister for commerce, crafts, consumption and the SSE).

---

⁷ Direction générale de la cohésion sociale, “General directorate for social cohesion,” an interministerial body.

⁸ A public investment institution.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>Second-order concepts:</strong></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Demobilisation of the SSE Lab in the CIPs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Obligation for TCECs to be represented by a legal person</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Emphasis on the entrepreneurial dimension</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>Central dimension:</strong></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Hegemony of reference to the market</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>Theoretical dimension:</strong></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Creation of an institutional vocabulary of the “managerial logic of normalisation of the SSE”</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>Second-order concepts:</strong></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Place of private enterprise</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>Reference to competitiveness clusters:</strong></th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>Pursuit of more precise definition:</strong></th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

| “But this nuance led to what happened with the second CIP which was that little by little they brought it down to a profile of the TCEC as they want to see it constructed, whereas that was not our idea at all” (director of SSE Lab). |
| “That has nothing to do with the definition or the decree or any of that and those are links which are absurd, it’s purely pragmatic the person you give the money to is the one who manages the money and the one you contact. I think that’s all there is to it. And they didn’t appreciate that behind that, it could cause problems for clusters that don’t have the time to set up a structure and so on.” |
| “The eligibility criteria also excluded all the clusters that did not present an economic model aimed at long-term viability. All the clusters that came along with subsidies, working 80% on public contracts, in fact more than 50%, were told well no, you aren’t mixing models, you’re presenting a model we know already and dressing it up differently. So we wanted to them to make progress on that point” (deputy director, cabinet of junior minister for commerce, crafts, consumption and the SSE). |
| “I think the actors were generally in favour of a flexible concept and for there not to be this obligation to have a non-SSE enterprise in the TCEC whereas the ministerial cabinet, the cabinet of Carole Delga, so the ministerial position was to keep going in that direction because they were determined to have really very solid, very structured projects” (project officer at DGCS). |
| “Yes indeed and moreover in terms of communication the choice that was made by Carole Delga’s ministry was to talk about the competitiveness clusters of the social and solidarity economy” (project officer at DGCS). |
| “For them that is the reference, they want to see how cooperation clusters are situated relative to competitiveness clusters. Whereas we never wanted to compare ourselves with them except on one point on the resources in other words what resources are given to technological innovation compared with social innovation. So we had zero, they had several million so we thought we could reach an agreement, they could give us some resource but three million euros is very very little” (director of SSE Lab). |
| “What are you trying to achieve? If that isn’t clear, you can draw up specifications as much as you like but I mean if you don’t know what you are trying to put together, to finance, afterwards it will be rather pointless to try and work on it…” (projects director, SGMAP) |
| “There are paradoxical intentions of the initial drivers of the TCECs – the SSE Lab – which are on the one hand to gain recognition for this dynamic...” |
and the fact that it remains a dynamic, it doesn’t hold together, the concept as such may work, I have had the opportunity to discuss with several private investors who are ready to invest so long as it’s with a much more precise definition and probably an Act II of the work on the subject which will be significant and will consist in defining much more precisely what a TCEC is and so bring together elements that were spelled out in the decree and the specifications so as to put them into the law to give a real legal framework for TCECs but knowing what one wants to achieve” (deputy director, cabinet of junior minister for commerce, crafts, consumption and the SSE).

**Table 1**: Illustrative data

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Theoretical dimension:</th>
<th>Persistence of founding civic logic on the margin</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Second-order concepts:</td>
<td>Refusal of rigidification of selection criteria</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

TCEC charter drawn up by SSE Lab.

“The point where I think experimentation was abandoned was in the regulatory texts and I think they wanted to frame too quickly something that still needed some flexibility, they should have been more flexible in the calls for projects.”

“This story of definition is still not settled, the Lab also brought out its own TCEC charter to say that in addition to that one needed I don’t remember exactly any more how it was formulated but to adhere to a certain number of values, except that among the TCECs we are following in the second CIP that are doing a bit of SSE without realising it but don’t want to belong to these SSE networks” (CDC project officer)

“And if in the future there are resources to develop all that, do we ask for there to be something, since there isn’t a label, ask at least as a minimum for there to be a charter?” (director of SSE Lab).

3. The TCEC policy: a Public Value Approach instrument? Evolution of the institutional logics present

This section describes the process of institutionalisation of the TCEC instrument, here seen as PVA-type public policy. First there is a description of the participatory procedure of the founders of the TCEC idea, which they envisaged through the prism of a civic logic for alternative regional development. The second sub-section deals with the appropriation of the idea by public actors who are considered here as “public managers” in Moore’s (1995) sense, seeking to bring civil society actors into the public value creation process. Emphasis is placed on the particularly favourable character of the legal framework for action and political legitimation (Moore, 1995). Then there is a description of what is called here the “managerial turn” in the process of drawing up the TCEC policy, partially associated here with a decline in “operational capacities” but also and especially with the imposition of the managerial logic of normalisation of the SSE. Finally, we explained how the founding logic seeks to live on in this context.

3.1. At first an undertaking initiated by the SSE networks around a civic logic of alternative regional development

Between 2009 and 2010, the SSE Lab – a social and solidarity economy think-tank set up by its first chairman Claude Alphandéry, a former member of the French Resistance and early advocate of the SSE – a series of meetings took place to bring together all the coordinators of networks and movements in the sector to think about the construction of a joint project. These two years of exchanges led to the publication in 2010 of a collective work, *Pour une Autre Economie*, which presented “60 proposals for a change of direction.” Among these proposals, no. 16 aims to “try out and label regional cooperation
clusters." The contributors there call for the recognition and public visibility of the forms of regional cooperation initiated by SSE organisations around sustainable local development projects. Their idea was both to draw attention to the existing efforts at cluster formation, so that they could receive greater support, and to encourage experimentation with new projects, so as to develop this regional development model, anchored in the principles of the SSE. The publication of the collective work aroused such emulation among the contributors that the SSE Lab decided in 2011 to organise a national meeting, an “Estates General of the SSE.” To prepare this event, the various actors worked on drawing up “lists of aspirations” that were synthesised and grouped under different topics. The idea of the Territorial Cluster for Economic Cooperation appeared under the heading “Cooperate and mutualise” and aroused growing interest. In the wake of the Estates General, the SSE Lab, together with the other network coordinators (COORACE, MES, RTES), decided to launch a call for expressions of interest to identify, analyse and support projects that saw themselves as TCECs. Of the one hundred candidatures received, twenty clusters were considered sufficiently emblematic and representative to be designated “pilot clusters” and to be regularly monitored.

Analysis of the public pronouncements of the TCEC founders reveals a clear ambition of social transformation:

“Resistance, Experiment, Vision – REV, that is our shared dream [rêve] “
(Claude Alphandéry).

The initial goal was to favour the emergence of alternative modes of production, consumption and distribution of wealth, envisaging the TCECs as a tool for alternative regional development. The “material practices and symbolic constructions” (Friedland and Alford, 1991) that guided the actors were structured around a vision of transformation and emancipation. The institutional logic that brought them together will be described as a civic logic of alternative regional development. The “lists of aspirations” drawn up in advance of the Estates General of the SSE, from which the proposal for development of the TCEC emerged, are structured, for example, by introductory remarks entitled, for each theme, “synthesis of indignations.”

A glance at the very first definition written jointly by the founders makes clearer the initial spirit of the TCEC idea. It states that a TCEC is

“a grouping over a given territory of initiatives, enterprises and networks of the social and solidarity economy, associated with socially responsible SMEs, local authorities, research centres and training organisations, which implements a common and continuous strategy of cooperation and mutualisation in the service of innovative economic projects for sustainable local development.”

The presence of conventional enterprise is thus not laid down as an obligation, and if it is envisaged, it is in the form of “socially responsible SMEs.”

3.2. A legal framework for action and political legitimation particularly favourable for launching the TCEC instrument

At the time of the excitement about TCECs in the wake of the Estates General and the call for expressions of interest, the administrative and political context was particularly favourable to the institutional development of the TCECs. In 2012, a post of Junior Minister [ministre délégué] for the SSE was created within the Ministry of the Economy. One of the key aims of the mandate of Benoît Hamon, the new Junior Minister, was pass a law on the SSE. At that point, the director of the ministerial cabinet positioned himself as a “public manager” (Moore, 1995) seeking to reveal collective preferences by involving the SSE actors in the drafting of this law. In parallel, Hamon and the Minister for Territorial Equality and Housing (Cécile Duflot) launched a first interdepartmental call for TCEC proposals co-financed by the CDC. In January 2014, 23 projects were selected and granted financial support for three years. It was the civil servants of the ministries concerned that took part in the selection committee, and not the cabinets directly. At the same time, experts were asked for their consultative opinions, designated by the SSE Lab.
A few months later, the idea of the TCEC was the object of a whole article in the Law on the SSE, which claimed to be co-written with all the founders mentioned in the previous part. It was in fact the cabinet ministériel that took the initiative of a legal recognition of TCECs, as confirmed by the remarks of the director of the SSE Lab:

"Article 9 didn’t necessarily come as a result of a request from us, frankly we weren’t thinking about it, it came from the Ministry who said “but we want the clusters to exist, so…”"

The head of the Innovation and Social Experimentation taskforce of the DGCS, who played an important role in drawing up the TCEC policy, emphasised that:

"we wrote the definition of TCECs very much in line with the experimenting that was going on then. The first CIP came before the law was passed, we started out more from the idea of the TCEC as formulated by the SSE Lab. It has to be said that we started to talk about TCECs in the High Council of the SSE and a committee called the Commission Economique we had a first presentation by the SSE Lab of what a TCEC was."

3.3. Increasingly limited operational capacities and the emergence of a “managerial turn”: domination of managerial logic

In April 2014, Benoît Hamon was appointed Minister of Education and was replaced first by Valérie Fourneyron and then Carole Delga, who were junior ministers [secrétaires d'État] not only for the SSE but also for commerce, crafts and consumption. The organisational capacities of their cabinet in resource terms were thus more limited. However, the public managers of the administrations and the CDC remained involved in the TCEC process and the CDC moreover positioned itself as the main funder of the second CIP.

It is from this point on that a managerial turn is identified. The appropriation of the TCEC instrument by the public authorities induced de facto a process of institutionalisation bringing in an institutional logic here described as “imported,” which guides the rationalities and behaviours of the public managers involved in the procedure. More precisely, the “imported” logic will be described as a managerial logic of normalisation of the SSE. Although each ministry involved in the two CIPs had its own interests, its own vision of the TCECs and the associated support policies, a strong emphasis on the notions of efficiency and entrepreneurship can be observed.

Whereas the specifications for the first CIP were drawn up collectively by all the administrations and network coordinators of the SSE, the evaluation that largely shaped the specifications for the second CIP was entrusted to the SGMAP and sub-contracted to consultancies. The cabinet ministériel, which commissioned the evaluation, increasingly wanted to tighten the TCEC selection criteria. According to the deputy director of the cabinet:

"The networks were working, well one of the networks in particular was working to ensure that the law didn’t mean a TCEC label being awarded to some of them and not others, so as to remain in the logic of a dynamic, which in fact contributes nothing, in the end they don’t self-diagnose any more, they do just what they want.”

The focus has shifted from relationships to results and the NPM influences are clear. The evaluation emphasised the idea of performance and characterised the clusters according to their “integration in value chains.” The SGMAP suggested “strengthening expectations regarding the modes of cooperation with the conventional economy,” with the implicit but sometimes clearly expressed postulate of the greater efficiency of the conventional economy and a devaluing of regional development projects, even though, as a number of respondents pointed out, there is no antinomy between the two and a regional development project may well have an entrepreneurial dimension. The discursive references to performance and monitoring of results, specific to NPM, become ever more present:

"benchmarks had been defined with the competitiveness clusters, they [the cabinet ministériel] were keen on this kind of experiment in other areas not far from them”,

(project director, SGMAP)
Moreover, in most of her public communications, Carole Delga, the junior minister for the SSE at the time of the second CfP, described the TCECs as “SSE competitiveness clusters” and even wanted to give them this name, rejected by the networks.

Following the evaluation conducted by the SGMAP, almost all recommendations made were adopted. The implementing decree and the specifications for the second CfP launched in 2015 required tighter selection criteria for TCECs in particular through two controversial obligations: the representation of the clusters by a legal person and the required presence of “at least one SSE enterprise and one conventional enterprise.” Thus the decree does not regard it as essential that the cluster should be driven by SSE organisations nor that they should be in the majority – contrary to the founders’ original vision of the TEC – but simply requires there to be at least one of them.

According to the head of the DGCS taskforce, who was opposed to this measure:

“The real problem is there, saying there may be only one SSE enterprise, you can end up with tricks, they create an ad hoc association then say there is one of them and anything can be done behind that.”

Moreover, the implementing decree particularly stressed the role of self-financing in the business model and the securing of the hypotheses of the financing plan. The number of applications then dropped from 183 for the first CfP to 123 for the second, indicating a growing dissatisfaction on the part of the actors. The public managers, especially at the level of the directorate of the cabinet ministériel, nonetheless maintained their involvement in the process and continued to support the TCEC instrument despite a significant lack of financial resources. According to the deputy director of the cabinet:

“I undertook the task of evangelising many of my colleagues in the other cabinets so they would join in the effort on the subject of TCECs […] for the second call for projects there were six ministries involved! It was a gigantic operation to manage to bring together 3 million euros, totally disproportionate in terms of negotiation with the cabinets, involving everyone, all the work…”

The amounts contributed by the ministries involved (Ministry of Commerce, Consumption, Crafts and the SSE; Education; Overseas Territories; Territorial Equality) were indeed small and the CDC positioned itself as the main funder.

The SSE Lab, strongly involved at the start of the process, was excluded at that point and none of its members took part in the expert committee for the selection of TCECs. The director of the SSE Lab said:

“And in the second call for projects, it was worse I would say, they did everything on their own and didn’t even invite us, we were totally cut out.”

The public managers, mainly at the level of the cabinet ministériel and in the person of the deputy director, were engaged in a process declared to be of public value but which, according to them, paradoxically had to be translated into a “less consensual” approach. The power in terms of legislative initiative held by the members adhering to the managerial institutional logic of the normalisation of the SSE gave it greater centrality (Kim et al., 2007). The wording of the decree setting out the conditions for the second CfP imposed the definition of TCECs relating to the managerial institutional logic of normalisation of the SSE. This then became dominant in the evolution of the TCEC instrument and ousted the civic logic of alternative development.

### 3.4. Estrangement and persistence of the founding logic on the margin

Given that the founders of the TCEC idea could not identify with the evolution of the institutionalised instrument, they sought to perpetuate the civic logic of alternative regional development on the margin of public policy. The director of the SSE Lab was glad not to have taken part in the selection of proposals, which she saw as unsatisfactory and not faithful to the ideas of the founders. The SSE Lab nonetheless continues to work on characterising projects that see themselves as TCECs, whether or not their proposals were selected. Moreover a charter has been drawn up, aiming to narrow the scope of the
TCECs by the signature of clusters that recognise themselves as such, whether their proposal was accepted or not. The founding TCEC inter-network (SSE Lab, MES, CNCRESS, RTES) continues to organise meetings and seminars despite a lack of resources and difficulty in coordination. At one of these events, the chairman of a CRESS said:

"the question of piloting deserves to be looked at more closely because we are seeing it being taken away from us by the public authorities, we must take care not be instrumentalised or confined in the spaces of political goals that are not those that we as citizens had defined, it's up to us to preserve all that we have achieved."

It emerges from these various moments of exchange that the core of the institutionalised TCEC instrument largely diverges from the conception of its founders and from the needs of potential promoters of cluster projects. This contributes directly to a questioning of the PVA since, behind a participative process, what makes value remains determined in the light of the reference frame of action of the public managers who control the levers of public policy. We thus find ourselves in the situation described by Esposito (2014): the PVA is used by public organisations to win legitimacy but does not support a real democratisation of decision-making. It rather defends the maintenance of the status quo by annihilating the social transformation dimension that was at the heart of the initial undertaking. According to the deputy director of the cabinet ministériel:

"the people who came along to advocate the TCECs came with militantly anticapitalist ideas, in other words we are going to make cooperation clusters because we don't believe in competitiveness and so you're going to favour us by giving us subsidies, in fact it went no further but behind it there is no deep thinking about what a TCEC is when it is embedded in its region for the long haul and what it needs for its development."

4. The roots of the banalisation of a PVA-type instrument: proposal for an analytical model

The previous part has made it possible to question whether social needs are really taken into account in the construction of a PVA-type policy and to bring to light the (ultimately) NPM-type influences; but no attempt has been Made to explain the roots of the banalisation of the TCEC instrument. The phases of the evolution of the institutional logics present have been characterised, making it possible to describe the phenomenon studied but not to explain it. In this section, there is a more direct return to the research question to shed light on the roots of the phenomenon of banalisation uncovered by the coding of the empirical material. The fourteen nodes constructed in the coding process (second-order concepts) have been assembled in six theoretical dimensions, themselves bringing out two central dimensions: the incompatibility of the institutional logics present and the hegemony of reference to the market.

4.1. Incompatibility of the institutional logics present

The prescriptions of the two institutional logics are contradictory because 1) the first one is based on cognitive schemas that consider the present mode of development inegalitarian and “wrong” – and therefore prescribes characterisation of and support for TCECs, highlighting their organisational diversity and their responsiveness to the needs of the regions; 2) the second is based more on a schema of rationalisation and sees TCECs as a tool for changing the scale of SSE organisations – and therefore prescribes a strict delimitation of their perimeter, on the model of competitiveness clusters.

The SGMAP evaluation report recommends prioritising “enterprise/entrepreneurial projects rather than political/local development projects.” However, the networks that founder the TCECs concept defined

---

*Conseil national des chambres régionales de l'économie sociale et solidaire*
their goal as one of sustainable local development and declared a political dimension with a view to social transformation. The SGMAP projects director explained:

“if you like, the idea behind privileging entrepreneurial projects means there is more chance of lasting and exploiting this synergy of the SSE world and the entrepreneurial world. If that isn’t behind it and if there is only funding I’m going to scramble in all directions for money but if there’s nothing behind it, well that’s all very you can do a bit of communication a bit of politics but it’s not something that lasts.”

Whereas the conception of the founders of the TCEC and more generally of the SSE project is based on the collective, the SGMAP’s recommendations highlight the individual figure of the entrepreneur. The SGMAP projects director in charge of the evaluation declared:

“we emphasised the mode of selection […], the people had to be interviewed, entrepreneurship means someone who is going to sell us something, who’s going to say look I’ve got an idea, I want to do this in the region, and who will set out his project for us. I can get a feel for a guy like that but someone who stays in his corner and has nothing to say well no. You have to sense whether the person has got something or not.”

Thus, the civic logic of alternative regional development and the managerial logic of normalisation of the SSE come into play. In terms of Besharov and Smith’s typology (2014), their compatibility is low and their centrality high, which induces strong conflictuality. Moreover, Claude Alphandéry, a founding figure of the TCECs, declared:

“For the leaders of the state, as regards TCECs, as soon as you talk about the role of the citizens, you’re being utopian; they want well-run enterprises with experts trained in business schools and so on.”

4.2. Hegemony of reference to the market

Since the two main institutional logics at work in the process of institutionalisation of the TCEC are incompatible, they cannot coexist while maintaining equal influence. What explains in depth the banalisation of the instrument through the imposition of the managerial logic of normalisation of the SSE, is the hegemony of reference to the market in the governmental spheres in charge of the SSE. This frame of reference colonised the institutionalisation of the TCEC and to a large extent explains the phenomenon that is studied here − the shift from the domination of the founding institutional logic (the civic logic of alternative regional development) to that of the present imported logic (the managerial logic of normalisation of the SSE).

The embedding of this reference to the market is also seen even within the institutional structures and its influence on the TCEC instrument grows as they develop. Thus the progressive attachment, from 2012 (see timeline), of the administration of the SSE to the Ministry of Finance emerges as an element explaining the growing influence of reference to the market. When the administration of the SSE was handled by the DGCS, its transformative dimension was taken into account. Although the attachment to “Social cohesion” was often seen from outside as assimilating the SSE to an “economy of reparation,” the head of the DGCS taskforce described it as a collective, alternative economy:

“We are in favour of a plural economy, in other words total freedom to choose one’s mode of enterprise and the coexistence of different modes of enterprise, including the social economy which has different aims in the distribution of wealth […] for me the foundation of the social economy is the collective.”

But from 2012 and the creation of a cabinet ministériel in SSE at the Ministry of the Economy and Finance, the view taken of the SSE in general and also of the TCECs took on a different colour. Analysis of the discourse of the deputy director of the cabinet of Martine Pinville, the successor of Carole Delga from 2015, reveals permanent references to the market as the only legitimate producer of wealth and to the dominant indicators of wealth as the only measure of increased well-being:

“At the same time if you want to increase the number of jobs and the social impact, there has to be an increase in turnover, because all the same it’s all about growth so I think that there
And yet the actors of the TCECs had from the outset called for recognition of the qualitative element of the externalities that they produce, which cannot, in their view, be reduced to quantitative indicators: “We create meaning and not just jobs,” the representative of one TCEC declared at one of the national day workshops.

In addition to the cabinet ministériel, an interdepartmental executive committee for the SSE was created within the Treasury in 2016. Here too, the operating procedures of the public manager who ran this committee were aligned with the dominant schemas of the organisation of production and competition. For example, this executive officer for the SSE announced that the state would contribute to the funding of a TCEC steering group to be called France PTCE [= France TCEC] (echoing France Clusters, the mainstream cluster federation), which would be set up through a call for tenders. This amounted to setting up competition among the organisations of the inter-network which had been cooperating since the birth of the TCECs. A representative of the MES said:

“A call for projects to set up a technical unit? I’m very surprised! I thought we were going to work out with the networks how to set up this collective organisation.”

The dominant culture of the Ministry of Finance sees the SSE not in its transformative dimension but rather in terms of the model of social entrepreneurship and with a view to economic normalisation. Moreover, social impact bonds, the key measure of Mme Pinville’s cabinet, illustrate this conception perfectly: by substituting private investors for the state in financing a social project, they bear witness, even more than the TCECs, to the ascendency of a culture of results.

Whereas the TCECs had first been conceived with a view to social transformation, our survey reveals that the public actors appropriated it in the light of a vision of “capitalism with a human face.” Like the proposal by Yunus (2008), the champion of social business, which consists in a hybridisation of the goals of capitalist enterprise and the NGOs, the idea that the public authorities had of the TCEC was based on a “moralisation” of capitalism.

Discussion and conclusion

This study aims to explain the phenomenon of the banalisation of PVA-type instruments. An attempt has been made to understand how the founding logic of the instrument could be ousted by the “imported logic” arising from the process of institutionalisation and appropriation by the public authorities. Through an analysis of the construction of the TCEC policy, we have described the evolution of the institutional logics present in the phenomenon of banalisation of a PVA-type instrument, in three successive phases: 1) the domination of the founding logic of the instrument, 2) institutionalisation and conflict between the founding logic and the imported logic, 3) the estrangement of the logics and the domination of the imported logic. This process of evolution was then accounted for in terms of two explanatory dimensions: the incompatibility between the civic logic of alternative regional development and the managerial logic of normalisation of the SSE, and the hegemony of reference to the market in the governmental spheres in charge of the SSE, which consolidated the domination of the second logic.

In addition, the analysis of the process of banalisation of a PVA-type instrument sheds interesting light on the relationship between institutional logics and institutional orders, and on the mobilisation of the PVA as managerial rhetoric. This part discusses these elements in greater depth and at the same time points to avenues for further research.

Institutional orders and institutional logics

An interinstitutional system (Thornton et al., 2012, p. 2) comprises various orders at the societal level, for example, the family, religion, state, market, professions, corporation and community. It is conceptualised as a metatheoretical framework, in which each institutional order distinguishes unique organising principles, practices and symbols that influence individual and organisational behaviour.
Some works have examined the relations between the institutional logics anchored in a field or organisation and the institutional orders at societal level. For example, discussing academic publication, Thornton (2004) describes the editorial and market logics of this industry as arising from the state and professional orders. In our study, a clear link can likewise be established between the community order and the institutional order at societal level. For example, discussing academic publication, Thornton (2004) describes the editorial and market logics of this industry as arising from the state and professional order. In our study, a clear link can likewise be established between the community order and the institutional order at societal level. Conversely, the managerial logic of normalisation of the SSE is largely inspired by the market order, whose guiding principle is increased profit and the ideal economic system market capitalism (Thornton et al., 2012). It then seems pertinent to aim to better understand the processes of construction of the institutional logics that stem from the societal institutional orders. In the present study it is the market frame of reference that links the institutional order and the institutional logic: along with the specific set of norms that it brings with it, it diffuses control mechanisms that reinforce and impose the managerial logic of normalisation of the SSE. It would then be particularly enlightening to look closer at this role of “relay” between institutional order and institutional logic, all the more so since the interpenetration of organisational practices and macro dynamics is at the heart of the research agenda of the institutional logics approach.

The PVA as managerial rhetoric

Our study reveals an inherent contradiction in the PVA. The terms “bottom-up,” “participation” or “co-construction” are increasingly used in discourses on the renewal of public policies. While better known in North America, the PVA presents itself as an action framework conducive to the creation of public value. Our study, however, suggests a necessary relativisation of the capacity of public managers to determine collective preferences. This result partly concurs with Rhodes and Wanna’s (2007) critique of the PVA: it shows that the approach implies a certain “heroification” of public managers which may position them as “Platonic guardians” of the general interest, at the expense of the expression of collective preferences.
Appendix A: Interview guide

Axis 1: Presentation of the interviewee

1. Describe your role in the organisation you represent.
2. What was your role in the drawing-up of the TCEC policy?

Axis 2: Partnership between the SSE networks and the public authorities

3. How was the partnership with the other members of the TCEC steering committee organised?
4. What are the principles and aims of your organisation’s participation in the TCEC procedure?

Axis 3: Institutionalisation of the TCEC instrument

Embedding the TCEC in law

5. What was your role in embedding the TCEC instrument in law?

The interdepartmental CIPs

6. What was your role in the interdepartmental calls for TCEC projects?
7. How do you explain the changes that occurred between the two, especially as regards the selection criteria?

Future of the TCEC instrument

8. How do you see the future of the TCEC policy?
Appendix B: Timeline of development of the TCEC instrument

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Event</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>Call for candidatures launched by network leaders</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>1st inter-departmental CfP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2013</td>
<td>Estates General of SSE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2014</td>
<td>Legislative recognition of TCECs Art.9 Law on SSE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2015</td>
<td>2nd inter-departmental CfP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2016</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2017</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Evolution of TCEC instrument

- Civic logic of alternative territorial development
- Founding logic in conflict with imported logic
- Domination of managerial logic of normalisation of SSE

Sterring of TCECs

- "Autonomous" instrument managed by heads of SSE networks
- Institutionalised instrument
References


