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Terrorism, Colonialism and Voter Psychology: Evidence from the United Kingdom

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Abstract: Extant theory suggests that terrorist groups strategically plan their attacks around elections. This study investigates the impact of terrorism on voting behavior in the United Kingdom (UK). To address endogeneity concerns related to the possibility that terrorism may be a response to the elections results, we have conducted an instrumental variables approach that relies on the political participation of Commonwealth-origin migrant voters, taking into account the fact that the strength of the Commonwealth's commitment to its principles and values - including the promotion of human and political rights, tolerance, respect for diversity, coexistence, equity and fairness- may affect terror dynamics. In other words, we have connected terrorism to colonial policies and practices. In fact, the colonial rulers had established effective application of economic, social and cultural rights, as well as civil and political rights which would contribute to the success of counter-terrorism strategies. The results indicate that terrorism significantly affects the electorate's preferences. We have also found that the vote of the right-wing party is likely to be higher in localities near the home base of a terror incident and in localities adjacent to international borders, and lower in cities with a noticeable percentage of Muslims. The current UK economic conditions do not work to the advantage of the right-wing party. The results are statistically significant and robust across a multitude of model specifications and differing measures of terrorism.

Keywords: Terrorism; Colonialism; Voter behavior; Elections; the United Kingdom.

JEL Classification: H56; D74.

1. Introduction

According to the last edition of The Global Terrorism Index from the Institute for Economics & Peace (IEP), the world has witnessed a rise by 69 percent in terrorist attacks within a single year. Terrorism is viewed as the curse of our times, and researchers are probing this common evil in several ways to find a remedy. After the attacks of September 11, 2001, a particular attention has been devoted to the historical and institutional causes, forms, and strategies of terrorism, offering valuable insights into the link between terrorism and the economy, the government policy, and the democratic freedoms; also into the determinants of terrorism and the issues faced by governments in their efforts to counteract terrorism (see, for example, Krueger and Laitin 2003; Krueger and Maleckova 2003; Berrebi 2007). So far, the empirical research on the effects of terrorism on people's evaluation of their political leaders' performances remains rather limited (Davis and Silver 2004, Shambaugh and Josiger 2004, Guilmartin 2004, Ludvigsen 2005). Several questions on this issue **still need** answers. In particular, is terrorism a tactic to achieve political goals? How does the phantom threat of terrorism influence voters' preferences? Are voters more likely to support parties that favor expanding heavier concessions to terrorists to prevent further violence? or are they more likely to vote for parties that oppose concessions and that favor more aggressive policy towards the perpetrators? Addressing these questions may have relevant implications for conflict resolution and to understand better the role that plays terrorism as a political tool (in particular, electoral terrorism). Research that concentrates on the exposure to terrorism and political preferences has been mixed with some researches showing that terrorism leads voters to accommodate terrorists' demands more, and others revealing a hardening of attitudes in the electorate. Various works documented a significant correlation between terrorism and the voting behavior and the electoral opinions (Pape 2005; Berrebi and Klor 2008; Kibris 2011; Montalvo 2011; Holmes and Gutiérrez de Pineres 2012; Robbins et al. 2013). These analyses were concentrated on the cases of Israel (Ludvigsen 2005; Berrebi and Klor 2006; Fielding and Penny 2006), Spain (Bali 2007), the U.S. (Guilmartin 2004; Shambaugh and Josiger 2004), and some European countries such as Spain (Bali 2007). Some of these researchers found that right-wing incumbent parties receive more votes following terrorism (Berrebi and Klor 2006; Berrebi and Klor 2008; Getmansky and Zeitsoff 2014). This also ties with Kbris (2011) and Onreat et al. (2013); they deduced that to deal with terror threats there is a turn toward right-wing attitudes. On the contrary, the terror attacks played a significant role on the win of the Socialist Party over the Spanish 2004 elections (Bali 2007). Although the Israeli case showed that the right-wing is likely to see its votes raise in the face of terrorist incidents,

according to Bali (2007) the Spanish case underscored that this support is still sensitive to public approval of potential policy areas. This outcome was confirmed by Koch and Cranmer (2007) and Williams et al. (2013) demonstrating that left-wing governments are less likely to survive transnational terrorist attacks.

The aim of this essay is to investigate this claim and test whether terrorism is an effective way to sway elections by delving into the last UK elections. The United Kingdom is one of the unfortunate countries for which dealing with terrorism has long become the top priority issue. Since 1970, the UK has faced the most deaths as a result of terrorism in Western Europe totaling 3,395, followed by Spain with 1,261 deaths since 1970 according to data from the Global Terrorism Database (see Figure A.1, Appendix). In 2017 and in particular after the Manchester attack (22 May), the UK's intelligence agency, increased its threat level from severe to critical¹. It is in this country that warnings about terrorism, nowadays, find the most resonance with politicians, journalists and public alike. Following the terrorist incident at Ariana Grande's concert in Manchester and at London Bridge a few days later, it is clearer the target is the general elections of June 8. Terrorism was and continues to be on the minds of the UK public even before these last attacks. Based on a recent poll, many voters have suggested that security and terrorism are the principal issue determining how they will vote. Nevertheless, the voters had differing opinions on which party would deal with the issue better and more seriously, with some saying they felt the Conservatives were stronger on security and counter-terrorism strategy, and others asserting that Theresa May had failed as Prime Minister. The present research utilizes the variation of terror attacks across time and space to estimate the magnitude of the impact of terrorism on the electorate's preferences while focusing on the UK case. To causally identify the relationship between terrorism and voting behavior, we have applied an instrumental variables approach using the number of Commonwealth² migrants eligible to vote as an instrument for terrorism. The organization has continually emphasized its focus on adaptability, hence the idea is whether the Commonwealth has adapted sufficiently to deal with terrorism predominant in the world today. Our results provide strong empirical support for the hypothesis that the electorate shows a sensitive response to terrorism. In particular, terrorism causes an important increase

¹ For more details, Figure A.2 (Appendix) shows the history of the U.K.'s threat level since the warning system was first introduced in 2006 to the last Bridge attack in June 3, 2017.

² The Commonwealth of nations is an intergovernmental organization of 52 member states that are mostly former territories of the British Empire, including (1) 16 members of the Commonwealth with Queen Elisabeth II as the Head of State, known as "Commonwealth realms", and (2) 31 republics with distinct heads of state and (3) five monarchies with a dissimilar monarch.

on the support for the right wing of political parties. Furthermore, we have documented that the right-wing party's vote-share is 2 percentage points greater in localities near to the home base of a terror incident, 9 to 11 percentage greater in localities with an international border, and 7 to 10 percentage lesser in cities with wider Muslim share of the population. We have also found that the electorate's voting behavior depends on the socio-economic conditions, while it seems insensitive to the education level.

We have structured the remainder of this research as follows. In Section 2, we describe the methodology and the data. In Section 3, we summarize and discuss our findings and check their robustness. In Section 4, we control for possible endogeneity problem. Section 5 provides some concluding remarks.

2. Methodology and data

2.1. The model

The present work empirically analyzes the strength of the effect of terrorism on the voting behavior or the electorate's preferences with special references to the case of United Kingdom. A potential problem that emerges in any essay to investigate the impact of terrorism on the voting behavior is that the estimates may be biased owing to the dynamic interactions among the two variables: terrorist incidents may exert a significant impact on the electorate's preferences, but terrorism may also be a response to those political preferences. This interaction precludes academics from effectively determining the effect of terrorism from other shocks to the voters' behaviors and beliefs by focusing only on time variation. Specifically, the correlation between terrorism and the electorate's preferences cannot be interpreted as a measure of the magnitude of the electoral effects of terrorism. Adding to our investigation the variation across space allows us to avoid the intrinsic difficulty of the task at hand. Indeed, following Berrebi and Klor (2006), we use the variation of terror attacks across time and space as an instrument to analyze the electoral impacts of terror incidents, even if we control for possible time and location specific effects. The model we estimate for the identification of the effect of terrorism on electoral outcomes is denoted as:

$$(Right\ Bloc\ Share)_{i,t} = \alpha(Terror\ Fatalities)_{i,t} + \beta(Total\ Fatalities)_t + \gamma X_{i,t} + \varepsilon_{i,t} \quad (1)$$

where $(Right\ Bloc\ Share)_{i,t}$ is the right-bloc share of the two-blocs vote in locality i in elections t ; $(Terror\ Fatalities)_{i,t}$ is the number of fatalities in locality i prior to the elections in t ; $(Total\ Fatalities)_t$ is the total number of terror fatalities in UK before elections t . $X_{i,t}$ is a vector of political, socio-economic and demographic control variables that vary across

localities and time. These variables include the net migration as percentage of voters, the geographical distribution of terror fatalities (localities near to the home base of attacks, localities with international border, regional capitals), and the attention to Brexit.

Based on related literature, α is expected to be significantly positive if localities within the range have a higher right-wing vote-share than localities outside the range (in particular, Berrebi and Klor 2006; Getmansky and Thomas Zeitzoff 2008). A terrorist incident triggers residents of a locality to change their daily routine as a result of insecurity and change in their behavior toward peace. Terror attacks may also exert a significant influence on the locality's economy and its residents' future income (Gordon and Arian 2001). However, a negative and statistically significant α would imply that localities within the range of terror attacks are less supportive of right-wing bloc, and more supporting of left-wing parties. An α coefficient that is not significant means that being in the range of terrorist incidents does not impact voting behavior. β measures the local electoral impact of terror attacks committed in other localities. A positive coefficient may be explained even partially by the policies proposed by parties in the right bloc won it new supporters after terrorist incidents. If the coefficient is negative, it may be due to the fact that national casualties from terrorism and voters' disapproval of the policies proposed by the right bloc prompted an erosion of its support (Berrebi and Klor 2008). The net migration share of the population is incorporated to control for Tiebout's (1956) hypothesis. Based on this hypothesis, voters sort themselves out between the different localities according to their preferences. Adding the net migration share of each locality's population enables us to differentiate migration of voters to localities that do not suffer terror attacks from the hypothesis assuming that voters change their preferences. Further, Berrebi and Klor (2008) argued that the electoral support for the right bloc drops with the distance of the locality to the home base of a terror attack and in localities with an international border. However, the support for the right-wing party rises in regional capitals and with population density. It is very important to assess the response of electorate's preferences to the geographical distribution of terrorist incidents. For instance, if localities that are near to the home base of terrorist attack are similar to those out of the range of attacks, then any differences in voting can be attributed to living in the range of terror attacks. Assessing similarity between within and out of the terror range localities is also prominent to avoid possible extrapolation bias (King and Zeng 2006). As mentioned above, many factors shape elections including migration, terrorism as well as healthcare but the UK general election was also dominated by the Brexit vote. The left wing party (Labour) has no clear policy on Brexit and offers a far-left, highly interventionist economic platform. However, the victory of the

right-wing party or Conservative constituency could raise the risk of a hard Brexit (Berenberg 2017). A positive Brexit's coefficient means that the electorate supports the right bloc win which is in favour of hard Brexit, while a negative coefficient would raise the possibility of softer Brexit strategy.

2.2. Data

Our focal variable of interest is the vote share for the different political parties during the last national parliamentary elections in UK. The available electoral data provided by the Office of National Statistics contain the total number of eligible voters and the support for each political party in the parliamentary elections of 2017. This information is available at the level of the polling station, thus offering a very detailed data set. To determine the electoral preferences of each locality, we have divided the political parties with representatives in the parliament into the Conservative Party on the right and the Labour on the left (i.e., the two main parties of UK). Statistics on terrorism are collected from the Office of the National Coordinator of Terrorist Investigations. The available data set on terror attacks contain daily information on every terrorist incident that caused the death of at least one non-combatant that occurred in the UK between January 1, 2017 and June 8, 2017. We have assigned each terror incident in the database to one of the localities, according to the geographic location of the attack, by employing Geographic Information System (GIS) and information from the National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism. The geographical distribution of terrorist fatalities during the time period of interest appears in Figure A.3 (Appendix). Thereafter, we have determined for each locality its mean relative support for the right bloc of parties (we focus here on conservatives' party) over the last parliamentary elections at issue. This measure offers information about the localities' electorate preferences. The map in Figure A.4 describes the distribution of the localities' support for the different UK political parties. We can note from the map that there is a sharp difference with respect the support for the right wing parties among cities that were attacked and the rest. The detailed data are available at Electoral commission and Data for UK 2017 General Election Results (Economist Infographic). What is surprising is that the localities which suffered most from terrorist incidents, just prior to the elections (for example, Manchester), show a larger support for the left wing (Labour), inconsistently with the literature suggesting that terrorism can raise the support for the right wing(see Figure A.5, Appendix). We have also incorporated further potential political, socio-economic and demographic variables into the investigation. Specifically, the analysis includes the distance

of locality to the terrorist home base during the period under study, and dummy variables for localities considered as regional capitals and localities that have an international border. Besides, we have integrated the net migration for each locality. We define the net migration as the total number of citizens that moved into a locality (including new immigrants) minus the total number of citizens that left the locality in a given year. The migration data are collected from the Office of National Statistics (ONS). Also, we have included the size of the population who is entitled to vote. Electoral statistics are gathered by ONS and represent the most accurate count possible of the number of people on electoral registers each year. Due to the great criticism for lacking clarity on Brexit negotiating strategy under Theresa May's government, the way in which Brexit has received interest in web is incorporated in this study, i.e., the search queries index for keyword "Brexit" has been retrieved from Google Trends. The data on electoral results and terror fatalities as well as the demographic, economic and geographic indicators are available at the locality level for the UK. Time series are expressed in natural logarithm to lessen fluctuations in the data set and to correct for potential heteroskedasticity and dimensional differences among variables. Table A.1 (Appendix) reports all the data used and their source links.

3. Results

3.1. Baseline model

To empirically assess the effects of terrorism on voting behavior, our strategy consists of regressing the political preferences (proxied by the right bloc share for each locality) on the locality's terror level and the total terror fatalities, even if we account for socio-economic indicators. To establish our empirical framework, we combined the necessary data on electoral outcomes and terror fatalities with data on economic, geographic and demographic indicators that are available at the locality level in UK (see Table A.1, Appendix). Table 1 displays the estimation of the effects of terror fatalities on the preferences of the electorate as specified in the equation (1). Column 1 reports the results of a specification accounting for the terror level within one month of the elections. Column 2 offers the outcomes of the specification considering the terror attacks occurred within 3 months of the elections, while column 3 reports the findings of the regression of electorate's preferences on the locality's terror level within one year of the elections. We show that the occurrence of a terror fatality within one month of the elections is associated with a 0.32 percentage points increase in the locality's relative electoral support for the right bloc of political parties. This effect appears

stronger compared to the elections within three months and one year of the elections. Three attacks happened in the UK during the time period at issue. Thus, one terror attack contributes roughly to an increase of 0.96 percentage points in the relative support for the right wing. Given that the UK electorate is mainly split between the right and left wings (conservative and labour, respectively), the aftermath of a terrorist incident just prior to the election significantly determine the electoral results.

By assessing the effect of total terror fatalities on voting behavior, we have noticed that a terror fatality has significant electorate effects beyond the locality where it is perpetrated. Moreover, we have found that the electoral support for the right wing drops with locality's population, the distance of the locality to the home base of a terror incident and in localities with an international border. However, the support for the right wing rises in regional capitals and depending to the net migration as a percentage of voters. Our results reveal that the net migration does not significantly influence the political preferences of the electorate after a terror incident. This implies that the local electoral impact of terror fatalities is not significantly determined by the voters changing their localities of residence- consistently with Tiebout hypothesis. The findings also reveal that Brexit is dominating the election or more accurately Brexit is likely to decide the election outcome rather than security concern. The obtained findings reveal that the particular attention toward Brexit is associated with a sharp decrease on the support for the right wing in favor of the left-wing party. The victory of left wing in the elections means that the Brexit would still go ahead. The labour party supported that the UK may attempt to go back to the negotiating table to discuss a better deal concerning Brexit. It must be mentioned that unlike the conservative party, the labour party has a tendency toward an open, business-friendly, low-regulated economy, and then they are against a "hard Brexit" and then a second referendum on the terms of any deal is possible if they win.

Table 1. The effect of terror fatalities on electoral preferences (*Right bloc share*) using different time spans to measure locality's terror level

	(1)	(2)	(3)
<i>Locality's terror level within</i>			
one month of the elections	0.0322*** (4.654)		
three months of the elections		0.0181*** (3.692)	
one year of the elections			0.0097* (1.812)
<i>Total terror fatalities</i>	0.0113** (2.746)	0.0107** (2.819)	0.0098* (2.164)
<i>Total population</i>	-0.0194*** (3.872)	-0.0174** (-2.566)	-0.0152*** (-3.508)
<i>Regional capital</i>	0.0097* (1.832)	0.0112* (1.958)	0.0110* (2.006)
<i>Distance to home base</i>	-0.026** (-2.835)	-0.021*** (-3.756)	-0.023** (-2.878)
<i>International border</i>	-0.0946** (-2.548)	-0.0910** (-3.063)	-0.1107** (-2.814)
<i>Attention to Brexit</i>	-0.1046* (-1.857)	-0.1083* (-1.911)	-0.1124* (-1.864)
<i>Net migration as a percentage of voters</i>	0.0982 (1.118)	0.0876 (1.342)	0.0652 (1.138)
R^2	0.79	0.81	0.76

Notes: Each column reports the estimated coefficients of an Ordinary least squares (OLS) regression model in which the dependent variable is the relative support for the right bloc (conservative) of parties. Robust t - statistics (adjusted for clustering at the locality level) are in parentheses.

Several tests were performed to ascertain the robustness of the main findings reported in Table 1. A first test consists of repeating the estimations of Table 1 while incorporating further control variables (in particular, by replacing the regional capital by other wealth indicators and by incorporating other Brexit proxies). Second, we assess the sensitivity of our results to the control for Muslim proportion in total population. This step consists of estimating the relationship between terror fatalities on electoral preferences and other control variables including total population while subtracting the Muslim share.

3.2. Inclusion of further control variables

A first test aims at replacing regional capital variable by GDP per capita as a potential wealth indicator. Multiple researches on voting behavior typically employ GDP growth to measure national economic performance. While several studies have successfully established

a significant linkage between economic performance and voter intent, some researchers have failed to find a solid relationship between electoral preferences and economic outcomes (for instance, Paldam 1991; Cheibub and Przeworski 1999). Others do not dispute the linkage among voting behavior and the economy, but they disagree on how voters judge the economy. Some perceive voters as completely myopic (Kramer 1971; Paldam 1991), whereas some other academics suggest that voters are more sophisticated and base their voting decision by accounting for long periods of information (see for example, Peltzman 1990). And another economic approach based on Bayesian framework remains, suggesting that voters' vision is vulnerable on how much "noisiness" or economic instability they witnessed in the past. This implies that voters will be short-sighted if they underwent great economic instability in the past, and longer sighted if the economic changes were low (see for instance, Magaloni 1997). By adding GDP per capita as wealth proxy, our main results are robust. We often find that an increase of terror fatalities reinforces the support of the right-wing party. We show also that the present UK economic situation is not in favor of the right-wing party, i.e., negative correlation between GDP per capita and electorate's support of the right bloc (Table 2, Equations (4), (5) and (6)).

Another robustness test consists of using another relevant wealth proxy which is the standardized locality mean wage adjusted for inflation is using 2006 as the base year. The incorporation of the average wage at the locality level enables us to account for possible effects of economic conditions on the relative support for the right wing party, as supported by the economic voter hypothesis (see, for example, Lewis-Beck and Stegmaier 2000; Berrebi and Klor 2008). Theory suggests that worsening socioeconomic conditions benefit the left-wing opposition rather than the right wing parties (for example, Getmansky and Thomas Zeitzoff 2008). For our case of study, we note that the estimated wage's coefficient is negative and significant (Table 2), highlighting that the current UK economic conditions do not work to the advantage of the right-wing party. By adding wage as a proxy of wealth, the effect of terrorism on the preferences of the electorate (right wing party) remains solid and unambiguous (i.e., positive and significant, Table 2, Equations (7), (8) and (9)).

The education level which is considered as one of the major predictors of turnout is also accounted for. Education improves people's commitment towards voting and enhances their interest in politics (Nie et al. 1996; Milligan et al. 2004). According to Niemi (1998) and Niemi and Smith (2001), the interest of people with higher education level differs from those with less education. They added that people with more education have a pronounced

allegiance to the political system and to affirm this allegiance vote participation is crucial. In the same context, Nesbitt-Larking (1992) showed that for the case of the United States, people with a college degree are twice more likely to vote than people with only a grammar school degree or less. We have tried to test this evidence for the case of the UK by controlling for the share of high school graduates who are 17-25 years old in each locality-year. In doing so, we have found that there is no significant effect of education on electorate preferences in the UK (Table 2), inconsistently with the results for other countries like the United States. This may be attributed to the fact that Britain has a socialist party with mechanism to mobilize the vote of working class, compensating thus for low education levels (Nesbitt-Larking 1992). But what is important from our results is that the impact of terrorism on the preferences of the electorate is fairly robust to the inclusion of these variables. Specifically, we confirm that terror fatalities exert a positive influence on the voting behavior favoring therefore the right-wing party, especially within one month of terror incident (Table 2, Equations (10), (11) and (12)).

Table 2. The effect of terror fatalities on electoral preferences (*Right bloc share*) after including further control variables

	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
<i>Locality's terror level within</i>									
one month of the elections	0.0411*** (3.9124)			0.03215** (2.4567)			0.02861* (1.9355)		
three months of the elections		0.0192*** (3.6124)			0.02456** (2.6029)			0.01308* (1.8769)	
one year of the elections			0.011672** (2.8134)			0.01368* (1.9654)			0.0046** (2.3861)
<i>Total terror fatalities</i>	0.01092** (2.3891)	0.01045* (1.9762)	0.01015** (2.43561)	0.01019** (2.5634)	0.01045* (1.9762)	0.01015** (2.43561)	0.0124* (1.7128)	0.0098* (1.8655)	0.01131* (1.7692)
<i>Total population</i>	-0.00871 (-1.1158)	-0.0096** (-2.4983)	-0.0084* (-1.9436)	-0.01034* (-1.8324)	-0.01106* (-1.7693)	-0.0101** (-2.5326)	-0.01034* (-1.8324)	-0.01106* (-1.7693)	-0.01015** (-2.4056)
<i>GDP per capita</i>	-0.0071** (-2.6193)	-0.00855* (-1.9643)	-0.00866** (-2.5928)						
<i>Wage</i>									
<i>Education</i>				-0.01668* (-1.8732)	-0.01654* (-1.95432)	-0.01573* (-1.77321)	0.05214 (1.2368)	0.03456 (1.3782)	0.026571 (1.4765)
<i>Distance to home base</i>	-0.00100* (-1.6999)	-0.00087* (-1.7541)	-0.00063* (-1.8054)	-0.00042* (-1.7652)	-0.00049* (-1.8041)	-0.0003** (-2.3145)	-0.0032** (-2.5075)	-0.0028* (-1.9235)	-0.0021* (-1.769)
<i>International border</i>	-0.0233** (-2.3456)	-0.0231** (-2.5539)	-0.02456** (-2.4097)	-0.04693* (-1.9542)	-0.04128* (-1.9163)	-0.03628* (-1.8745)	-0.07113* (-1.7715)	-0.06821* (-1.8954)	-0.07214* (-1.7658)
<i>Attention to Brexit</i>	-0.091*** (-3.1789)	-0.1153* (-1.9246)	-0.11678** (-2.8134)	-0.1195** (-2.7183)	-0.1153* (-1.9246)	-0.1167** (-2.8134)	-0.12142* (-1.9013)	-0.11462* (-1.7385)	-0.11345** (-2.5110)
<i>Net migration as a percentage of voters</i>	0.01256 (1.0875)	0.00853 (1.2210)	0.00817 (1.0095)	0.00131* (1.9564)	0.00221* (1.8356)	0.00186** (2.4394)	0.01345 (1.4246)	0.0361 (1.4368)	0.00121* (1.7732)
<i>R²</i>	0.81	0.80	0.80	0.86	0.82	0.80	0.89	0.87	0.88

Notes: Each column reports the estimated coefficients of an Ordinary least squares (OLS) regression model in which the dependent variable is the relative support for the right bloc (conservative) of parties. Robust t -statistics (adjusted for clustering at the locality level) are in parentheses.

Furthermore, we have re-examined the correlation between terrorism and electorate's preferences while replacing the uncertainty surrounding the Brexit vote by other proxies (twitter search). In addition to Twitter, we have used another indicator which is the British Volatility Index (BVIX). The interest here is to use a more appropriate index that reflects more adequately the Brexit fears. It must be stressed at this stage that the volatility index is a sentiment indicator that allows determining when there is too much optimism or great anxiety in the market. Also, we should point out that VIX responds sensitively to all events (reflecting both economic and geopolitical issues) that may cause uncertainty, and the Brexit is no exception. Our results displayed in Table 3 confirm that the great anxiety over Brexit is linked to a drop of the support for the right-wing party and then towards "hard Brexit". Our findings also indicate sharp distinguishability among Googlers (Table 1, Equations (1), (2) and (3)), Twitter users (Table 3, Equations (13), (14), (15)) and volatility traders (Table 5, Equations (16), (17), (18)). Despite considerable support for the claim that computing indicators of the public's sentiment from large-scale online data may be useful and meaningful to reflect public sentiment and mood and to predict a variety of phenomena, the British VIX index can explain better the voting behavior, since it may reflect more largely the existing news and even the hidden information driving the British market (Mao et al. 2011).

Table 3. The effect of terror fatalities on electoral preferences (*Right bloc share*) after including other Brexit proxies

	(13)	(14)	(15)	(16)	(17)	(18)
<i>Locality's terror level within</i>						
one month of the elections	0.03456* (1.87652)			0.041562* (1.8754)		
three months of the elections		0.01532** (2.4578)			0.01269** (1.9143)	
one year of the elections			0.011232** (2.3418)			0.02131** (2.4193)
<i>Total terror fatalities</i>	0.01125** (2.8314)	0.01452** (2.8132)	0.01239* (1.8854)	0.00982* (1.7145)	0.00913* (1.7735)	0.00981** (2.2456)
<i>Total population</i>	-0.00923* (-1.7653)	-0.01045* (-1.9123)	-0.01092** (-2.5098)	-0.01034* (-1.8324)	-0.01106* (-1.7693)	-0.01157* (-1.9432)
<i>Regional capital</i>	-0.0415** (-2.5421)	-0.03246* (-1.9432)	-0.01135*** (-3.4672)	-0.01157* (-1.8832)	-0.0196** (-2.3892)	-0.19884* (-1.9145)
<i>Distance to home base</i>	-0.0009* (-1.8934)	-0.0018** (-2.9235)	-0.001246* (-1.8124)	-0.001*** (-3.8762)	-0.0013** (-2.6144)	-0.00116** (-2.6134)
<i>International border</i>	-0.0651** (-2.4789)	-0.0432** (-2.3144)	-0.04157* (-1.9123)	-0.04167* (-1.8011)	-0.0513** (-2.4419)	-0.04981* (-1.9473)
<i>Attention to Brexit (Twitter)</i>	-0.09978* (-1.7695)	-0.0812** (-2.6511)	-0.06235** (-2.4122)			
<i>Attention to Brexit (BVIX)</i>				-0.1098** (-2.7410)	-0.1013** (-2.3946)	-0.10621** (-2.7189)
<i>Net migration as a percentage of voters</i>	0.15689 (1.1768)	0.10152 (1.2861)	0.09324 (1.6513)	-0.05124 (-1.3986)	0.0361 (1.4368)	0.02456 (1.6189)
R^2	0.85	0.81	0.83	0.79	0.77	0.81

Notes: Each column reports the estimated coefficients of an Ordinary least squares (OLS) regression model in which the dependent variable is the relative support for the right bloc (conservative) of parties. Robust t -statistics (adjusted for clustering at the locality level) are in parentheses.

3.3. Control for the Muslim proportion in total population

Due to the surge of Islamophobia in Britain, it is important to assess the Muslim participation in the last UK elections. In general, the relationship between the left wing party (in particular, the Labour party) and Muslim communities in the UK has always been very strong. The majority of Muslims who are members of political parties are likely to be related to the Labour party. The major parties often attempt to appeal to a Muslim electorate via their policies and candidates. Nonetheless, the Muslim vote is inaccurate with respect a homogenous voting bloc. British Muslim voters are always split depending to various cleavages whether regarding family ties, theological affiliations or other kinds of socio-economic cleavages that separate Muslim voters (Timothy 2012). The results displayed in Table 4 (Equations (19), (20) and (21)) indicate that localities with more pronounced percentage of Muslims are less likely to increase their support for the right bloc of parties in the onset of a terror attack. These results can be a reflect of the lack of trust between the rightist government and Muslim community in Britain. Notably, the British Muslim community was alienated by the main political parties over the last elections. Several analysts asserted that holding the general elections during Ramadan implies that there could be a disproportionate influence on voter turnout in constituencies with large Muslim population.

Table 4. The effect of terror fatalities on electoral preferences (*Right bloc share*) after excluding Muslims from the total population

	(19)	(20)	(21)
<i>Locality's terror level within one month of the elections</i>	0.0456** (2.897)		
<i>three months of the elections</i>		0.0283** (2.765)	
<i>one year of the elections</i>			0.0172*** (3.458)
<i>Total terror fatalities</i>	0.0125*** (3.634)	0.0113*** (4.109)	0.0111*** (3.518)
<i>Total population excluding Muslims</i>	-0.0095** (-2.819)	-0.00942*** (-3.558)	-0.00873** (-2.915)
<i>Regional capital</i>	0.0068** (2.751)	0.0091** (2.314)	0.0084** (2.523)
<i>Distance to home base</i>	-0.0195*** (-3.610)	-0.0211** (-2.793)	-0.0204** (-2.881)
<i>International border</i>	-0.0819*** (-3.726)	-0.0765** (-2.634)	-0.0883** (-2.711)
<i>Attention to Brexit</i>	-0.1156** (-2.594)	-0.1132* (-1.886)	-0.1108** (-2.449)
<i>Net migration as a percentage of voters</i>	0.1345	0.1024	0.1125

(1.000)	(0.7632)	(1.1128)
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R^2	0.72	0.74	0.74
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Notes: the dependent variable is the relative support for the right bloc (conservative) of parties. Robust t -statistics (adjusted for clustering at the locality level) are in parentheses. Robust t -statistics (adjusted for clustering at the locality level) are in parentheses.

In short, all the tests conducted show that the effect of terrorism on the voters' preferences documented in Table 1 is fairly robust to alternative specifications.

4. Endogeneity issue

A fundamental problem that emerges when trying to quantify the impact of terrorist fatalities on the voting behavior is that the estimates drawn may be biased due to the interaction between the two variables. In particular, the terror incidents may exert a significant effect on the electorate's preferences, but terrorism may also be a response to those preferences. For instance, the terrorists may choose the location of their terror incidents strategically, and that this choice may not be orthogonal to the political preferences of the localities' electorate. To avoid this concern, it seems crucial to check that even if the electorate's preferences may influence significantly the terror organizations' decision on whether or not to perpetrate a terror attack, the location of the attack is not selected as a response to the political views of the locality's electorate. The Instrumental Variables (IV) estimation methods allow consistent estimation when the explanatory variables are correlated with the error terms of a regression. The IV model asserts that the instruments affect the dependent variable only indirectly, through their correlations with the included endogenous variables. If an instrument exerts both direct and indirect effects on the dependent variable, the instrument is ineffective and it should be excluded. Nevertheless, if the considered instrumental variable affects significantly terrorism and has any influence on voting,

consistent results may be obtained. For our case of study, to account for possible reverse causality between terrorism and voting behavior, we have used an IV approach that relies on the participation of Commonwealth-origin migrant voters in the elections, considering the fact that terrorism does not comply with multicultural model based on the respect of human and political rights of migrants, tolerance and diversity.

The changing size and composition of the migrant population across the UK during the past years has had potential effects on the migrant voter base. The data presented in Table A.2 (Appendix) presents the major migrant communities in UK based on the size of the eligible electorate from each country. It indicates that although migrant voters in the UK originate from a large range of countries across the world, those born in the Commonwealth are the most dominant. Indeed, five of the top six countries from which migrant voters in UK general elections originate are all Commonwealth members: India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Nigeria, and South Africa (in this order). We should mention that the number of migrants voters from these Commonwealth countries increased sharply in the year 2016/2017 (see Table A.3, Appendix). The Commonwealth migrants and the UK citizens have a shared history, cultural links, common legal systems, business practices and much more. Commonwealth citizens who reside in Britain have held such voting rights for nearly seventy years. These rights were first granted in the British Nationality Act 1948 and have been retained through all subsequent rounds of reform to British citizenship rules. Add to this that rates of citizenship acquisition by Commonwealth migrants are higher.

This implies that wide majority of Commonwealth migrants participating in British elections will do so as naturalized British citizens (Vertovec 2006). The historical relations between Britain and the Commonwealth, and patterns of migration to Britain tracing back decades, mean that most of Britain's largest and well-established migrant communities hail from Commonwealth countries (Spencer 1997; Vertovec 2006; Ford and Goodwin 2014). The steady rise in population size among key Commonwealth communities in the UK has thus been accompanied by an increase in their effect within the UK general elections. From 1949, the word "British" was omitted from the Commonwealth name. The latter was symbolic of the abandonment of British ambitions of dominance in favour of equal rights for all members of the Commonwealth. This highlights the role of the development of the multicultural model and the advancement of human rights for the integration of immigrants from the former British Empire (Lee 1967). It must be stressed at this stage that the Commonwealth immigrants have less of a problem with culture shock than other arriving immigrants, as they

share a common history, language, and culture. In other words, the Commonwealth-origin migrants had been educated in the language and values Britain. They were therefore not foreign to British ways and values. Violent extremists generally do not comply with this model (Heggins 1997; Marks and Clapham 2005; Ford and Goodwin 2014). Whatever their ideology, these groups glorify the supremacy of a particular group, whether based on religion, race, citizenship, class or conviction, and oppose the idea of open and inclusive society. In brief, the idea here is that combating and ultimately overcoming terrorism will not succeed if the means to secure that society are not consistent with human rights standards. Interestingly, a huge body of literature has focused on the differences in the orientation of the European colonial powers and have shown that the identity of the colonizing nation explains the variation in postcolonial development (for example, Grier 1999; Bertocchi and Canova 2002) and democratic survival (for instance, Bernhard et al. 2004). While British, French and Spanish colonialism mainly aimed at reversing the fortunes of precolonial regions, they did so in dissimilar ways (Lange et al. 2006). The British attempted to utilize indirect rule and respected the traditional customs and leaders, whereas the French and the Spanish tried to use assimilation policies that never had such features, i.e., with the purpose to destroy traditional cultural identities. Unlike areas that were colonized by France and Spain, countries that were highly colonized by Britain saw the introduction of substantial liberal institutions that tend to be characterized by tolerance and pluralism. The British colonialism ensured a rule of law and effective administration showing respect for customs and traditions. Certainly, the single rationale of colonies was to serve the interests of the mother country. Throughout this study, we have hypothesized that there are differences between the colonizing countries. In our opinion, this difference may explain the behavior of the colonized countries in their relationship with the former colonial powers. Indeed, the relations between the old-style colonized and the colonizers can be appeased, strengthening today's cooperation. Regardless of several years after independence, these relations can be vivid and often complicated. Hence the potential impact on migration. The latter is a vestige of the colonial dispute not yet settled. The migrant, like the colonized, carries within it its history, a system of values and two-sided and contradictory references. In this sense, the situation of the migrant is reminiscent of that of the colonized. According to Sayad (2006), migration is a kind of colonization that survives. With a double-faced reference system (country of origin, host country), the migration experience can prompt contradictory results. Indeed, migrants from former colonial countries can in some cases easily integrate into the host country because they eventually mastered the customs, and are predisposed to integrate into their new country. In other cases, their

integration seems more difficult because of the negative attitudes (hatred) they may have towards their host country, because they considered that their economic difficulties come from countries that formerly were colonizers. This may partly explain, and only partially, and in extreme cases why people resort to terrorism.

For empirical purpose, we have used a dummy variable each locality in the study to code whether (scored 1) or not (scored 0) the migrants are from the Commonwealth. With this coding, a positively Information on the immigrant population by country of origin is obtained from the Population Censuses and from various issues of the Control of Immigration Statistics published by the U.K government. To be more effective in our analysis, we have replaced the dummy variable that account for the whole Commonwealth by a dummy variable that considers the old Commonwealth which was formed in 1931 when the Statute of Westminster gave legal recognition to the sovereignty of dominions. This dummy variable takes the value 1 if the electorate is a migrant from the original Commonwealth members including the United Kingdom, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, South Africa and Newfoundland. Britain, Australia, Canada and New Zealand have many common interests and a longest shared history. Compared to the rest of Commonwealth states, the alliances between the UK and the old Commonwealth members in several areas had been and continue to be strongest and enduring (Roberston and Singleton 2000).

In doing so, we confirm that the occurrence of terror attack before the elections play a significant role on the voting behavior and then on the election outcomes (Table 5, Equations (22), (23), (24), (25), (26) and (27)). Using different diagnostic tests, we show that the migrants from the Commonwealth may be considered as a valid instrument for terrorism³. We initially conduct the Sargan– Hansen J-statistic test to verify the validity of our instrument. By carrying out this test, the joint null hypothesis is not rejected for almost all cases. Then, we have performed a test suggested by Stock and Yogo (2005) to identify if there exist a problem of weak instruments⁴. According to Chit et al. (2010), if the instruments appear weak, the IV estimators would be biased. To verify this evidence, we have applied Cragg–Donald F-statistic test⁵. For all the considered cases, we show that migrants from Commonwealth (both cases; whole Commonwealth and old commonwealth) is an effective instrument for terrorism.

³ The joint null hypothesis of the test is that the concerned instrument is valid when it is uncorrelated with the error term and when the instrument is correctly excluded from the regressions.

⁴ If this F-statistic value is greater than the critical value provided by Stock and Yogo (2005), the null hypothesis of weak instruments can be rejected.

Table 5. The effect of terror fatalities on electoral preferences (*Right bloc share*) after controlling for endogeneity bias

	<i>Instrument 1: migrants from the whole Commonwealth</i>			<i>Instrument 2: migrants from the old Commonwealth</i>		
	(22)	(23)	(24)	(25)	(26)	(27)
<i>Locality's terror level within one month of the elections</i>	0.04110** (2.8193)			0.0367*** (3.459)		
<i>three months of the elections</i>		0.02867* (1.9873)			0.0191** (2.910)	
<i>one year of the elections</i>			0.01245* (1.9435)			0.0008*** (3.156)
<i>Total population</i>	-0.00452* (-1.8765)	-0.005** (-2.7206)	-0.0049** (-2.5018)	-0.0213** (-2.5062)	-0.0208** (-2.8146)	-0.0185*** (-3.4691)
<i>Total terror fatalities</i>	0.0018** (2.7651)	0.0021** (2.668)	0.0019** (2.7145)	0.0093* (1.881)	0.0141** (2.553)	0.0108* (1.945)
<i>Regional capital</i>	0.00813** (2.6914)	0.00815* (1.8965)	0.00832* (1.8845)	0.0065** (2.337)	0.0089** (3.106)	0.0101** (2.465)
<i>Distance to home base</i>	-0.00315* (-1.9324)	-0.00306* (-1.9144)	-0.00289** (-2.3465)	-0.0019* (-1.745)	-0.0024* (-1.819)	-0.0021* (-1.769)
<i>International border</i>	-0.0415* (-1.8345)	-0.0493** (-2.1259)	-0.0532* (-1.9876)	-0.0613** (-2.587)	-0.059*** (-3.346)	-0.0491*** (-3.124)
<i>Attention to Brexit</i>	-0.10113* (-1.8145)	-0.10192* (-1.9876)	-0.0965** (-2.2976)	-0.0942* (-1.739)	-0.1061* (-1.954)	-0.1028* (-2.143)
<i>Net migration as a percentage of voters</i>	-0.01177 (-0.8769)	0.01345 (1.0922)	0.01568 (1.0000)	0.00161* (1.815)	0.0442 (1.349)	0.0497 (1.300)
Cragg Donald test	27.56	24.55	23.61	23.45	21.96	21.89
J-statistic test	0.0445 [.1394]	0.0391 [.1541]	0.0683 [.2134]	0.0932 [.1645]	0.0523 [.1358]	0.0879 [.1986]

Notes: Each column reports the estimated coefficients of 2SLS regression model in which the dependent variable is the relative support for the right bloc (conservative) of parties. Robust t-statistics (adjusted for clustering at the locality level) are in parentheses; Statistics are robust to heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation. Cragg–Donald F-statistic tests for weak identification. Critical values are for CraggDonald F statistic and i.i.d. errors. Ten per cent and 15 per cent critical value of Stock–Yogo weak identification test are 17.02 and 13.85, respectively; [.]: p-value.

5. Conclusions

Since 1970, the United Kingdom has been suffering from terrorism. Terrorism has cost the country dearly in many respects, and has been declared the most important problem posing a significant threat to the state both by politicians, and by the public on several occasions. There have been different causes of terrorism in the UK. Before the 2000s, most terrorist incidents were related to the Northern Ireland conflict. In the late 20th century there were terror attacks by Middle Eastern terrorist groups, most of which were linked to the Arab–Israeli conflict. Since the 2000s, all the terror attacks in Britain were linked to Islamic extremism. In addition to the casualties and physical destruction directly resulting from their attacks, terrorists seek to inflict substantially psychological, social, political, economic damage upon the societies they target. Our study focuses on the political domain. It empirically analyzes the effects of

terrorism on the electoral choices of the British voters in the 2017 elections. To our best knowledge, this study is a first in many ways. The study contributes to the existing literature on the determinants of voting behavior in UK. It is the first essay at measuring the political impacts of terrorism in UK. This is a significant contribution considering that terrorism has been declared as one of the most important problems facing the country, both by candidates and voters over 2017 elections.

This analysis performs a designed econometric framework allowing analyzing the effect of terrorism on the electorate's preferences across time and location. Another contribution of this study relies on addressing possible endogeneity bias by using the Commonwealth migrant voters as an instrument for terrorism. The idea here is to account for the role that may play the British colonialism heavily characterized by the respect of customs, traditions, culture and laws in the war on terror (Higgins 1997; Marks and Clapham 2005). In doing so, we show that terrorism exerts a positive and significant effect on voting behavior. In this setup, a terrorist incident brings information to the electorate; that is, terror attacks tend to persuade the electorate that the moderate faction seems unable to effectively deal with terrorism and security concern and hence cannot be trusted. Indeed, our results reveal that terror fatalities lead to a rise on the support for the right bloc. This finding substantiates the hypothesis that democracies are highly susceptible to be targeted by terror organizations. In this way, the United Kingdom and more generally democratic governments should consider the political implications of terrorism that we uncover throughout this research when they implement counter-terrorism policies. Normally, the conduct of counter-terrorism policies is accompanied by a rise on the salience of terrorism, partially attributed to public declarations made by policy makers. We also show that more is the Muslims proportion in total population, less is the support for the right-wing party.

Last but not least, the results reveal that Brexit decides the elections outcome rather than concerns about terrorism and security. This result seems highly expected. As much as Brexit event revolves around tangible economic consequences, it is also heavily linked to an increased national sentiment among the British people. A year has passed after the announcement of the UK's EU membership referendum and the details of exit and its economic repercussions remain unknown to the British people, thus their increased suspicions and concerns.

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Appendix




Figure A.1. Victims of terror attacks (persons killed) in Western Union 1970-2015

Source: Global Terrorism Database.




Figure A.2. The UK's changing terror threat level from 2005 to 2017




Figure A.3. Terrorist incidents map of the United Kingdom 1970-2017

Source: The National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START).




Figure A. 4. The geographical distribution of the localities’ support for the different political parties in Britain

Source: Electoral commission.




Figure A.5. Manchester elections results
Labour: 63.41%; Conservative: 22.73%

Source: Electoral commission.

Table A.1. Data sources

	Variables	Sources
The dependent variable	The right bloc share by locality	The Office of National Statistics (https://www.ons.gov.uk/)
Terrorism indicators	Total terror fatalities	The Office of the National Coordinator of Terrorist Investigations
	The locality's terror level, i.e., the geographic location of the attack	The National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (http://www.start.umd.edu/)
	Distance to home base of terror incident	The Geographic Information System (GIS)
	Localities with international border.	A dummy variable that takes the value 1 for localities that have an international border.
Socio-economic indicators	The attention to Brexit	Google Trends (http://trends.google.com) Twitter hashtag to track (http://keyhole.co/) BVIX: Quandl Financial, Economic, and Alternative Data (https://www.quandl.com/)
	GDP per capita	The Office of National Statistics (https://www.ons.gov.uk/)
	Wage	The Office of National Statistics (https://www.ons.gov.uk/)
	The share of high school graduates who are 17-25 years old	The Office of National Statistics (https://www.ons.gov.uk/)
	Demographic proxies	Net migration as percentage of voters
	Total population	The Office of National Statistics (https://www.ons.gov.uk/)
	Number of potential Commonwealth migrant voter (excluding Children migrants under 18s)	UK censuses; the Office of National Statistics (https://www.ons.gov.uk/)

Table A.2. The most significant migrants population in the United Kingdom

Country of origin	Migrant population 2001	Migrant population 2011	Migrant population 2015 (projected)	Change in migrant population 2001-15	Share of migrant population with British citizenship (2011 est)	Share of migrant population with voting rights (2011 est)	Number of potential migrant voters***
1. India*	456,000	694,000	789,000	333,000	55%	100%	615,000
2. Pakistan*	308,000	482,000	552,000	244,000	69%	100%	431,000
3. Irish Republic*	473,000	407,000	381,000	-92,000	9%	100%	297,000
4. Bangladesh*	153,000	212,000	235,000	82,000	72%	100%	183,000
5. Nigeria*	87,000	191,000	233,000	146,000	41%	100%	182,000
6. South Africa*	131,000	191,000	215,000	84,000	46%**	100%	168,000
7. Jamaica*	146,000	160,000	166,000	20,000	73%	100%	130,000
8. Sri Lanka*	67,000	127,000	157,000	96,000	46%**	100%	118,000
9. Germany	244,000	274,000	286,000	42,000	54%	54%	120,000
10. Kenya*	127,000	137,000	142,000	15,000	87%	100%	111,000
11. Australia*	99,000	116,000	123,000	24,000	46%**	100%	96,000
12. Hong Kong*	88,000	102,000	108,000	20,000	83%	100%	84,000
13. Somalia	43,000	101,000	125,000	82,000	72%	72%	69,000
14. Zimbabwe	47,000	118,000	147,000	100,000	50%	50%	57,000
15. Turkey	53,000	91,000	106,000	53,000	67%	67%	55,000
16. United States	144,000	177,000	190,000	46,000	32%	32%	48,000
17. China	48,000	152,000	194,000	146,000	30%	30%	45,000
18. Poland	58,000	597,000	788,000	730,000	5%	5%	30,000
19. France	89,000	130,000	146,000	57,000	17%	17%	20,000
20. Italy	102,000	135,000	147,000	45,000	14%	14%	16,000
21. Romania	7,000	80,000	109,000	102,000	9%	9%	8,000
22. Portugal	36,000	88,000	109,000	73,000	6%	6%	5,000
23. Lithuania	10,000	97,000	132,000	122,000	2%	2%	2,000
Total	3,016,000	4,841,000	5,574,000	+2,558,000	46%	66%	2,890,000

* Country is in Commonwealth plus Irish Republic

** Estimate based on overall citizenship acquisition rates as separate data not available

*** Excludes projected under 18 population (based on national Census share of 22% under 18)

Notes: The data excludes the UK-born children of migrants (the proportion of under-18s in the general population - about 22%), who are not classified as migrants in the official statistics and are thus not taken into account as part of the migrant voter population throughout this analysis.

Table A.3. The distribution of Commonwealth migrants to UK by country of birth 2016/2017

Country	Continent	Migrant population	(as percentage of total Commonwealth migrants)
Antigua and Barbuda	Caribbean	3891	0,12%
Australia	Australia	106000	2,98%
Bahamas	Caribbean	945	0,029%
Bangladesh	Asia	212000	6,54%
Barbados	Caribbean	1433	0,044%
Belize	North America	1126	0,034%
Botswana	Africa	3984	0,12%
Brunei	Asia	249	0%
Cameroon	Africa	3134	0,09%
Canada	North America	265000	0,081%
Cyprus	Eurasia	887	0,027%
Dominica	Caribbean	1172	0,036%
Fiji	Oceania	4132	0,12%
Ghana	Africa	7456	0,23%
Grenada	Caribbean	3149	0,09%
Guyana	South America	1243	0,038%
India	Asia	694000	21,41%
Jamaica	Caribbean	160000	4,93%
Kenya	Africa	112920	1,74%
Kiribati	Oceania	614	0,018%
Lesotho	Africa	577	0,017%
Malawi	Africa	2210	0,068%
Malaysia	Asia	31400	0,96%
Malta	Europe	175	0%
Mauritius	Africa	41000	1,26%
Mozambique	Africa	2337	0,07%
Namibia	Africa	4169	0,12%
Nauru	Oceania	643	0,019%
New Zealand	Oceania	407000	12,56%

Nigeria	Africa	191000	5,89%
Pakistan	Asia	482000	14,87%
Papua New Guinea	Australia	27053	0,83%
Rwanda	Africa	3895	0,12%
Saint Kitts and Nevis	Caribbean	2734	0,084%
Saint Lucia	Caribbean	4163	0,13%
Saint Vincent and the Grenadines	Caribbean	3037	0,093%
Samoa	Oceania	8691	0,26%
Seychelles	Africa	288	0%
Sierra Leone	Africa	9475	0,29%
Singapore	Asia	101522	3,13%
Solomon Islands	Oceania	14553	0,45%
South Africa	Africa	191000	5,89%
Sri Lanka	Asia	118000	2,45%
Swaziland	Africa	288	0%
Tanzania	Africa	3216	0,099%
Tongo	Oceania	3037	0,094%
Trinidad and Tobago	Caribbean	12152	0,37%
Tuvalu	Oceania	1086	0,033%
Uganda	Africa	15107	0,46%
Vanuatu	Oceania	768	0,024%
Zambia	Africa	7995	0,25%

Notes: Source: the Office of National Statistics; the data excludes the UK-born children of migrants (the proportion of under-18s in the general population - about 22%), who are not classified as migrants in the official statistics and are thus not taken into account as part of the migrant voter population throughout this analysis.