Effects of the share remuneration system on fisheries management targets and rent distribution - Archive ouverte HAL
Article Dans Une Revue Marine Resource Economics Année : 2015

Effects of the share remuneration system on fisheries management targets and rent distribution

Résumé

Most fisheries worldwide remunerate their crew with a share system, where crew receive a part of the revenues or a part of the revenues less costs, rather than a fixed wage. Although labor is one of the main costs in fisheries and the share remuneration system has a strong influence on firm behavior and its economic performance, little attention has been paid it. In a share remuneration system, crew salaries can significantly increase when the economic performance of a vessel improves. This allows the crew to capture part of the fisheries rent. Bioeconomic analyses are performed for the Bay of Biscay nephrops fishery on main management targets. Results confirm the importance of considering a share system compared to a fixed remuneration system in vessel owner (capital) and crew (labor) rent distribution and fishing decisions.

Dates et versions

hal-01726745 , version 1 (08-03-2018)

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Jordi Guillen, Claire Macher, M. Merzéréaud, Jean Boncoeur, Olivier Guyader. Effects of the share remuneration system on fisheries management targets and rent distribution. Marine Resource Economics, 2015, 30 (2), pp.123-138. ⟨10.1086/679970⟩. ⟨hal-01726745⟩
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