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Article Dans Une Revue Economics Letters Année : 2014

Smug Alert! Exploring self-licensing behaviour in a cheating game

Résumé

We test experimentally a prediction of the ‘moral credit model’, in which committing a virtuous act creates moral credits that can license immoral behaviour in a succeeding decision. We use a basic cheating experiment that was either preceded by a virtuous deed or not in a developing country context. We found that people who previously achieved a good deed cheat more. Gender and origin are also significant explicative variables for cheating.
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Dates et versions

hal-01506292 , version 1 (12-04-2017)

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Sophie Clot, Gilles Grolleau, Lisette Ibanez. Smug Alert! Exploring self-licensing behaviour in a cheating game. Economics Letters, 2014, 123 (2), pp.191-194. ⟨10.1016/j.econlet.2014.01.039⟩. ⟨hal-01506292⟩
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