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Insurance Law and Incomplete Contracts

Jean-Marc Bourgeon* Pierre Picard†

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Abstract

Under moral hazard most insurance contracts condition the coverage neither on the contingencies under which policyholders have chosen their unobserved behavior, nor on the concrete features of the event that generated the damages. This incompleteness can be explained by underwriting and auditing costs borne by insurers, by policyholders' cognitive costs, and by the limits of market regulation. It opens the door to controversies and disputes between insured and insurer. In this context, we analyze how insurance law can mitigate moral hazard by allowing insurers to cut indemnities in some circumstances, while preventing them from excessive nitpicking. We also highlight conditions under which the burden of proof should be on the policyholders, provided that insurers are threatened with bad faith penalties.

Keywords: insurance, moral hazard, incomplete contracts.
JEL Classification Numbers: D82, D86, G22.

*INRA and CREST- Ecole Polytechnique. Address: UMR Économie Publique, 16 rue Claude Bernard, 75231 Paris Cedex 05, France. E-mail: bourgeon@agroparistech.fr

†CREST- Ecole Polytechnique. Address: Department of Economics, Ecole Polytechnique, 91128 Palaiseau Cedex, France. E-mail: pierre.picard@polytechnique.edu. Pierre Picard acknowledges financial support from Investissements d'Avenir (ANR-11-IDEX-0003/Labex Ecodec/ANR-11-LABX-0047).

1 Introduction

Rightly or wrongly, policyholders frequently think that insurers have leeway in settling claims and that they nitpick on the indemnity payment if they believe it possible. This is particularly true for risk categories where insurance contracts and the soft-law guidelines provided by market regulators do not specify the coverage unambiguously in all possible contingencies. As a result, the insurer is perceived as having a propensity to challenge the legitimacy of claims by invoking provisions or the practices of insurance law.

From a risk-sharing standpoint, this unpredictability of coverage weakens the efficiency of insurance contracting.[1] On the other hand, conditioning coverage on the circumstances of the loss may be worthwhile under moral hazard if circumstances are informative concerning the policyholder's effort (Holmström, 1979; Shavell, 1979). However, in practice, the link between the circumstances of the claim and the indemnity is rarely specified in detail in the insurance contract, and it is often limited to exclusions or force majeure clauses.[2] In other words, more often than not, insurance contracts are incomplete, and the resulting ambiguity may introduce a conflicted dimension into the insurer-insured relationship.[3]

[1]The efficiency loss due to the unpredictability of insurance coverage has been highlighted in the literature on insurance contract non-performance, whose canonical formal set-up was introduced by Doherty & Schlesinger (1990). Insurance non-performance occurs when the insurer is insolvent, but also when he denies coverage in an abusive manner. See Harrison & Ng (2018) for a behavioral evaluation of the welfare effects of non-performance risk.

[2]For instance, a corporate property policy may exclude the damage resulting from fire caused by an explosion or from the transportation of hazardous materials. Likewise, an insurer may impose on its customers the necessity to call on affiliated service providers (e.g., managed care networks), except in the case of force majeure. However, insurance contracts rarely include conditional indemnities depending on all possible circumstances, such as, for instance, the precise weather conditions at the origin of damages in the case of homeowner or automobile insurance, the number and quality (e.g., family or job-related connections) of witnesses, or the conditions when the policyholder is authorized to involve emergency services.

[3]The specificity of insurance contracts is subject to much attention from lawyers, judges and policymakers. This concerns primarily the incompleteness of contracts. As Abraham (1986) puts it: "Insurance policies often are not specific enough to make the rights and obligations of the parties during the claims process crystal clear". It has also been recognized that the sequential nature of the insurer-insured relationship (meaning that the insured has to pay the premium before coverage starts) puts policyholders in a position of inferiority, and may favor insurers' opportunism. In this regard, Works (1998) draws a parallel with the conditions identified by Williamson (1985), i.e., bounded rationality and asset specificity, under which opportunism is likely to thrive. He highlights how insurance law should limit the "forfeiture risk", i.e., the propensity of insurers to unduly deny coverage, by interpreting to their advantage the contractual conditions that trigger the payment of the insurance indemnity. This reinforces the importance of dispute resolution mechanisms in insurance law and regulation, including litigation, and, more often, arbitration, state-sponsored complaint-conciliation programs, and private ombudsmen schemes (see Schwarcz, 2008).

This incompleteness can be attributed to the insurer's underwriting cost and to the policyholder's cognitive cost,[4] both of them being prohibitive in the case of complete contracts. Furthermore, the operative event at the origin of the loss is frequently private information of the claimant, and exhaustively verifying the claim circumstances may be too costly. Observing the detailed circumstances of a loss requires a costly state verification process, and, most of the time, such an audit is justified only when the insurer has reason to believe that the policyholder misbehaved in some way.

The incompleteness of insurance contracts does not necessarily break the link between the indemnity paid to the claimant and the circumstances of the loss. In particular, the insurer may invoke legal means to deny coverage by elaborating on the evidence obtained by auditing the claim, which may be contested in court by the claimant. To take this forward, we consider a model where insurers either validate claims on the basis of (freely available) soft information, or back denial of coverage by verifiable information obtained through a costly audit. In the case of judicial recourse, we assume that the judge has perfect knowledge of the distribution of the insured behaviors in the population, and that his decision is made according to the "balance of probabilities" standard of proof.[5] Alleging some misconduct by the policyholder then appears as an indirect way to condition the insurance coverage on the circumstances of the loss.

We consider a setting where the insurer observes neither the action taken by the policyholder (as in usual moral hazard problems), nor the concrete contingencies she faced at that time, and that conditioned her behavior. This takes us away from a first-best world where, in the absence of transaction cost, risk-averse policyholders should transfer their risk exposure entirely to risk-neutral insurers. The variety of situations leads to a variety of behaviors among the population of policyholders. If a loss occurs, the insured files a claim that provides some partial information on the circumstances of the loss. In a second-best world with moral hazard, where the only asymmetry of information concerns the policyholder's behavior, the optimal contract should condition the coverage on the state faced by the policyholder, and on the circumstances of the loss. However, although force majeure cases and some particular circumstances may be contractible, this second-best setting is not very realistic for a general approach

[4]For instance, Thaler & Sunstein (2009) and Handel & Kolstad (2015) present evidence that choosing a health insurance plan is viewed as a complicated decision by individuals, and that their choices are heavily influenced by factors such as context, switching costs, information frictions and hassle costs.

[5]Our results could be easily extended to other standards of proof. Demougin & Fluet (2006) show that the balance of probabilities decision rule provides maximal incentives to exert care. See also Demougin & Fluet (2008) for an analysis of the case of imperfect evidence.

to insurance contracting. In a third-best world, gathering evidence about the circumstances of the loss is costly and, furthermore, the insurer cannot know the contingencies that conditioned the policyholder's behavior. Hence, contracts are incomplete, i.e., it is impossible to spell out the relationship between the indemnity cut and the many states and circumstances of loss. In this third-best setting, the insurer may decide to audit a claim in order to obtain evidence on the circumstances of the loss, and possibly to allege that the policyholder misbehaved in some way. Such allegations may be contested by policyholders, and the law of insurance contracts will be the final arbiter of conflicts. When courts make decisions "on the balance of probabilities", insurance law should allow insurers to cut indemnities in circumstances that are likely to reveal severe misconduct by the policyholder. This leeway provided by the law leads the insurer to indirectly condition coverage on the circumstances of the loss, which is a desirable feature of the contract but cannot be written into contractual clauses.

We also investigate the burden of proof issue, when the costs of providing verifiable information (i.e., strong evidence that may checked by a court) are at the origin of an additional efficiency loss. We show that, in this fourth-best world, the burden of proof should be on the policyholder if the cost of transmitting hard evidence is not larger (or, at least, not much larger) for the policyholder than for the insurer. Intuitively, attributing the burden of proof to the policyholder is a way of avoiding the cost of transmitting hard evidence to the court, because the insurer has only to allege misconduct that will not be contested at equilibrium. However, this is true only when the insurer faces a bath faith penalty if he is contradicted by the judge. In other words, giving the burden of proof to the policyholder and threatening insurers with bad faith penalties appear to be the two arms of a balanced fourth-best solution.

Our analysis has many sources. The first is the wide literature on incentives with incomplete contracts whose origin lies in the theory of the firm, when the state-contingent sharing of surplus cannot be exhaustively described in contractual arrangements between stakeholders (see Hart & Moore, 1999). It is also related to the analysis of conflicts in firms when labor contracts are incomplete because of the difficulty in gauging and verifying the many aspects of performance such as teamwork or initiative.[6] Another approach to incomplete contracts focuses on the legal rules that restrict the set of feasible contracts and constrain the process of adversarial litigation in contract enforcement. This consists in analyzing incomplete contracts as agreements that do not specify what should be done by the parties in some contingencies and that include

[6]See MacLeod (2007), or Malcomson (2012), for an overview of the "relational contracts" literature.

references to broad legal standards.[7] Our approach is linked to this second trend by considering a setting where insurers may refer to behavioral standards to deny claims, and by focusing attention on how insurance law and adversarial litigation restrict their discretionary power. The analysis of the negligence rule by Fagart & Fluet (2009) is illustrative of this approach in the case of liability insurance.[8] A connection may also be made with the analysis of insurance fraud by Bourgeon & Picard (2014): by allowing insurers to cut the indemnity according to the circumstances of the loss, insurance law acts as an incentive device to perform costly audits.

The rest of the paper is as follows. Section 2 introduces our insurance model under moral hazard. Its main specificity, by comparison with more usual approaches, is twofold. Firstly, we consider an environment where the policyholder may be in various states when she chooses her behavior, resulting in a distribution of effort levels among a population of identical policyholders. Secondly, claims are characterized by the circumstances of the operative event (the accident) at the origin of the loss. In this setting, we characterize the optimal (second-best) insurance contract in a moral hazard setting, where the only asymmetry of information concerns the policyholder's behavior. In Section 3, we turn towards an incomplete (third-best) contract setting, where verifying the circumstances of the loss requires a costly audit. We still consider in this case that the state (i.e., the contingencies in which the policyholder has chosen her behavior) remains unknown to the insurer. We analyze the post-claim insurer-insured interaction in such a setting, with courts making decisions on the balance of probabilities. Section 4 focuses attention on a simplified case, with only two types of behavior ("effort" and "no effort"). This allows us to highlight a trade-off between incentives through the rules of law and through partial insurance coverage that characterizes the third-best optimal solution. Section 5 considers the case where auditing claims only provides soft information about the circumstances of the loss, i.e., it only allows the insurer to take notice of these circumstances. Providing hard evidence requires verifiable information that can be transmitted to the court, either by the policyholder or by the insurer, with specific additional costs. This leads us to a fourth-best optimal

[7] See for instance Shavell (1980) on damage measures for breach of contract, and Scott & Triantis (2005), who challenge the stylized representation of legal enforcement in the concept of verifiability, and advocate a more sophisticated understanding of litigation in the analysis of contract design.

[8] Fagart & Fluet (2009) consider a setting in which the level of care of a potential injurer is not verifiable, a signal about this behavior being perceived following the occurrence of harm affecting a victim. A non-contractible signal makes liability insurance contracts incomplete, but it nevertheless provides some evidence to courts. This evidence can be compared to a standard in order to implement the negligence rule, with a binary set of possible judicial decisions {liable, non-liable}. Fagart & Fluet (2009) show that such an evidence-based negligence rule may Pareto dominate the strict liability rule.

solution where the burden of proof may be given either to the insurer or to the insured. Section 6 concludes. Proofs are in an appendix.

2 The model

2.1 Notations and basic assumptions

Consider an insurance company providing coverage to a risk-averse individual (household or firm) against accidents that may result in a loss L. The occurrence of the loss depends on the policyholder's behavior which is indexed by $b \in \mathcal{B} = \{1, 2, \ldots, n\}$ and ranks the probability of accident π_b increasingly, i.e., $\pi_1 < \pi_2 < ... < \pi_n$. Hence, $b = 1$ corresponds to a cautious behavior with the lowest probability of accident, and the other behaviors $b \in \{2, ..., n\}$ refer to various types of misconduct, increasingly risky, but also decreasingly demanding in terms of effort. The disutility of each behavior b is, however, imperfectly known to the policyholder at the time she takes out the insurance policy: it depends on a parameter θ that reflects the diversity of concrete situations in which she may find herself during the policy period, and which we refer to as the "state" in which the individual finds herself when she chooses her behavior.[9] We assume $\theta \in \Theta$, where Θ is the (multidimensional) set of possible states, and the disutility of behavior b in state θ is denoted $d_b(\theta)$, with $d_b(\theta) > d_{b+1}(\theta)$, for all $b \in \mathcal{B}$ and all $\theta \in \Theta$. Hence, in all states, less risky behaviors entail a larger disutility because they require more effort on the part of the policyholder.[10] We assume that θ is distributed in Θ according to a continuous c.d.f. $H(\theta)$ with density function $h(\theta)$.[11] If the policyholder chooses behavior b in state θ, then her utility is $u(W_f) - d_b(\theta)$ where W_f is her final wealth and u is a (twice continuously differentiable) von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function such that $u' > 0$ and $u'' < 0$.

The insurer may collect evidence concerning the circumstances of the accident,

[9] For instance, a car driver may exert a low level of effort because she does not adequately maintain her vehicle, or because her speed is not appropriate, or because she drives after drinking, or because of a mixture of these behaviors, and all possible misconducts correspond to $b \in \{2, ..., n\}$. θ may be viewed as a random shock that affects the driver's disutility of refraining from these various misconducts. For example, vehicle maintenance will be more painful to the owner when she is struggling to make ends meet in unexpected tough economic circumstances. Likewise, a driver may think that it is not so bad to break the speed limit if he has to arrive on time at an important business meeting.

[10] Assuming $d_b(\theta) > d_{b+1}(\theta)$ is not restrictive because the policyholder would prefer b to $b+1$ in state θ if $d_b(\theta) \leq d_{b+1}(\theta)$ and $\pi_b < \pi_{b+1}$. In other words, behavior $b+1$ would not be chosen in state θ.

[11] Assuming a continuous c.d.f. is made for notational convenience. In section 4, we consider a discrete distribution with Θ reduced to two elements.

which leads to an index $x \in [0,1]$ that reflects the more or less risky behavior of the policyholder, with $x = 0$ when there is no claim. If a claim is filed, x is continuously distributed in $(0,1]$ and measures the likelihood of the various misconducts that may have been at the origin of the claim. The distribution of x depends on the policyholder's behavior $b \in \mathcal{B}$. It is distributed according to c.d.f. $G_b(x)$, with a mass of probability $G_b(0) = 1 - \pi_b$ corresponding to the no-accident case, and density $g_b(x) = G_b'(x)$ if $x \in (0,1]$. We denote $\hat{g}_b(x) = g_b(x)/\pi_b$ the density of x for behavior b, conditionally on a loss occurring. We assume that an increase in b induces a shift in the distribution of x, with strict MLRP when a loss occurs, i.e., $g_{b+1}(x)/g_b(x)$ is increasing with respect to x in $(0,1]$ for all $b \in \{1,\ldots,n-1\}$. In words, a large x leads one to think that the policyholder was at fault for severe misconduct.[12,13] By an abuse of language, in what follows we may refer to x as the circumstances of the loss, although this is only the suspicion index derived from them. Hence, state θ refers to everything that conditions the policyholder's decision-making about her behavior b, while circumstances x characterize the operative event at the origin of the financial loss L.

An insurance contract specifies a premium P paid at the outset, and a non-negative indemnity I in the case of a loss. We denote by $b^\star(\cdot) : \Theta \to \mathcal{B}$ the corresponding policyholder's behavioral rule, i.e., $b^\star(\theta)$ is the action taken by the insured in state $\theta \in \Theta$.[14,15] We neglect any transaction cost, and assume that insurers are risk neutral. Hence, the insurer's break-even constraint imposes that the insurance premium covers the expected indemnity payments. We also assume that over-insurance is ruled out, either for legal reasons, or because the policyholder could deliberately create losses in order to pocket the insurance indemnity. An optimal insurance contract maximizes the individual's expected utility (i.e., her expected utility before she knows the state

[12]We may be more explicit, and denote by $\omega \in \Omega$, the operative event at the origin of the loss, where Ω is the set of all possible events (i.e., all types of accident that may occur). Let $(\Omega, \mathcal{F}, \mathbb{P}_b)$ be a probability space, with a probability measure $\mathbb{P}_b$ for each policyholder's behavior $b \in \mathcal{B}$. We know from Milgrom (1981) that we can associate a real variable x to event ω through a function $x = \varphi(\omega)$, with $\varphi : \Omega \longrightarrow [0,1]$, such that x is a sufficient statistic for b and satisfies MLRP for all b. In particular, for any non-degenerate prior on b, an increase in x induces a FOSD shift in the posterior probability distribution of b. In this sense, a large x can be interpreted as a "bad news", i.e., as suggesting that the policyholder is guilty of serious misconduct.

[13]To simplify matters (and to avoid corner solutions), we also assume $g_n(x)/g_1(x) \to 0$ when $x \to 0$ and $g_n(x)/g_1(x) \to \infty$ when $x \to 1$. Intuitively, $b = 1$ is much more likely than $b = n$ when x is close to 0, and conversely when x is close to 1.

[14]In particular, an insurance policy inducing a behavior $b^\star(\theta) = 1$ for all θ is usually suboptimal because $d_1(\theta)$ may be very large in some states θ. To take an extreme example, think of a man who breaks the speed limit when driving his wife to the maternity hospital, or, less dramatically, think of a driver who is worrying about arriving late at a business meeting.

[15]In what follows, we consider behavioral rules for which incentives matters, in the sense that $b^*(\theta) < n$ in a positive-measure subset of Θ.

θ in which she will find herself) under the insurer's break-even constraint, the no-overinsurance constraint and the non-negative indemnity constraint.

In such a setting, a first-best allocation corresponds to the case where there is no asymmetry of information of any kind between insurer and insured. In particular, the insurer observes the state θ and the policyholder's behavior b, and this information is verifiable by a third party, like a court. It is well-known that such a first-best allocation is characterized by full coverage $I = L$ whatever the state θ and the circumstances of the loss x.

2.2 Second-best contract under moral hazard

A second-best solution to the optimal insurance contracting problem corresponds to the case where the insurer does not observe the policyholder's behavior b, which is thus private information to the policyholder, but there is no other asymmetry of information between insured and insurer. In particular, they both observe the state θ and the circumstances x of any accident which may occur. This information (θ, x) is costlessly verifiable and may be used to condition the insurance coverage. Let $I(\theta, x)$ denotes the insurance indemnity. The policyholder's final wealth is $W_f = W - P$ if there is no accident, and $W_f = W - P - L + I(\theta, x)$ when an accident with circumstances x occurs in state θ. Thus, conditionally on state $\theta \in \Theta$, the expected utility of a policyholder with behavior $b \in \mathcal{B}$ is written as $u_b(\theta) - d_b(\theta)$, where

$$u_b(\theta) = (1 - \pi_b)u(W - P) + \pi_b \int_0^1 u(W - P - L + I(\theta, x))\hat{g}_b(x)dx. \tag{1}$$

The first and second terms in (1) correspond to the no-accident and accident states respectively. If the insurance contract induces behaviors $b^\star(\theta)$ in state θ, then the ex ante expected utility of the policyholder (when she signs the contract) and her ex post incentive constraints (once she has learned about the relevant θ) are written as

$$\mathbb{E}u^\star \equiv \int_\Theta [u_{b^\star(\theta)}(\theta) - d_{b^\star(\theta)}(\theta)]dH(\theta), \tag{2}$$

and

$$u_{b^\star(\theta)}(\theta) - d_{b^\star(\theta)}(\theta) \geq u_b(\theta) - d_b(\theta) \text{ for all } (\theta, b) \in \Theta \times \mathcal{B}, \tag{3}$$

respectively. The insurer's break-even constraint, and the no-overinsurance and non-

negativity constraints are written as

$$P \geq \int_{\Theta} \pi_{b^\star(\theta)} \int_0^1 I(\theta, x) g_{b^\star(\theta)}(x) dx dH(\theta), \tag{4}$$

and

$$0 \leq I(\theta, x) \leq L \text{ for all } (\theta, x) \in \Theta \times [0, 1]. \tag{5}$$

respectively.

The optimal insurance contract maximizes the expected utility given by (2) with respect to P, $I(\cdot)$ and $b^\star(\cdot)$ subject to (3),(4) and (5).

Unsurprisingly, as shown in Proposition 1, $I^\star(\theta, x)$ actually depends on θ and x. Indeed, for a given behavioral rule $b^\star(\cdot)$, the uncertainty about θ should be taken into account in the insurance coverage.[16] Furthermore, x is informative about the policyholder's effort in the sense of Holmström (1979) and, in our moral hazard context, it should condition the transfer from insurer to policyholder. Proposition 1 shows how this conditioning should be implemented.

Proposition 1 *For all $\theta \in \Theta$ such that $b^\star(\theta) < n$, there exist $\underline{x}(\theta), \overline{x}(\theta) \in [0, 1]$ with $\underline{x}(\theta) < \overline{x}(\theta)$, such that the second-best optimal indemnity schedule $I^\star(\theta, x)$ is continuous in x, with*

$$\begin{array}{ll} I^\star(\theta, x) = L & \textit{if } 0 \leq x < \underline{x}(\theta) \textit{ if } \underline{x}(\theta) > 0, \\ \left.\begin{array}{l} 0 < I^\star(\theta, x) < L \\ dI^\star(\theta, x)/dx < 0 \end{array}\right\} & \textit{if } \underline{x}(\theta) < x < \overline{x}(\theta), \\ I^\star(\theta, x) = 0 & \textit{if } \overline{x}(\theta) < x \leq 1 \textit{ if } \overline{x}(\theta) < 1. \end{array}$$

If $b^\star(\theta) = n$, then $dI^\star(\theta, x)/dx = 0$ for all x.

In all states θ where some effort is required (i.e., $b^\star(\theta) < n$), the optimal insurance policy provides either full coverage, partial coverage or zero coverage, depending on the circumstances of the loss. The more favorable the circumstances (i.e., the lower x), the larger the indemnity. The bounds L and 0 may be reached under the most favorable or worst possible circumstances (i.e., when $0 \leq x \leq \underline{x}(\theta)$ and $\overline{x}(\theta) \leq x \leq 1$), respectively. There is partial coverage in the intermediary cases, with larger coverage when circumstances are more favorable. Equivalently, we may write $I^\star(\theta, x) = [1 -$

[16] By way of follow-up to footnote 14, it is conceivable that, when a road traffic offense has been committed, cutting the indemnity is less recommended in the case of the man who drives his wife to the maternity in an emergency, than when the same person is worried about arriving late at a business meeting. The behavioral disutility associated with obeying speed limits is probably larger in the first case than in the second.

$z^\star(\theta, x)]L$, where $z^\star(\theta, x)$ is an indemnity cut such that $z^\star(\theta, x) = 0$ if $x < \underline{x}(\theta)$, $z^\star(\theta, x) \in (0, 1)$ if $\underline{x}(\theta) < x < \overline{x}(\theta)$ and $z^\star(\theta, x) = 1$ if $x > \overline{x}(\theta)$. These results are illustrated in Figure 1.



Figure 1: Optimal indemnity

3 Incomplete contracts

Aside from exceptional cases (e.g., a well-documented natural disaster being at the origin of force majeure), the state θ in which policyholders find themselves is not observed by insurers, and verifying it by audit would be very difficult, and even impossible in many cases. As regards the circumstances of the loss x, there are at least two reasons for which, in practice, they may condition the insurance coverage only in a very rudimentary way, particularly though exclusions for specific types of accident. Firstly, obtaining verifiable information about the circumstances of an accident usually requires a costly verification process. More often than not, claimhandlers routinely pay the insurance indemnity, but sometimes a (privately perceived) signal convinces the insurer that the claim should be audited in order to know more about the circumstances

surrounding it. However, equal treatment of all policyholders prevents insurers from conditioning coverage on the information obtained by audit for some of them. Another reason is related to the cognitive costs of contracts. It is true that insurance policies frequently contain a lot of small print, but, apart from exclusion clauses, they mainly focus either on the legal principles governing insurance contracts, or on policyholders' duties.[17] In fact, property and liability losses may occur through operative events that correspond to such a large number of circumstances that listing and describing them all, with specific coverage in all cases, would be unfeasible in practice.[18]

Hence, in most cases, contractual insurance payments are neither conditioned upon the ex ante situation of the policyholders nor on the ex post circumstances of the loss, although such circumstances may nevertheless be verified by audit. It remains no less true that the insurer may use the evidence yielded by audits to invoke a breach of law in order to justify a more or less severe cut in the indemnity. Hence, auditing the claim may be the starting point of disputes between insurer and insured that are resolved through some legal arrangement, be it an amicable settlement, by resorting to an arbitrator or by going to court. The auditing cost coupled with the incompleteness of insurance policies are obviously at the origin of an efficiency loss, by comparison with the second-best solution. We thus consider here a third-best solution to the insurance problem under moral hazard.

A standard way in the analysis of conflicts arbitrated by law consists in assuming that judges decide by relying on the likelihood of the behavior alleged by each party. An insurer may allege that the policyholder misbehaved and thus, on the basis of the law of contracts, that the claim should be fully or partially denied. However, the insurer's allegations must be consistent with the empirical evidence provided by the circumstances of losses, for otherwise the judge would consider them to be bad faith on the part of the insurer and they would be invalidated. This corresponds to the usual standard of proof for civil cases in Common Law: judges are supposed to decide "on the balance of probabilities".

Assume that, when a claim is filed, the insurer privately observes a signal $s \in \mathbb{R}$ defined by

$$s = x + \varepsilon,$$

where ε is a zero-mean random variable with density $f(\varepsilon)$ defined over $\mathbb{R}$ and such

[17] For instance, calling for the service of affiliated car repairers or health care providers.

[18] Put differently, by using the terminology of cognitive science, complete contracts would induce such a large cognitive load (i.e., too much effort in using working memory) that their incentive advantages would not be worth it.

that $\mathrm{Cov}(x, \varepsilon) = 0$. We assume that x can be verified by auditing the claim, which costs c to the insurer, and we denote $q(s) \in [0, 1]$ the audit probability when signal s is perceived.

When no audit is performed, the insurer routinely pays I to the claimant, in which case we have $W_f = W - P - L + I$. If x has been verified through an audit, then the insurance payment depends on x through legal means that may be invoked by the insurer. For notational simplicity we will not distinguish misconduct $b \in \{2, \ldots, n\}$ from the corresponding legal means (or broad standards) that can be invoked by insurers, although, in practice, there are many types of misconduct, while the law of insurance contracts only includes a limited number of legal means.[19] Insurance law specifies the insurer's leeway in the claim settlement process, i.e., to what extent a legal means allows him to cut or even cancel coverage. More precisely, in what follows, the law of insurance contracts is subsumed in the proportions of claims $y_b \in [0, 1]$ that the insurer is allowed to cut for each behavior b. When the insurer is allowed to fully cancel the claim, we have $y_b = 1$. We assume $y_1 = 0$ because the insurer can cut the indemnity only by alleging that the policyholder misbehaved in some way, and that the law is constrained by a severity principle, according to which the severity of misconducts and the intensity of indemnity cuts are co-monotone, i.e., $y_b \leq y_{b+1}$ for all $b = 1, \ldots, n-1$. If the insurer is in a position to invoke legal means b under circumstances x, then he may decide to cut the indemnity by a fraction $z(x)$ lower or equal to y_b, and the insurance payment is $[1 - z(x)]I$, with $W_f = W - P - L + [1 - z(x)]I$

When the policyholder behaves according to the state-dependent rule $b^\star(\theta)$, Bayes Law provides the conditional probability of a behavior b when signal $x \in (0, 1]$ is observed after an audit. This is written as

$$\Pr(b|x) = \frac{g_b(x) \int_{\Theta_b^\star} dH(\theta)}{\sum_{b' \in \mathcal{B}} g_{b'}(x) \int_{\Theta_{b'}^\star} dH(\theta)}, \tag{6}$$

where $\Theta_b^\star \equiv \{\theta \in \Theta | b^\star(\theta) = b\}$ is the set of states in which the policyholder chooses $b \in \mathcal{B}$.

Given x, alleging misconduct $b_0 \in \{2, \ldots, n\}$ is said to be "credible on a balance of probabilities" if it is more likely that the policyholder had misconduct b_0 or a worse

[19] The list of available legal means includes: non-disclosure, misrepresentation, duty of care, reckless conduct, bad faith, etc., with possible overlaps.

misconduct $b \in \{b_0+1,\ldots,n\}$ than a better behavior $b \in \{1,\ldots,b_0-1\}$, i.e., if[20]

$$\sum\nolimits_{b=b_0}^{n} \Pr(b|x) \geq \sum\nolimits_{b=1}^{b_0-1} \Pr(b|x),$$

or, equivalently if

$$\sum\nolimits_{b=b_0}^{n} \Pr(b|x) \geq \frac{1}{2}.$$

We denote $\hat{b}(x)$ the most serious misconduct that can be credibly alleged when signal x is perceived through an audit, i.e.,

$$\sum\nolimits_{b=\hat{b}(x)+1}^{n} \Pr(b|x) < \frac{1}{2} \leq \sum\nolimits_{b=\hat{b}(x)}^{n} \Pr(b|x), \tag{7}$$

with $\hat{b}(x) = 1$ if no misconduct $b_0 \in \{2,\ldots,n\}$ is credible. The following lemma is based on the MLRP assumption and shows that a larger x allows the insurer to credibly allege more serious misconducts.

Lemma 1 $\hat{b}(\cdot) : [0,1] \to \mathcal{B}$ *is a non-decreasing step function.*

Lemma 1 allows us to write $\hat{b}(x) = b$ if $x_b \leq x < x_{b+1}$, for all $b \in \mathcal{B}$, with $x_1 = 0$ and x_b given by

$$\sum\nolimits_{b'=b}^{n} \Pr(b'|x_b) = \frac{1}{2}$$

for all $b = 2, ..., m$, where $m \in \mathcal{B}$ is the most severe misconduct that can be confirmed by the judge, i.e., that is credible under the balance of probabilities when x is close to 1. The corresponding maximum indemnity cuts are given by $y_{\hat{b}(x)}$ as illustrated Figure 2 (where $m = 4$).

The policyholder-insurer interaction can then be described by the following five-stage game:

- **Stage 1:** The individual takes out the insurance policy (I, P). Nature chooses θ. The policyholder observes θ and then she chooses behavior $b \in \mathcal{B}$. Should a loss occur, she files a claim. In that case, the insurer observes signal s.

[20] This legal standard, also called "preponderance of evidence", is generally understood as implying a threshold degree of certainty just above 50%. Other legal standards, like "proof beyond reasonable doubt" or "clear and convincing evidence," would correspond to different (larger) levels of certainty that could be easily dealt with in our setup without qualitatively changing our results.



Figure 2: Optimal indemnity and the balance of probability.

- **Stage 2:** If a claim has been filed, the insurer either directly validates it or triggers an audit. In that case, he incurs the audit cost c and he obtains the verifiable information x.

- **Stage 3:** If an audit has been performed, the insurer either validates the claim and pays I to the claimant, or he alleges that the policyholder misbehaved according to $b \in \{2, \ldots, n\}$.

- **Stage 4:** The policyholder may contest the insurer's allegation in court. The judge confirms the insurer's allegation if $b \leq \hat{b}(x)$, and dismisses it otherwise.

- **Stage 5:** The indemnity paid to the policyholder is I if the claim has been validated by the insurer or if the insurer's allegation b has been dismissed by the judge. Otherwise, the insurer pays an indemnity $(1 - z)I$, with $z \leq y_b$.

A subgame perfect equilibrium of this game is easily characterized. After observing s at stage 1, the insurer triggers an audit at stage 2 if $c \leq \mathbb{E}[y_{\hat{b}(x)}|s]I$, since $b = \hat{b}(x)$ is the most severe allegation made at stage 3 that will not be dismissed by the judge at stage 4, and the insurer chooses $z = y_{\hat{b}(x)}$ at stage 5. Thus, an equilibrium audit strategy is defined by[21]

$$q(s) = \begin{cases} 1 & \text{if } c \leq \mathbb{E}[y_{\hat{b}(x)}|s]I, \\ 0 & \text{otherwise.} \end{cases} \tag{8}$$

Lemma 2 *When $f(\varepsilon)$ is log-concave, the equilibrium audit strategy is a unit step function: $q(s) = 0$ if $s < s^\star$ and $q(s) = 1$ if $s \geq s^\star$, with $s^\star \in \mathbb{R} \cup \{-\infty, +\infty\}$.*

The intuition of lemma 2 is straightforward. Its proof goes through preliminary Lemma 3 in the Appendix, showing that under log-concavity of $f(\varepsilon)$, an increase in s induces a FOSD shifts in the conditional probability distribution of x.[22] It is worth auditing a claim when the signal s is bad enough to be considered to be a red flag, indicating that the circumstances of the loss are likely to be unfavorable (i.e., x is probably large). Cases where $s^\star = \pm\infty$ correspond to corner solutions where claims are never (resp. always) audited because c is very large (resp. very low).

Conditionally on state $\theta \in \Theta$, the expected utility of a policyholder with behavior $b \in \mathcal{B}$ is written as $u_b(\theta) - d_b(\theta)$, where [23]

$$\begin{aligned} u_b(\theta) = (1-\pi_b)u(W-P) + \pi_b \int_0^1 u(W-P-L+I)\left(1-\mathbb{E}[q(s)|x]\right)\hat{g}_b(x)dx \\ + \pi_b \int_0^1 u(W-P-L+(1-z(x))I)\mathbb{E}[q(s)|x]\hat{g}_b(x)dx. \end{aligned} \tag{9}$$

and

$$z(x) = y_{\hat{b}(x)} \tag{10}$$

for all x. The first, second and third terms in (9) correspond to the no-accident state, to the accident states without audit and to the accident states with audit, respectively.

[21] The proof of lemma 2 provides an explicit formula for $\mathbb{E}[y_{\hat{b}(x)}|s]$.

[22] Many univariate random variables whose distributions are defined by densities are log-concave, including the Normal, Laplace, Uniform, Gamma and Beta distributions. A log-concave density is unimodal, with convex level sets and sub-exponential tails. More strongly than what is necessary for establishing Lemma 2, it can be shown that an increase in s shifts the conditional distribution of x in the sense of MLRP.

[23] More precisely, we have $f(\cdot)$ the density distribution of ε over $\mathbb{R}$, then $\mathbb{E}[q(s)|x] = \int_{-\infty}^{+\infty} q(s)f(s-x)ds$.

For an optimal insurance law, the insurance contract (P, I), the audit strategy $q(\cdot)$, and the insurance law $\{y_b, b \in \mathcal{B}\}$ jointly maximize

$$\mathbb{E}u^\star \equiv \int_\Theta [u_{b^\star(\theta)}(\theta) - d_{b^\star(\theta)}(\theta)] dH(\theta) \tag{11}$$

subject to

$$P \geq \int_\Theta \pi_{b^\star(\theta)} \left\{ I + \int_0^1 (c - I y_{\hat{b}(x)}) \mathbb{E}[q(s)|x] \hat{g}_{b^\star(\theta)}(x) dx \right\} dH(\theta), \tag{12}$$

$$u_{b^\star(\theta)}(\theta) - d_{b^\star(\theta)}(\theta) \geq u_b(\theta) - d_b(\theta) \text{ for all } (\theta, b) \in \Theta \times \mathcal{B}, \tag{13}$$

$$q(s) = \begin{cases} 1 & \text{if } s \geq s^\star \\ 0 & \text{if } s < s^\star \end{cases}, \tag{14}$$

where $s^\star$ is given by

$$c = \mathbb{E}[y_{\hat{b}(x)}|s^\star] I, \tag{15}$$

and $\hat{b}(\cdot) : [0, 1] \to \mathcal{B}$, $b^\star(\cdot) : \Theta \to \mathcal{B}$ satisfy conditions (6) and (7).

Notations can be recapped as follows: $b^\star(\theta)$ is the policyholder's behavior in state θ, $\hat{b}(x)$ is the most severe policyholder's misconduct that can be alleged by the insurer after observing circumstances x through a claim audit, and $s^\star$ is the signal threshold above which an audit is triggered. Hence, $\mathbb{E}u^\star$ given by (11) is the ex ante policyholder's expected utility, i.e., before she knows the state θ, with behavioral rule $b^\star(\cdot)$. Condition (14) is deduced from condition (8) and Lemma 2: an audit is triggered if $s \geq s^\star$, where $s^\star$ is given by (15).[24] Auditing a claim costs c, but it allows the insurer to reduce the indemnity from I to $I[1 - y_{\hat{b}(x)}]$ if the audit reveals claim circumstances x. Hence, (12) is the insurer's break-even condition. (13) is the ex post incentive constraint: in state θ, the policyholder weakly prefers behavior $b^\star(\theta)$, rather than any other behavior $b \neq b^\star(\theta)$.

Proposition 2 *If c is not prohibitively large, then an optimal third-best solution to the insurance moral hazard problem is such that $y_b > 0$ in a non-empty subset of $\mathcal{B}$ and the insurer audits claims with positive probability (i.e., $s^\star < +\infty$).*

In short, when judges make decisions on the balance of probabilities, an audit puts the insurer in the position to allege that the policyholder misbehaved in some way when x is sufficiently large, i.e., when $\hat{b}(x) \geq 2$. The insurer will not be dismissed by the court and, in such cases, insurance law should allow him to cut indemnities. It

[24] Eq. (15) assumes that $s^\star \neq \pm\infty$. It can be easily extended to these cases.

is worth auditing the claim when the expected claim cut $E[y_{\hat{b}(x)}|s]I$ is larger than the audit cost c, which holds when $s \geq s^*$, with $s^\star < +\infty$ if c is not too large. This leeway provided by law leads the insurer to condition the payment on the circumstances of the loss, which is a desirable feature of the relationship between insurer and insured, although it is not written in contractual clauses.

4 The two-type case

In this section, we characterize more precisely the optimal second-best insurance contract in the simple case where $n = 2$, with a single type of misconduct ($b = 2$), and two states, i.e., $\Theta = \{\underline{\theta}, \bar{\theta}\}$ with $d_1(\underline{\theta}) > d_2(\underline{\theta}) > 0$ and $d_1(\bar{\theta}) = +\infty, d_2(\bar{\theta}) > 0$. In words, $\underline{\theta}$ is a normal state, in which the policyholder can be incentivized in order to choose $b = 1$, while she never chooses $b = 1$ when she is in state $\bar{\theta}$. We consider an optimal second-best allocation where the policyholder chooses $b = 1$ when $\theta = \underline{\theta}$, and $b = 2$ when $\theta = \bar{\theta}$. We denote $\underline{h} = \Pr\{\theta = \underline{\theta}\}$ and $\bar{h} = \Pr\{\theta = \bar{\theta}\}$ the probabilities of the states, with $\underline{h} + \bar{h} = 1$. The law of contracts allows the insurer to reduce the indemnity by a proportion y_2 when $x \geq x_2$ where the threshold x_2 is deduced from $\Pr\{b = 2|x_2\} = 1/2$. We denote $\hat{S}_b = \Pr\{x \geq x_2|b\} = 1 - \hat{G}_b(x_2)$, where $\hat{G}_b$ is the c.d.f. of x, conditionally on a loss occuring under behavior b. The optimal solution of our problem is easier to characterize by defining

$$\begin{aligned}
\hat{u} &= u(W - P), \\
u_0 &= u(W - P - L + I), \\
u_1 &= u(W - P - L + (1 - y_2)I),
\end{aligned}$$

and by denoting

$$\begin{aligned}
v &= u_0 - u_1, \\
\bar{g} &= 1 - [\pi_2 \hat{G}_2(x_2) - \pi_1 \hat{G}_1(x_2)]/(\pi_2 - \pi_1), \\
A &= [d_1(\underline{\theta}) - d_2(\underline{\theta})]/(\pi_2 - \pi_1) > 0.
\end{aligned}$$

Since the type-$\underline{\theta}$ incentive constraint is obviously binding, we may rewrite this constraint as

$$\hat{u} = u_0 + A - v\bar{g}. \tag{16}$$

Substituting

$$P = W - u^{-1}(\hat{u}) = W - u^{-1}(u_0 + A - v\bar{g}), \tag{17}$$

$$I = P + L - W + u^{-1}(u_0), \tag{18}$$

$$(1 - y_2)I = P + L - W + u^{-1}(u_0 - v), \tag{19}$$

in the insurer's break-even constraint gives

$$\begin{aligned} \bar{W} &\geq (\underline{h}\pi_1\hat{G}_1 + \bar{h}\pi_2\hat{G}_2)u^{-1}(u_0) + (\underline{h}\pi_1\hat{S}_1 + \bar{h}\pi_2\hat{S}_2)u^{-1}(u_0 - v) \\ &\quad + (1 - \underline{h}\pi_1 - \bar{h}\pi_2)u^{-1}(u_0 + A - v\bar{g}) \\ &\equiv K(u_0, v), \end{aligned} \tag{20}$$

where $\bar{W} = W - L(\underline{h}\pi_1 + \bar{h}\pi_2)$ is the ex ante policyholder's expected wealth. Since u is concave, u^{-1} is convex and thus $K(u_0, v)$ is a convex function of u_0 and v, with $\partial K/\partial u_0 > 0$ and $\partial K/\partial v < 0$. The same substitutions yield

$$\mathbb{E}u^\star = \underline{h}[(1 - \pi_1)\hat{u} + \pi_1(u_0 - \hat{S}_1 v)] + \bar{h}[(1 - \pi_2)\hat{u} + \pi_2(u_0 - \hat{S}_2 v)] - \underline{h}d_1(\underline{\theta}) + \bar{h}d_2(\bar{\theta})$$

and, using (16) and simplifying gives

$$\begin{aligned} \mathbb{E}u^\star &= u_0 - v\{\underline{h}[(1 - \pi_1)\bar{g} + \pi_1\hat{S}_1] + \bar{h}[(1 - \pi_2)\bar{g} + \pi_2\hat{S}_2]\} \\ &\quad + (1 - \underline{h}\pi_1 - \bar{h}\pi_2)A - \underline{h}d_1(\underline{\theta}) + \bar{h}d_2(\bar{\theta}). \end{aligned} \tag{21}$$

Finally, using (18) and (19) allows us to rewrite the conditions $0 \leq (1-y_2)I \leq I \leq L$ as $u^{-1}(u_0 - v) \leq u^{-1}(u_0) \leq W - P = u^{-1}(\hat{u}) = u^{-1}(u_0 + A - v\bar{g})$. As u is increasing, we must have

$$0 \leq v \leq A/\bar{g}. \tag{22}$$

The optimal solution is obtained by maximizing $\mathbb{E}u^\star$ given by (21) subject to (20) and (22). As illustrated in Figure 3, the insurer's break-even constraint $K(u_0, v) = \bar{W}$ corresponds to an increasing convex locus in the (u_0, v) plane. Iso-expected utility curves are increasing straight lines. Figure 3 illustrates the case of a corner solution at point E where $v = A/\bar{g}$, and thus with $I = L$. A calculation developed in the appendix shows that this is the case when $\bar{h}$ is large enough. More explicitly:

Proposition 3 *There exists $h^\star \in (0, 1)$, such that there is full coverage (i.e., $I = L$) if $\bar{h} \geq h^\star$ and partial coverage (i.e., $I < L$) if $\bar{h} < h^\star$.*



Figure 3: Optimal contract when $\bar{h} > h^\star$

Proposition 3 highlights the substitutability between the incentives provided by the law of insurance contracts and those provided by the indemnity schedule. Two regimes exist, according to whether $\overline{h}$ is larger or lower than the threshold $h^\star$.[25] If the proportion of individuals exerting only the low effort level is large (i.e. if $\bar{h} > h^\star$), it is socially optimal to offer an insurance contract with full coverage and to give the insurer the opportunity to cut the indemnity when the circumstances reveal misconduct. On the contrary, if $\bar{h} < h^\star$, it is difficult for the insurer to credibly claim that the insured did misbehave (i.e., this is possible only for very large x), and incentives are better provided by offering a contractual indemnity that is lower than the loss, whatever the circumstances. This corresponds to the case depicted Figure 4.

Very often, the law of insurance contracts is rather coarse in specifying the conditions that allow the insurer to renege on the indemnity payment: either the insurer must pay the complete indemnity because the circumstances are not sufficient to convince the court that the insured did misbehave, or the insurer pays nothing when he

[25] $h^\star$ depends on $G_1(\cdot)$ and $G_2(\cdot)$, i.e., on the probability distributions of the circumstances of a loss.



Figure 4: Optimal contract when $\bar{h} < h^\star$

can credibly make such an allegation. Formally, this is equivalent to restricting the cut function $z(x)$ to either 0 or 1, hence, a reduced indemnity $(1 - y_2)I = 0$ and a corresponding utility level $u_1 = u(W - P - L)$. We now investigate the consequences of this restriction on the contractual indemnity.

Similar to (20), the insurer break-even constraint can be written as $\bar{W} \geq K(u_0, v)$, but with an ex ante policyholder's expected wealth given by

$$\bar{W} = W - L(\underline{h}\pi_1\hat{G}_1 + \bar{h}\pi_2\hat{G}_2)$$

and

$$K(u_0, v) = (1 - \underline{h}\pi_1\hat{G}_1 - \bar{h}\pi_2\hat{G}_2)u^{-1}(u_0 + A - v\bar{g}) + (\underline{h}\pi_1\hat{G}_1 + \bar{h}\pi_2\hat{G}_2)u^{-1}(u_0),$$

which is a convex function of u_0 and v, satisfying $\partial K/\partial u_0 > 0$ and $\partial K/\partial v < 0$. We



Figure 5: Optimal constrained contract

also have

$$\begin{aligned}\mathbb{E}u^\star &= \underline{h}\{(1-\pi_1)(A-\bar{g}v+u_0)+\pi_1[\hat{G}_1u_0+\hat{S}_1u(u^{-1}(A-\bar{g}v+u_0)-L)]-d_1(\underline{\theta})\}\\ &\quad+\bar{h}\{(1-\pi_2)(A-\bar{g}v+u_0)+\pi_2[\hat{G}_2u_0+\hat{S}_2u(u^{-1}(A-\bar{g}v+u_0)-L)]-d_2(\bar{\theta})\}\\ &\equiv U(u_0,v)\end{aligned}$$

which is a concave function of u_0 and v if u is DARA, with $\partial U/\partial u_0 > 0$ and $\partial U/\partial v < 0$. Calculation shows that $v < A/\bar{g}$, i.e., $I < L$ at the optimum, as illustrated in Figure 5.

Proposition 4 *When $y_2 \in \{0,1\}$, the optimal contract provides partial coverage, i.e., $I < L$.*

Hence, when the law of insurance contracts is restricted to an "all or nothing" type of decision, its efficiency is limited and it is necessary to reinforce the incentives provided by the terms of the contract by offering only a reduced coverage.

5 The burden of proof

In the two previous sections, we have assumed that the information x on the circumstances of the loss, known to the policyholder and possibly observed by the insurer through an audit, is hard evidence: this information could be presented as such to a court, without incurring any supplementary cost. Realities are often more complex. Auditing a claim may allow the insurer to examine all the information about the circumstances of an accident, but persuading a judge that the policyholder misbehaved in a certain way frequently requires more. Put differently, it is one thing for the insurer to know the circumstances of an accident through an audit and make its own judgment, and quite another to be able to provide verifiable information to a court, if it is required to do so. To distinguish these two levels of information, we now consider that auditing a claim only provides soft information about the circumstances of the accident: the insurer can observe x through an audit, but more evidence is needed to sustain an allegation in court (i.e., to upgrade observed circumstances to verifiable hard information). Sustaining a claim by verifiable information is also costly to the policyholder, although this cost is presumably smaller than the investigation cost incurred by the insurer.[26] This raises the question of the allocation of the burden of proof, i.e., the obligation of a party to produce the evidence that will prove its claim against the other party who is given the "benefit of the doubt". These verification costs are at the origin of an additional efficiency loss by comparison with the third-best case where audit directly provides hard information on the circumstances of the accident. Accordingly, we qualify the optimal allocation in this setting as a fourth-best solution to the insurance moral hazard problem.

Consider first that the burden of proof is on the policyholder, and the insurer is given the benefit of the doubt. We assume that it costs the insured k_P per dollar of indemnity to produce evidence on the circumstances of the loss. We also assume that evidence can only be found about the actual events that generated the loss, i.e., that the information cannot be distorted or forged.[27] The judge cannot therefore be misguided by the policyholder with some piece of fake evidence sustaining an information level that is different from x. In other words, the policyholder can only prove (at cost k_P) that the circumstances are x if she wants to refute the allegation of the insurer. The

[26] For instance, the policyholder may need to yield reliable testimonies by witnesses or technical reports in corporate or personal liability issues, expert reports in property claims, medical certificates in medical malpractice claims or some kind of psychological report in work harassment cases.

[27] Crocker and Morgan (1997) develop a theory of claim falsification, in which policyholders spend resources to distort the information insurers perceive about their loss.

policyholder-insurer interaction is modified as follows:

- **Stages 1 to 3** are unaffected, but the information x obtained by the insurer in case of an audit is only soft information. Hence, the insurer's allegation $b \in \{2, \ldots, n\}$ is not sustained by evidence, i.e., it does not allow the judge to verify the true value x.

- **Stage 4:** the policyholder may decide to contest in court the insurer's allegation by transmitting verifiable information about x to the judge at cost k_P. In that case, the judge proves the insured right if $\hat{b}(x) < b$, which entitles the insured to receive the full indemnity I. Otherwise, the judge confirms the insurer's allegation and the rule of law y_b applies.

- **Stage 5** is unaffected.

Note that the contractual indemnity I is entirely paid if the judge proves the insured right. We will discuss this assumption below, but we may already consider it as corresponding to a bad faith clause frequently applied in insurance law: if $\hat{b}(x) < b$, the judge considers that the insurer was plainly deceptive and he obliges him to pay the contractual indemnity as bad faith penalty.[28]

After an audit that revealed x, the insurer knows that any allegation $b > \hat{b}(x)$ at stage 2 will be successfully contested by the insured at stage 4 if and only if $k_P \leq y_b$, because otherwise contesting the insurer's allegation would not be worthwhile. Let

$$x^\star = \inf\{x \in (0, 1] : y_{\hat{b}(x)} \geq k_P\}. \tag{23}$$

When $x \geq x^\star$, it is optimal for the policyholder to contest any allegation $b > \hat{b}(x)$ with $y_b \geq y_{\hat{b}(x)}$. Indeed, bringing verifiable information about x to the court will persuade the judge that the allegation b is unfounded (i.e., cannot be justified on the balance of probabilities). Thus, the insurer will be condemned for bad faith and the policyholder proved right, with net gain for the latter

$$(y_b - k_P)I \geq (y_{\hat{b}(x)} - k_P)I \geq 0.$$

Consequently, when the insurer observes $x \geq x^\star$ through an audit, it is an optimal strategy for him to allege misbehavior $\hat{b}(x)$, and this will not be contested by the insured.

[28] Should the insurer have alleged $b = \hat{b}(x)$, then he would have been allowed to cut the indemnity by a fraction $y_{\hat{b}(x)}$.

When $x < x^\star$, we have $y_{\hat{b}(x)} < k_P$ and the insurer knows that any allegation $b > \hat{b}(x)$ will be successfully contested by the policyholder if $y_b \geq k_P$, i.e., if $b \geq \hat{b}(x^\star)$. Hence, an optimal insurer's strategy consists in alleging the misconduct immediately lower than $\hat{b}(x^\star)$, i.e., $b = \hat{b}(x^\star) - 1$, which will not be contested by the policyholder.

The indemnity cut is

$$z(x) = \begin{cases} y_{\hat{b}(x^\star)-1} & \text{if } x < x^\star \\ y_{\hat{b}(x)} & \text{if } x \geq x^\star \end{cases} \tag{24}$$

instead of (10), and, whatever the case, the insured does not contest the insurer's allegation. The corresponding break-even condition for the insurer is given by

$$\begin{aligned} P \geq \int_\Theta \pi_{b^\star(\theta)} \Bigg\{ I + \int_0^1 cE[q(s)|x]\hat{g}_{b^\star(\theta)}(x)dx \\ - I \left(\int_0^{x^\star} y_{\hat{b}(x^\star)-1} + \int_{x^\star}^1 y_{\hat{b}(x)} \right) E[q(s)|x]\hat{g}_{b^\star(\theta)}(x)dx \Bigg\} dH(\theta), \end{aligned} \tag{25}$$

instead of (12), where the curly bracketed terms are successively the contractual indemnity, the expected audit cost, and the expected indemnity cut.

Consider now that the burden of proof is on the insurer, and the policyholder is given the benefit of the doubt. When the insurer alleges some misconduct of the insured, he must provide verifiable information about x, which costs k_I per dollar of indemnity. The insured-insurer game after a claim is similar to the case where the information x is verifiable, but with the additional cost k_I for the insurer if he wants to allege some behavior $b \in \{2, ..., n\}$. Hence, after an audit at stage 2, the insurer alleges misconduct $b = \hat{b}(x)$ if and only if $y_{\hat{b}(x)} \geq k_I$, and thus the equilibrium indemnity cut is

$$z(x) = \begin{cases} 0 & \text{if } x < \tilde{x} \\ y_{\hat{b}(x)} & \text{if } x \geq \tilde{x} \end{cases} \tag{26}$$

instead of (10), where

$$\tilde{x} = \inf\{x \in (0, 1] : y_{\hat{b}(x)} \geq k_I\} \tag{27}$$

$\tilde{x}$ is the threshold above which the insurer finds it worthwhile to gather verifiable evidence about the circumstances of the claim, in order to convince the judge that the

insured's behavior was $\hat{b}(x)$ or worse. The corresponding break-even condition is

$$P \geq \int_{\Theta} \pi_{b^\star(\theta)} \left\{ I + \int_0^1 cE[q(s)|x]\hat{g}_{b^\star(\theta)}(x)dx - I \int_{\tilde{x}}^1 (y_{\hat{b}(x)} - k_I)E[q(s)|x]\hat{g}_{b^\star(\theta)}(x)dx \right\} dH(\theta) \tag{28}$$

instead of (12), where the curly bracketed terms are successively the contractual indemnity, the expected audit cost, and the expected indemnity cut, net of the cost of providing verifiable information.

Comparing the two cases yields the following proposition.

Proposition 5 *If $k_P \leq k_I$ (or if $k_P - k_I$ is positive but not too large), an optimal fourth-best solution to the insurance moral hazard problem requires that the burden of proof is on the policyholder.*

The intuition of this result is twofold. Firstly, when the insurer has the burden of proof and wants to contest a claim, he must provide the court with costly evidence, whereas he only has to allege misconduct that will not be contested when he has the benefit of doubt and the insured is given the burden of proof. Thus, attributing the burden of proof to the policyholder is a way to avoid the cost of transmitting hard evidence to the court. Secondly, it would be too costly for the insurer to contest a claim when x is small if he has the burden of proof, which implies the constraint $z(x) = 0$ if $x < \widetilde{x}$. Conversely, when the burden of proof is given to the policyholder, the insurer has some leeway to nitpick when circumstances are favorable to the policyholder, since he may reduce the indemnity by a fraction $z(x) = y_{\hat{b}(x^\star)-1}$ if $x < x^\star$.

This is illustrated by figure 6 in the case $n = 4$, with $x^\star = \tilde{x} = x_3$. The step function in black corresponds to the optimal function $y_{\widehat{b}(x)}$ when the insurer has the burden of proof. It is deduced from (6) and (7), $b^*(\cdot)$ being the optimal behavior rule in that case. We deduce from (26) that $z(x)$ corresponds to the red step curve, with $z(x) = 0$ if $x < x_3$ and $z(x) = y_{\widehat{b}(x)}$ if $x \geq x_3$.[29] Assume now that the insured has the burden of proof, and y_2, y_3, y_4 are unchanged. If the policyholder follows the same behavior rule $b^*(\cdot)$ as the one which is optimal when the insurer has the burden of proof, function $y_{\hat{b}(x)}$ is unchanged and function $z(\cdot)$ corresponds to the blue line in figure 6. Choosing $y_2 = 0$ allows us to induce this unchanged behavior rule $b^*(\cdot)$ and the same indemnity

[29] If $x < x_3$, the insurer prefers not to incur the cost of gathering evidence, even if $x_2 \leq x < x_3$, because $y_2 < k_I$. In that case, the indemnity cut that could be sustained in court with verifiable information is not enforced by the insurer. Conversely, when $x \geq x_3$, it is worthwhile for the insurer to enforce the indemnity cut $z(x) = y_3$ or y_4, by gathering the required verifiable information on the circumstances of the loss.

cut function $z(\cdot)$ as when the burden of proof is on the insurer. The blue and red curve would then coincide. In other words, we can replicate the outcome of a legal regime where the insurer has the burden of proof with one where he is given the benefit of the doubt. As the evidential cost k_P is not incurred at equilibrium when the policyholder has the burden of proof, whereas k_I is spent if $x \geq x_3$ when the insurer has to prove his allegation, we may deduce that providing the benefit of the doubt to the insurer dominates the legal regime where he has the burden of proof.



Figure 6: Burden of proof and insurance indemnity

These are good reasons for the burden of proof to be given to the policyholder only if the cost of transmitting hard evidence is not larger (or, at least, not much larger) for the policyholder than for the insurer, i.e., if $k_P \leq k_I$ or at least if $k_P - k_I$ is positive but not too large. Should this not be the case, then the policyholder would hardly ever be in a position to contest any allegation of the insurer. In the extreme case where $k_I = 0$, then $\widetilde{x} = 0$ and the third-best and fourth-best optimal solutions coincide with the burden of proof given to the insurer.

We have assumed that the insurer must pay the entire contractual indemnity I, and not the reduced indemnity $I[1 - y_{\hat{b}(x)}]$, if he has initially the benefit of the doubt but he is contradicted by the judge. Having to pay the additional amount $y_{\hat{b}(x)}I$ may thus be interpreted as a penalty reflecting the importance of utmost good faith in insurance law.[30] We could move further in that direction. A hypothetical legal regime would consist in giving the burden of proof to the policyholder, with an insurer bad faith penalty at least equal to $[k_P - (y_b - y_{\hat{b}(x)})]I$ to be paid to the policyholder, in addition to the indemnity $[1 - y_{\hat{b}(x)}]I$ when misconduct $b > \hat{b}(x)$ is alleged by the insurer, and successfully contested by the policyholder. Under such a regime, the policyholder is incentivized to contest any exaggerated allegation about her behavior because her cost $k_P I$ will be reimbursed if the judge agrees with her, and consequently the insurer restricts himself to indemnity cuts that can be sustained in court. The third-best optimal solution could be reached in such a hypothetical legal regime, in which the policyholder has the burden of proof and the insurer has to pay her a sufficiently high bad faith penalty. Unfortunately, although in some cases courts may sentence insurers to pay compensatory penalties to policyholders, it would be unwise to conclude that this is the ultimate solution to the moral hazard problem. In practice, courts cannot assess the policyholders' cost of gathering evidence about the circumstances of their loss. This is private information that cannot be easily estimated. Obliging the insurer to pay the contractual indemnity in case of bad faith is thus a convenient, albeit less effective, alternative to the cost-reimbursement solution.

6 Conclusion

Our results can be recapped in a few words. When the insurance policy does not specify the indemnity payment according to all the contingencies that may characterize the claim, insurance contracts are incomplete. In a context of moral hazard, conditioning the indemnity on the circumstances of the loss is nevertheless desirable in order to incentivize policyholders to exert an adequate level of effort. This can be indirectly reached through provisions of insurance law. Legal principles that allow insurers to

[30] From an empirical standpoint, insurers' bad faith penalties play a more or less important role according to the specificities of insurance law. In the US, most states recognize the right of policyholders to file private lawsuits against insurers alleging unfair claim settlement practices involving first-party insurance coverage. Some states consider bad faith as a breach of contract, while others consider it as a tort, allowing the policyholder to recover for all harm or injuries sustained, including legal expenses, economic loss, and mental distress, while punitive damages may also be awarded. Tennyson & Warfel (2009) describe these various approaches. Asmat & Tennyson (2014) show that, on average, tort liability for insurer's bad faith is associated with higher settlement amounts.

reduce or cancel compensation under unfavorable claim circumstances act as an incentive device, and improve contractual efficiency. Their application is constrained by the judgment of courts who decide on the balance of probabilities. When audit only yields non-verifiable information to the insurer, then the burden of proof should be given to policyholders, while threatening bad faith penalties against insurers.

These conclusions have been reached in a setting that could be easily extended in several directions. In particular, we have assumed that courts decide on the balance of probabilities, because, in the common law tradition, this is the most usual standard of proof in case of civil suits. Although the "proof beyond reasonable doubt" standard is mainly used in criminal trials, it could be incorporated into our analysis by increasing from 1/2 to a higher value the probability threshold above which courts agrees with the party that has the burden of proof. The relationship between insurer, insured and courts could also be modelled in a richer and more interactive way, but the same fundamental trade-off between conditioning the indemnity on circumstances to incentivize policyholders and limiting the opportunism of the insurers would remain, and thus similar results would emerge.

Much remains to be done in order to explore the consequences of the incompleteness of insurance contracts in other directions. The issues of insurance fraud and bad faith in insurance contracting are of special interest. In particular, many theory papers about insurance fraud have restricted their attention to models where opportunistic policyholders file claims although they did not suffer any loss, or build up their claims above their true loss, and insurers may verify claims through costly audits.[31] In practice, such a clear-cut framework is far less frequent than more fuzzy situations where policyholders may claim they were in good faith because their situation was not clearly specified in their insurance policy, and ambiguity prevails on the duty of the contracting parties. Whatever the interaction process between policyholder and insurer, whether it be an amicable settlement or a litigation process, its outcome will be determined by stipulations of insurance law, such as the definition and consequences of misrepresentation and non-disclosure, the legal regime for bad faith in claims settlement, the interpretation of contractual exclusion clauses or the allocation of the burden of proof.[32]

It is also worth emphasizing that similar issues arise in other types of principal-

[31] See Picard (2013) for a survey on the economic analysis of insurance fraud.

[32] As an illustration, see Tennyson & Warfel (2009) and Asmat & Tennyson (2014) on the effect of the insurance bad faith legal regime on claims settlement, the settlement process, and insurance markets.

agent relationships, where the incompleteness of contracts results from the difficulty to objectively measure individualized performance signals (e.g., customer satisfaction or involvment in cooperative tasks, in the case of job-related activities). The literature on relational contracts (Levin, 2003; MacLeod, 2003) characterizes mechanisms that may allow the truthful revelation of unverifiable information in such settings. For instance, the payment of bonuses may be transferred to a third-party acting as an independent referee, similar to a private or state-sponsored ombudsman. We have followed another route, by focusing attention on the role of contract law. Clearly, both approaches are complementary, as illustrated by insurance and labor markets, where the enforcement of legal principles and arbitration processes coexist.

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Appendix

A Proof of Proposition 1

Let $\mu_b(\theta) \geq 0$ and $\lambda \geq 0$ be Kuhn-Tucker multipliers associated with (3) and (4), respectively. Denoting $W(\theta, x) \equiv W - P - L + I(\theta, x)$, the first-order optimality conditions w.r.t. $I(\theta, x)$ and P lead to

$$u'(W(\theta,x)) \left[1 - \sum_{b \neq b^\star(\theta)} \frac{\mu_b(\theta)}{h(\theta)} \left(\frac{\pi_b}{\pi_{b^\star(\theta)}} \frac{\widehat{g}_b(x)}{\widehat{g}_{b^\star(\theta)}(x)} - 1 \right) \right] \begin{cases} \leq \lambda & \text{if } I(\theta,x) = 0, \\ = \lambda & \text{if } 0 < I(\theta,x) < L, \\ \geq \lambda & \text{if } I(\theta,x) = L, \end{cases} \tag{29}$$

for all $(\theta, x) \in \Theta \times [0, 1]$.

Note that, for all $\theta \in \Theta$, the optimal solution is such that $b > b^\star(\theta)$ for all $b \neq b^\star(\theta)$ such that (3) is binding,[33] and also that $\mu_b(\theta) = 0$ for all $b \neq b^\star(\theta)$ such that (3) is not binding. Let

$$\phi_b(x) \equiv \frac{\widehat{g}_{b+1}(x)}{\widehat{g}_b(x)} \text{ for all } b = 1, ..., n-1.$$

Hence, the l.h.s. of (29) may be written as

$$u'(W(\theta,x)) \left[1 - \sum_{b > b^\star(\theta)} \frac{\mu_b(\theta)}{h(\theta)} \left(\frac{\pi_b}{\pi_{b^\star(\theta)}} \prod_{i=b^\star(\theta)}^{b-1} \phi_i(x) - 1 \right) \right],$$

and it is decreasing if $b^\star(\theta) < n$, because $\phi_b'(x) > 0$. Consider the case where $b^\star(\theta) < n$. We have

$$I_x'(\theta,x) = \frac{u'(W(\theta,x))^2}{u''(W(\theta,x))} \sum_{b > b^\star(\theta)} \frac{\mu_b(\theta)}{h(\theta)} \frac{\pi_b}{\pi_{b^\star(\theta)}} \frac{d}{dx} \left[\prod_{i=b^\star(\theta)}^{b-1} \phi_i(x) \right] < 0,$$

if $0 < I(\theta, x) < L$. We have $I(\theta, 0) < L$ - and thus $I(\theta, x) < L$ for all x - if

$$u'(W-P) \left[1 - \sum_{b > b^\star(\theta)} \frac{\mu_b(\theta)}{h(\theta)} \left(\frac{\pi_b}{\pi_{b^\star(\theta)}} \frac{d}{dx} \left[\prod_{i=b^\star(\theta)}^{b-1} \phi_i(0) \right] - 1 \right) \right] \leq \lambda,$$

[33] Indeed if there exists $b \in \mathcal{B}$ such that $b < b^*(\theta)$ and the incentive constraint (3) is binding, then replacing $b^*(\theta)$ by b would reduce the expected insurance cost - i.e., the right-hand-side of (4) - because $\pi_b < \pi_{b^*(\theta)}$, without changing the policyholder's expected utility. This would contradict the optimality of the solution.

and otherwise, we have $I(\theta, x) = L$ if $0 \leq x \leq \underline{x}(\theta)$ and $I(\theta, x) < L$ if $x > \underline{x}(\theta)$, with $\underline{x}(\theta) > 0$ defined by

$$u'(W-P)\left[1 - \sum_{b>b^\star(\theta)} \frac{\mu_b(\theta)}{h(\theta)} \left(\frac{\pi_b}{\pi_{b^\star(\theta)}} \frac{d}{dx} \left[\prod_{i=b^\star(\theta)}^{b-1} \phi_i(\underline{x}(\theta)) \right] - 1 \right) \right] = \lambda.$$

Similarly, we have $I(\theta, 1) > 0$ - and thus $I(\theta, x) > 0$ for all x - if

$$u'(W-P-L)\left[1 - \sum_{b>b^\star(\theta)} \frac{\mu_b(\theta)}{h(\theta)} \left(\frac{\pi_b}{\pi_{b^\star(\theta)}} \frac{d}{dx} \left[\prod_{i=b^\star(\theta)}^{b-1} \phi_i(1) \right] - 1 \right) \right] \geq \lambda,$$

and otherwise, we have $I(\theta, x) = 0$ if $\overline{x}(\theta) \leq x \leq 1$ and $I(\theta, x) > 0$ if $x < \overline{x}(\theta)$, with $\overline{x}(\theta) > 0$ defined by

$$u'(W-P-L)\left[1 - \sum_{b>b^\star(\theta)} \frac{\mu_b(\theta)}{h(\theta)} \left(\frac{\pi_b}{\pi_{b^\star(\theta)}} \frac{d}{dx} \left[\prod_{i=b^\star(\theta)}^{b-1} \phi_i(\overline{x}(\theta)) \right] - 1 \right) \right] = \lambda.$$

If $b^\star(\theta) = n$, then the l.h.s. of (29) is equal to $u'(W(\theta, x))$, which implies that $W(\theta, x)$ and $I(\theta, x)$ do not depend on x.

B Proof of Lemma 1

Let

$$\begin{aligned}\Phi(b_0, x) &= \sum\nolimits_{b=b_0}^{n} \Pr(b|x) - \sum\nolimits_{b=1}^{b_0-1} \Pr(b|x) \\ &= \frac{\sum_{b=b_0}^{n} g_b(x) \int_{\Theta_b^\star} dH(\theta) - \sum_{b=1}^{b_0-1} g_b(x) \int_{\Theta_b^\star} dH(\theta)}{\sum_{b\in\mathcal{B}} g_b(x) \int_{\Theta_b^\star} dH(\theta)},\end{aligned}$$

for $b_0 \geq 2$. When $\hat{b}(x) \geq 2$, we have

$$\hat{b}(x) = \sup\{b_0 \in \mathcal{B} | \Phi(b_0, x) \geq 0\}.$$

Let $x' > x$. Using strict MLRP yields

$$g_b(x') > g_b(x)\frac{g_{b_0}(x')}{g_{b_0}(x)} \quad \text{if} \quad b > b_0,$$
$$g_b(x') < g_b(x)\frac{g_{b_0}(x')}{g_{b_0}(x)} \quad \text{if} \quad b < b_0.$$

Hence, if $b_0 \geq 2, x' > x$, we have $\Phi(b_0, x') > 0$ if $\Phi(b_0, x) \geq 0$. We deduce $\hat{b}(x') \geq \hat{b}(x)$ if $\hat{b}(x) \geq 2$ and $x' > x$, which implies that $\hat{b}(x)$ is non-decreasing in $[0, 1]$. It is thus a step function that takes its values in $\mathcal{B}$.

C Proof of Lemma 2

First, we show that

Lemma 3 *When $f(\varepsilon)$ is log-concave, an increase in s shifts the conditional probability distribution of x in the sense of strong FOSD.*

Proof. Let $\tilde{g}(x)$ be the density function of x for the equilibrium behavior rule $b^\star(\theta)$. We have $\tilde{g}(x) = \int_\Theta g_{b^\star(\theta)}(x)dH(\theta)$. Using Bayes rule and the independence of ε and x allows us to write de conditional density function of x as

$$\tilde{g}(x|s) = \frac{f(s-x)\tilde{g}(x)}{\int_0^1 f(s-u)\tilde{g}(u)du}$$

and thus the conditional c.d.f. of x is

$$\tilde{G}(x|s) = \frac{\int_0^x f(s-u)\tilde{g}(u)du}{\int_0^1 f(s-u)\tilde{g}(u)du}.$$

Differentiating $\tilde{G}(x|s)$ w.r.t. s shows that $\tilde{G}(x|s)$ is decreasing in s if

$$\varphi(x) \equiv \frac{\int_0^x f'(s-u)\tilde{g}(u)du}{\int_0^x f(s-u)\tilde{g}(u)du} < \frac{\int_0^1 f'(s-u)\tilde{g}(u)du}{\int_0^1 f(s-u)\tilde{g}(u)du}. \tag{30}$$

$\varphi'(x) > 0$ is a sufficient condition for (30) to hold for all $x \in [0, 1]$. This is true if

$$\frac{f'(s-x)}{f(s-x)} > \frac{\int_0^x f'(s-u)\tilde{g}(u)du}{\int_0^x f(s-u)\tilde{g}(u)du}. \tag{31}$$

Indeed, let $\eta(\varepsilon) = f'(\varepsilon)/f(\varepsilon) = d\ln f(\varepsilon)/d\varepsilon$ for all ε such that $f(\varepsilon) > 0$. (31) is

rewritten as

$$\eta(s-x) > \frac{\int_0^x \eta(s-u)f(s-u)\tilde{g}(u)du}{\int_0^x f(s-u)\tilde{g}(u)du}. \tag{32}$$

Assume that $\eta'(\varepsilon) = d^2 \ln f(\varepsilon)/d\varepsilon^2 < 0$. Then we have $\eta(s-u) < \eta(s-x)$ for all $u \in [0, x)$ and (32) holds. ■

We know that, $y_b \leq y_{b+1}$ for all $b \in \{1, ..., n-1\}$ and, furthermore, that $\hat{b}(x)$ is non-decreasing from Lemma 1. Consequently, $y_{\hat{b}(x)}$ is non-decreasing with x and Lemma 3 shows that $\mathbb{E}[y_{\hat{b}(x)}|s]$ is non-decreasing with s. Hence, $\mathbb{E}[y_{\hat{b}(x)}|s]I \geq c$ implies $\mathbb{E}[y_{\hat{b}(x)}|s']I \geq c$ if $s' > s$, which proves the Lemma by using (8).

D Proof of Proposition 2

Assume first $c = 0$. In that case, $q(s) = 1$ for all s, i.e., $s^\star = -\infty$. Let us restrict the set of feasible solutions to $y_b = y \geq 0$ for all $b \geq 2$. We have $z(x) = 0$ if $x < x_2$ and $z(x) = y$ if $x \geq x_2$ with x_2 the solution of $\hat{b}(x_2) = 2$, or equivalently

$$\sum\nolimits_{b=2}^{n} \Pr(\tilde{b} = b|x_2) = \Pr(\tilde{b} = 1|x_2),$$

where $\tilde{b}$ is the behavior of an individual who is randomly drawn among the claimants. This condition can be written as

$$\sum\nolimits_{b=2}^{n} \frac{g_b(x_2)}{g_1(x_2)} \int_{\Theta_b^\star} dH(\theta) = \int_{\Theta_1^\star} dH(\theta). \tag{33}$$

From MLRP, the L.H.S of (33) is increasing in x_2. Under the assumptions made in footnote 12, this L.H.S. goes to 0 (resp. to $+\infty$) when x_2 goes to zero (resp. to 1). The sets $\Theta_1^\star, \ldots, \Theta_n^\star$ depend on I, P and y, and thus (33) implicitly defines function $x_2(I, P, y)$, with $x_2(I, P, 0) = x_{2na}$ if I, P is the optimal no-audit contract. Let $\lambda > 0$ and $\mu_b(\theta) \geq 0$ for $b \in \mathcal{B}, \theta \in \Theta$, be Lagrange multipliers corresponding to the insurer's break-even constraint and the incentive constraints respectively. Denote $u(1)$ and $u'(1)$ (resp. $u(2)$ and $u'(2)$) the value of the utility function and of its derivative when $x < x_2$ (resp. when $x \geq x_2$). The first-order optimality conditions w.r.t. I and y are written

as

$$
\begin{aligned}
&\int_{\Theta} \left\{ \left[u'(1) G_{b^\star(\theta)}(x_2) + u'(2)(1-y)[1 - G_{b^\star(\theta)}(x_2)] \right.\right. \\
&\left.\left. -\lambda \left[1 - y[1 - G_{b^\star(\theta)}(x_2)] \right] \right\} dH(\theta) \\
&- \int_{\Theta} \{ \sum\nolimits_{b \in \mathcal{B}} \mu_b(\theta) \left\{ u'(1)[G_b(x_2) - G_{b^\star(\theta)}(x_2)] \right. \\
&\left. + u'(2)(1-y)[G_{b^\star(\theta)}(x_2) - G_b(x_2)] \right\} \} \, dH(\theta) \\
&- \frac{\partial x_2}{\partial I} \times A \\
&\geq 0, = 0 \text{ if } I < L,
\end{aligned} \tag{34}
$$

and

$$
\begin{aligned}
&I[\lambda - u'(2)] \int_{\Theta} [1 - G_{b^\star(\theta)}(x_2)] dH(\theta) \\
&+ u'(2) I \int_{\Theta} \sum\nolimits_{b \in \mathcal{B}} \mu_b(\theta) [G_{b^\star(\theta)}(x_2) - G_b(x_2)] dH(\theta) \\
&- \frac{\partial x_2}{\partial y} \times A \\
&\leq 0, = 0 \text{ if } y > 0,
\end{aligned} \tag{35}
$$

where

$$
\begin{aligned}
A = {} & [u(1) - u(2)] \int_{\Theta} \{ g_{b^\star(\theta)}(x_2) + \textstyle\sum_{b \in \mathcal{B}} \mu_b(\theta) [g_{b^\star(\theta)}(x_2) - g_b(x_2)] \} dH(\theta) \\
& + \lambda y \int_{\Theta} g_{b^\star(\theta)}(x_2) dH(\theta).
\end{aligned}
$$

Suppose that $y = 0$ at an optimal solution. This implies $I < L$ and $x_2 = x_{2na}$, because $I = L$ would imply $b^\star_{na}(\theta) = n$ almost everywhere in Θ, which has been excluded by assumption. In that case, we have $u(1) = u(2) \equiv u, u'(1) = u'(2) \equiv u'$ and $A = 0$. (34) and (35) simplify to

$$
\int_{\Theta} \{ (u' - \lambda) \pi_{b^\star_{na}(\theta)} - u' \sum\nolimits_{b \in \mathcal{B}} \mu_b(\theta) (\pi_b - \pi_{b^\star_{na}(\theta)}) \} dH(\theta) = 0, \tag{36}
$$

and

$$(\lambda - u') \int_\Theta [1 - G_{b^\star_{na}(\theta)}(x_{2na})] dH(\theta)$$
$$+ u' \int_\Theta \sum\nolimits_{b \in \mathcal{B}} \mu_b(\theta) [G_{b^\star_{na}(\theta)}(x_{2na}) - G_b(x_{2na})] dH(\theta) \leq 0, \tag{37}$$

respectively. Substituting the value of $u' - \lambda$ given by (36) into (37) yields

$$\int_\Theta \sum\nolimits_{b \in \mathcal{B}} \mu_b(\theta)(\pi_b - \pi_{b^\star_{na}(\theta)}) dH(\theta) \times \int_\Theta [1 - G_{b^\star_{na}(\theta)}(x_{2na})] dH(\theta)$$
$$+ \int_\Theta \pi_{b^\star_{na}(\theta)} dH(\theta) \times \int_\Theta \sum\nolimits_{b \in \mathcal{B}} \mu_b(\theta) [G_{b^\star_{na}(\theta)}(x_{2na}) - G_b(x_{2na})] dH(\theta) \leq 0. \tag{38}$$

There exists $b \in \mathcal{B}$ and a positive-measure subset of Θ in which $\mu_b(\theta) > 0$, once again because otherwise we would have $b^\star_{na}(\theta) = n$ almost everywhere in Θ. Furthermore, we have $b > b^\star_{na}(\theta)$ and $\pi_b > \pi_{b^\star_{na}(\theta)}$ if $\mu_b(\theta) > 0$, which implies that the first product in (38) is positive. Similarly, MLRP implies FOSD, which yields $G_b(x_{2na}) < G_{b^\star_{na}(\theta)}(x_{2na})$. Since this is true for all $\theta \in \Theta$, the second product in (38) is also positive, hence a contradiction.

Consequently, when $c = 0$ we have $z(x) > 0$ in a positive-measure subset of $[0, 1]$. As the optimal expected utility of the policyholder varies continuously with c, the previous conclusion remains true with $s^\star < +\infty$ when c is not too large.

E Proof of Proposition 3

There is a corner solution with $v = A/\bar{g}$ when the slope of the iso-utility lines is larger than the one of the $K(u_0, v) = \bar{W}$ locus at that point. We have

$$\frac{\partial K(u_0, v)}{\partial u_0} = \frac{\underline{h}\pi_1 \hat{G}_1 + \bar{h}\pi_2 \hat{G}_2}{u'(u^{-1}(u_0))} + \frac{\underline{h}\pi_1 \hat{S}_1 + \bar{h}\pi_2 \hat{S}_2}{u'(u^{-1}(u_0 - v))} + \frac{1 - \underline{h}\pi_1 - \bar{h}\pi_2}{u'(u^{-1}(u_0 + A - v\bar{g}))}$$

which gives

$$\left.\frac{\partial K(u_0, v)}{\partial u_0}\right|_{v = A/\bar{g}} = \frac{1 - \hat{S}_1 \pi_1 \underline{h} - \hat{S}_2 \bar{h}\pi_2}{u'(u^{-1}(u_0))} + \frac{\underline{h}\pi_1 \hat{S}_1 + \bar{h}\pi_2 \hat{S}_2}{u'(u^{-1}(u_0 - v))},$$

and

$$\frac{\partial K(u_0, v)}{\partial v} = -\frac{\underline{h}\pi_1 \hat{S}_1 + \bar{h}\pi_2 \hat{S}_2}{u'(u^{-1}(u_0 - v))} - \bar{g}\frac{1 - \underline{h}\pi_1 - \bar{h}\pi_2}{u'(u^{-1}(u_0 + A - v\bar{g}))},$$

Hence, the slope of the insurer's break-even locus when $v = A/\bar{g}$ is given by

$$\left.\frac{dv}{du_0}\right|_{\substack{K=\bar{W}\\ v=A/\bar{g}}} = \frac{(1-\underline{h}\pi_1\hat{S}_1-\bar{h}\pi_2\hat{S}_2)/u'(u^{-1}(u_0))+(\underline{h}\pi_1\hat{S}_1+\bar{h}\pi_2\hat{S}_2)/u'(u^{-1}(u_0-v))}{\bar{g}(1-\underline{h}\pi_1-\bar{h}\pi_2)/u'(u^{-1}(u_0))+(\underline{h}\pi_1\hat{S}_1+\bar{h}\pi_2\hat{S}_2)/u'(u^{-1}(u_0-v))}$$
$$= \frac{1-\underline{h}\pi_1\hat{S}_1-\bar{h}\pi_2\hat{S}_2+(\underline{h}\pi_1\hat{S}_1+\bar{h}\pi_2\hat{S}_2)u'(u^{-1}(u_0))/u'(u^{-1}(u_0-v))}{\bar{g}(1-\underline{h}\pi_1-\bar{h}\pi_2)+(\underline{h}\pi_1\hat{S}_1+\bar{h}\pi_2\hat{S}_2)u'(u^{-1}(u_0))/u'(u^{-1}(u_0-v))}.$$

Similarly, the slope of the iso-utility lines is given by

$$\left.\frac{dv}{du_0}\right|_{Eu^\star=cst} = \frac{1}{\bar{g}(1-\underline{h}\pi_1-\bar{h}\pi_2)+\underline{h}\pi_1\hat{S}_1+\bar{h}\pi_2\hat{S}_2}.$$

Defining

$$f(\gamma) \equiv \frac{1-\underline{h}\pi_1\hat{S}_1-\bar{h}\pi_2\hat{S}_2+\gamma(\underline{h}\pi_1\hat{S}_1+\bar{h}\pi_2\hat{S}_2)}{\bar{g}(1-\underline{h}\pi_1-\bar{h}\pi_2)+\gamma(\underline{h}\pi_1\hat{S}_1+\bar{h}\pi_2\hat{S}_2)},$$

we have $(dv/du_0)|_{K=\bar{W};v=A/\bar{g}} = f(u'(u^{-1}(u_0))/u'(u^{-1}(u_0-v)))$ where $u'(u^{-1}(u_0))/u'(u^{-1}(u_0-v)) < 1$, while $(dv/du_0)|_{Eu^\star=cst} = f(1)$. We thus have $(dv/du_0)|_{K=\bar{W};v=A/\bar{g}} < (dv/du_0)|_{Eu^\star=cst}$ if f is increasing, i.e., if

$$\bar{g}(1-\underline{h}\pi_1-\bar{h}\pi_2) > 1-\underline{h}\pi_1\hat{S}_1-\bar{h}\pi_2\hat{S}_2 = 1-\pi_1\hat{S}_1-\bar{h}(\pi_2\hat{S}_2-\pi_1\hat{S}_1)$$
$$= 1-\pi_1\hat{S}_1-\bar{h}(\pi_2-\pi_1)\bar{g},$$

hence if $\bar{g} > (1-\pi_1\hat{S}_1)/(1-\pi_1)$. Subtracting 1 on both sides, this condition becomes

$$\bar{g}-1 = \frac{\pi_1\hat{G}_1-\pi_2\hat{G}_2}{\pi_2-\pi_1} > \frac{1-\pi_1\hat{S}_1}{1-\pi_1}-1 = \frac{\pi_1\hat{G}_1}{1-\pi_1},$$

or, reorganizing terms,

$$0 < (\pi_1\hat{G}_1-\pi_2\hat{G}_2)(1-\pi_1)-(\pi_2-\pi_1)\pi_1\hat{G}_1$$
$$= \hat{G}_1\pi_1(1-\pi_2)-\hat{G}_2\pi_2(1-\pi_1)$$
$$= G_1(x_2)G_2(0)-G_2(x_2)G_1(0),$$

hence

$$\frac{G_1(x_2)}{G_2(x_2)} > \frac{G_1(0)}{G_2(0)}.$$

Under this condition, the optimal solution satisfies $v = A/\bar{g}$, i.e. $I = L$, and as $A/\bar{g} > 0$, $J = (1-y_2)I < I$: the optimal solution involves contractual full insurance and the law of contracts allows the insurer to reduce the indemnity by an amount

$I - J = u^{-1}(u_0^*) - u^{-1}(u_0^* - A/\bar{g})$ where u_0^* is given by $K(u_0^*, A/\bar{g}) = \bar{W}$.

This condition can also be written as

$$\frac{\hat{G}_2(x_2)}{\hat{G}_1(x_2)} < \frac{\pi_1(1-\pi_2)}{\pi_2(1-\pi_1)} \equiv R < 1 \tag{39}$$

where $x_2 > 0$ is defined by $\Pr\{b = 2|x_2\} = 1/2$, i.e.

$$\frac{\hat{g}_2(x_2)}{\hat{g}_1(x_2)} = \frac{\pi_1(1-\bar{h})}{\pi_2\bar{h}}. \tag{40}$$

We know from MLRP, that $\hat{g}_2(x)/\hat{g}_1(x)$ is increasing for all $x \in (0,1]$. Using $\hat{g}_2(x)/\hat{g}_1(x) \to 0$ when $x \to 0$ and $\hat{g}_2(x)/\hat{g}_1(x) \to +\infty$ when $x \to 1$, implies $0 < x_2 < 1$. Given π_1 and π_2, (40) defines x_2 as a decreasing function of $\bar{h} : x_2 = x_2(\bar{h})$ with $dx_2/d\bar{h} < 0$, $x_2(\bar{h}) \to 1$ when $\bar{h} \to 0$ and $x_2(\bar{h}) \to 0$ when $\bar{h} \to 1$. Define $\psi(x) = \hat{G}_2(x)/\hat{G}_1(x)$ where $x > 0$. We have

$$\begin{aligned}
\psi'(x) &= [\hat{g}_2(x)\hat{G}_1(x) - \hat{g}_1(x)\hat{G}_2(x)]/\hat{G}_1(x)^2 \\
&= \hat{G}_1(x)^{-2}\int_0^x [\hat{g}_2(x)\hat{g}_1(y) - \hat{g}_1(x)\hat{g}_2(y)]dy \\
&> 0
\end{aligned}$$

since, from MLRP, $\hat{g}_2(x)/\hat{g}_1(x) > \hat{g}_2(y)/\hat{g}_1(y)$ for $y < x$. Moreover, l'Hôpital's rule gives $\lim_{x\to 0}\psi(x) = \lim_{x\to 0}\hat{g}_2(x)/\hat{g}_1(x) = 0$ and we also have $\psi(1) = 1$. Function $\psi(x)$ is thus an increasing bijection from $(0,1]$ to itself. Condition (39) can be written as $\psi(x_2(\bar{h})) < R$, hence $x_2(\bar{h}) < \psi^{-1}(R)$, i.e., $\bar{h} > x_2^{-1}(\psi^{-1}(R)) \equiv h^\star$. We thus have $I = L$ if $\bar{h} \geq h^\star$ and $I < L$ if $\bar{h} < h^\star$.

F Proof of Proposition 4

Using $y_2 = 1$ gives

$$\left.\frac{dv}{du_0}\right|_{\substack{K=\bar{W}\\ v=A/\bar{g}}} = \frac{1}{\bar{g}(1 - \underline{h}\pi_1\hat{G}_1 - \bar{h}\pi_2\hat{G}_2)} = \eta$$

and

$$\left.\frac{dv}{du_0}\right|_{Eu^\star = cst} = \Gamma\left(\frac{u'(u^{-1}(A - \bar{g}v + u_0) - L)}{u'(u^{-1}(A - \bar{g}v + u_0))}\right)$$

where function $\Gamma(\cdot)$ is given by

$$\Gamma(\gamma) = \frac{1 + \underline{h}\pi_1\hat{S}_1(\gamma - 1) + \bar{h}\pi_2\hat{S}_2(\gamma - 1)}{\bar{g}[1 + \underline{h}\pi_1(\hat{S}_1\gamma - 1) + \bar{h}\pi_2(\hat{S}_2\gamma - 1)]}$$

with $\Gamma(1) = \eta$ and

$$\Gamma'(\gamma) = -\frac{(\underline{h}\pi_1\hat{S}_1 + \bar{h}\pi_2\hat{S}_2)(\underline{h}\pi_1\hat{G}_1 + \bar{h}\pi_2\hat{G}_2)}{\bar{g}[1 + \underline{h}\pi_1(\hat{S}_1B - 1) + \bar{h}\pi_2(\hat{S}_2B - 1)]^2} < 0.$$

As $u'(u^{-1}(u_0) - L) > u'(u^{-1}(u_0))$, we have $(dv/du_0)|_{Eu^\star = cst, v = A/\bar{g}} < (dv/du_0)|_{K = \bar{W}, v = A/\bar{g}}$, which implies that $v < A/\bar{g}$, i.e., $I < L$ at the optimum.

G Proof of proposition 5

In the fourth-best case, an allocation a is defined by a contract (P, I), an audit strategy $q(\cdot)$ with threshold $s^\star$, insurance law rules $\{y_b, b \in \mathcal{B}\}$, a behavioral function $b^\star(\cdot)$ and a (potential) allegation function $\hat{b}(\cdot)$. The indemnity cut function $z(x)$ is defined by (24) or (26) instead of (10). Let a_I be the optimal allocation when the burden of proof is given to the insurer, with verification cost k_I. It satisfies (6)-(9), (11), (13)-(15), and (26)-(28). As $z(x) = 0$ for $x < \tilde{x} = \inf\{x \in (0, 1] : y_{\hat{b}(x)} \geq k_I\}$, we may assume $y_{\hat{b}(x)} = 0$ if $x < \tilde{x}$ wlg.

Let $\mathcal{A}_P$ the set of feasible allocations when the burden of proof is given to the policyholder, with cost of verifiable information k_P. An allocation a belongs to $\mathcal{A}_P$ if It satisfies (6)-(9), (11), (13)-(15), and (23)-(25). Consider first the case where $k_P = k_I$. We have $x^\star = \inf\{x \in (0, 1] : y_{\hat{b}(x)} \geq k_P\} = \tilde{x}$, the indemnity cut functions (24) and (26) are the same, and since a_I satisfies (28) as an equality, it also satisfies (25) strictly. Hence $a_I \in \mathcal{A}_P$. However, since (25) is satisfied but not binding, a_I is not the optimal allocation when the burden of proof is given to the policyholder, i.e., there exists $a \in \mathcal{A}_P$ that leads to a policyholder's expected utility higher than with a_I. Since the optimal expected utility is non-increasing w.r.t. k_P when the policyholder has the burden of proof, the same conclusion holds when $k_P < k_I$, and it remains true if $k_P - k_I$ is positive but not too large.