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Automated Security Proofs for Message Authentication Codes^{*}

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Abstract. Message authentication codes (MACs) are an essential primitive in cryptography. They are used to ensure the integrity and authenticity of a message, and can also be used as a building block for larger schemes, such as chosen-ciphertext secure encryption, or identity-based encryption. We present a method for automatically proving the security for block-cipher-based and hash-based MACs in the ideal cipher model. Our method proceeds in two steps, following the traditional method for constructing MACs. First, the ‘front end’ of the MAC produces a short digest of the long message, then the ‘back end’ provides a mixing step to make the output of the MAC unpredictable for an attacker. We develop a Hoare logic for proving that the front end of the MAC is an almost-universal hash function. The programming language used to specify these functions is quite expressive. As a result, our logic can be used to prove functions based on block ciphers and hash functions. Second, we provide a list of options for the back end of the MAC, each consisting of only two or three instructions, each of which can be composed with an almost-universal hash function to obtain a secure MAC.

Using our method, we implemented a tool that can prove the security of many CBC-based MACs (DMAC, ECBC, FCBC and XCBC to name only a few), PMAC and HMAC.

1 Introduction

Message authentication codes (MACs) are among the most common primitives in symmetric key cryptography. They ensure the integrity and provenance of a message, and they can be used, in conjunction with chosen-plaintext secure encryption, to obtain chosen-ciphertext secure encryption. Given the importance of this primitive, it is important that their proofs of security be the object of close scrutiny. The study of the security of MACs is, of course, not a new field. Bellare et al. [5] were the first to prove the security of CBC-MAC for fixed-length inputs. Following this work, a myriad of new MACs secure for variable-length

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inputs were proposed ([4, 7–9, 17]). None of these protocols’ proofs have been verified by any means other than human scrutiny.

Automated proofs can provide additional assurance of the correctness of these security proofs by providing an independent proof of complex schemes. This paper presents a method for automatically proving the security of MACs based on block ciphers and hash functions.

Contributions: To prove the security of MACs, we first break the MAC algorithms into two parts: a ‘front-end’, whose work is to compress long input messages into small digests, and a ‘back-end’, usually a mixing step, which obfuscates the output of the front-end. We present a Hoare logic to prove that the front-ends of MACs are almost-universal hash functions. We then make a list of operations which, when composed with an almost-universal hash function, yield a secure MAC.

Our result differs significantly from our previous work that used Hoare logic to generate proofs of cryptographic protocols (such as [12, 15]) because those results proved the security of encryption schemes. Proving the security of MACs proved to be singularly more challenging because the security property required is different and much harder to capture using predicates. In particular, we have to consider the simultaneous execution of the program, define a new semantics to capture these executions, and introduce new predicates that keep track of equality and inequality of values between the two executions. We also present a treatment of for-loops, which allows us to prove the security of protocols that can take arbitrary strings as an input. We describe two heuristics that can be used to discover stable loop invariants and apply them to one example. These heuristics successfully find stable invariants for all the MACs presented in this paper. This is an important improvement over previous results that only deal with schemes that had fixed-length inputs.

Finally, we implemented our method into a prototype [14] that can be used to prove the security of several well-known MACs, such as HMAC [4], DMAC [17], ECBC, FCBC and XCBC [8] and PMAC [9]. Our prototype goes through the programs of MACs from beginning to end, instead of the more common backward approach, because going backwards is potentially exponential, and this proved extremely inefficient in a previous prototype. We also present an invariant filter that enables us to discard unnecessary predicates, which speeds up our implementation and facilitates the discovery of loop invariants.

Related Work: The idea of using Hoare logic to automatically produce proofs of security for cryptographic protocols is not new. Courant et al. [12] presented a Hoare logic to prove the security of asymmetric encryption schemes in the random oracle model. This work was continued by Gagné et al. [15], who showed a Hoare logic for verifying proofs of security of block cipher modes of encryption. Also worth mentioning is the paper by Corin and Den Hartog [11], which presented a Hoare-style proof system for game-based cryptographic proofs.

Fournet et al. [13] developed a framework for modular code-based cryptographic verification. However, their approach considers interfaces for MACs. In

a way, our work is complementary to theirs, as our result, coupled with theirs, could enable a more complete verification of systems.

In [1], the authors introduce a general logic for proving the security of cryptographic primitives. This framework can easily be extended using external results, such as [12], to add to its power. Our result could also be added to this framework to further extend it.

Other tools, such as Cryptoverif [10] and EasyCrypt [3, 2], can be used to verify the security of cryptographic schemes, but they do not offer the functionalities necessary to prove the security of MACs. Cryptoverif does not support loop constructs, which are an important part of our result. As for Easycrypt, it relies on a game-based approach and requires human assistance to enter the sequence of games. In contrast, our method only requires the description of the program as input, and automatically outputs a proof.

Outline: In Section 2, we introduce cryptographic background. The following section introduces our grammar, semantics and assertion language. In Section 4, we present our Hoare logic and method for proving the security of almost-universal hash functions, and we discuss our implementation of this logic and treatment of loops in Section 5. We then obtain a secure MAC by combining these with one of the back-end options described in Section 6. Finally, we conclude in Section 7.

2 Cryptographic Background

In this section, we introduce a few notational conventions, and we recall a few cryptographic concepts that will be used in this paper.

Notation and Conventions

Throughout this paper, we assume that all variables range over domains whose cardinality is exponential in the security parameter η and that all programs have length polynomial in η .

We say that a function $f : \mathbb{N} \rightarrow \mathbb{R}$ is negligible if, for any polynomial p , there exists a positive integer n_0 such that for all $n \geq n_0$, $f(n) \leq \frac{1}{p(n)}$.

For a probability distribution \mathcal{D} , we denote by $x \stackrel{\$}{\leftarrow} \mathcal{D}$ the operation of sampling a value x according to distribution \mathcal{D} . If S is a finite set, we denote by $x \stackrel{\$}{\leftarrow} S$ the operation of sampling x uniformly at random among the values in S .

MAC Security

A message authentication code ensures the authenticity a message m by computing a small tag τ , which is sent together with the message to the intended receiver. Upon receiving the message and the tag, the receiver recomputes the tag τ' using the message and his own copy of the key, and he accepts the message as authentic if $\tau = \tau'$. More formally:

Definition 1 (MAC). *A message authentication code is a triple of polynomial-time algorithms (K, MAC, V) , where $K(1^\eta)$ takes a security parameter 1^η and outputs a secret key sk , $MAC(sk, m)$ takes a secret key and a message m , and outputs a tag, and $V(sk, m, tag)$ takes a secret key, a message and a tag, and outputs a bit: 1 for a correct tag, 0 otherwise.*

We say that a MAC is secure, or *unforgeable* if it is impossible to compute a new valid message-tag pair for anybody who does not know the secret key, even when given access to oracles that can compute and verify the MACs. This way, when one receives a valid message-tag pair, he can be certain that the message was sent by someone who possesses a copy of his secret key.

Definition 2 (Unforgeability). *A MAC (K, MAC, V) is unforgeable under a chosen-message attack (UNF-CMA) if for every polynomial-time algorithm \mathcal{A} that has oracle access to the MAC and verification algorithm, whose output message m^* is different from any message it sent to the MAC oracle, the following probability is negligible*

$$\Pr[sk \xleftarrow{\$} K(1^\eta); (m^*, tag^*) \xleftarrow{\$} \mathcal{A}^{MAC(sk, \cdot), V(sk, \cdot, \cdot)} : V(sk, m^*, tag^*) = 1]$$

A standard method for constructing MACs is to apply a pseudo-random function, or some other form of ‘mixing’ step, to the output of an almost-universal hash function [18, 19]. Our verification technique assumes that the MAC is constructed in this way.

Definition 3 (Almost-Universal Hash). *A family of functions $\mathcal{H} = \{h_i\}$ indexed with key $i \in \{0, 1\}^\eta$ is a family of almost-universal hash functions if for any two strings a and b , $\Pr_{h_i \in \mathcal{H}}[h_i(a) = h_i(b)]$ is negligible, where the probability is taken over the choice of h_i in \mathcal{H} .*

It is much easier to work with this definition than with the unforgeability definition because of the absence of an adaptive adversary, and the collision probability is taken over all possible choices of key.

Block Cipher Security

Many MAC constructions are based on block cipher, so we quickly recall the definition of block ciphers and their security definition.

A block cipher is a family of permutations $\mathcal{E} : \{0, 1\}^{K(\eta)} \times \{0, 1\}^\eta \rightarrow \{0, 1\}^\eta$ indexed with a key $k \in \{0, 1\}^{K(\eta)}$ where $K(\eta)$ is a polynomial. A block cipher is secure if, for a randomly sampled key, the block cipher is indistinguishable from a permutation sampled at random from the set of all permutations of $\{0, 1\}^\eta$. However, since random permutations of $\{0, 1\}^\eta$ and random functions from $\{0, 1\}^\eta$ to $\{0, 1\}^\eta$ are statistically close, and that random functions are often more convenient for proof purposes, it is common to assume that secure block ciphers are pseudo-random functions.

Definition 4 (Pseudo-Random Functions). *Let $P : \{0, 1\}^{K(\eta)} \times \{0, 1\}^\eta \rightarrow \{0, 1\}^\eta$ be a family of functions and let \mathcal{A} be an algorithm that takes an oracle and returns a bit. The prf-advantage of \mathcal{A} is defined as follows.*

$$\text{Adv}_{\mathcal{A}, P}^{\text{prf}} = \left| \Pr[k \xleftarrow{\$} \{0, 1\}^{K(\eta)}; \mathcal{A}^{P(k, \cdot)} = 1] - \Pr[R \xleftarrow{\$} \Phi_\eta; \mathcal{A}^{R(\cdot)} = 1] \right|$$

where Φ_η is the set of all functions from $\{0, 1\}^\eta$ to $\{0, 1\}^\eta$.

Since all the schemes in this paper require only one key for the block cipher, to simplify the notation, we write only $\mathcal{E}(m)$ instead of $\mathcal{E}(k, m)$, but it is understood that a key was selected at the initialization of the scheme, and remains the same throughout.

Random Oracle Model

For MACs that make use of a hash function, we assume that the hash function behaves like a random oracle. That is, we assume that the hash function is picked at random among all possible functions from the given domain and range, and that every algorithm participating in the scheme, including all adversaries, has oracle access to this random function. This is a fairly common assumption to analyze hash functions in cryptographic protocols [6].

Indistinguishable Distributions

Given two distribution ensembles $X = \{X_\eta\}_{\eta \in \mathbb{N}}$ and $X' = \{X'_\eta\}_{\eta \in \mathbb{N}}$, an algorithm \mathcal{A} and $\eta \in \mathbb{N}$, we define the *advantage* of \mathcal{A} in distinguishing X_η from X'_η as the following quantity:

$$\text{Adv}(\mathcal{A}, \eta, X, X') = \left| \Pr[x \stackrel{\$}{\leftarrow} X_\eta : \mathcal{A}(x) = 1] - \Pr[x \stackrel{\$}{\leftarrow} X'_\eta : \mathcal{A}(x) = 1] \right|.$$

We say that X and X' are *indistinguishable*, denoted by $X \sim X'$, if $\text{Adv}(\mathcal{A}, \eta, X, X')$ is negligible as a function of η for every probabilistic polynomial-time algorithm \mathcal{A} .

3 Model

In this section, we introduce the grammar for the programs describing almost-universal hash function. We present the semantics of each commands, and introduce the assertion language that will be used in for our Hoare logic.

3.1 Grammar

We consider the language defined by the following BNF grammar,

$$\begin{aligned} \text{cmd} ::= & x := \mathcal{E}(y) \mid x := \mathcal{H}(y) \mid x := y \mid x := y \oplus z \mid x := y \parallel z \mid x := \rho^i(y) \\ & \mid \text{for } l = p \text{ to } q \text{ do: } [\text{cmd}_l] \mid \text{cmd}_1; \text{cmd}_2 \end{aligned}$$

where p and q are positive integers. Each command has the following effect:

- $x := \mathcal{E}(y)$ denotes application of the block cipher \mathcal{E} to the value of y and assigning the result to x .
- $x := \mathcal{H}(y)$ denotes the application of the hash function \mathcal{H} to the value of y and assigning the result to x .
- $x := y \oplus z$ denotes the assignment to x of the xor or the values of y and z .
- $x := y \parallel z$ denotes the assignment to x of the concatenation of the values of y and z .

- $x := \rho^i(y)$ denotes the i -fold application of the function ρ to the value of y (that is, $\rho(\dots(\rho(y)\dots))$, where ρ is repeated i times) and assigning the result to x .
- for $l = p$ to q do: $[\text{cmd}_l]$ denotes the successive execution of $\text{cmd}_p, \text{cmd}_{p+1}, \dots, \text{cmd}_q$ when $p \leq q$. If $p > q$, the command has no effect.
- $c_1; c_2$ is the sequential composition of c_1 and c_2 .

The function ρ is used to compute the *tweak* in *tweakable block ciphers* ([16]). The function used to compute this tweak can vary from one protocol to the next, so we only specify that it must be a public function. When a scheme uses a function ρ , the properties of the function ρ required for the proof will be added to the initial conditions of the verification procedure.

Definition 5 (Generic Hash Function). *A generic hash function Hash on n message blocks m_1, \dots, m_n and with output c_n , is represented by a tuple $(\mathcal{F}_\mathcal{E}, \mathcal{F}_\mathcal{H}, \text{Hash}(m_1 \parallel \dots \parallel m_n, c_n) : \text{var } \mathbf{x}; \text{cmd})$, where $\mathcal{F}_\mathcal{E}$ is a family of pseudorandom permutations (usually a block cipher), $\mathcal{F}_\mathcal{H}$ is a family of cryptographic hash functions, and $\text{Hash}(m_1 \parallel \dots \parallel m_n, c_n) : \text{var } \mathbf{x}; \text{cmd}$ is the code of the hash function, where \mathbf{x} is the set of all the variables in the program that are neither input variable, output variables, or the secret key, and the commands of cmd are built using the grammar described above.*

We assume that, prior to executing the MAC, the message has been padded using some unambiguous padding scheme, so that all the message blocks m_1, \dots, m_n are of equal and appropriate length for the scheme, usually the input length of the block cipher. We also assume that each variable in the program cmd is assigned at most once, as it is clear that any program can be transformed into an equivalent program with this property, and that the input variables m_1, \dots, m_n never appear on the left side of any command since these variables already hold a value before the execution of the program. For simplicity of exposition, we henceforth assume that all the programs in this paper satisfy these assumptions.

Using this formalism, we describe in Figure 1 the hash functions Hash_{CBC} , $\text{Hash}_{CBC'}$, Hash_{PMAC} and Hash_{HMAC} , which are treated in this paper. The hash function Hash_{CBC} will be used as a running example throughout this paper.

3.2 Semantics

In our analysis, we consider the execution of a program on two inputs simultaneously. These simultaneous executions will enable us to keep track of the probability of equality and inequality of strings between the two executions, thereby allowing us to prove that the function is almost-universal.

Each command is a function that takes a configuration and outputs a distribution on configurations. A *configuration* is a tuple $(S, S', \mathcal{E}, \mathcal{H}, \mathcal{L}_\mathcal{E}, \mathcal{L}_\mathcal{H})$ where S and S' are states, \mathcal{E} is a block cipher, \mathcal{H} is a hash function (that will be modeled as a random oracle), and $\mathcal{L}_\mathcal{E}$ and $\mathcal{L}_\mathcal{H}$ are lists of pairs.

<pre> <i>Hash</i>_{CBC}($m_1 \parallel \dots \parallel m_n, c_n$) : var $i, z_2, \dots, z_n, c_1, \dots, c_{n-1}$; $c_1 := \mathcal{E}(m_1)$; for $i = 2$ to n do: [$z_i := c_{i-1} \oplus m_i$; $c_i := \mathcal{E}(z_i)$] <i>Hash</i>_{CBC'}($m_1 \parallel \dots \parallel m_n, c_n$) : var $i, z_2, \dots, z_n, c_1, \dots, c_{n-1}$; $c_1 := m_1$; for $i = 2$ to n do: [$z_i := \mathcal{E}(c_{i-1})$; $c_i := z_i \oplus m_i$] </pre>	<pre> <i>Hash</i>_{PMAC}($m_1 \parallel \dots \parallel m_n, c_n$) : var $i, w_1, x_1, y_1, z_1, \dots, w_n, x_n, y_n, z_n$, c_1, \dots, c_{n-1}; $c_1 := m_1$; $w_1 := \rho(k)$; $x_1 := w_1 \oplus m_1$; $z_1 = \mathcal{E}(w_1)$; for $i = 2$ to n do: [$c_i := z_{i-1} \oplus m_i$; $w_i := \rho^i(k)$; $x_i := w_i \oplus m_i$; $y_i := \mathcal{E}(x_i)$; $z_i := z_{i-1} \oplus y_i$] <i>Hash</i>_{HMAC}($m_1 \parallel \dots \parallel m_n, c_n$): var $i, z_1, \dots, z_n, c_1, \dots, c_{n-1}$; $z_1 := k \parallel m_1$; $c_1 = \mathcal{H}(z_1)$; for $i = 2$ to n do: [$z_i := c_{i-1} \parallel m_i$; $c_i := \mathcal{H}(z_i)$] </pre>
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Fig. 1. Description of *Hash*_{CBC}, *Hash*_{CBC'}, *Hash*_{PMAC} and *Hash*_{HMAC}

A *state* is a function $S : \text{Var} \rightarrow \{0, 1\}^* \cup \perp$, where Var is the full set of variables in the program, that assigns bitstrings to variables (the symbol \perp is used to indicate that no value has been assigned to the variable yet). A configuration contains two states, one for each execution of the program.

The list $\mathcal{L}_{\mathcal{E}}$ records the values for which the functions \mathcal{E} was computed. The list is common for both executions of the program. Every time a command of the type $x := \mathcal{E}(y)$ is executed in the program, we add $(S(y), \mathcal{E}(S(y)))$ and $(S'(y), \mathcal{E}(S'(y)))$ to $\mathcal{L}_{\mathcal{E}}$ if they are not already present. We denote by $\mathcal{L}_{\mathcal{E}}.\text{dom}$ and $\mathcal{L}_{\mathcal{E}}.\text{res}$ the lists obtained by projecting each pair in $\mathcal{L}_{\mathcal{E}}$ to its first and second element respectively. We define $\mathcal{L}_{\mathcal{H}}$, $\mathcal{L}_{\mathcal{H}}.\text{dom}$ and $\mathcal{L}_{\mathcal{H}}.\text{res}$ for the hash function \mathcal{H} similarly.

Let Γ denote the set of configurations and $\text{DIST}(\Gamma)$ the set of distributions on configurations. The semantics is given in Table 1, where $\delta(x)$ denotes the Dirac measure, i.e. $\text{Pr}[x] = 1$, $S\{x \mapsto v\}$ denotes the state which assigns the value v to the variable x , and behaves like S for all other variables, $\mathcal{L}_{\mathcal{E}} \cdot (x, y)$ denotes the addition of element (x, y) to $\mathcal{L}_{\mathcal{E}}$ and \circ denotes function composition. The semantic function $\text{cmd} : \Gamma \rightarrow \text{DIST}(\Gamma)$ of commands can be lifted in the usual way to a function $\text{cmd}^* : \text{DIST}(\Gamma) \rightarrow \text{DIST}(\Gamma)$ by point-wise application of ϕ . By abuse of notation we also denote the lifted semantics by $\llbracket \text{cmd} \rrbracket$.

Here, we are only interested in the distributions that capture the initial situation of Definition ??, which we denote $\text{DIST}_0(\Gamma, \mathcal{F}_{\mathcal{E}}, \mathcal{F}_{\mathcal{H}})$ where $\mathcal{F}_{\mathcal{E}}$ is a family of block ciphers, $\mathcal{F}_{\mathcal{H}}$ is a family of hash functions, and those distributions

$$\begin{aligned}
\llbracket x := \mathcal{E}(y) \rrbracket(S, S', \mathcal{E}, \mathcal{H}, \mathcal{L}_\mathcal{E}, \mathcal{L}_\mathcal{H}) &= \\
\left\{ \begin{array}{l}
\delta(S\{x \mapsto v\}, S'\{x \mapsto v'\}, \mathcal{E}, \mathcal{H}, \mathcal{L}_\mathcal{E}, \mathcal{L}_\mathcal{H}) \text{ if } (S(y), v), (S'(y), v') \in \mathcal{L}_\mathcal{E} \\
\delta(S\{x \mapsto v\}, S'\{x \mapsto v'\}, \mathcal{E}, \mathcal{H}, \mathcal{L}_\mathcal{E} \cdot (S(y), v), \mathcal{L}_\mathcal{H}) \\
\quad \text{if } (S(y), v) \notin \mathcal{L}_\mathcal{E}, (S'(y), v') \in \mathcal{L}_\mathcal{E} \text{ and } v = \mathcal{E}(S(y)) \\
\delta(S\{x \mapsto v\}, S'\{x \mapsto v'\}, \mathcal{E}, \mathcal{H}, \mathcal{L}_\mathcal{E} \cdot (S'(y), v'), \mathcal{L}_\mathcal{H}) \\
\quad \text{if } (S(y), v) \in \mathcal{L}_\mathcal{E}, (S'(y), v') \notin \mathcal{L}_\mathcal{E} \text{ and } v' = \mathcal{E}(S'(y)) \\
\delta(S\{x \mapsto v\}, S'\{x \mapsto v'\}, \mathcal{E}, \mathcal{H}, (\mathcal{L}_\mathcal{E} \cdot (S(y), v)) \cdot (S'(y), v'), \mathcal{L}_\mathcal{H}) \\
\quad \text{if } (S(y), v), (S'(y), v') \notin \mathcal{L}_\mathcal{E} \text{ and } v = \mathcal{E}(S(y)), v' = \mathcal{E}(S'(y))
\end{array} \right. \\
\llbracket x := \mathcal{H}(y) \rrbracket(S, S', \mathcal{E}, \mathcal{H}, \mathcal{L}_\mathcal{E}, \mathcal{L}_\mathcal{H}) &= \\
\left\{ \begin{array}{l}
\delta(S\{x \mapsto v\}, S'\{x \mapsto v'\}, \mathcal{E}, \mathcal{H}, \mathcal{L}_\mathcal{E}, \mathcal{L}_\mathcal{H}) \text{ if } (S(y), v), (S'(y), v') \in \mathcal{L}_\mathcal{H} \\
\delta(S\{x \mapsto v\}, S'\{x \mapsto v'\}, \mathcal{E}, \mathcal{H}, \mathcal{L}_\mathcal{E}, \mathcal{L}_\mathcal{H} \cdot (S(y), v)) \\
\quad \text{if } (S(y), v) \notin \mathcal{L}_\mathcal{H}, (S'(y), v') \in \mathcal{L}_\mathcal{H} \text{ and } v = \mathcal{H}(S(y)) \\
\delta(S\{x \mapsto v\}, S'\{x \mapsto v'\}, \mathcal{E}, \mathcal{H}, \mathcal{L}_\mathcal{E}, \mathcal{L}_\mathcal{H} \cdot (S'(y), v')) \\
\quad \text{if } (S(y), v) \in \mathcal{L}_\mathcal{H}, (S'(y), v') \notin \mathcal{L}_\mathcal{H} \text{ and } v' = \mathcal{H}(S'(y)) \\
\delta(S\{x \mapsto v\}, S'\{x \mapsto v'\}, \mathcal{E}, \mathcal{H}, \mathcal{L}_\mathcal{E}, (\mathcal{L}_\mathcal{H} \cdot (S(y), v)) \cdot (S'(y), v')) \\
\quad \text{if } (S(y), v), (S'(y), v') \notin \mathcal{L}_\mathcal{H} \text{ and } v = \mathcal{H}(S(y)), v' = \mathcal{H}(S'(y))
\end{array} \right. \\
\llbracket x := y \oplus z \rrbracket(S, S', \mathcal{E}, \mathcal{H}, \mathcal{L}_\mathcal{E}, \mathcal{L}_\mathcal{H}) &= \delta(S\{x \mapsto S(y) \oplus S(z)\}, S'\{x \mapsto S'(y) \oplus S'(z)\}, \\
&\quad \mathcal{E}, \mathcal{H}, \mathcal{L}_\mathcal{E}, \mathcal{L}_\mathcal{H}) \\
\llbracket x := y || z \rrbracket(S, S', \mathcal{E}, \mathcal{H}, \mathcal{L}_\mathcal{E}, \mathcal{L}_\mathcal{H}) &= \delta(S\{x \mapsto S(y) || S(z)\}, S'\{x \mapsto S'(y) || S'(z)\}, \mathcal{E}, \mathcal{H}, \\
&\quad \mathcal{L}_\mathcal{E}, \mathcal{L}_\mathcal{H}) \\
\llbracket x := \rho^i(t) \rrbracket(S, S', \mathcal{E}, \mathcal{H}, \mathcal{L}_\mathcal{E}, \mathcal{L}_\mathcal{H}) &= \delta(S\{x \mapsto \rho^i(S(y))\}, S'\{x \mapsto \rho^i(S'(y))\}, \mathcal{E}, \mathcal{H}, \\
&\quad \mathcal{L}_\mathcal{E}, \mathcal{L}_\mathcal{H}) \\
\llbracket \text{for } l = p \text{ to } q \text{ do: } [\text{cmd}_i] \rrbracket &= \begin{cases} \llbracket \text{cmd}_q \rrbracket \circ \llbracket \text{cmd}_{q-1} \rrbracket \circ \dots \circ \llbracket \text{cmd}_p \rrbracket & \text{if } p \leq q \\ \text{the identity function} & \text{otherwise} \end{cases} \\
\llbracket c_1; c_2 \rrbracket &= \llbracket c_2 \rrbracket \circ \llbracket c_1 \rrbracket
\end{aligned}$$

Table 1. The semantics of the programming language

obtained by executing a program on one of the initial distributions, denoted $\text{DIST}(\Gamma, \mathcal{F}_\mathcal{E}, \mathcal{F}_\mathcal{H})$. The set of initial distributions $\text{DIST}_0(\Gamma, \mathcal{F}_\mathcal{E}, \mathcal{F}_\mathcal{H})$ contains all the following distributions:

$$\begin{aligned}
\mathcal{D}_0^{(M, M')} &= [\mathcal{E} \stackrel{\$}{\leftarrow} \mathcal{F}_\mathcal{E}(1^n); \mathcal{H} \stackrel{\$}{\leftarrow} \mathcal{F}_\mathcal{H}(1^n); u \stackrel{\$}{\leftarrow} \{0, 1\}^n; (S, S', \mathcal{L}_\mathcal{E}, \mathcal{L}_\mathcal{H}) \stackrel{\$}{\leftarrow} \mathcal{A}^\mathcal{H}(1^n) : \\
&\quad (S\{k \mapsto u, m_1 || \dots || m_n \mapsto M\}, S'\{k \mapsto u, m_1 || \dots || m_n \mapsto M'\}, \mathcal{E}, \mathcal{H}, \mathcal{L}_\mathcal{E}, \mathcal{L}_\mathcal{H})]
\end{aligned}$$

where M and M' are any two n block messages (where n is left as a parameter) and k is a variable holding a secret string needed in some MACs (among our examples, $\text{Hash}_{\text{PMAC}}$ and $\text{Hash}_{\text{HMAC}}$ need it). The set $\text{DIST}(\Gamma, \mathcal{F}_\mathcal{E}, \mathcal{F}_\mathcal{H})$ contains all the distributions of the form $\llbracket \text{cmd} \rrbracket X_0$, where $X_0 \in \text{DIST}_0(\Gamma, \mathcal{F}_\mathcal{E}, \mathcal{F}_\mathcal{H})$ and cmd is a program.

A notational convention. It is easy to see that commands never modify \mathcal{E} or \mathcal{H} . Therefore, we can, without ambiguity, write $(\hat{S}, \hat{S}', \mathcal{L}'_\mathcal{E}, \mathcal{L}'_\mathcal{H}) \stackrel{\$}{\leftarrow} \llbracket c \rrbracket(S, S', \mathcal{L}_\mathcal{E}, \mathcal{L}_\mathcal{H})$ instead of $(\hat{S}, \hat{S}', \mathcal{E}, \mathcal{H}, \mathcal{L}'_\mathcal{E}, \mathcal{L}'_\mathcal{H}) \stackrel{\$}{\leftarrow} \llbracket c \rrbracket(S, S', \mathcal{E}, \mathcal{H}, \mathcal{L}_\mathcal{E}, \mathcal{L}_\mathcal{H})$.

3.3 Assertion Language

Like [15], our assertion languages deals with block ciphers, so it stands to reason that some of our invariants will be similar to theirs. However, the definition of all the predicates has to be adapted to our new semantics with two simultaneous executions. We also need additional predicates to describe equality or inequality of strings between the two executions, that will allow us to capture the definition of almost-universal hash functions. We first give an intuitive description of our predicates, then we define them all formally.

Since we are using block cipher and hash functions modeled as random function, it is very useful to keep track of values on which the block cipher and the hash function has never been computed before, because computing the block cipher on such a value would yield a value that is indistinguishable from a random value. To this end, the predicates $\mathbf{E}(\mathcal{E}; x; V)$ and $\mathbf{H}(\mathcal{H}; x; V)$ mean that the probability that the value of the variable x (in either execution) is either in $\mathcal{L}_{\mathcal{E}}.\text{dom}$ (resp. $\mathcal{L}_{\mathcal{H}}.\text{dom}$) or in V is negligible. We also add the predicate \mathbf{Empty} to mean that the probability that $\mathcal{L}_{\mathcal{E}}$ is non-empty is negligible – this predicate holds at the beginning of the program.

When computing the block cipher or a random oracle on a new value, the result will be indistinguishable from a random value. This property is captured by the predicate $\mathbf{Indis}(x; V; V')$, which means that no adversary has non-negligible probability to distinguish whether he is given results of computations performed using the value of x or a random value, when he is given the values of the variables in V and the values of the variables in V' from the second execution. In addition to variables in \mathbf{Var} , the set V can contain special symbols $\ell_{\mathcal{E}}$ or $\ell_{\mathcal{H}}$. When the symbol $\ell_{\mathcal{E}}$ is present, it means that, in addition to the other variables in V , the distinguisher is also given the values in $\mathcal{L}_{\mathcal{E}}.\text{dom}$, similarly for $\ell_{\mathcal{H}}$.

Finally, we introduce two new predicates, $\mathbf{Equal}(x, y)$ and $\mathbf{Unequal}(x, y)$, which are used to keep track of equality and inequality of the value of variables between the two executions. The predicate $\mathbf{Equal}(x, y)$ means that the probability that the value of x in the first execution and the value of y in the second execution are unequal is negligible. Similarly, the predicate $\mathbf{Unequal}(x, y)$ means that the probability that the value of x in the first execution and the value of y in the second execution are equal is negligible.

Our Hoare logic is based on statements from the following language.

$$\begin{aligned} \varphi &::= \varphi \wedge \varphi \mid \varphi \vee \varphi \mid \psi \\ \psi &::= \mathbf{Indis}(x; W; V') \mid \mathbf{Equal}(x, y) \mid \mathbf{Unequal}(x, y) \mid \mathbf{Empty} \mid \mathbf{E}(\mathcal{E}; x; V) \\ &\quad \mid \mathbf{H}(\mathcal{H}; x; V) \end{aligned}$$

where $x, y \in \mathbf{Var}$ and $V, V' \subseteq \mathbf{Var}$, and $W \subseteq \mathbf{Var} \cup \{\ell_{\mathcal{E}}, \ell_{\mathcal{H}}\}$.

We introduce a few notational shortcuts that will help in formally defining our predicates. For any set $V \subseteq \mathbf{Var}$, we denote by $S(V)$ the multiset resulting from the application of S on each variable in V . We also use $S(V, \ell_{\mathcal{E}})$ as a shorthand for $S(V) \cup \mathcal{L}_{\mathcal{E}}.\text{dom}$, and similarly for $S(V, \ell_{\mathcal{H}})$ and $S(V, \ell_{\mathcal{E}}, \ell_{\mathcal{H}})$. For a set V and a variable, we write V, x as a shorthand for $V \cup \{x\}$ and $V - x$ as a shorthand for $V \setminus \{x\}$.

We define that a distribution X satisfies φ , denoted $X \models \varphi$ as follows:

- $X \models \varphi \wedge \varphi'$ iff $X \models \varphi$ and $X \models \varphi'$
- $X \models \varphi \vee \varphi'$ iff $X \models \varphi$ or $X \models \varphi'$
- $X \models \text{Empty}$ iff $\Pr[(S, S', \mathcal{L}_\mathcal{E}, \mathcal{L}_\mathcal{H}) \stackrel{\$}{\leftarrow} X : \mathcal{L}_\mathcal{E} \neq \emptyset]$ is negligible
- $X \models \text{Equal}(x, y)$ iff $\Pr[(S, S', \mathcal{L}_\mathcal{E}, \mathcal{L}_\mathcal{H}) \stackrel{\$}{\leftarrow} X : S(x) \neq S'(y)]$ is negligible
- $X \models \text{Unequal}(x, y)$ iff $\Pr[(S, S', \mathcal{L}_\mathcal{E}, \mathcal{L}_\mathcal{H}) \stackrel{\$}{\leftarrow} X : S(x) = S'(y)]$ is negligible
- $X \models \text{E}(\mathcal{E}; x; V)$ iff $\Pr[(S, S', \mathcal{L}_\mathcal{E}, \mathcal{L}_\mathcal{H}) \stackrel{\$}{\leftarrow} X : \{S(x), S'(x)\} \cap (\mathcal{L}_\mathcal{E}.\text{dom} \cup S(V - x) \cup S'(V - x)) \neq \emptyset]$ is negligible³
- $X \models \text{H}(\mathcal{H}; x; V)$ iff $\Pr[(S, S', \mathcal{L}_\mathcal{E}, \mathcal{L}_\mathcal{H}) \stackrel{\$}{\leftarrow} X : \{S(x), S'(x)\} \cap (\mathcal{L}_\mathcal{H}.\text{dom} \cup S(V - x) \cup S'(V - x)) \neq \emptyset]$ is negligible
- $X \models \text{Indis}(x; V; V')$ iff the two following formulas hold:

$$\begin{aligned} & [(S, S', \mathcal{L}_\mathcal{E}, \mathcal{L}_\mathcal{H}) \stackrel{\$}{\leftarrow} X : (S(x), S(V - x) \cup S'(V'))] \sim \\ & \quad [(S, S', \mathcal{L}_\mathcal{E}, \mathcal{L}_\mathcal{H}) \stackrel{\$}{\leftarrow} X; u \stackrel{\$}{\leftarrow} \mathcal{U} : (u, S(V - x) \cup S'(V'))] \\ & [(S, S', \mathcal{L}_\mathcal{E}, \mathcal{L}_\mathcal{H}) \stackrel{\$}{\leftarrow} X : (S'(x), S'(V - x) \cup S(V'))] \sim \\ & \quad [(S, S', \mathcal{L}_\mathcal{E}, \mathcal{L}_\mathcal{H}) \stackrel{\$}{\leftarrow} X; u \stackrel{\$}{\leftarrow} \mathcal{U} : (u, S'(V - x) \cup S(V'))] \end{aligned}$$

The following lemma shows useful relations between our invariants.

Lemma 1. *The following relations are true for any sets V_1, V_2, V_3, V_4 and variables x, y with $x \neq y$*

1. $\text{Indis}(x; V_1; V_2) \Rightarrow \text{Indis}(x; V_3; V_4)$ if $V_3 \subseteq V_1$ and $V_4 \subseteq V_2$
2. $\text{H}(\mathcal{H}; x; V_1) \Rightarrow \text{H}(\mathcal{H}; x; V_2)$ if $V_2 \subseteq V_1$
3. $\text{E}(\mathcal{E}; x; V_1) \Rightarrow \text{E}(\mathcal{E}; x; V_2)$ if $V_2 \subseteq V_1$
4. $\text{Indis}(x; V_1, \ell_\mathcal{H}; \emptyset) \Rightarrow \text{H}(\mathcal{H}; x; V_1)$
5. $\text{Indis}(x; V_1, \ell_\mathcal{E}; \emptyset) \Rightarrow \text{E}(\mathcal{E}; x; V_1)$
6. $\text{Indis}(x; \emptyset; \{y\}) \Rightarrow \text{Unequal}(x, y) \wedge \text{Unequal}(y, x)$

Proof. These are all fairly straightforward.

1. If an algorithm could distinguish $(S(x), S(V_3) \cup S'(V_4))$ from $(u, S(V_3) \cup S'(V_4))$, a similar algorithm would be able to distinguish $(S(x), S(V_1) \cup S'(V_2))$ from $(u, S(V_1) \cup S'(V_2))$ by simply disregarding the values in $S(V_1) \setminus S(V_3)$ and $S'(V_2) \setminus S'(V_4)$.

2. and 3. are trivial: $x \notin T \Rightarrow x \notin T'$ for $T' \subset T$.

4. to 6. follow from the simple observation that if $X \models \text{Indis}(x, V)$, then the probability that the value of x is equal to the value of any variable in V (or any values in $\mathcal{L}_\mathcal{E}.\text{dom}$, $\mathcal{L}_\mathcal{H}.\text{dom}$ or in the simultaneous execution, if $\mathcal{L}_\mathcal{E}$ or $\mathcal{L}_\mathcal{H}$ is in V) is negligible, otherwise an adversary could distinguish the value of x from a random value by comparing it to all the values in $S(V)$.

³ Since the variable x is removed from the set V when taking the probability, we always have $X \models \text{E}(\mathcal{E}; x; V)$ iff $X \models \text{E}(\mathcal{E}; x; V, x)$. This is to remove the trivial case that $\{S(x), S'(x)\} \cap (\mathcal{L}_\mathcal{E}.\text{dom} \cup S(\{x\}) \cup S'(\{x\})) \neq \emptyset$ never holds, and to simplify the notation. The same is also used for predicates $\text{H}(\mathcal{H}; x; V)$ and $\text{Indis}(x; V; V')$.

Note that results 4, 5 and 6 are particularly helpful because the predicate `Indis` is much easier to propagate than the other predicates.

We also show that, as a consequence of our definition of $\text{DIST}(\Gamma, \mathcal{F}_\mathcal{E}, \mathcal{F}_\mathcal{H})$, we can always infer the following predicate on the message blocks.

Lemma 2. *Let $X \in \text{DIST}(\Gamma, \mathcal{F}_\mathcal{E}, \mathcal{F}_\mathcal{H})$. Then for any integer i , $1 \leq i \leq n$, $X \models \text{Equal}(m_i, m_i) \vee \text{Unequal}(m_i, m_i)$.*

Proof. Since $X \in \text{DIST}(\Gamma, \mathcal{F}_\mathcal{E}, \mathcal{F}_\mathcal{H})$, then, by definition, $X = \llbracket \text{cmd} \rrbracket \mathcal{D}_0^{(M, M')}$ for some program `cmd` and n -block messages M, M' . We note that, by design, for every configuration $(S, S', \mathcal{E}, \mathcal{H}, \mathcal{L}_\mathcal{E}, \mathcal{L}_\mathcal{H})$ that has non-zero probability in $\mathcal{D}_0^{(M, M')}$, $S(m_i)$ is equal to the i^{th} block of M and $S'(m_i)$ is equal to the i^{th} block of M' . Therefore, it is clear that either the i^{th} blocks of M and M' are equal, in which case $\mathcal{D}_0^{(M, M')} \models \text{Equal}(m_i, m_i)$, or they are not equal, and $\mathcal{D}_0^{(M, M')} \models \text{Unequal}(m_i, m_i)$. The result then follows from our assumption that the message variables are never assigned new values.

4 Proving Almost-Universal Hash

The main contribution of this paper is a Hoare logic for proving that a program is an almost-universal hash function. To do this, we require that the program be written in a way so that, on input $m_1 \parallel \dots \parallel m_n$, the program must assign values to variables c_1, \dots, c_n in such a way that the variable c_1 contains the output of the function on input m_1 , the variable c_2 contains the output of the function on input $m_1 \parallel m_2$ and so on. Under this assumption, we can model the security of an almost-universal hash function using our predicates as follows.

Proposition 1. *Let the generic hash $(\mathcal{F}_\mathcal{E}, \mathcal{F}_\mathcal{H}, \text{Hash}(m_1 \parallel \dots \parallel m_n, c_n) : \text{var } \mathbf{x}; \text{cmd})$ describe the program to compute a hash function `Hash` on an n block message. Then, `Hash` is an almost-universal hash function if, for every positive integer n , the following holds at the end of the program:*

$$\text{UNIV}(n) = \left(\bigwedge_{i=1}^{n-1} \text{Unequal}(c_n, c_i) \wedge \bigwedge_{i=1}^n \text{Equal}(m_i, m_i) \right) \vee \bigwedge_{i=1}^n \text{Unequal}(c_n, c_i)$$

Proof. (sketch) Say M_1 is a k -block message, and M_2 is an l -block message with $1 \leq l \leq k$. We want to show that, either $M_1 = M_2$, or the probability that M_1 and M_2 hash to the same value is negligible. Thanks to our constraint on the construction of the program, with M_1 placed as the message in S and M_2 placed in S' , we will have that c_l contains the hash of M_1 in the first execution and c_k contains the hash of M_2 in the second execution. If the invariant $\text{UNIV}(k)$ holds, then we have that either $\text{Unequal}(c_k, c_l)$, which shows that the probability that the hashes are equal is negligible, or $k = l$ and all the message blocks are equal which imply that $M_1 = M_2$, as required. \square

Hoare Logic Rules

We present a set of rules of the form $\{\varphi\}\text{cmd}\{\varphi'\}$, meaning that execution of command cmd in any distribution that satisfies φ leads to a distribution that satisfies φ' . Using Hoare logic terminology, this means that the triple $\{\varphi\}\text{cmd}\{\varphi'\}$ is valid.

Since the predicates $\text{Equal}(m_i, m_i)$ are useful only if the whole prefix of the two messages up to the i^{th} block are equal, so that keeping track of the equality or inequality of the message blocks after the first point at which the messages are different is unnecessary. For this reason, when we design our rules, we never produce the predicates $\text{Unequal}(m_i, m_i)$ even when they would be correct.

We group rules together according to their corresponding commands. The rules of our Hoare logic are detailed in Table 2. In all the rules, unless indicated otherwise, we assume that $t \notin \{x, y, z\}$ and $x \notin \{y, z\}$. In addition, for all rules involving the predicate Indis , we assume that $\ell_{\mathcal{E}}$ and $\ell_{\mathcal{H}}$ can be among the elements in the set V . The proofs of soundness of our rules are given in Appendix A.

We first introduce a few general rules for consequence, sequential composition, conjunction and disjunction. Let $\phi_1, \phi_2, \phi_3, \phi_4$ be any four invariants in our logic, and let $\text{cmd}, \text{cmd}_1, \text{cmd}_2$ be any three commands. These rules are standard, and their proof are not included in the appendix.

- (Csq) if $\phi_1 \Rightarrow \phi_2, \phi_3 \Rightarrow \phi_4$ and $\{\phi_2\}\text{cmd}\{\phi_3\}$, then $\{\phi_1\}\text{cmd}\{\phi_4\}$
- (Seq) if $\{\phi_1\}\text{cmd}_1\{\phi_2\}$ and $\{\phi_2\}\text{cmd}_2\{\phi_3\}$, then $\{\phi_1\}\text{cmd}_1;\text{cmd}_2\{\phi_3\}$
- (Conj) if $\{\phi_1\}\text{cmd}\{\phi_2\}$ and $\{\phi_3\}\text{cmd}\{\phi_4\}$, then $\{\phi_1 \wedge \phi_3\}\text{cmd}\{\phi_2 \wedge \phi_4\}$
- (Disj) if $\{\phi_1\}\text{cmd}\{\phi_2\}$ and $\{\phi_3\}\text{cmd}\{\phi_4\}$, then $\{\phi_1 \vee \phi_3\}\text{cmd}\{\phi_2 \vee \phi_4\}$

Initialization:

We find that the following predicates holds at the beginning of the program's execution.

$$(\text{Init}) \{\text{Indis}(k; \text{Var}, \ell_{\mathcal{E}}, \ell_{\mathcal{H}}; \text{Var} - k) \wedge \text{Equal}(k, k) \wedge \text{Empty}\}$$

The string k is part of the secret key sk of the MAC. It is sampled at random before executing the program and is the same in both executions, so it is indistinguishable from a random value given any other value.

Generic preservation rules:

Rules (G1) to (G6) show how predicates are preserved by most of the commands when the predicates concern a variable other than that being operated on. For all these rules, we assume that t and t' can be y or z and cmd is either $x := \rho^i(y)$, $x := y$, $x := y \parallel z$, $x := y \oplus z$, $x := \mathcal{E}(y)$, or $x := \mathcal{H}(y)$. We note that, for rules (G3) to (G6), the straightforward preservation rule does not apply when the command is either of the form $x := \mathcal{E}(y)$ or $x := \mathcal{H}(y)$, because some predicates may no longer hold if the block cipher or the random oracle is computed more than once on any given point. Therefore, the preservation of these predicates for the block cipher and hash commands will have to be handled separately in rules (B4) to (B6) and (H3) to (H5). For rule (G5), in general, we say that the value of a variable x is *constructible* from the values of variables in V if there exists a deterministic polynomial-time algorithm that can compute the value of x from

- (G1) $\{\text{Equal}(t, t')\}$ cmd $\{\text{Equal}(t, t')\}$
- (G2) $\{\text{Unequal}(t, t')\}$ cmd $\{\text{Unequal}(t, t')\}$
- (G3) $\{\text{E}(\mathcal{E}; t; V)\}$ cmd $\{\text{E}(\mathcal{E}; t; V)\}$ provided $x \notin V$ and cmd is not $x := \mathcal{E}(y)$
- (G4) $\{\text{H}(\mathcal{H}; t; V)\}$ cmd $\{\text{H}(\mathcal{H}; t; V)\}$ provided $x \notin V$ and cmd is not $x := \mathcal{H}(y)$
- (G5) $\{\text{Indis}(t; V; V')\}$ cmd $\{\text{Indis}(t; V; V')\}$ provided cmd is not $x := \mathcal{E}(y)$ or $x := \mathcal{H}(y)$, and $x \notin V$ unless x is constructible from $V - t$ and $x \notin V'$ unless x is constructible from $V' - t$
- (G6) $\{\text{Empty}\}$ cmd $\{\text{Empty}\}$ provided cmd is not $x := \mathcal{E}(y)$
- (P1) $\{\text{Equal}(y, y)\}$ $x := \rho^i(y)$ $\{\text{Equal}(x, x)\}$ for any positive integer i
- (A1) $\{\text{true}\}$ $x := m_i$ $\{(\text{Equal}(m_i, m_i) \wedge \text{Equal}(x, x)) \vee \text{Unequal}(x, x)\}$
- (A2) $\{\text{Equal}(y, y)\}$ $x := y$ $\{\text{Equal}(x, x)\}$
- (A3) $\{\text{Unequal}(y, y)\}$ $x := y$ $\{\text{Unequal}(x, x)\}$
- (A4) $\{\text{Indis}(y; V; V')\}$ $x := y$ $\{\text{Indis}(x; V; V')\}$ provided $x \notin V'$ unless $y \in V'$ and $y \notin V$
- (A5) $\{\text{E}(\mathcal{E}; y; V)\}$ $x := y$ $\{\text{E}(\mathcal{E}; x; V) \wedge \text{E}(\mathcal{E}; y; V)\}$ provided $y \notin V$
- (A6) $\{\text{H}(\mathcal{H}; y; V)\}$ $x := y$ $\{\text{H}(\mathcal{H}; x; V) \wedge \text{H}(\mathcal{H}; y; V)\}$ provided $y \notin V$
- (A7) $\{\text{E}(\mathcal{E}; t; V, y)\}$ $x := y$ $\{\text{E}(\mathcal{E}; t; V, x, y)\}$
- (A8) $\{\text{H}(\mathcal{H}; t; V, y)\}$ $x := y$ $\{\text{H}(\mathcal{H}; t; V, x, y)\}$
- (C1) $\{\text{Equal}(y, y)\}$ $x := y \parallel m_i$ $\{(\text{Equal}(m_i, m_i) \wedge \text{Equal}(x, x)) \vee \text{Unequal}(x, x)\}$
- (C2) $\{\text{Equal}(y, y) \wedge \text{Equal}(z, z)\}$ $x := y \parallel z$ $\{\text{Equal}(x, x)\}$
- (C3) $\{\text{Unequal}(y, y)\}$ $x := y \parallel z$ $\{\text{Unequal}(x, x)\}$
- (C4) $\{\text{Indis}(y; V, y, z; V') \wedge \text{Indis}(z; V, y, z; V')\}$ $x := y \parallel z$ $\{\text{Indis}(x; V, x; V')\}$ provided $y \neq z$, $x, y, z \notin V$ and $x \notin V'$ unless $y, z \in V'$
- (C5) $\{\text{Indis}(y; V, \ell_{\mathcal{E}}; V)\}$ $x := y \parallel z$ $\{\text{E}(\mathcal{E}; x; V)\}$
- (C6) $\{\text{Indis}(y; V, \ell_{\mathcal{H}}; V)\}$ $x := y \parallel z$ $\{\text{H}(\mathcal{H}; x; V)\}$
- (X1) $\{\text{Equal}(y, y)\}$ $x := y \oplus m_i$ $\{(\text{Equal}(m_i, m_i) \wedge \text{Equal}(x, x)) \vee \text{Unequal}(x, x)\}$
- (X2) $\{\text{Indis}(y; V, y, z; V')\}$ $x := y \oplus z$ $\{\text{Indis}(x; V, x, z; V')\}$ provided $y \neq z$, $y \notin V$ and $x \notin V'$ unless $y, z \in V'$
- (X3) $\{\text{Equal}(y, y) \wedge \text{Equal}(z, z)\}$ $x := y \oplus z$ $\{\text{Equal}(x, x)\}$
- (X4) $\{\text{Equal}(y, y) \wedge \text{Unequal}(z, z)\}$ $x := y \oplus z$ $\{\text{Unequal}(x, x)\}$
- (B1) $\{\text{Empty}\}$ $x := \mathcal{E}(m_i)$ $\{(\text{Unequal}(x, x) \wedge \text{Indis}(x; \text{Var}, \ell_{\mathcal{E}}, \ell_{\mathcal{H}}; \text{Var})) \vee (\text{Equal}(m_i, m_i) \wedge \text{Equal}(x, x) \wedge \text{Indis}(x; \text{Var}, \ell_{\mathcal{E}}, \ell_{\mathcal{H}}; \text{Var} - x))\}$
- (B2) $\{\text{E}(\mathcal{E}; y; \emptyset) \wedge \text{Unequal}(y, y)\}$ $x := \mathcal{E}(y)$ $\{\text{Indis}(x; \text{Var}, \ell_{\mathcal{E}}, \ell_{\mathcal{H}}; \text{Var})\}$
- (B3) $\{\text{E}(\mathcal{E}; y; \emptyset) \wedge \text{Equal}(y, y)\}$ $x := \mathcal{E}(y)$ $\{\text{Indis}(x; \text{Var}, \ell_{\mathcal{E}}, \ell_{\mathcal{H}}; \text{Var} - x) \wedge \text{Equal}(x, x)\}$
- (B4) $\{\text{E}(\mathcal{E}; y; \emptyset) \wedge \text{Indis}(t; V; V')\}$ $x := \mathcal{E}(y)$ $\{\text{Indis}(t; V, x; V', x)\}$ provided $\ell_{\mathcal{E}} \notin V$, even if $t = y$
- (B5) $\{\text{E}(\mathcal{E}; y; \emptyset) \wedge \text{Indis}(t; V, \ell_{\mathcal{E}}, y; V', y)\}$ $x := \mathcal{E}(y)$ $\{\text{Indis}(t; V, \ell_{\mathcal{E}}, x, y; V', x, y)\}$
- (B6) $\{\text{E}(\mathcal{E}; y; \emptyset) \wedge \text{E}(\mathcal{E}; t; V, y)\}$ $x := \mathcal{E}(y)$ $\{\text{E}(\mathcal{E}; t; V, y)\}$
- (H1) $\{\text{H}(\mathcal{H}; y; \emptyset) \wedge \text{Unequal}(y, y)\}$ $x := \mathcal{H}(y)$ $\{\text{Indis}(x; \text{Var}, \ell_{\mathcal{E}}, \ell_{\mathcal{H}}; \text{Var})\}$
- (H2) $\{\text{H}(\mathcal{H}; y; \emptyset) \wedge \text{Equal}(y, y)\}$ $x := \mathcal{H}(y)$ $\{\text{Indis}(x; \text{Var}, \ell_{\mathcal{H}}; \text{Var} - x) \wedge \text{Equal}(x, x)\}$
- (H3) $\{\text{H}(\mathcal{H}; y; \emptyset) \wedge \text{Indis}(t; V; V')\}$ $x := \mathcal{H}(y)$ $\{\text{Indis}(t; V, x; V', x)\}$ provided $\ell_{\mathcal{H}} \notin V$, even if $t = y$
- (H4) $\{\text{H}(\mathcal{H}; y; \emptyset) \wedge \text{Indis}(t; V, \ell_{\mathcal{H}}, y; V', y)\}$ $x := \mathcal{H}(y)$ $\{\text{Indis}(t; V, \ell_{\mathcal{H}}, x, y; V', x, y)\}$
- (H5) $\{\text{H}(\mathcal{H}; t; V, y)\}$ $x := \mathcal{H}(y)$ $\{\text{H}(\mathcal{H}; t; V, y)\}$
- (F1) $\{\psi(p - 1)\}$ for $l = p$ to q do: $[\text{cmd}_l]$ $\{\psi(q)\}$ provided $\{\psi(l - 1)\}$ cmd _{l} $\{\psi(l)\}$ for $p \leq l \leq q$

Table 2. Rules of our Hoare Logic

the values in V . In this case, it means that the variables in the right-hand side of `cmd` are all in V .

Function ρ :

Since the details of the function ρ are not known in advance, we can infer only one rule, that ρ preserves equality, because it is a deterministic function.

Assignment:

Rules (A1) to (A8), for the assignment, are all straightforward, and follow simply from the simple fact that after the command, the value of x is equal to the value of y .

Concatenation:

Rules (C1) to (C6) propagate the predicates for the concatenation command. The most important rule for the concatenation is (C4), which states that the concatenation of two random strings results in a random string. Note that it is important for this rule that $y \neq z$, otherwise the string x consists of a string twice repeated, which can be distinguished easily from a random value. The condition $x \notin V'$ unless $y, z \in V'$ is similar to rule (G5), and follows from the constructibility of x from y and z . Rules (C5) and (C6) state that if a string is indistinguishable from a random value given all the values in the list of queries to the block cipher (or the hash function), then clearly it cannot be a prefix of one of the strings $\mathcal{L}_{\mathcal{E}}$. For rules (C1), (C3), (C5) and (C6), the roles of y and z , or y and m_i in the case of (C1), can be exchanged.

Xor operator:

Rules (X1) to (X4) describe the effect of the Xor operation. Rules (X2) is reminiscent of a one-time-pad encryption: if a value z is xor-ed with a random-looking value y , then the result is similarly random-looking provided the value of y is not given. Again, the condition $x \notin V'$ unless $y, z \in V'$ is similar to rule (G5), and follows from the constructibility of x from y and z . The other rules are propagation of the **Equal** and **Unequal** predicates. Due to the commutativity of the xor, the role of y and z , or y and m_i in the case of (X1), can be exchanged in all the rules above.

Block cipher:

Since block ciphers are modeled as random functions, that is, functions picked at random among all functions from $\{0, 1\}^n$ to $\{0, 1\}^n$, the output of the function for a point on which the block cipher has never been computed is indistinguishable from a random value. This is expressed in rules (B1) to (B3), and also used in the proof of many other rules. Note that, when executing $x := \mathcal{E}(y)$ on a new value, if the values of y from the two executions are equal, then of course the values of x will be equal afterwards. However, if the values of y are not the same in the two executions, then the values of x will be indistinguishable from two *independent* random values afterwards.

Since the querying of a block cipher twice at any point is undesirable, we always require the predicate **E** as a precondition. We also have rules similar to (B2) to (B6), with the predicate $\mathbf{E}(\mathcal{E}; y; \emptyset)$ replaced by the predicate **Empty**, since both imply that the value of y is not in $\mathcal{L}_{\mathcal{E}}$.

Hash Function:

We note that the distinguishing adversary, described in Section 2, does not have access to the random oracle. This is an unusual decision, but sufficient for our purpose since our goal is only to prove inequality of strings, not their indistinguishability from random strings. As a result, the rules for the hash function are essentially the same as those for the block cipher.

For loop:

The rule for the For loop simply states that if an indexed invariant $\psi(i)$ is preserved through one iteration of the loop, then it is preserved through the entire loop. We discuss methods for finding such an invariant in Section 5.

Combining our logic with Proposition 1, we obtain the following theorem.

Theorem 1. *Let the generic hash $(\mathcal{F}_E, \mathcal{F}_H, \text{Hash}(m_1 \parallel \dots \parallel m_n, c_n) : \text{var } \mathbf{x}; \text{cmd})$ describe the program to compute a hash function Hash on an n block message. Then, Hash is an almost-universal hash function if, for every positive integer n , $\{\text{init}\} \text{cmd} \{UNIV(n)\}$.*

The theorem is the consequence of Proposition 1 and of the soundness of our Hoare logic. We then say that a sequence of invariants $[\phi_0, \dots, \phi_n]$ is a proof that a program $[\text{cmd}_1, \dots, \text{cmd}_n]$ computes an almost-universal hash function if $\phi_0 = \text{true}$, $\phi_n \Rightarrow UNIV(n)$ and for all i , $1 \leq n$, $\{\phi_{i-1}\} \text{cmd}_i \{\phi_i\}$ holds.

Example 1. Figure 2 shows the application of our logic on a program describing Hash_{CBC} for a two block message, with the loop unrolled – we show how . We can see that the invariant at the end implies $UNIV(2)$. For simplicity of exposition, we only present the invariants that are necessary to the analysis.

5 Implementation

To use our method, we start at the beginning of the program, at each command apply every possible rule and, once done, test if the invariant $UNIV(n)$ holds at the end of the program. One downside of this forward approach is that the application of every possible rule can be very time consuming because the invariants tend to grow after each command, which leads to more and more rules being applied each step. For this reason, we need a way to filter out unneeded predicates, so that execution time remains reasonable.

We chose to go forward through the program, instead of the more common approach of going backward from the end, after implementing both methods. Going backward through the program can require exploring multiple “branches” when many rules can lead to the necessary invariant. The presence of the logical-or connector in our logic often resulted in an exponential number of branches at each step. As a result, our prototype for the forward method was several orders of magnitude faster than the backward method.

$c_1 := \mathcal{E}(m_1);$	(Init) {Empty} (B1) { (Unequal(c_1, c_1) \wedge Indis($c_1; \text{Var}, \ell_{\mathcal{E}}, \ell_{\mathcal{H}}; \text{Var}$)) \vee (Equal(m_1, m_1) \wedge Equal(c_1, c_1) \wedge Indis($c_1; \text{Var}, \ell_{\mathcal{E}}, \ell_{\mathcal{H}}; \text{Var} - c_1$)) }
$z_2 := c_1 \oplus m_2;$	(G5)(X2) { (Indis($c_1; \text{Var} - z_2, \ell_{\mathcal{E}}, \ell_{\mathcal{H}}; \text{Var}$) \wedge Indis($z_2; \text{Var} - c_1, \ell_{\mathcal{E}}, \ell_{\mathcal{H}}; \text{Var}$)) \vee (G1)(X1) (Equal(m_1, m_1) \wedge Indis($c_1; \text{Var} - z_2, \ell_{\mathcal{E}}, \ell_{\mathcal{H}}; \text{Var} - c_1 - z_2$) \wedge Unequal(z_2, z_2) \wedge Indis($z_2; \text{Var} - c_1, \ell_{\mathcal{E}}, \ell_{\mathcal{H}}; \text{Var} - c_1 - z_2$)) \vee (Equal(m_1, m_1) \wedge Equal(m_2, m_2) \wedge Equal(z_2, z_2) \wedge Indis($c_1; \text{Var} - z_2, \ell_{\mathcal{E}}, \ell_{\mathcal{H}}; \text{Var} - c_1 - z_2$) \wedge Indis($z_2; \text{Var} - c_1, \ell_{\mathcal{E}}, \ell_{\mathcal{H}}; \text{Var} - c_1 - z_2$)) }
$c_2 := \mathcal{E}(z_2)$	(B2)(B4) { (Indis($c_1; \text{Var} - z_2, \ell_{\mathcal{H}}; \text{Var}$) \wedge Indis($c_2; \text{Var}, \ell_{\mathcal{E}}, \ell_{\mathcal{H}}; \text{Var}$)) \vee (G1) (Equal(m_1, m_1) \wedge Indis($c_1; \text{Var} - z_2, \ell_{\mathcal{H}}; \text{Var} - c_1 - z_2$) \wedge Indis($c_2; \text{Var}, \ell_{\mathcal{E}}, \ell_{\mathcal{H}}; \text{Var}$)) \vee (B3) (Equal(m_1, m_1) \wedge Equal(m_2, m_2) \wedge Indis($c_1; \text{Var} - z_2, \ell_{\mathcal{H}}; \text{Var} - c_1 - z_2$) \wedge Indis($c_2; \text{Var}, \ell_{\mathcal{E}}, \ell_{\mathcal{H}}; \text{Var} - c_2$)) }

Fig. 2. Use of our Hoare Logic on Hash_{CBC} for two block message

5.1 Invariant Filter

We say that ϕ is an *predicate on x* if ϕ is either $\text{Equal}(x, y)$, $\text{Unequal}(x, y)$, $\text{E}(\mathcal{E}; x; V)$ $\text{H}(\mathcal{H}; x; V)$ or $\text{Indis}(x; V_1, V_2)$ (for some $y \in \text{Var}$ and $V_1, V_2 \subseteq \text{Var}$). We say that a predicate ϕ on variable x is *obsolete for program p* if x does not appear anywhere in p and if $\neg(\phi \Rightarrow \text{Unequal}(c_n, c_i))$ and $\neg(\phi \Rightarrow \text{Equal}(m_i, m_i))$ for any i , $1 \leq i \leq n$.⁴ The following theorem shows that once an predicate is obsolete, it can be discarded.

Theorem 2. *If there exists a proof $[\phi_0, \dots, \phi_n]$ that a program $p = [\text{cmd}_1, \dots, \text{cmd}_n]$ computes an almost-universal hash function, then there also exists a proof $[\phi'_0, \dots, \phi'_n]$ that p computes an almost-universal hash function where for each i , $\phi_i \Rightarrow \phi'_i$ and each ϕ'_i does not contain any obsolete predicates for $[\text{cmd}_{i+1}, \dots, \text{cmd}_n]$.*

The theorem is a consequence of the fact that, in our logic, the rules for creating a predicate on x following the execution of command $x := e$ only have as preconditions predicates on the variables in e . As a result, we can always filter out obsolete predicates after processing each command.

Also, we note that the only commands that can make a predicate $\text{Equal}(m_i, m_i)$ appear are those of the form $x := e$ in which m_i appears in e . As a result, if we find that, for some integer l , the predicate $\text{Equal}(m_l, m_l)$ is not present in one of the conjunctions of the current invariant (after transforming the invariant in disjunctive normal form) and that the variable m_l is no longer present in

⁴ Here, p will usually be the rest of the program after the program point at which the predicate ϕ holds.

the rest of the program, then there is no longer any chance that it will satisfy the conjunction with $\bigwedge_{j=1}^n \text{Equal}(m_j, m_j)$ from $UNIV(n)$. Therefore, we can also safely filter out all other predicates of the form $\text{Equal}(m_i, m_i)$ from that conjunction.

We also add a *heuristic filter* to speed up the execution of our method. We make the hypothesis that the predicate $\text{Indis}(c_n; V; \{c_1, \dots, c_{n-1}\})$ will be present at the end of the program, which is the case for all our examples, so that we can filter out $\text{Indis}(c_i; V; V')$ if $i < n$ and c_i is no longer present in the remainder of the program. In addition to speeding up the program, filtering out these predicates greatly simplifies the construction of loop invariants discussed in the next section. If we fail to produce a proof while using the heuristic filter, we simply attempt again to find a proof without it.

5.2 Finding Loop Invariants

The programs describing the almost-universal hash function usually contains loops. It is therefore necessary to have an automatic procedure to detect the invariant $\psi(i)$ that allows us to apply rule (F1). We now show a heuristic that can be used to construct such an invariant, and illustrate how it works by applying them to $Hash_{CBC}$, described in Section 3.1. One could easily verify that it also works on $Hash_{CBC'}$, $Hash_{HMAC}$ and $Hash_{PMAC}$.

Once we hit a command "for $l = p$ to q do: $[\text{cmd}_l]$ ", we express the precondition in the form $\varphi(p - 1)$. The classical method for finding a stable invariant consists in processing the instructions c_l contained in the loop to find the invariant $\psi(l)$ such that $\{\varphi(l - 1)\} c_l \{\psi(l)\}$. If $\psi(l) \Rightarrow \varphi(l)$, then we have found an invariant such that $\{\varphi(l - 1)\} c_l \{\varphi(l)\}$ and we can apply rule (F1). Otherwise, we repeat this process with $\varphi'(l) = \varphi(l) \wedge \psi(l)$ until we find a stable invariant.

Unfortunately, for certain loops, one could repeat the process infinitely and never obtain a stable invariant. If, after a certain number n of iterations of the process above, we did not find a stable invariant, we decide that the classical method has failed. The choice of the number of times the process is repeated is completely arbitrary, we choose to try only two iterations in our prototype since it is sufficient for all our examples.

We need a new heuristic to construct the stable invariant for the cases in which the first one failed. The heuristic we describe here is inspired from widening methods in abstract interpretation. We start over with invariant $\varphi(l - 1)$, and process the code of the loop once to find invariant $\psi_1(l)$ such that $\{\varphi(l - 1)\} c_l \{\psi_1(l)\}$. Then, we repeat this starting with invariant $\varphi(l - 1) \wedge \psi_1(l - 1)$ to find invariant $\psi_2(l)$ such that $\{\varphi(l - 1) \wedge \psi_1(l - 1)\} c_l \{\psi_2(l)\}$. By analyzing the invariants $\varphi(l)$, $\varphi(l) \wedge \psi_1(l)$ and $\varphi(l) \wedge \psi_1(l) \wedge \psi_2(l)$, we identify an invariant $\gamma(l)$ such that $\gamma(l)$ appears in $\varphi(l)$, $\gamma(l - 1)$ appears in $\psi_1(l)$ and $\gamma(l - 2)$ appears in $\psi_2(l)$.⁵ We then use a new starting invariant $\varphi'(l)$ which is just like $\varphi(l)$, except

⁵ We want $\gamma(l - 1)$ and $\gamma(l - 2)$ in $\psi_1(l)$ and $\psi_2(l)$ respectively, instead of in $\varphi(l) \wedge \psi_1(l)$ and $\varphi(l) \wedge \psi_1(l) \wedge \psi_2(l)$ to emphasize that the progression from $\gamma(l)$ to $\gamma(l + 1)$ is caused by one iteration of the loop.

that occurrences of $\gamma(l)$ in $\varphi(l)$ are replaced by $\bigwedge_{j=p-1}^{j=l} \gamma(j)$ in $\varphi(l)'$. Note that, by construction, $\varphi(p-1)$ always implies $\varphi'(p-1)$, so we know that $\varphi'(p-1)$ is satisfied at the beginning of the loop.

Example 2. We now apply this method to $Hash_{CBC}$. After processing command $c_1 := \mathcal{E}(m_1)$, we obtain the invariant $\varphi(1) = (\text{Equal}(m_1, m_1) \wedge \text{Equal}(c_1, c_1) \wedge \text{Indis}(c_1; \text{Var}, \ell_{\mathcal{E}}; \text{Var} - c_1)) \vee \text{Indis}(c_1)$. Parameterizing this in terms of l , we obtain

$$\varphi(l) = (\text{Equal}(m_l, m_l) \wedge \text{Equal}(c_l, c_l) \wedge \text{Indis}(c_l; \text{Var}, \ell_{\mathcal{E}}; \text{Var} - c_l)) \vee \text{Indis}(c_l)$$

We recall that the two instructions in the loop of $Hash_{CBC}$ are the following:

$$z_i := c_{i-1} \oplus m_i; \quad c_i := \mathcal{E}(z_i)$$

After processing the code of the loop on $\varphi(l-1)$, we obtain the following.

$$\begin{aligned} \psi_1(l) = & (\text{Equal}(m_{l-1}, m_{l-1}) \wedge \text{Equal}(m_l, m_l) \wedge \text{Equal}(c_l, c_l) \wedge \\ & \text{Indis}(c_l; \text{Var}, \ell_{\mathcal{E}}; \text{Var} - c_l)) \vee \text{Indis}(c_l) \end{aligned}$$

We get this by applying rules (G1), (X1) and (X2) for the first command and rules (G1), (B2) and (B3) for the second command. We repeat the same process with $\varphi(l-1) \wedge \psi_1(l-1)$ to obtain

$$\begin{aligned} \psi_2(l) = & (\text{Equal}(m_{l-2}, m_{l-2}) \wedge \text{Equal}(m_{l-1}, m_{l-1}) \wedge \text{Equal}(m_l, m_l) \\ & \wedge \text{Equal}(c_l, c_l) \wedge \text{Indis}(c_l; \text{Var}, \ell_{\mathcal{E}}; \text{Var} - c_l)) \vee \text{Indis}(c_l). \end{aligned}$$

This requires applying the same rules as before, but rule (G1) more often applied for each command. We find $\gamma(l) = \text{Equal}(m_l, m_l)$ and use

$$\begin{aligned} \varphi'(l) = & \left(\left(\bigwedge_{i=1}^l \text{Equal}(m_i, m_i) \right) \wedge \text{Equal}(c_l, c_l) \wedge \text{Indis}(c_l; \text{Var}, \ell_{\mathcal{E}}; \text{Var} - c_l) \right) \\ & \vee \text{Indis}(c_l) \end{aligned}$$

as our next attempt at finding a stable invariant. We find that $\varphi'(l)$ is a stable invariant for the loop. So we apply the rule (F1) to obtain that $\varphi'(n)$ holds at the end of the program, and we easily find that $\varphi'(n) \Rightarrow UNIV(n)$ for all positive integer n , thereby proving that $Hash_{CBC}$ computes an almost-universal hash function.

We programmed an OCaml prototype of our method for proving that the front end of MACs are almost-universal hash functions. The program requires about 1000 lines of code, and can successfully produce proofs of security for all the examples discussed in this paper in less than one second on a personal workstation. Our prototype is available on [14].

6 Proving MAC Security

As mentioned in Section 2, we prove the security of MACs in two steps: first we show that the ‘compressing’ part of the MAC is an almost-universal hash function family, and then we show that the last section of the MAC, when applied to an almost-universal hash function, results in a secure MAC. The following shows how a secure MAC can be constructed from an almost-universal hash function. The proof can be found in [4, 8, 9], so we do not repeat them here.

Proposition 2. *Let $\mathcal{F}_{\mathcal{E}}$ be a family of block ciphers, $\mathcal{H} = \{h_i\}_{i \in \{0,1\}^{\eta}}$ and $\mathcal{H}' = \{h'_i\}_{i \in \{0,1\}^{\eta}}$ be families of almost-universal hash function and \mathcal{G} be a random oracle. If $h \stackrel{\$}{\leftarrow} \mathcal{H}$, $h_{\mathcal{E}} \stackrel{\$}{\leftarrow} \mathcal{H}'$, $\mathcal{E} \stackrel{\$}{\leftarrow} \mathcal{F}_{\mathcal{E}}$, \mathcal{G} is sampled at random from all functions with the appropriate domain and range and $k, k_1, k_2 \stackrel{\$}{\leftarrow} \{0,1\}^{\eta}$, then the following hold:*

- $MAC_1(m) = \mathcal{E}(h_i(m))$ is a secure MAC with key $sk = (i, k_{\mathcal{E}})$.⁶
- $MAC_2(m) = \mathcal{G}(k || h_i(m))$ is a secure MAC with key $sk = (i, k)$.
- $MAC_3(m) = \begin{cases} \mathcal{E}_1(h_i(m')) & \text{where } m' = \text{pad}(m) \text{ if } m \text{'s length is not a} \\ & \text{multiple of } \eta \\ \mathcal{E}_2(h_i(m)) & \text{if } m \text{'s length is a multiple of } \eta \end{cases}$
is a secure MAC with key $sk = (i, k_{\mathcal{E}_1}, k_{\mathcal{E}_2})$.
- $MAC_4(m) = \begin{cases} \mathcal{E}(h_{\mathcal{E}}(m') \oplus k_1) & \text{where } m' = \text{pad}(m) \text{ if } m \text{'s length is not a} \\ & \text{multiple of } \eta \\ \mathcal{E}(h_{\mathcal{E}}(m) \oplus k_2) & \text{if } m \text{'s length is a multiple of } \eta \end{cases}$
is a secure MAC with key $sk = (k_{\mathcal{E}}, k_1, k_2)$

Using $Hash_{CBC}$ with MAC_1 and MAC_3 yield the message authentication code DMAC and ECBC respectively, using $Hash_{CBC'}$ with MAC_3 and MAC_4 yield FCBC and XCBC, combining $Hash_{PMAC}$ and MAC_4 yield a four key construction of PMAC and using $Hash_{HMAC}$ with MAC_2 yield HMAC.

7 Conclusion

We presented a Hoare logic that can be used to automatically prove the security of constructions for almost-universal hash functions based on block ciphers and compression functions modeled as random oracles. We can then obtain a secure MAC by combining with a few operations, such as those presented in Section 6. Our method can be used to prove the security of DMAC, ECBC, FCBC, XCBC, a two-key variant of HMAC and a four-key variant of PMAC. A downside of our approach is that since we do not have a global view of the algorithm, we cannot prove the one key variants of HMAC or PMAC, nor can we prove CMAC or OMAC, which are one-key variants of XCBC. It is however relatively simple to derive the security of these one-key schemes by hand once the security of the multiple key variants has been proven.

⁶ Here, $k_{\mathcal{E}}$ denotes the secret key associated with block cipher \mathcal{E} .

It should be possible to extend our logic to prove exact reduction bounds for the security of the ϵ -universal hash function. This could be done by keeping track of exact security for each predicate to obtain a bound on the final invariant. We are also working on integrating our tool for verifying the security of MACs with the tool for verifying the security of encryption modes of operation of [15], to get a general tool for producing security proofs of symmetric modes of operation.

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A Proofs

Before presenting the proofs for all the claims in our paper, we present a few results that will be used repeatedly in our proofs.

The following formalizes the intuition that if a value can be computed in polynomial time from other values available, then adding this value does not give the adversary any useful information.

Lemma 3. *For any $X, X' \in \text{DIST}(\Gamma, \mathcal{F}_\mathcal{E}, \mathcal{F}_\mathcal{H})$, any set of variables V , any expression e constructible from V , and any variable x , if $X \sim_V X'$ then $\llbracket x := e \rrbracket(X) \sim_{V,x} \llbracket x := e \rrbracket(X')$.*

Proof. We assume $X \sim_V X'$. Suppose that $\llbracket x := e \rrbracket(X) \not\sim_{V,x} \llbracket x := e \rrbracket(X')$. This means there exists a polynomial-time adversary \mathcal{A} that, on input $S(V, x)$ drawn either from $\llbracket x := e \rrbracket(X)$ or $\llbracket x := e \rrbracket(X')$, guesses the right initial distribution with non-negligible probability. We let \mathcal{B} be the adversary against $X \sim_V X'$ which simply computes x from values in $S(V)$ – which can be done in polynomial time since e is constructible from values in V – and runs $\mathcal{A}(V, x)$. It is clear that the advantage of \mathcal{B} is exactly that of \mathcal{A} , which would imply that it is not negligible, although we assumed $X \sim_V X'$.

Corollary 1. *For any $X \in \text{DIST}(\Gamma, \mathcal{F}_\mathcal{E}, \mathcal{F}_\mathcal{H})$, any sets of variables V , any expression e constructible from V , and any variable x, z such that $z \notin \{x\} \cup \text{Var}(e)$ if $X \models \text{Indis}(z; V; V')$ then $\llbracket x := e \rrbracket(X) \models \text{Indis}(z; V, x; V')$. We emphasize that here we use the notation $\text{Var}(e)$ (in its usual sense), that is to say, the variable z does not appear at all in e .*

Similarly, if $X \models \text{Indis}(z; V'; V)$, then $\llbracket x := e \rrbracket(X) \models \text{Indis}(z; V'; V, x)$.

Proof. Since $X \models \text{Indis}(z; V; V')$, we have the two following:

$$\begin{aligned} & [(S, S', \mathcal{L}_\mathcal{E}, \mathcal{L}_\mathcal{H}) \stackrel{\S}{\leftarrow} \llbracket x := e \rrbracket X : (S(z), S(V-z) \cup S'(V'))] \\ & \sim [(S, S', \mathcal{L}_\mathcal{E}, \mathcal{L}_\mathcal{H}) \stackrel{\S}{\leftarrow} \llbracket x := e \rrbracket X; u \stackrel{\S}{\leftarrow} \mathcal{U} : (u, S(V-z) \cup S'(V'))] \\ & [(S, S', \mathcal{L}_\mathcal{E}, \mathcal{L}_\mathcal{H}) \stackrel{\S}{\leftarrow} \llbracket x := e \rrbracket X : (S'(z), S'(V-z) \cup S(V'))] \\ & \sim [(S, S', \mathcal{L}_\mathcal{E}, \mathcal{L}_\mathcal{H}) \stackrel{\S}{\leftarrow} \llbracket x := e \rrbracket X; u \stackrel{\S}{\leftarrow} \mathcal{U} : (u, S'(V-z) \cup S(V'))] \end{aligned}$$

Since $z \notin \{x\} \cup \text{Var}(e)$ using the same technique as in Lemma 3, we easily obtain

$$\begin{aligned} & [(S, S', \mathcal{L}_\mathcal{E}, \mathcal{L}_\mathcal{H}) \stackrel{\S}{\leftarrow} X : (S(z), S(V-z, x) \cup S'(V'))] \\ & \sim [(S, S', \mathcal{L}_\mathcal{E}, \mathcal{L}_\mathcal{H}) \stackrel{\S}{\leftarrow} X; u \stackrel{\S}{\leftarrow} \mathcal{U} : (u, S(V-z, x) \cup S'(V'))] \\ & [(S, S', \mathcal{L}_\mathcal{E}, \mathcal{L}_\mathcal{H}) \stackrel{\S}{\leftarrow} X : (S'(z), S'(V-z, x) \cup S(V'))] \\ & \sim [(S, S', \mathcal{L}_\mathcal{E}, \mathcal{L}_\mathcal{H}) \stackrel{\S}{\leftarrow} X; u \stackrel{\S}{\leftarrow} \mathcal{U} : (u, S'(V-z, x) \cup S(V'))] \end{aligned}$$

which means $\llbracket x := e \rrbracket X \models \text{Indis}(z; V, x)$.

The proof that $X \models \text{Indis}(z; V'; V)$ implies $\llbracket x := e \rrbracket(X) \models \text{Indis}(z; V'; V, x)$ is done in exactly the same way.

The following will be useful when dealing with the concatenation command.

Lemma 4. *For any distribution $X \in \text{DIST}(\Gamma, \mathcal{F}_{\mathcal{E}}, \mathcal{F}_{\mathcal{H}})$, any program cmd produced by our grammar any $(S, S', \mathcal{E}, \mathcal{H}, \mathcal{L}_{\mathcal{E}}, \mathcal{L}_{\mathcal{H}}) \stackrel{\S}{\leftarrow} \llbracket \text{cmd} \rrbracket X$ and any variable $v \in \text{Var}$, $|S(v)| = |S'(v)|$.*

Proof. This is a trivial consequence of the fact that the message blocks always have equal length in both executions. All values computed from there will therefore also have equal length.

A.1 Initialization

Proposition 3 (Rule (init)).

$\text{INIT} \{ \text{Indis}(k; \text{Var}, \mathcal{L}_{\mathcal{E}}, \mathcal{L}_{\mathcal{H}}; \text{Var} - k) \wedge \text{Empty} \}$

Proof. We note that the initialization command can only appear at the beginning of a program. Let X be an initial distribution, as described in the definition of security of ϵ -universal hash function. We have that $\llbracket \text{INIT} \rrbracket X = X$ because the initialization command has no impact on the distribution. So we have to prove that $X \models \text{Empty}$ and $X \models \text{Indis}(k; \text{Var}, \mathcal{L}_{\mathcal{E}}, \mathcal{L}_{\mathcal{H}}; \text{Var} - k)$. The former is obvious since the adversary has no access to \mathcal{E} in the attack. The latter is also clear because k is sampled randomly and independently after the adversary terminates.

A.2 Generic Preservation

Proposition 4 (Rule (G1)).

$\{ \text{Equal}(t) \} \text{cmd} \{ \text{Equal}(t) \}$ even if $t = y$ or $t = z$

Proof. Trivial since $t \neq x$ and only the value of x can be changed by the command.

Proposition 5 (Rule (G2)).

$\{ \text{Unequal}(t) \} \text{cmd} \{ \text{Unequal}(t) \}$ even if $t = y$ or $t = z$

Proof. Trivial since $t \neq x$ and only the value of x can be changed by the command.

Proposition 6 (Rule (G3)).

$\{ \text{E}(\mathcal{E}; t; V) \} \text{cmd} \{ \text{E}(\mathcal{E}; t; V) \}$ provided $x \notin V$ and cmd is not $x := \mathcal{E}(y)$

Proof. Clearly, $\Pr[(S, S', \mathcal{L}_{\mathcal{E}}, \mathcal{L}_{\mathcal{H}}) \stackrel{\S}{\leftarrow} X : S(t) \in \mathcal{L}_{\mathcal{E}}.\text{dom} \cup S(V) \vee S'(t) \in \mathcal{L}_{\mathcal{E}}.\text{dom} \cup S'(V)] = \Pr[(S, S', \mathcal{L}_{\mathcal{E}}, \mathcal{L}_{\mathcal{H}}) \stackrel{\S}{\leftarrow} \llbracket x := \mathcal{E}(y) \rrbracket X : S(t) \in \mathcal{L}_{\mathcal{E}}.\text{dom} \cup S(V) \vee S'(t) \in \mathcal{L}_{\mathcal{E}}.\text{dom} \cup S'(V)]$ because, the values in the sets $S(V)$, $S'(V)$ and Elist.dom are unchanged by the command.

Proposition 7 (Rule (G4)).

$\{ \text{H}(\mathcal{H}; t; V) \} \text{cmd} \{ \text{H}(\mathcal{H}; t; V) \}$ provided $x \notin V$ and cmd is not $x := \mathcal{H}(y)$

Proof. Similar to the proof of Rule (G3).

Proposition 8 (Rule (G5)).

$\{\text{Indis}(t; V; V')\} \text{cmd} \{\text{Indis}(t; V; V')\}$ provided *cmd* is not $x := \mathcal{E}(y)$ or $x := \mathcal{H}(y)$, and $x \notin V$ unless x is constructible from $V - t$ and $x \notin V'$ unless x is constructible from $V' - t$

Proof. It should be clear that, since $\mathcal{L}_{\mathcal{E}}$ and $\mathcal{L}_{\mathcal{H}}$ are unchanged by the command, the following hold since the values of the variables in $V - x$ are unchanged by the command:

$$\begin{aligned} & [(S, S', \mathcal{L}_{\mathcal{E}}, \mathcal{L}_{\mathcal{H}}) \stackrel{\S}{\leftarrow} X; (S(t), S(V - x) \cup S'(V' - x))] = \\ & \quad [(S, S', \mathcal{L}_{\mathcal{E}}, \mathcal{L}_{\mathcal{H}}) \stackrel{\S}{\leftarrow} \llbracket \text{cmd} \rrbracket X; (S(t), S(V - x) \cup S'(V' - x))] \\ & [(S, S', \mathcal{L}_{\mathcal{E}}, \mathcal{L}_{\mathcal{H}}) \stackrel{\S}{\leftarrow} X; (S'(t), S'(V - x) \cup S'(V' - x))] = \\ & \quad [(S, S', \mathcal{L}_{\mathcal{E}}, \mathcal{L}_{\mathcal{H}}) \stackrel{\S}{\leftarrow} \llbracket \text{cmd} \rrbracket X; (S'(t), S'(V - x) \cup S'(V' - x))]. \end{aligned}$$

We can add back x to V (resp. V') when x is constructible from $V - t$ (resp. $V' - t$) using Corollary 1. It follows that $(X \models \text{Indis}(t; V)) \Rightarrow (\llbracket \text{cmd} \rrbracket X \models \text{Indis}(t; V))$.

Proposition 9 (Rule (G6)).

$\{\text{Empty}\} \text{cmd} \{\text{Empty}\}$ provided *cmd* is not $x := \mathcal{E}(y)$

Proof. This is obvious since the command does not modify $\mathcal{L}_{\mathcal{E}}$.

A.3 Function ρ **Proposition 10 (Rule (P1)).**

$\{\text{Equal}(y)\} x := \rho(y) \{\text{Equal}(x)\}$

Proof. This is a trivial consequence of the fact that ρ is a (deterministic) function.

A.4 Assignment**Proposition 11 (Rule (A1)).**

$\{\text{true}\} x := m_i \{\text{Equal}(m_i, m_i) \wedge \text{Equal}(x, x) \vee \text{Unequal}(x, x)\}$

Proof. This follows immediately from Lemma 2 and the fact that after the execution of the command, the value of x is the same as the value of m_i .

Proposition 12 (Rules (A2) to (A9)). *The following rules hold.*

- (A2) $\{\text{Equal}(y, y)\} x := y \{\text{Equal}(x, x)\}$
- (A3) $\{\text{Unequal}(y, y)\} x := y \{\text{Unequal}(x, x)\}$
- (A4) $\{\text{Indis}(y; V; V')\} x := y \{\text{Indis}(x; V; V')\}$ provided $y \notin V \cup V'$
- (A5) $\{\text{E}(\mathcal{E}; y; V)\} x := y \{\text{E}(\mathcal{E}; x; V)\}$ provided $y \notin V$
- (A6) $\{\text{H}(\mathcal{H}; y; V)\} x := y \{\text{H}(\mathcal{H}; x; V)\}$ provided $y \notin V$
- (A7) $\{\text{E}(\mathcal{E}; t; V, y)\} x := y \{\text{E}(\mathcal{E}; t; V, x, y)\}$
- (A8) $\{\text{H}(\mathcal{H}; t; V, y)\} x := y \{\text{H}(\mathcal{H}; t; V, x, y)\}$

Proof. The proofs of all those rules are trivial consequences of the fact that if X is any distribution, then, in $\llbracket x := y \rrbracket X$, the variables x and y will always be assigned the same value.

A.5 Concatenation

Proposition 13 (Rule (C1)).

$$\{\text{Equal}(y, y)\} x := y \| m_i \{(\text{Equal}(m_i, m_i) \wedge \text{Equal}(x, x)) \vee \text{Unequal}(x, x)\}$$

Proof. This is a clear consequence of Lemma 2.

Proposition 14 (Rule (C2)).

$$\{\text{Equal}(y, y) \wedge \text{Equal}(z, z)\} x := y \| z \{\text{Equal}(x, x)\}$$

Proof. Trivial.

Proposition 15 (Rule (C3)).

$$\{\text{Unequal}(y, y)\} x := y \| z \{\text{Unequal}(x, x)\}$$

Proof. Trivial consequence of the fact that for any distribution X and $(S, S', \mathcal{E}, \mathcal{H}, \mathcal{L}_\mathcal{E}, \mathcal{L}_\mathcal{H}) \stackrel{\S}{\leftarrow} X$, with overwhelming probability, $S(y) \neq S'(y)$, and, from Lemma 4, $|S(y)| = |S'(y)|$ implies that $S(y) \| S(z) \neq S'(y) \| S'(z)$.

Proposition 16 (Rule (C4)).

$$\{\text{Indis}(y; V, y, z; V') \wedge \text{Indis}(z; V, y, z; V')\} x := y \| z \{\text{Indis}(x; V, x; V')\} \text{ provided } x, y, z \notin V \text{ and } x \notin V' \text{ unless } y, z \in V' \text{ and } y \neq z$$

Proof. We first consider the case where X be a distribution such that $X \models \text{Indis}(y; V, y, z) \wedge \text{Indis}(z; V, y, z)$ with $x, y, z \notin V$ and $x \notin V'$. We have that

$$\begin{aligned} & [(S, S', \mathcal{L}_\mathcal{E}, \mathcal{L}_\mathcal{H}) \stackrel{\S}{\leftarrow} \llbracket x := y \| z \rrbracket X : (S(x), S((V, x) - x) \cup S'(V'))] \\ & = [(S, S', \mathcal{L}_\mathcal{E}, \mathcal{L}_\mathcal{H}) \stackrel{\S}{\leftarrow} \llbracket x := y \| z \rrbracket X : (S(x), S(V) \cup S'(V'))] \\ & = [(S, S', \mathcal{L}_\mathcal{E}, \mathcal{L}_\mathcal{H}) \stackrel{\S}{\leftarrow} X : (S(y) \| S(z), S(V) \cup S'(V'))] \\ & \sim [(S, S', \mathcal{L}_\mathcal{E}, \mathcal{L}_\mathcal{H}) \stackrel{\S}{\leftarrow} X, u_1 \stackrel{\S}{\leftarrow} \mathcal{U} : (u_1 \| S(z), S(V) \cup S'(V'))] \\ & \sim [(S, S', \mathcal{L}_\mathcal{E}, \mathcal{L}_\mathcal{H}) \stackrel{\S}{\leftarrow} X, u_1 \stackrel{\S}{\leftarrow} \mathcal{U}, u_2 \stackrel{\S}{\leftarrow} \mathcal{U} : (u_1 \| u_2, S(V) \cup S'(V'))] \\ & \sim [(S, S', \mathcal{L}_\mathcal{E}, \mathcal{L}_\mathcal{H}) \stackrel{\S}{\leftarrow} X, u \stackrel{\S}{\leftarrow} \mathcal{U} \mathcal{U} : (u, S(V) \cup S'(V'))] \\ & \sim [(S, S', \mathcal{L}_\mathcal{E}, \mathcal{L}_\mathcal{H}) \stackrel{\S}{\leftarrow} \llbracket x := y \| z \rrbracket X, u \stackrel{\S}{\leftarrow} \mathcal{U} \mathcal{U} : (u, S((V, x) - x) \cup S'(V'))] \end{aligned}$$

The first two equality are consequences of the fact that $x \notin V \cup V'$ and of the semantics of $x := y \| z$. The second to last line is true because, for strings u, u_1, u_2 of appropriate sizes, $[u_1, u_2 \stackrel{\S}{\leftarrow} \mathcal{U} : u_1 \| u_2] = [u \stackrel{\S}{\leftarrow} \mathcal{U} : u]$. The last line follows from the fact that $x \notin V \cup V'$. So we only have left to justify the two lines in which $S(y)$ and $S(z)$ are replaced with uniform random values u_1 and u_2 respectively. Suppose there exists an adversary \mathcal{A} that can break the following:

$$\begin{aligned} & [(S, S', \mathcal{L}_\mathcal{E}, \mathcal{L}_\mathcal{H}) \stackrel{\S}{\leftarrow} X : (S(y) \| S(z), S(V) \cup S'(V'))] \\ & \sim [(S, S', \mathcal{L}_\mathcal{E}, \mathcal{L}_\mathcal{H}) \stackrel{\S}{\leftarrow} X, u_1 \stackrel{\S}{\leftarrow} \mathcal{U} : (u_1 \| S(z), S(V) \cup S'(V'))] \end{aligned}$$

Then we can construct an algorithm \mathcal{B} that attacks the following:

$$\begin{aligned} & [(S, S', \mathcal{L}_\mathcal{E}, \mathcal{L}_\mathcal{H}) \stackrel{\$}{\leftarrow} X : (S(y), S(V, z) \cup S'(V'))] \\ & \sim [(S, S', \mathcal{L}_\mathcal{E}, \mathcal{L}_\mathcal{H}) \stackrel{\$}{\leftarrow} X, u \stackrel{\$}{\leftarrow} \mathcal{U} : (u, S(V, z) \cup S'(V'))]. \end{aligned}$$

On input (b, B) , \mathcal{B} runs algorithm \mathcal{A} on input $(b||a, B - a)$ where a is the value of the variable z in A . When \mathcal{A} terminates, algorithm \mathcal{B} outputs the same result as \mathcal{A} . It should be clear that \mathcal{B} is successful into distinguishing its two distributions precisely when \mathcal{A} does. So if \mathcal{A} succeeds in distinguishing between its two distributions with non-negligible probability, so can \mathcal{B} , which violates our assumption that $X \models \text{Indis}(y; V, y, z)$. We can show similarly that the following also holds:

$$\begin{aligned} & [(S, S', \mathcal{L}_\mathcal{E}, \mathcal{L}_\mathcal{H}) \stackrel{\$}{\leftarrow} X, u_1 \stackrel{\$}{\leftarrow} \mathcal{U} : (u_1||S(z), S(V) \cup S'(V'))] \\ & \sim [(S, S', \mathcal{L}_\mathcal{E}, \mathcal{L}_\mathcal{H}) \stackrel{\$}{\leftarrow} X, u_1 \stackrel{\$}{\leftarrow} \mathcal{U}, u_2 \stackrel{\$}{\leftarrow} \mathcal{U} : (u_1||u_2, S(V) \cup S'(V'))]. \end{aligned}$$

The same argument can be applied with the roles of S and S' reversed, which completes the proof that $\llbracket x := y||z \rrbracket X \models \text{Indis}(x; V, x; V')$.

The case when $y, z \in V'$ is similar, the result follows from the argument above and Corollary 1.

Proposition 17 (Rules (C5) and (C6)).

- (C5) $\{\text{Indis}(y; V, \mathcal{L}_\mathcal{E}; \emptyset)\} x := y||z \{E(\mathcal{E}; x; V)\}$
(C6) $\{\text{Indis}(y; V, \mathcal{L}_\mathcal{H}; \emptyset)\} x := y||z \{H(\mathcal{H}; x; V)\}$

Proof.

- (C5) Let \mathcal{A} be the algorithm which, on input (a, A) , outputs 1 if and only if a is a prefix of one of the strings in A . We examine \mathcal{A} advantage in breaking the following:

$$[(S, S', \mathcal{L}_\mathcal{E}, \mathcal{L}_\mathcal{H}) \stackrel{\$}{\leftarrow} X; (S(y), S(V, \mathcal{L}_\mathcal{E}))] \sim [(S, S', \mathcal{L}_\mathcal{E}, \mathcal{L}_\mathcal{H}) \stackrel{\$}{\leftarrow} X, u \stackrel{\$}{\leftarrow} \mathcal{U}; (u, S(V, \mathcal{L}_\mathcal{E}))].$$

Since $X \models \text{Indis}(y; V, \mathcal{L}_\mathcal{E}; \emptyset)$, \mathcal{A} 's advantage in distinguishing the two distributions above must be negligible. Noting that the probability that A outputs 1 when given an input from the second distribution must be negligible (because u is sampled from a domain of size exponential in the security parameter), then we must that that the probability that A outputs 1 when given an output from the first distribution is negligible as well. That is, for $(S, S', \mathcal{L}_\mathcal{E}, \mathcal{L}_\mathcal{H}) \stackrel{\$}{\leftarrow} X$, the probability that $S(y)$ is a prefix of any string in $S(V, \mathcal{L}_\mathcal{E})$ is negligible. Thus, the probability that $S(y)||S(z) = S(x) \in S(V, \mathcal{L}_\mathcal{E})$ is negligible. Similarly, we can find that the probability that $S'(y)||S'(z) = S'(x) \in S'(V, \mathcal{L}_\mathcal{E})$ is negligible as well, which shows that $\llbracket x := S'(y)||S'(z) \rrbracket X \models E(\mathcal{E}; x; V)$.

- (C6) The proof is similar to the proof of Rule (C5), but with $\mathcal{L}_\mathcal{H}$ instead of $\mathcal{L}_\mathcal{E}$.

A.6 Xor

Proposition 18 (Rule (X1)).

$$\{\text{Equal}(y, y)\} x := y \oplus m_i \{(\text{Equal}(x, x) \wedge \text{Equal}(m_i, m_i)) \vee \text{Unequal}(x, x)\}$$

Proof. This easily follows from Lemma 2.

Proposition 19 (Rule (X2)).

$$\{\text{Indis}(y; V, y, z; V')\} x := y \oplus z \{\text{Indis}(x; V, x, z; V')\} \text{ provided } y \neq z, y \notin V \text{ and } x \notin V' \text{ unless } y, z \in V'$$

Proof. This proof is similar to the proof of Rule (C4). Let X be a distribution such that $X \models \text{Indis}(y; V, y, z)$ with $y \neq z, y \notin V$ and $x \notin V'$. We have that

$$\begin{aligned} & [(S, S', \mathcal{L}_E, \mathcal{L}_H) \stackrel{\$}{\leftarrow} [x := y \oplus z]X : (S(x), S((V, x, z) - x) \cup S'(V'))] \\ &= [(S, S', \mathcal{L}_E, \mathcal{L}_H) \stackrel{\$}{\leftarrow} [x := y \oplus z]X : (S(x), S(V, z) \cup S'(V'))] \\ &= [(S, S', \mathcal{L}_E, \mathcal{L}_H) \stackrel{\$}{\leftarrow} X : (S(y) \oplus S(z), S(V, z) \cup S'(V'))] \\ &\sim [(S, S', \mathcal{L}_E, \mathcal{L}_H) \stackrel{\$}{\leftarrow} X, u \stackrel{\$}{\leftarrow} \mathcal{U} : (u \oplus S(z), S(V, z) \cup S'(V'))] \\ &\sim [(S, S', \mathcal{L}_E, \mathcal{L}_H) \stackrel{\$}{\leftarrow} X, u \stackrel{\$}{\leftarrow} \mathcal{U}\mathcal{U} : (u, S(V, z) \cup S'(V'))] \\ &\sim [(S, S', \mathcal{L}_E, \mathcal{L}_H) \stackrel{\$}{\leftarrow} [x := y \oplus z]X, u \stackrel{\$}{\leftarrow} \mathcal{U}\mathcal{U} : (u, S((V, x, z) - x) \cup S'(V'))] \end{aligned}$$

All those lines are justified similarly to the proof of Rule (C4), except for the two lines in which $S(y)$ is replaced with a uniform random values u , and the line in which $u \oplus S(z)$ is replaced with u . The latter is easily justified by the fact that, for any random value independent from $S(z)$, the two distributions $[u \stackrel{\$}{\leftarrow} \mathcal{U}; u \oplus S(z)]$ and $[u \stackrel{\$}{\leftarrow} \mathcal{U}; u]$ are identical (under the condition that $y \neq z$).

As for the former, suppose there exists an adversary \mathcal{A} that can break the following:

$$\begin{aligned} & [(S, S', \mathcal{L}_E, \mathcal{L}_H) \stackrel{\$}{\leftarrow} X : (S(y) \oplus S(z), S(V, z) \cup S'(V'))] \\ &\sim [(S, S', \mathcal{L}_E, \mathcal{L}_H) \stackrel{\$}{\leftarrow} X, u \stackrel{\$}{\leftarrow} \mathcal{U} : (u \oplus S(z), S(V, z) \cup S'(V'))] \end{aligned}$$

Then we can construct an algorithm \mathcal{B} that attacks the following:

$$\begin{aligned} & [(S, S', \mathcal{L}_E, \mathcal{L}_H) \stackrel{\$}{\leftarrow} X : (S(y), S(V, z) \cup S'(V'))] \\ &\sim [(S, S', \mathcal{L}_E, \mathcal{L}_H) \stackrel{\$}{\leftarrow} X, u \stackrel{\$}{\leftarrow} \mathcal{U} : (u, S(V, z) \cup S'(V'))]. \end{aligned}$$

On input (b, B) , \mathcal{B} runs algorithm \mathcal{A} on input $(b \oplus a, B)$ where a is the value of the variable z in A . When \mathcal{A} terminates, algorithm \mathcal{B} outputs the same result as \mathcal{A} . It should be clear that \mathcal{B} is successful into distinguishing its two distributions precisely when \mathcal{A} does. So if \mathcal{A} succeeds in distinguishing between

its two distributions with non-negligible probability, so can \mathcal{B} , which violates our assumption that $X \models \text{Indis}(y; V, y, z; V')$.

The same argument can be applied with the roles of S and S' reversed, which completes the proof that $\llbracket x := y \oplus z \rrbracket X \models \text{Indis}(x; V, x, z; V')$.

The case when $y, z \in V'$ is similar, the result follows from the argument above and Corollary 1.

Proposition 20 (Rule (X3)).

$$\{\text{Equal}(y, y) \wedge \text{Equal}(z, z)\} x := y \oplus z \{\text{Equal}(x, x)\}$$

Proof. Trivial.

Proposition 21 (Rule (X4)).

$$\{\text{Equal}(y, y) \wedge \text{Unequal}(z, z)\} x := y \oplus z \{\text{Unequal}(x, x)\}$$

Proof. Trivial.

A.7 Block Cipher

For many of the proofs of rules involving the evaluation of the block cipher, we use the fact that, in the ideal cipher model, the block cipher is modeled as a perfectly random function. As a result, if the block cipher has not yet been evaluated at a given point, then the value of the block cipher at that point is indistinguishable from an independent random value. This is due to the fact that the distinguishing adversary does not have any access to \mathcal{E} .

Proposition 22 (Rules (B1), (B2) and (B3)).

$$(B1) \{\text{Empty}\} x := \mathcal{E}(m_i) \{(\text{Equal}(m_i, m_i) \wedge \text{Equal}(x, x) \wedge \text{Indis}(x; \text{Var}, \mathcal{L}_{\mathcal{E}}, \mathcal{L}_{\mathcal{H}}; \text{Var} - x)) \vee (\text{Unequal}(x, x) \wedge \text{Indis}(x))\}$$

$$(B2) \{\text{E}(\mathcal{E}; y; \emptyset) \wedge \text{Unequal}(y, y)\} x := \mathcal{E}(y) \{\text{Indis}(x)\}$$

$$(B3) \{\text{E}(\mathcal{E}; y; \emptyset) \wedge \text{Equal}(y, y)\} x := \mathcal{E}(y) \{\text{Indis}(x; \text{Var}, \mathcal{L}_{\mathcal{E}}, \mathcal{L}_{\mathcal{H}}; \text{Var} - x) \wedge \text{Equal}(x, x)\}$$

Proof.

(B1) Since $X \models \text{Empty}$, we know that, with overwhelming probability, $\mathcal{E}(S(m_i))$ and $\mathcal{E}(S'(m_i))$ have never been computed before. Following Lemma 2, we either have $X \models \text{Equal}(m_i, m_i)$ or $X \models \text{Unequal}(m_i, m_i)$. We consider each case separately:

- if $S(m_i) \neq S'(m_i)$, i.e. $X \models \text{Unequal}(m_i, m_i)$, and since neither is in $\mathcal{L}_{\mathcal{E}}.\text{dom}$, then both $\mathcal{E}(S(m_i))$ and $\mathcal{E}(S'(m_i))$ look random and independent from all other values (just as if they had both been sampled randomly and independently), so $\llbracket x := \mathcal{E}(y) \rrbracket X \models \text{Indis}(x)$ is immediate. It should be clear that, in this case, $\text{Unequal}(m_i, m_i)$ is preserved by $x := \mathcal{E}(m_i)$.
- if $S(m_i) = S'(m_i)$, that is $X \models \text{Equal}(m_i, m_i)$, then clearly $\llbracket x := \mathcal{E}(m_i) \rrbracket X \models \text{Equal}(m_i, m_i) \wedge \text{Equal}(x, x)$ since \mathcal{E} is a function. As before, $S(m_i), S'(m_i) \notin \mathcal{L}_{\mathcal{E}}.\text{dom}$, so $\mathcal{E}(S(m_i))$ is indistinguishable from a random and independent value even given all other values in the system, values except for $\mathcal{E}(S'(m_i))$, to which it is equal. So $\llbracket x := \mathcal{E}(y) \rrbracket X \models \text{Indis}(x; \text{Var}, \mathcal{L}_{\mathcal{E}}, \mathcal{L}_{\mathcal{H}}; \text{Var} - x)$ is also clear.

- (B2) Since $\text{Unequal}(y, y)$ is given here, this is exactly the first case of the proof of Rule (B1).
- (B3) Since $\text{Equal}(y, y)$ is given here, this is exactly the second case of the proof of Rule (B1).

Proposition 23 (Rule (B4)).

$\{\mathbf{E}(\mathcal{E}; y; \emptyset) \wedge \text{Indis}(t; V; V')\} x := \mathcal{E}(y) \{\text{Indis}(t; V, x; V', x)\}$ provided $\mathcal{L}_{\mathcal{E}} \not\subseteq V$, even if $t = y$

Proof. Since $X \models \mathbf{E}(\mathcal{E}; y; \emptyset)$, for any $(S, S', \mathcal{L}_{\mathcal{E}}, \mathcal{L}_{\mathcal{H}}) \stackrel{\S}{\leftarrow} \llbracket x := \mathcal{E}(y) \rrbracket X$, any adversary \mathcal{A} that successfully distinguishes t from a random value given $S(V, x) \cup S'(V', x)$ could be simulated by an algorithm which, given only $S(V) \cup S'(V')$, samples a uniform random u and runs $\mathcal{A}(t, S(V) \cup S'(V') \cup \{u\})$ (this is for the case in which $S(y) = S'(y)$, we would need two random values if $S(y) \neq S'(y)$ but the argument is the same), which would contradict $X \models \text{Indis}(t; V; V)$. The same can be argued with the roles of S and S' reversed.

Proposition 24 (Rules (B5)).

(B5) $\{\mathbf{E}(\mathcal{E}; y; \emptyset) \wedge \text{Indis}(t; V, \mathcal{L}_{\mathcal{E}}, y; V', y)\} x := \mathcal{E}(y) \{\text{Indis}(t; V, \mathcal{L}_{\mathcal{E}}, x, y; V', x, y)\}$

Proof. This is a simple consequence of the fact that, while the values of y (through both S and S') get added to $\mathcal{L}_{\mathcal{E}}.\text{dom}$, this does not change anything to the sets $S(V, \mathcal{L}_{\mathcal{E}}, y) \cup S'(V', y)$ and $S'(V, \mathcal{L}_{\mathcal{E}}, y) \cup S(V', y)$ since the values of y were already included in both. The addition of x in $\text{Indis}(t; V, \mathcal{L}_{\mathcal{E}}, x, y; V', x, y)$ can be proven in the same way as in the proof of Rule (B4).

Proposition 25 (Rule (B6)).

$\{\mathbf{E}(\mathcal{E}; t; V, y)\} x := \mathcal{E}(y) \{\mathbf{E}(\mathcal{E}; t; V, y)\}$

Proof. Clearly, $\Pr[(S, S', \mathcal{L}_{\mathcal{E}}, \mathcal{L}_{\mathcal{H}}) \stackrel{\S}{\leftarrow} X : \{S(x), S'(x)\} \in \mathcal{L}_{\mathcal{E}}.\text{dom} \cup S(V, y) \cup S'(V', y)] = \Pr[(S, S', \mathcal{L}_{\mathcal{E}}, \mathcal{L}_{\mathcal{H}}) \stackrel{\S}{\leftarrow} \llbracket x := \mathcal{E}(y) \rrbracket X : S(x) \in \mathcal{L}_{\mathcal{E}}.\text{dom} \cup S(V, y) \vee S'(x) \in \mathcal{L}_{\mathcal{E}}.\text{dom} \cup S'(V', y)]$ because, since $S(y), S'(y) \in S(V, y) \cup S'(V', y)$, adding $S(y), S'(y)$ to $\mathcal{L}_{\mathcal{E}}.\text{dom}$ will not change the set $\mathcal{L}_{\mathcal{E}}.\text{dom} \cup S(V, y) \cup S'(V', y)$.

A.8 Hash Function

All the proofs for hash function computation are essentially the same as the proofs for block cipher evaluation. This is due to our choice of using an adversary that does not have access to the random oracle when trying to distinguish distributions (see Section 3).

Proposition 26 (Rules (H1) to (H5)).

- (H1) $\{\mathbf{H}(\mathcal{H}; y; \emptyset) \wedge \text{Unequal}(y, y)\} x := \mathcal{H}(y) \{\text{Indis}(x)\}$
- (H2) $\{\mathbf{H}(\mathcal{H}; y; \emptyset) \wedge \text{Equal}(y, y)\} x := \mathcal{H}(y) \{\text{Indis}(x; \text{Var}, \mathcal{L}_{\mathcal{E}}, \mathcal{L}_{\mathcal{H}}, \text{Var} - x) \wedge \text{Equal}(x, x)\}$
- (H3) $\{\mathbf{H}(\mathcal{H}; y; \emptyset) \wedge \text{Indis}(t; V; V')\} x := \mathcal{H}(y) \{\text{Indis}(t; V, x; V', x)\}$ provided $\mathcal{L}_{\mathcal{H}} \not\subseteq V$, even if $t = y$

(H4) $\{\mathcal{H}(\mathcal{H}; y; \emptyset) \wedge \text{Indis}(t; V, \mathcal{L}_{\mathcal{H}}, y; V', y)\} x := \mathcal{H}(y) \{\text{Indis}(t; V, \mathcal{L}_{\mathcal{H}}, x, y; V', x, y)\}$
(H5) $\{\mathcal{H}(\mathcal{H}; t; V, y)\} x := \mathcal{H}(y) \{\mathcal{H}(\mathcal{H}; t; V, y)\}$

Proof. All the proofs for hash function computation are essentially the same as the proofs for block cipher evaluation. This is due to our choice of using an adversary that does not have access to the random oracle when trying to distinguish distributions (see Section 3).

A.9 For Loop

Proposition 27 (Rule (F1)).

$\{\psi(i-1)\}$ for $x = i$ to j do: $c_x \{\psi(j)\}$ provided $\{\psi(k-1)\} c_k \{\psi(k)\}$ for $i \leq k \leq j$

Proof. This is a simple induction on x .