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Satō Eisaku, Yasuoka Masahiro and the Re-establishment of 11 February as National Day: the Political Use of National Memory in Post-war Japan

EDDY DUFOURMONT

INTRODUCTION

As Pierre Nora has pointed out, national flags, national songs or national holidays are part of the realms of memory of a nation, the *lieux de mémoire*.¹ In the case of Japan, all of these symbolic realms existed already in the pre-war period and were remodelled in the post-war era by Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) cabinets.² The dominance of the LDP in politics and the creeping recent nationalism, symbolized by the visits of Prime Minister Koizumi Jun'ichirō to the Yasukuni Shrine or the approval of revisionist textbooks, are well-known aspects of Japan's post-war political life. The history of post-war politics is largely under construction, although efforts have been made to sketch the establishment of the 1955 system, characterized by LDP supremacy.³ But our knowledge of the motivation for the re-establishment of prewar symbols is still weak. The re-establishment of 11 February as National Day in 1966 by a cabinet under Prime Minister Satō Eisaku is a case in point. The cabinet met strong opposition, especially from Marxist historians. If we want to fully understand the reasons for the re-establishment of pre-war symbols by the government, we need to examine the motivations of Satō and the politicians who supported him. They have been largely ignored by previous research, especially by Marxist historians.⁴

It is well known that leftist analysis of contemporary Japanese history describes the political measures of Yoshida Shigeru, Hatoyama Ichirō and Kishi Nobusuke as a 'reverse course', from democracy to renewed 'fascism'. The few works written about Satō's supporters, represented by

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the *Soshinkai* (The Society of Public Spirit), led by the representative Chiba Saburō and the Confucian thinker Yasuoka Masahiro (1898–1983), presented both the *Soshinkai* and Yasuoka as fascists, giving little explanation. Even if we accept the assertion that they are fascists, we need to know their motivation. The question remains: why did Satō, the *Soshinkai* and Yasuoka desire the re-establishment of 11 February as the National Day?

To deal with a part of the question, we should focus our analysis on Yasuoka and the *Soshinkai*. The *Soshinkai* is completely untreated in historiography, but Yasuoka, a specialist of Wang Yangming, is often described as an acquaintance of Kita Ikki and Ōkawa Shūmei, fathers of the pre-war ultra-nationalist movement. He is also known to be an ideologue of bureaucrats of *Kokuikai* (Association for National Reform), and one of the authors of the imperial declaration of surrender from 15 August. However very few works address his thought.⁵ Thus, we must first treat the *Soshinkai* itself as an organization, then its role in the re-establishment of 11 February, and finally the influence of Yasuoka on Satō and the *Soshinkai*.

THE SOSHINKAI AND THE RE-ESTABLISHMENT OF 11 FEBRUARY

Satō Eisaku's Emphasis on the Renewal of Tradition

11 February was introduced as National Day by the Meiji government in 1872 because, following the legends described in eighth century texts *Kojiki* and *Nihon Shoki*, it was considered the day when the first emperor, Jimmu, built the imperial palace and founded Japan. It was called *kigensetsu* (in English officially designated as 'Empire Day') and was one of the major holidays in pre-war Japan as well as an important part of state Shintō. Therefore, it was abolished under the US occupation in February 1948, along with the Emperor's birthday. On 9 December 1966, the government of Satō Eisaku decided to make 11 February 'National Foundation Day' (*kenkoku kinen no hi*), in order to 'commemorate the foundation and to stimulate patriotic spirit', according to the law of 25 June 1966.⁶

Even though the 1966 law did not explicitly say it, the decision to designate the 11 February National Foundation Day was nothing more than the re-establishment of pre-war *kigensetsu*. At the beginning of the 1950s, Yoshida Shigeru had already expressed his desire to re-establish *kigensetsu* as a national holiday in a meeting of the Diet. As early as 1953, the government celebrated the imperial birthday in the traditional way, but it was not until 1956 that *kigensetsu* was openly discussed, at which point Shintō groups, right-wing organizations and conservatives called for its re-establishment. Some local governors organized 11 February commemoration ceremonies, encouraged by Hatoyama Ichirō and his education minister, Kiyose Ichirō. Even the *Japan Times* deemed a national day necessary, because Japan was now a

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reconstructed country and a member of the United Nations. But the newspaper opposed the label *kigensetsu*, referring to its lack of historical authenticity and its militaristic and nationalistic overtones.⁷ The project of the Hatoyama government was perceived as anti-democratic and unconstitutional because it was initiated by the government, and not based upon the will of the people. The government met with strong opposition of scholars, especially those affiliated with Marxist organizations like *Nikkyōso*. In 1959, Prince Mikasa himself, the emperor's brother, declared that 11 February was completely superfluous.⁸ For the government, its re-establishment was one element used by the LDP for the revision of the constitution and the creation of the Self Defence Force. However, in the late 1950s, the LDP lost the two-thirds majority in the Diet it needed to revise the constitution. Then Satō Eisaku succeeded Ikeda Hayato in November 1964.

Satō's diary shows that he was personally devoted to the emperor and nostalgic as regards the pre-war emperor-centred system.⁹ Soon after he became Prime Minister on 3 February 1965, he decided to present a bill introducing 11 February as a national holiday, and combined it with the re-establishment of Respect for the Aged Day (*keirō no hi*, pre-war *rōjin no hi*, on 15 September) and the creation of Sports Day (*taïku no hi*, on 10 October).

Satō Eisaku established a committee to prepare the re-establishment of 11 February.¹⁰ He also decided to change the country's name on stamps, replacing *Nihon* with *Nippon*. Those facts should make Satō a perfect example of the 'reverse course' described by Marxist historians. But it is important to recognize that Satō disliked the violence of far right-wing movements as well as that of leftist ones: he was not pleased when rightists demonstrated for the emperor's birthday, nor when Mishima Yukio committed suicide in the Self-Defense Force headquarters. In 1960, he supported the new laws issued in order to repress far right movements (*uyoku*).¹¹ At the same time, he had contacts with far-right leading politicians, including Kodama Yoshio. Yet he was not the only one to be in contact with him, and even if Kodama sometimes appears in Satō's diary, this does not prove any relationship between the two men.¹² However, what about Satō's main supporters, the *Soshinkai*, who are also often called 'rightists'?

Supporters of the Soshinkai

The *Soshinkai* is a group of nearly eighty LDP members of the Lower and the Upper House of the Diet, created in October 1958 by Chiba Saburō. Chiba began his political career in the 1920s, under the patronage of the liberal Ozaki Yukio, and became an important leader in the National Democratic Party (later the Reform Party, then the Democratic Party).¹³ In 1958, Chiba Saburō became the head of the special committee for security measures of Kishi Nobusuke's cabinet. Except for the fact that Chiba was the leader of the *Soshinkai* and Yasuoka Masahiro the

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counsellor, we have very few documents that provide information about the *Soshinkai* and its members. *Mainichi Shinbun* (15 August 1961) presents the *Soshinkai* as an organization whose activities 'transcend factions'.¹⁴ The newspaper lists the following names (the participation in a Satō cabinet is indicated by the abbreviation S and the number of the cabinet):

- Kiyose Ichirō. Minister of Education under Hatoyama Ichirō. Head of the Deputy Assembly in the 1960s.
- Araki Manjuo. Minister of Education under Ikeda Hayato. President of the Committee for Public Security (S2–3).
- Naoki Kōjirō. Minister of Justice (S3).
- Fukuda Takeo. Future Prime Minister. Minister of Finance in S1–2–3.
- Kimura Atsutarō. Minister of Justice under Yoshida Shigeru, First Commander-in-Chief of the Self Defence Forces.
- Kaya Okinori. Minister of Finances under the Ikeda government.
- Aoki Kazuo. Minister of Greater Asia during the war.
- Hasegawa Takashi. Secretary of Ogata Taketora in Higashikuni and Yoshida Shigeru cabinets, Deputy Vice-Minister of Education under Ikeda Hayato, Minister of Labour under Tanaka Kakuei, Minister of Transports under Miki Takeo, Minister of Justice under Takeshita Noboru.
- Shūtō Hideo. Minister of Agriculture (Yoshida 1) and Minister of Construction (Yoshida 3). Leader of the Committee for Public Security under Ikeda Hayato.
- Nadao Hirokichi. Minister of Education under Ishibashi Tanzan, Kishi Nobusuke and S2. Minister of Health under Ikeda Hayato.
- Hamachi Bunpei. Vice-Minister of Transports under Hatoyama Ichirō. President of the Japanese Fishing Association.

Others sources also name:¹⁵

- Aikawa Katsuroku. Clerk of the Home Ministry and Ministry of Health under Koiso Kuniaki. Under the Satō government, head of the Committee for Security Measures.
- Aichi Sōichi, Minister of Education in S1, Foreign Minister in S2 and 3.
- Hoshina Zenshirō. Naval officer. One the most important members of the LDP's Committee for Defence Measures and the patronal organization *Keidanren*. Under Satō Eisaku, he was sent to discuss the retrocession of Ogasawara Islands.
- Sakata Michita. Minister of Education (S3–4).
- Saigō Kichinosuke. Minister of Justice (S2).
- Hayakawa Takashi. Deputy Vice-Minister of Autonomy Ministry under Hatoyama Ichirō, Autonomy Minister under Ikeda Hayato, Labour Minister under S1 and 2, Health Minister under Miki Takeo.

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- Ōmura Seiichi. Home Minister (Yoshida 1) and Chief of the Self-Defence Forces under the Hatoyama cabinet.
- Tachibana Naoshige, President of Heiwa Business Company and adviser for the Kinki Sōgo bank.
- Kudō Shōshirō. President of the Tomin bank.
- Shibusawa Keizō. President of the Bank of Japan, Minister of Finance under the Shidehara cabinet.
- Ichimanda Hisato. Minister of Finance under Hatoyama Ichirō and Kishi Nobusuke. President of the Vietnam Association (*Betonamu kyōkai*).
- Ishii Kōjirō, Minister of Justice in S1 and 2.
- Shimomura Sadamu. General, last Minister of the Army Ministry (Shidehara cabinet).
- Hamada Sachio. Vice President of the Diet General Assembly.
- Ōtsubo Yasuo.¹⁶ Home Ministry clerk and owner of the Daiei Company. Deputy Vice-Minister of Education under Ikeda Hayato and deputy Vice-Minister of Justice under Satō Eisaku.

As the list shows, the *Soshinkai* was composed of very important politicians, and we can even say that the *Soshinkai* dominated not only the Satō, but also the Ikeda Hayato cabinets. We have little information about the other members of the *Soshinkai*, but the list above allows us to make three further observations. First, some politicians who served in pre-war and war cabinets were still in office. Members of the Koiso cabinet (1944) and the former Imperial Navy were especially strongly represented. We can connect this with Yasuoka Masahiro's service as a counsellor for the Greater Asia Ministry under the Koiso and Suzuki cabinets (September 1944 – August 1945). Second, some of the *Soshinkai* members were members of the *Kokusei dōshikai* (Friends' Circle for the Government of the Country).¹⁷ The *Kokusei dōshikai* was founded in June 1954, and included deputies from the Liberal Party and the Reformist Party. They were under the ideological direction of Yasuoka, the political thinker Yabe Teiji, and the journalist Mitarai Tatsuo. They were connected with the *Chōenkai* (Peach Garden Society) of Ogata Taketora.¹⁸ Their goal was to unify the conservative forces to create a new party opposed to Yoshida Shigeru, and to establish a new policy of independence. Their key role in the formation of the LDP put them in senior posts within the party.¹⁹

People from the Kishi-Fukuda faction were present in both *Kokusei dōshikai* and *Soshinkai*.²⁰ In the *Tōfū sasshin renmei* (Renovation of the Party League), created by Fukuda Takeo, we find Hoshina Zenshirō, Aikawa Katsuroku, Chiba Saburō, Sakata Michita, and Hasegawa Takashi.²¹ Thus it is possible to say that Fukuda faction was the principal force represented in *Soshinkai*.

What was the main goal of *Soshinkai*? The sources give the following points:²²

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- to fight the violence of Marxist movements.
- to warn society against the international threat of communism.
- to promote respect for the tradition and history and Japan, the spirit of democracy and independence.
- to protect the parliamentary democracy and contribute to the pacification of politics.
- to fight factionalism inside the LDP, to make it appear devoted to the country and attractive to the people.

The meaning of the word *soshin*, given to the group by Yasuoka, was 'public spirit', meaning that it transcended personal ambition and the political struggles inside the LDP.²³ The *Soshinkai* applied these goals in two ways: anti-communism and support for spiritual mobilization. Let us begin with the anti-communist activities. In 1965 Chiba Saburō was one of the creators of the Asia Parliamentarian's Union (APU, *Ajia kokkai giin rengō*), of which Kishi Nobusuke was the president. Ishii Kōjirō, Kimura Atsutarō and Kaya Arinori also participated. APU assembled representatives from Japan, Korea, Taiwan, the Philippines, Thailand, South Vietnam, Malaysia and Indonesia, in order to resist communism and to promote the prosperity of Asia.²⁴ Chiba, Kishi, Masuhara Keikichi met with Yasuoka to prepare the creation of APU.²⁵ For Yasuoka, this project was the perfect example of what Japanese politics in Asia should be: a 'community of destiny'.²⁶ The *Soshinkai* was also a bastion of the pro-Taiwan lobby. The Association for Researches on the Asian Question (*Ajia mondai kenkyūkai*, called *A ken*) represented this group in the LDP.

It was opposed to the Association for Research on Asian and African Questions (*Ajia-Afurika mondai kenkyūkai*, called *AA ken*), which was the pro-China lobby. Fukui Haruhiro says that thirty-six members of *Soshinkai* were present among the ninety-eight members of *AA ken*.²⁷ Kanda Yutaka also showed that Kaya Okinori, Ishii Kōjirō, Kishi Nobusuke, Fukuda Takeo and Aichi Sōichi belonged to the Association for Japan-Taiwan cooperation (*Nichika kyōroku iinkai*).²⁸

The *Soshinkai* and Yasuoka were also strongly linked with Park Chung-Hee's Korea, which is one reason why the normalization treaty between the two countries was realized in the *Soshinkai* dominated Ikeda-Sato cabinets (and met with strong opposition in both Korea and Japan). Yasuoka played the role of an unofficial counsellor in matters of international relations for Ikeda Hayato and Satō Eisaku: when Park Chung-Hee assumed power in May 1961, Satō consulted Yasuoka in the presence of the Korean politician Park Choong-Eum.²⁹ Park himself had old relations with Yasuoka.³⁰ Other meetings between Yasuoka and Satō took place as well.³¹ Ikeda and his foreign minister Ōhira Masayoshi themselves met Yasuoka to talk about Japanese-Korean relations just after Park's visit to Japan in July 1962.³² In October the same year, Chief of Information Service Kim Jong-Pil met Yasuoka.³³ According to Chiba Saburō, Yasuoka met Park Choong-Eum himself, with Kim Jong-Pil, on

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10 May 1962.³⁴ Yasuoka had also good connections to Gwon Il, one of the main delegates of the Korean community in Japan, and Jeong Han-Yeong, president of the Japanese-Korean friendship association (*Nikkan yūkō kyōkai*).³⁵ Meetings between members of *Soshinkai* and key members of the Korean government are recorded as well in June 1968, Kaya Arinori was invited by Park Chung-Hee and his prime minister to discuss problems of civil security and defence.³⁶ One of the reasons why Yasuoka has been so much involved in Japanese-Korean affairs is the strong desire of Kansai businessmen to reopen diplomatic relations between Japan and Korea.

The *Kansai Shiyū kyōkai* created by Yasuoka in 1957 assembled prominent businessmen from the Kansai region, and delegates from the business world who promoted the reopening of Japanese-Korean relations as part of their enterprises.³⁷ The second aspect of the *Soshinkai* activities, spiritual mobilization, was a domestic one, and the reestablishment of 11 February was one part of this effort. Aside from an attempt to revise the constitution with the creation of a committee led by Chiba and dissolved without results, the *Soshinkai* did not involve in concrete activities. Minister of Education Nadao Hirokichi emphasized the 'spirit of defence' in education, and Araki Manjū stopped meeting *Nikkyōso* delegates as his predecessors used to do. Nadao and Sakata Michita were confronted with student demonstrations, especially at Tokyo University, at the end of the 1960s. The *Soshinkai's* most significant concrete activity was the organization of the Meiji's centennial celebration. Through the cabinet, the *Soshinkai* was heavily involved in the anniversary committee. Yasuoka joined the preparatory committee, with other conservative thinkers and writers like Kobayashi Hideo, Ōya Sōichi and Yabe Teiji.³⁸

Satō and the Soshinkai: Opponents of Yoshida Shigeru?

The public knew about the existence of the *Soshinkai* because of Matsuo Shōichi, an historian and member of the *Nikkyōso*, who opposed Chiba and Araki at a trial at the end of 1960s. He denounced Satō's policy of the re-establishment of 11 February, the organization of the Meiji centennial, and pointed out the influence of the *Soshinkai* in Satō's cabinet. Matsuo called it the '*Soshinkai* cabinet'.³⁹ He presented the *Soshinkai* as a 'fascist' brains trust of the LDP directed by Yasuoka. As noted above, *Soshinkai* members and Yasuoka joined Koiso and Suzuki wartime cabinets. If we follow the 'reverse course' thesis, this could demonstrate the reactionary nature of the *Soshinkai* and Yasuoka, and suggest that they were nostalgic as to a militaristic Japan. The re-establishment of 11 February would then be an attempt to recreate it. But Yasuoka's case contrasts with such conclusions. Yasuoka was deeply opposed to wartime government politics: first, although he was not opposed to the principle of expansion, he thought that it should be done not only by militaristic means, but also by cultural and economic means. Moreover,

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this expansion should be maintained in good relations with the other countries.

For these reasons he pointed out both the foolishness of the project of world domination and the reasons for the lack of support from the Asians.⁴⁰ Second, he was against an alliance with the Axis, because of Hitler and Mussolini, as well as Stalin, all of whom he regarded as tyrants, and which he contrasted to the kingly way (*ōdō*).⁴¹ Third, Yasuoka opposed the total control of the society by the *Taisei Yokusankai* (Imperial Rule Assistance Association), which replaced parties, and he also criticized the controlled economy.⁴² Therefore he joined the group that opposed wartime Prime Minister Tōjō Hideki, together with Yoshida Shigeru, Makino Nobuaki and Hatoyama Ichirō. It is said that at that time Hatoyama read Yasuoka's articles with interest.⁴³ When Nakano Seigō, another member of the anti-Tōjō group, was arrested, Yasuoka wrote an article criticizing Tōjō.⁴⁴ Yasuoka had also strong connections with the Navy and the Kyoto School at that time.⁴⁵ In other words, Yasuoka belonged to the peace party; that is why he joined the Koiso cabinet, which secretly began peace negotiations, and became one of the editors of the imperial declaration of surrender from 15 August. The fact that he joined the anti-Tōjō group certainly explains the influence of Yasuoka in the post-war LDP.

The people of *Soshinkai* are often described as right-wing, representative of a chauvinist attempt to destroy the heritage of post-war Japan, as symbolized by Yoshida Shigeru. The basic opposition to Yoshida among the participants of the *Kokusei Dōshikai*, and the 'fascist' manner of Yasuoka's thought seem to be going in the same direction, but this would be incorrect. First Yasuoka himself was strongly linked with Yoshida. Otabe Yūji indicates that Yasuoka knew the father-in-law of Yoshida Shigeru, Makino Nobuaki, who was a well-known liberal politician. Makino had barely escaped assassination a number of times in 1930s. Otabe argues that Yasuoka escaped from prison thanks to Yoshida, and through his relations to Makino.⁴⁶

Although this is true, Otabe's research largely underestimated the relation between Yasuoka and Makino: as the Makino diary reveals, Yoshida's father-in-law was one of Yasuoka's closest links and they planned the reform of the *Kyōchōkai* (Society for Cooperation) together.⁴⁷ They suffered the attacks of the Movement for the Clarification of National Essence (*Kokutai meichō undō*) in 1930s and, like Yoshida, they opposed war against the USA and Great Britain.⁴⁸ After 1945, Yoshida often invited Yasuoka to discuss foreign relations.⁴⁹

Second, we cannot simply label Yoshida a 'democrat'. Yoshida is the man who saw the Korean War as a 'gift from the Heaven'.⁵⁰ If he was a liberal, he was also a pure product of the imperial regime. He was interested in restoring pre-war institutions in order to promote a 'healthy patriotism'. Along with Yasuoka, Ogata Taketora, Okazaki Katsuo and Gōko Kiyoshi he reorganized the Association for Martial Virtue

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(*Butokukai*), in March 1954.⁵¹ Satō, Chiba, Yasuoka and some others members of Yoshida's faction met in 16 May 1956 because they opposed the treaty with the USSR proposed by Hatoyama Ichirō. Satō and his followers met on Yoshida's order.⁵² The meeting played a decisive role in the formation of the *Soshinkai*, which was created soon after. Hatoyama was not so different from Chiba, Yasuoka and Yoshida's faction, because he also planned the revision of the constitution and support for the Self Defence Forces. Some future members of the *Soshinkai* served in his cabinet. In any case, it is clear that the *Soshinkai* cannot be seen as the supposed opponents of Yoshida's disciples. Moreover, a number of *Soshinkai* members participated in Yoshida's cabinets, including Kimura Atsutarō, Hasegawa Takashi and Shūtō Hideo. Thus we cannot describe the *Soshinkai* as reactionary opponents to a democratic line represented by Yoshida and his followers. So, to understand their intention with the re-establishment of the 11 February, we need to radically rethink their position. An examination of Yasuoka's thought can be useful here.

JAPANESE TRADITION IN YASUOKA MASAHIRO'S THOUGHT

The Imperial Symbols as Lieux de Mémoire

Yasuoka formulated a Confucian personalism (*jinkakushugi*), emphasizing self-cultivation and respect for the individual. Such ideas were dominant during the Taishō period (1912–26), but Yasuoka's major contribution was to mix it with Wang Yangming neo-Confucian thought. In order to preserve the future of Confucianism, he thought of a conservative ethic based on the respect for the individual person.⁵³ On the basis of this Confucian personalism, Yasuoka devised a system of political thought, which I call 'Confucian democracy,' or 'Confucian *minponshugi*' because he used this translation of democracy coined by Yoshino Sakuzō.

With this political thought, Yasuoka did not want to develop a new imperial ideology justifying the putsch or military intervention in politics, but a new way to defend the political *status quo*. As a matter of fact, he was not satisfied with the traditional imperial ideology as presented by Inoue Tetsujirō, who emphasized the paternalistic figure of the emperor, and presented the Japanese nation as his family. Yasuoka criticized this theory as unfit to rationally explain the virtue of the emperor. He wanted each Japanese subject to recognize the superiority of the emperor on his own initiative and on a logical basis. The emperor should reside in the heart of each Japanese subject like a deity.⁵⁴ To explain the emperor ideology, Yasuoka chose to structure his argument in the form of a dialogue, with questions like 'Why we should respect the State?' 'What are the necessary links between the statesmen and the people?' 'Why is the emperor inviolable?' 'Why should the unity of the imperial line be venerated?' Yasuoka centred his political thought around the emperor, assigning to him the role of the Head of State,

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superior to the people and divine in nature. In this case, Yasuoka simply echoed the Meiji constitution. But he made this imperial superiority a symbolic and a spiritual one: convinced by the materialistic nature of man, Yasuoka thought that the only way for the king to be recognized by his subjects was to be absolutely impartial, and in order to be impartial he needed to be free from all material desires. The domination of the emperor was thought to be an absence of domination.

This Taoist imagery was used deliberately: Yasuoka chose the Taoist term of 'mysterious virtue' (*gentoku*) to express the imperial nature: the emperor was an organ of the state but, as a descendant of the gods, a spiritual one. The emperor symbolized the consciousness of the State and the desires and interests of all the people. He ruled without violence. Yasuoka saw the proof for his ideas in the complete absence of revolution in Japan and in the 'unbroken line' of emperors. Japan should be a united and peaceful country, as opposed to the occident and China. This was the *kokutai*, the essence of the nation. Yasuoka also clearly expressed the symbolic nature of the emperor. He said: 'one nation might symbolize itself with the national flag, another one with its laws, and yet another one with nothing. We Japanese do it with the emperor'.⁵⁵ Yasuoka recognized the spiritual and religious power of the emperor as real, but he gave all the governmental duties to the 'statesmen' (*iseisha*). The 'statesmen' were the bureaucrats, the members of parliament and the ministers – all political forces of the Meiji system. Citing Guisepppe Mazzini, Yasuoka desired 'the progress of all, through all, under the leading of the best and the wisest'.⁵⁶ But, using the idea of Huang Zongxi (1619–95), Yasuoka said also that, like the emperor, the statesmen's duty was to serve the people and sacrifice all their desires for its sake in order to receive the support of the people. He defended the religious aspect of the emperor but did not see it as opposed to rationality: Yasuoka thought that it was superficial to present religion and science as incompatible. The sciences should also discover truth and participate in the realization of an ideal. The true enemy was not science but the materialistic tendency to destroy all spirit and ideal.⁵⁷

Yasuoka's thought was just one theory of the *kokutai* among many others, but it was distinctive. Among the categories of pre-war *kokutai* theories defined by Oguma Eiji,⁵⁸ we can categorize Yasuoka in the category of the few thinkers who rejected Inoue Tetsujirō's traditional theory in an attempt to rationalize it. Oguma put Satomi Kishio in this category. Like Yasuoka, Satomi tried to logically explain the figure of the emperor considering the same difficulties. But their systems of thought were radically different, and Satomi did not view the emperor as a symbol. Yasuoka's thought was unique, and it preceded the relegation of the emperor to a symbolic status argued by Tsuda Sōkichi and Watsuji Tetsurō, and realized in 1947 constitution.

That is also why, after the war, Yasuoka felt no need to change his ideas. On the contrary, he repeated:

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Imperial inviolability never meant that the emperor was able to enter fire without burning in a miraculous and unscientific way. The idea of imperial divinity itself never meant that the emperor was a being without form and colour, living in super-human existence, without sleeping or eating.⁵⁹

The pressure of the American occupation, which pushed the emperor to affirm his human nature, destroyed State Shintō and put to an end to pre-war symbols. Yasuoka did not abandon his ideas of a saintly and pacifistic emperor but he did try new ways to defend the emperor, who like most pre-war symbols became one part of a general frame of respect for 'tradition'. Yasuoka presented the emperor as a Japanese particularity, because the emperor did not have a family name like other kings, and because he combined a political role as head of State with a religious role emanating from the national Shintō religion.⁶⁰ He criticized communists because they presented the emperor and tradition as feudal. He also attacked scholars like Ninagawa Arata, who described the sovereign as a toy in the hands of statesmen, even during the Meiji area.⁶¹ As in the pre-war period, Yasuoka's goal was to promote the spirit of independence, i.e. a way for Japan to get itself involved in the world not by constant influence of the Occident, but based on respect for its own 'oriental' tradition. The failure of pre-war Japan was due to excessive imitation of Anglo-Saxons, Germans and Italians. In post-war Japan the risk was a loss of autonomy due to imitation of America or the USSR. Yasuoka encouraged the Japanese to reconstruct Japan with frugality and endurance. Of course, Yasuoka approved of the re-establishment of 11 February. But for him the question was not whether the 11 February was historically accurate or not. The question was: what we should do with 11 February and the legacy of the *Kojiki* and *Nihon Shoki*? Yasuoka thought that, as part of the national memory, 11 February, as well as the *Kojiki* and *Nihon Shoki*, did not only belong in the hands of historians. These 'realms of memory' possessed an eternal message and the commemoration of 11 February was one way to remember the history of the Japanese nation.

11 February has a symbolic significance, exactly like Christmas or Buddha's birthday, neither of which can be historically confirmed, as Yasuoka pointed out. In other words, Yasuoka recognized that 11 February was not scientifically verifiable, but had to be respected for its symbolic significance. His position is not an irrational and fanatical attempt to return to the past, but such nuances were completely ignored by leftist historians like Hori Yukio, who characterized Yasuoka's thought as 'irrational' and 'poor in logic'. This remark can be applied to other cases. The historian Tsuda Sōkichi was accused of *l'èse-majesté* in 1940 for his research on the *Kojiki* and *Nihon Shoki*. For that reason he is often presented as a liberal victim of 'fascism'. In fact, as Oguma Eiji demonstrated, Tsuda wanted to treat the myths as myths and not as history because he believed in their sanctity and argued that myths transcend

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human reason. After the war, Tsuda was attacked by Marxist historians who criticized him as 'irrational'.⁶² As Eric Seizelet pointed out, Minister of Education Amano Teiyū was not simply being nostalgic regarding the pre-war period when in 1951 he invited all schools and universities to sing *Kimi ga yo* and display the *Hinomaru* flag. Amano was aware of their utility as national symbols.

A Lieu de Mémoire as Tool for People's Education

The 'education of the people' (*kyōka*), the basic concept for spiritual mobilization, was a keyword in domestic politics of pre-war Japan elites, in both the 'authoritarian' Meiji regime and the Taishō democracy. Sheldon Garon was among the first ones to emphasize the importance of spiritual mobilizations organized by the State.⁶³ Eizawa Kōji explained that spiritual mobilization, an emphasis on austerity and respect for Confucian values as expressed by the Imperial Rescript on Education were constant goals of the government, especially after 1905 and the growth of Marxist influence.⁶⁴ Political leaders received strong support of businessmen, as spiritual mobilization and Confucianism aided economic growth, and so represented an obstacle to Marxism. Shibusawa Eiichi (1840–1931), the most famous businessman of his time, founded the Confucian association *Shibunkai* and the labour association *Kyōchōkai*, with government cooperation.

The fact that Yasuoka was able to promote reform in the *Kyōchōkai* in the 1930s was no coincidence: he was one of the few scholars to use Confucianism in his thought, while political leaders still used it to promote spiritual mobilization. Between 1937 and 1945, the domination of society by the state increased through economic control and establishment of the *Taisei Yokusankai*. As explained above, Yasuoka was very critical of the regimentation of the population, and he was against tight control of the economy. But even in wartime he was aware of the need to 'educate the people', which is why he agreed to promote 'thought war' (*shisōsen*), at the invitation of Ogata Taketora, the Chief of the Information Office. Yasuoka's thought was not meant to be propaganda to mobilize the population for the war, but to unify the people under imperial ideology and tradition against the communist threat; he described communist propaganda as a 'rhetorical weapon' (*bunbatsu*) from Moscow.⁶⁵ In other words, for Yasuoka the thought war was not offensive but defensive, directly related to *kyōka* efforts. Satō Takumi showed that the propaganda measures created by Ogata were not completely directed at foreign enemies, but that they also had a domestic dimension. The propagandist's goal was also to assure the stability of the people and to guard it against veneration of the West, especially communism. Unity and stabilization were goals in themselves.⁶⁶

The American occupation destroyed most, but not all of the authoritarian pre-war state: a majority of the bureaucrats remained in their posts and a great number of pre-war politicians returned as well. The

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return of these figures also signified the return of spiritual mobilization as a means to control the people and protect it against communism. In other words, Japanese elites were still preoccupied with the 'education of the people' (*kyōka*). The emphasis on tradition by conservatives in the post-war period was in no way more the will to use Confucianism as a tool for spiritual mobilization, as in the pre-war period. Two sets of circumstances reinforced the desire for spiritual mobilization: the success of Marxist revolutions in China, North Korea and North Vietnam, and the need to reconstruct Japan. In both cases politicians received the support of businessmen, exactly as in the pre-war period.

Yasuoka himself enjoyed great popularity among businessmen because his discourse emphasized the need for reconstruction and protection against communism. They also appreciated Yasuoka's personalism because with the Taishō period they experienced neo-Kantian personalism and were themselves paternalists.⁶⁷ That is why they invited Yasuoka to speak on conferences for their employees and organized Confucian study group circles where they often met with political leaders.⁶⁸ Yasuoka was also invited by patronal organizations like the *Keidanren* or the Industrial Club (*Nihon Kōgyō Kurabu*).⁶⁹ As Sheldon Garon has pointed out, the great movement for spiritual mobilization in the post-war period, the New Life Movement (*Shin seikatsu undō*), was organized by businessmen and LDP politicians. In fact, Yasuoka and his disciples were in the top level of the movement. Yasuoka's thought was described as the 'philosophy of the movement'.⁷⁰ For Yasuoka, the goal of the Meiji centennial was the same as for the New Life Movement: the improvement of the national consciousness and morality. But he also hoped for the active and spontaneous participation of the people with minimal direction from the government. That is why he pointed out the necessity to clearly explain the goal of the centennial.⁷¹ The official goal was to thank earlier generations for their contribution to national prosperity. The objective of catching up to the West had been achieved. But the people, especially the young people, had an obligation to preserve tradition and the Japanese spirit in order to build a better future.⁷² Thus, the re-establishment of 11 February should be understood not as a step in the 'reverse course' but as a tool for *kyōka*, organized by political and economic elites within a general frame of spiritual mobilization, in order to unify the nation for economic development and move it away from communism.

CONCLUSION

In 1892, the historian Kume Kunitake was forced to resign because he presented myths as pure legends, and criticized their use in politics. His opponents, practitioners of 'nativist studies' (*kokugaku*), wanted Shintō to be the national religion and the basis for the divine emperor ideology and for the 'education of the people' (*kyōka*). They attacked him precisely because his theories were 'harmful to the state'.⁷³ In other words,

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truth was less important than national interests. We can see the conflict between historians and the government about 11 February as an avatar of the Kume incident. That is to say that the 11 February re-establishment as a *kyōka* measure should be understood in the light of Michel Foucault's theory of state domination. Indeed, Yasuoka, Satō Eisaku and the *Soshikai* stressed the importance of 11 February as a *lieu de mémoire* but they were unable to think that a *lieu de mémoire* should be in the hands of the people instead in the hands of the leaders, even if it was the people they were willing to sacrifice themselves for. They were unable to understand the citizen movement against them. Like the sanctuary of Yasukuni, 11 February is not a real national *lieu de mémoire* because originally the leaders, but not the people decided to establish it. Moreover, they met strong opposition from the people at that point. Actually few people still think about opposing 11 February today, but most people take their holidays on that day without thinking about tradition at all, contrary to what Yasuoka wanted to achieve. Pierre Nora has explained that commemoration is something particular in each country: in contrast to republican France, the kingdom of Great Britain organizes very few commemorations, and the USA has a real 'civic religion'.⁷⁴ Perhaps we can view 11 February as characteristic of Japanese political and economic elites' attempts to use a *lieu de mémoire* in order to mobilize the population. The existence of the *Soshinkai* suggests a mobilization from above. Recently, Kenneth Ruoff pointed out a relatively popular mobilization in favour of *kigensetsu*, even among scholars.⁷⁵ I agree with this interpretation, but the existence of both *Soshinkai* and popular mobilization is not necessarily contradictory. I think the attempt of *kyōka* by the elites is a basic pattern in Japanese twentieth century. This remark can be extended to East Asia, as Prasenjit Duara has shown the importance of *kyōka* in Jiang Jieshi politics.⁷⁶ This topic certainly requires future research.

NOTES

- ¹ Pierre Nora, *Les lieux de mémoire* (Paris: Gallimard, 1987).
- ² Seizelet Eric, *Les petits fils du soleil: la jeunesse japonaise et le patriotisme* (Paris: Publications Orientalistes de France, 1988).
- ³ Masumi Junnosuke, *Sengo seiji 1945–1955* (Tokyo: Tokyo Daigaku Shuppankai, 1983). Murakawa Ichirō, 'Nihon jiyūtō shi, minshu jiyūtō shi, jiyūtō shi', in *Hokuriku Hōgaku*, vol. 2, no. 1, June 1994, pp. 1–59; no. 2, September 1994 pp. 13–51; no. 3, March 1995, pp. 1–53; no. 4 March 1995, pp. 47–115. 'Nihon shinpotō shi, Minshutō shi, Kokumin minshutō shi', in *Hokuriku Hōgaku*, vol. 3, no. 2, September 1995, pp. 3–82; No. 3, December 1995, pp. 2–25. 'Kaishintō shi', in *Hokuriku Hōgaku*, vol. 4, no. 1, April 1996, pp. 25–80.
- ⁴ Matsuo Shōichi, 'Soshinkai jiken ni tsuite', in *Bunka Hyōron*, August 1969, pp. 193–5; Matsuo Shōichi, 'Soshikai jiken to 1970 nen mondai', in

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- Gekkan Sōhyō*, January 1970, pp. 43–50; Matsuo Shōichi, ‘Soshinkai jiken to sengo minshushugi no kiki’, in *Rekishigaku Kenkyū*, no. 359, April 1970, pp. 55–60.
- ⁵ Itō Takashi, ‘Kyoku icchi naikakuki no seikai saihensei mondai’, in *Shakaikagaku Kenkyū*, Vol. 24, No. 1, 1972, pp. 56–130; Otabe Yūji, ‘Tennōsei ideologī to shin’eibei-ha no keifu – Yasuoka Masahiro o chūshin ni’, in *Shien*, vol. 43, no.1, 1983, pp. 25–38. Furukawa Takahisa, ‘Kakushin kanryō no shisō to kōdō’, in *Shigaku Zasshi*, vol. 99, no. 4, 1990, pp. 1–39; Kawajima Makoto, ‘Kokuikai to shin kanryō’, in *Nihonshi Kenkyū*, no. 360, 1992, pp. 1–25.
- ⁶ Quoted in Eric Seizelet, *Monarchie et démocratie dans le Japon d’après-guerre* (Paris: Maisonneuve & Larose, 1990), p. 250.
- ⁷ Quoted in Olavi Fält, ‘The Image of the Emperor Showa as a Symbol of National Aspirations’, in: Ian Neary (ed.), *Leaders and Leadership in Japan* (London: Japan Library, 1996), pp. 235–8.
- ⁸ Mikasa no Miya Takahito, ‘Kigensetsu ni tsuite no watashi no shinnen’, in *Bungei Shunjū*, January 1959, pp. 73–84.
- ⁹ See for example the following entries in his diary, Satō Eisaku, *Satō Eisaku nikki*, (Tokyo: Asahi Shinbunsha, 1998): 11 February 1964 (p. 86), 29 April 1964 (p. 121), 1 January 1965 (p. 217), 29 April 1966 (416).
- ¹⁰ Members of this committee were: Sugahara Michinari (President of the Anti-Prostitution Committee), Yoshimura Makoto (Professor of Tōkai University), Abe Gen’ichi (Professor at Tokyo Metropolitan University), Okuda Azuma (President of Kyoto University), Oketani Shigeo (Professor at Tokyo Institute of Technology), Sakakibara Shigeru (Professor at Tokyo Women’s Medical University), Tanabe Shigeo (Professor at Senshū University), Funabashi Seiichi (Writer), Matsushita Masahisa (President of Ritsumeikan University) and Ōya Sōichi (Critic).
- ¹¹ See the entries in Satō, *Satō Eisaku nikki* for 29 April 1966, p. 417, and 25 November 1970, p. 210.
- ¹² See for example the diary of the liberal Ashida Hitoshi, *Ashida Hitoshi nikki* (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1986), vols 3 and 4.
- ¹³ Chiba Saburō, *Sōzō ni ikite* (Tokyo: Karucha Shuppansha, 1977), pp. 78, 90, 104, 276.
- ¹⁴ *Mainichi Shinbun Yūkan*, p. 2. *Shiyū*, September 1961, p. 63.
- ¹⁵ Matsuo, *Soshinkai jiken ni tsuite*, p. 194, as well as Matsuo, *Soshikai jiken to 1970 nen mondai*, pp. 43–50.
- ¹⁶ *Kansai Shiyū*, March 1959, p. 8. Ōmura Seiichi Tsuitokuroku Kankōkai, *Ōmura Seiichi o shinobu* (Tokyo: Ōmura Seiichi tsuitakuroku kankōkai, 1970), p. 300. Chiba, *Sōzō ni ikite*, pp. 333, 368, 372, 391, 404.
- ¹⁷ Fukuda Takeo, Araki Manjuo, Nadao Hirokichi, Sakata Michita, Hayakawa Takashi, Ōmura Seiichi.
- ¹⁸ Hayashi Shigeyuki, *Yasuoka Masahiro sensei dōjōki* (Tokyo: Purejidentosha, 1988), p. 28, ‘Kokusei dōshikai no hassoku’, in *Bunka to rokka*, April 1954, p. 103. All the *Kaishintō* members of the *Kokusei Dōshikai* were key people of the *Kaishintō* committee for the renovation of the constitution. See

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- Jishu Kenpō Kiseigiin Renmei, *Kaishintō kenpō chōsa kaihō hōkokusho, Kaishintō kenpō chōsakai kenpō chōsa No.7* (Tokyo: Jishu Kenpō Kiseigiin Renmei, 1955), pp. 40–41.
- ¹⁹ Murakawa Ichirō, *Nihon jiyūtō shi, minshu jiyūtō shi, jiyūtō shi*, p. 54, fig 68–76, shows lists with names of members of the founder committees of the LDP. We can see *Kokusei Dōshikai* largely represented.
- ²⁰ Among others, former Prime Ministers Takeshita Noboru, Mori Yoshirō, Koizumi Junichirō as well as present Prime Minister Abe Shintarō belong to this faction.
- ²¹ Fukuda Takeo, *Kaiko 90 nen* (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1995), pp. 155–156.
- ²² Tsuji Kiyooki, *Shiryō – sengo 20 nen shi* (Tokyo: Nihon Hyōronsha, 1966–1967), vol. 1, p. 352.
- ²³ *Shiyū*, No. 143, September 1961, p. 63.
- ²⁴ Chiba Saburō sensei kenshō kinnen shuppan kankōkai, *Yonjūgo nen no konjaku*, (Chiba Saburō sensei kenshō kinnen shuppan kankōkai, 1969), pp. 295, 309. Chiba, *Sōzō ni ikite*, p. 356.
- ²⁵ Hayashi, *Dōjōki*, p. 60.
- ²⁶ Yasuoka Masahiro, 'Fukai hansei to ooi ni naru kakushin', in *Shiyū*, no. 154, August 1962, p. 9.
- ²⁷ Fukui Haruhiro, *Jiyū minshutō to seisaku kettei* (Tokyo: Fukumura Shoten, 1968), pp. 316–17.
- ²⁸ Kanda Yutaka, 'Satō naikaku to "futatsu no chūgoku", taichū taitaiwan seisaku ni okeru baransu no mōsaku', in *Kokusai Kankeiron Kenkyū*, no. 21, March 2004, p. 28.
- ²⁹ Entry for 17 May 1961, Satō, *Satō Eisaku nikki*, vol. 1, p. 484.
- ³⁰ He appears in the *Shiyū Kyōkai* reunions. See *Shiyū*, No. 61, November 1954, pp. 41–42.
- ³¹ See the entries for 26 January 1962, 12 March and 21 April 1964, Satō, *Satō Eisaku nikki*, vol. 2, p. 502, vol. 2, pp. 110, 117.
- ³² Hayashi, *Dōjōki*, p. 53.
- ³³ Ibid.
- ³⁴ Chiba, *Sōzō ni ikite*, p. 341, p. 343.
- ³⁵ Gwon came often to give conferences for *Shiyū Kyōkai*. He joined also the radio programme of Yasuoka called *Asa no kagami*. See *Shiyū*, no. 113, March 1959, no. 148, February 1962 and no. 149, March 1962. About Jeong, see *Shiyū*, no. 138, April 1961.
- ³⁶ Chiba, *Sōzō ni ikite*, p. 374.
- ³⁷ See Kimura Masato, 'Nihon no taikan minkan keizai gaikō-kokkō seijōka o meguru kansai zaikai no hataraki', in *Kokusai Seiji*, no. 92, October 1989, pp. 116–31.
- ³⁸ *Meiji hyakunen kinen kankei gyōji nado gaikyō* (Tokyo: Naikaku, 1968), pp. 228–9.
- ³⁹ Matsuo, *Soshinkai jiken ni tsuite*, p. 195.
- ⁴⁰ See for example *Kawai Sōryūkutsu no gakugen* (Niigata: Nihon Gosonsha, 1936), pp. 48–51. 'Shina jihen no taigi to sochi', in *Kinkei kaihō, tokushū*, September 1937, 'Shina kōbo dangi', in Gaimushō Chōsabu (ed.), *Shina*

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- tochi ni kan suru ronsō* (Tokyo: Gaimushō Chōsabu, 1939), pp. 37–67. Naikaku Jōhōbu (ed.), *Nihon seishin to shisōsen*, (Tokyo: Naikaku Jōhōbu, 1940), pp. 13–15. *Daitōa kyōeiken no shidōsha tarubeki Nihonjin no kyōiku* (Tokyo: Keimyōkai Jimusho, 1943), p. 15.
- ⁴¹ *Kawai Sōryūkutsu no gakugen*, p. 78, ‘Seiyōjin to nōson’, in *Tokunō*, no. 75, June 1939, pp. 1–2. *Sekai no tabi* (Tokyo: Daichi Shobō, 1942), pp. 207–18.
- ⁴² *Keisen sagan* (Tokyo: Ōbunsha, 1944), p. 232.
- ⁴³ Hatoyama Ichirō, *Hatoyama Ichirō-Kaoru nikki* (Tokyo: Chūō Kōron Shinsha, 1999), p. 328, 350.
- ⁴⁴ Yasuoka Masahiro, ‘Yamaga ryū seijiron’, *Yomiuri Shinbun*, 10 January 1943, p. 2.
- ⁴⁵ Yasuoka joined the brains trust of the Marine officer Takagi Sōkichi, with Tanaka Kōtarō, Abe Yoshihige, Rōyama Masamichi, Hozumi Shigetada, Kōyama Iwao, Yabe Teiji and Watsuji Tetsurō. See Takagi Sōkichi, *Taiheiyō to Rikukaigun no kōsō* (Tokyo: Keizai Ōraisha, 1982), p. 197. Yasuoka defended the Kyoto School in 1944 vigorously when they were accused to be traitors by the Education Ministry. See Kuroda Hidetoshi, *Shōwa genronshi e no shōgen* (Tokyo: Kōbundō, 1966), p. 56.
- ⁴⁶ Otabe Yūji, *Tennō sei ideorogī to shin’eibei-ha no keifu*, p. 25–38.
- ⁴⁷ Makino Nobuaki, *Makino Nobuaki nikki* (Tokyo: Chūō Kōronsha, 1990), pp. 431–2, 445.
- ⁴⁸ The movement for the clarification of national essence was a league of far right organizations led by Minoda Muneki. It was directed against liberals and Minobe Tatsukichi, the father of the emperor-state-organ-theory, popular during the Taishō democracy. See Eddy Dufourmont, ‘Yasuoka Masahiro to tennō kikansetsu jiken: 1932–5 nen no seijishi o saikō suru tame ni’, in *Kokusai Kankeiron Kenkyū*, vol. 24, September 2005, pp. 81–110.
- ⁴⁹ Yoshida Shigeru Kinnen Jigyō Zaidan (ed.), *Yoshida Shigeru shokan* (Tokyo: Chūō Kōronsha, 1994), pp. 758–61. Hayashi, *Dōjōki*, p. 17.
- ⁵⁰ John W. Dower, *Embracing Defeat: Japan in the Wake of World War II* (New York: W.W. Norton, 1999), p. 541.
- ⁵¹ Ivan Morris, *Nationalism and the Right Wing in Japan: A Study of Post-War Trends* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1960), p. 243.
- ⁵² Satō, *Satō Eisaku nikki*, vol.1, p. 309.
- ⁵³ On Yasuoka’s thought, see Dufourmont, *Yasuoka Masahiro*, pp. 81–90.
- ⁵⁴ *Nihon no kokutai*, p. 67.
- ⁵⁵ *Nihon no kokutai*, p. 84.
- ⁵⁶ ‘Ōdō ni tsuite’, in *Tōyō Shisō Kenkyū*, no. 20, January 1925, p. 18. *Tōyō rinri gairon* (Tokyo: Genkōsha, 1929), p. 88; *Nihon seishin no shingī to kisū* (Tokyo: Keimyōkai, 1934), p. 50; ‘Shin Nihon to warera no shinjō,’ in *Tōyō Shisō Kenkyū*, October 1945, p. 15
- ⁵⁷ ‘Yamaga Sokō no chūchō jijitsu to shinkoku no jikaku’, in *Nihon oyobi Nihonjin*, no. 5, February 1924, p. 7.
- ⁵⁸ Oguma Eiji, *Tan’itsu minzoku shinwa no kigen – Nihonjin no jigazō no keifu* (Tokyo: Shinyōsha, 1995), p. 115 ff.

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- ⁵⁹ *Shin Nihon to warera no shinjō*, p. 20.
- ⁶⁰ Ibid.
- ⁶¹ 'Nenmatsu zokuron soshun e', in *Shiyū*, no. 299, December 1974, p. 9; 'Nihon to tennō ni tsuite,' in *Shiyū*, no. 322, November 1976, p. 5. Yasuoka refers to Ninagawa Arata, *Tennō – Dare ga nihon minzoku no shujin de aru ka* (Tokyo: Kōbunsha, 1952).
- ⁶² Oguma Eiji, Tan'itsu minzoku shinwa no kigen, p. 335; Oguma Eiji, 'Minshū' to 'aikoku' – *Sengo Nihon no nashonarizumu to kōkyōsei* (Tokyo: Shinyōsha, 2002), p. 316–17.
- ⁶³ Sheldon Garon, *Molding Japanese Minds: The State in Everyday Life* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1997).
- ⁶⁴ Eizawa Kōji, *Taishō demokurashiiki no kenryoku no shisō*, (Tokyo: Kenbun Shuppan, 1992).
- ⁶⁵ 'Nihon seishin to shisōsen', p. 2.
- ⁶⁶ Satō Takumi, 'The System of Total War and the Discursive Space of the Thought War', in: Yasushi Yamanouchi, J. Victor Koschmann and Ryuichi Narita (eds), *Total War and Modernization* (New York: Cornell University Press, 1998), p. 294.
- ⁶⁷ See e.g. (President of Nomura Shoken and Vice-President of Keidanren) Okumura Tsunao, *Waga hanshōgai* (Tokyo: Yomiuri Shinbunsha, 1971). Itō Yasuhiko, *Itō Yasujirō tsuisōroku* (Tokyo: Fujiki Shuppansha, 1973). Itō was president of the Company for the Development of Tōhoku. Ishida Kamesaburō Tsuisōroku Henshū Inkaï (ed.), *Ishida Kamesaburō* (Tokyo: Nihon Keizai Shinbunsha, 1978). Ikeda was President of Mitsubishi Petroleum Company.
- ⁶⁸ Hayashi, *Dōjōki*, p. 75.
- ⁶⁹ *Yasuoka Masahiro sensei nenpu*, p. 119.
- ⁷⁰ Shin Seikatsu Undō Kyōkai (ed.), *Shin seikatsu undō kyōkai 25 nen no ayumi* (Tokyo: Shin Seikatsu Undō Kyōkai, 1983), pp. 1, 171–82.
- ⁷¹ 'Meiji hyakunen kinen junbi kaigi hōbukai dai san kaigi jiroku', in *Meiji hyakunen kinen junbi kaigi shiryō*, (Tokyo: Naikaku sōridaijin kanbō, 1966–8), vol. 1, p. 33; 'Meiji hyakunen kinen junbi kaigi hōbukai dai ion kaigi jiroku', in *Meiji hyakunen kinen junbi kaigi shiryō*, vol. 1, p. 27; 'Meiji 100 nen kinen gyōji ni kansuru teian dai 2 shū,' in *Meiji hyakunen kinen junbi kaigi shiryō*, vol. 3, p. 41.
- ⁷² 'Meiji hyakunen o iwau', in *Meiji hyakunen kinen kankei gyōji tō gaikyō*, pp. 4–5.
- ⁷³ Nagahara Keiji, *20 seiki Nihon no rekishigaku* (Tokyo: Yoshikawa Kōbunkan, 2003), pp. 36–7.
- ⁷⁴ Pierre Nora, *Les lieux de mémoire*, p. 4707.
- ⁷⁵ Kenneth Ruoff, *The People's Emperor: Democracy and the Japanese Monarchy, 1945–1995* (Cambridge: Harvard University Asia Center, 2001), pp. 160–83.
- ⁷⁶ Duara Prasenjit, *Sovereignty and Authenticity: Manchukuo and the East Asian Modern* (Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield, 2003).