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Obfuscation and Honesty Experimental Evidence on Insurance Demand with Multiple Distribution Channels

Abstract

This paper aims to shed light on the dilemma faced by insurance purchasers faced with multiple distribution channels. Should the consumer herself choose from a large set of insurance policies or rather delegate a part her decision to an intermediary who is more or less honest? We consider decisions based on a number of real-world insurance distribution channels with different information frames. Beliefs about intermediary honesty are the main determinants of individual choice. In addition, the obfuscation of information is the main source of inefficiency in decision-making, particularly regarding the characteristics of the insurance contracts chosen by consumers.
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Dates and versions

hal-01819522 , version 1 (20-06-2018)

Identifiers

  • HAL Id : hal-01819522 , version 1

Cite

Claire Mouminoux, Jean-Louis Rullière, Stéphane Loisel. Obfuscation and Honesty Experimental Evidence on Insurance Demand with Multiple Distribution Channels. 2018. ⟨hal-01819522⟩
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