Comparing regulations to protect the commons: An experimental investigation - Archive ouverte HAL
Article Dans Une Revue Environmental and Resource Economics Année : 2014

Comparing regulations to protect the commons: An experimental investigation

Résumé

In a laboratory experiment we test three regulations imposed on a common-pool resource game with heterogeneous users: an access fee and subsidy scheme, transferable quotas and non-transferable quotas. We calibrate the game so that all regulations improve users’ profits compared to free-access extraction. We compare the regulations according to five criteria: resource preservation, individual profits, profit difference, Pareto-improvement from free-access and sorting of the most efficient users. One of the main findings is that, even though it performs better in sorting out the most efficient subjects, the fee and subsidy scheme is not more profitable than tradable quotas.
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Dates et versions

hal-01517242 , version 1 (17-04-2024)

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Stefan Ambec, Alexis Garapin, Laurent Muller, Arnaud Reynaud, Carine Sebi. Comparing regulations to protect the commons: An experimental investigation. Environmental and Resource Economics, 2014, 58 (2), pp.219-244. ⟨10.1007/s10640-013-9700-9⟩. ⟨hal-01517242⟩
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