Selfish primary user emulation (PUE) is a serious security problem in cognitive radio networks. By emitting emulated incumbent signals, a PUE attacker can selfishly occupy more channels. Consequently, a PUE attacker can prevent other secondary users from accessing radio resources and interfere with nearby primary users. To mitigate the selfish PUE, a surveillance process on occupied channels could be performed. Determining surveillance strategies, particularly in multi-channel context, is necessary for ensuring network operation fairness. Since a rational attacker can learn to adapt to the surveillance strategy, the question is how to formulate an appropriate modeling of the strategic interaction between a defender and an attacker. In this paper, we study the commitment model in which the network manager takes the leadership role by committing to its surveillance strategy and forces the attacker to follow the committed strategy. The relevant strategy is analyzed through the Strong Stackelberg Equilibrium (SSE). Analytical and numerical results suggest that, by playing the SSE strategy, the network manager significantly improves its utility with respect to playing a Nash equilibrium (NE) strategy, hence obtains a better protection against selfish PUEs. Moreover, the computational effort to compute the SSE strategy is lower than to find a NE strategy.