Managing the pesticide safety risk to provide end markets with safe fruit and vegetables raises complex issues due to the diversity and stringent nature of public and private safety requirements and the high cost of controlling the product and the production process. More often than not, this leads to the development of diversified and more integrated relationships between growers and their buyers. Our paper is a case study of the hybrid forms underlying such relationships. It begins by developing the analytical framework, drawing on transaction cost, positive agency, and property rights theories with a special focus on the model proposed by Ménard (The Handbook of Organizational Economics, Princeton, 1066–1108, 2013), positioning the hybrid forms along the two dimensions of decision rights and strategic resources. It then presents a selection of quantitative and qualitative findings obtained from data collected through face-to-face interviews with managers of fresh produce shipping firms in France and Chile. Both case studies confirm that the level of centralization increases with the buyer’s commercial reputation, the level of customer safety requirements (a key component in the marketing strategy of the buyer), and the level of asset specificity which is mostly embedded in the technical assistance and training provided by the buyer to the growers. Moreover, our paper establishes a clear divide between firms that only control product safety at the delivery stage and firms that also control safety throughout the production process and may take decisions on behalf of the grower before harvesting.