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Article Dans Une Revue International Journal of Computers, Communications and Control Année : 2017

Improved Timing Attacks against the Secret Permutation in the McEliece PKC

Résumé

In this paper, we detail two side-channel attacks against the McEliece public-key cryptosys-tem. They exploit timing differences on the Patterson algorithm used for binary Goppa codes decoding in order to reveal one part of the secret key: the support permutation. The first one is improving two existing timing attacks and uses the correlation between two different steps of the decoding algorithm. This improvement can be deployed on all error-vectors with Hamming weight smaller than a quarter of the minimum distance of the code. The second attack targets the evaluation of the error locator polynomial and succeeds on several different decoding algorithms. We also give an appropriate countermeasure.
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Dates et versions

hal-01560052 , version 1 (16-09-2019)

Identifiants

  • HAL Id : hal-01560052 , version 1

Citer

Dominic Bucerzan, Pierre-Louis Cayrel, Vlad Dragoi, Tania Richmond. Improved Timing Attacks against the Secret Permutation in the McEliece PKC. International Journal of Computers, Communications and Control, 2017. ⟨hal-01560052⟩
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