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**The World on Show, or Sensibility in Disguise.
Philosophical and Aesthetic Issues in a Stanza by
Abhinavagupta (Tantrāloka I 332, Locana ad
Dhvanyāloka I 13)**

Lyne Bansat-Boudon

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Abhinavagupta is undoubtedly the most famous Kashmirian medieval intellectual: his decisive contributions to Indian aesthetics, Śaiva theology and metaphysics, and to the philosophy of the subtle and original Pratyabhijñā system are well known. Yet so far his works have often been studied without fully taking into account the specific context in which they are embedded – an intellectual background that is not less exceptional than Abhinavagupta himself. While providing fresh interpretations of some of the great Śaiva polymath's works, the nineteen essays gathered here attempt to map out for the first time the extraordinary cultural effervescence that took place in the little kingdom of Kashmir around Abhinavagupta's time.

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Eli Franco, Isabelle Ratié (Eds.)

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Around Abhinavagupta

Aspects of the Intellectual History of Kashmir
from the Ninth to the Eleventh Century

edited by

Eli Franco and Isabelle Ratié

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The World on Show,
or Sensibility in Disguise.

Philosophical and Aesthetic Issues
in a Stanza by Abhinavagupta
(*Tantrāloka* I 332, *Locana* ad
Dhvanyāloka I 13)*

LYNE BANSAT-BOUDON

The stanza I examine here belongs to two texts by Abhinavagupta: the *Tantrāloka* (henceforth TĀ) and the *Dhvanyālokalocana* (henceforth *Locana*). It is amenable to different interpretations according to the text in which it appears, its context and its exegesis. The stanza must have been famous, since it is quoted again by Bhāskara, commenting on Abhinavagupta's *Īśvarapratyabhijñāvimarśinī* (henceforth ĪPV) ad *Īśvarapratyabhijñākārikā* (henceforth ĪPK) I 1, 14.¹

Jayaratha, the author of the *Viveka* (henceforth TĀV), comments on the stanza in the TĀ. In the *Locana* [ad *Dhvanyāloka* I 13], it is Abhinavagupta who offers a self-exegesis of it. I give here a provisional translation, in conformity with the context in which it is employed as well as with the analysis of the TĀV:²

* I wish to express my deep gratitude to David Shulman whose paper, published in this volume, has inspired the last section of my contribution and whose careful reading of my first draft has significantly improved its English wording. I am likewise indebted to Yigal Bronner for his insightful comments on the question of the *apratutaprasaṃsā* and to Yves Codet for a thorough discussion on several points of interpretation. I am also extremely grateful to Christophe Valia-Kollery for his final reading of the English text and, needless to say, to Isabelle Ratié for her rigorous and generous work on the final editing.

¹ *Bhāskarī* ad ĪPV I 1, 4; see Appendix-4.

² See below, § 1, for the detail of Jayaratha's analysis.

*bhāvavrāta haṭhāj janasya hṛdayāny ākramya yan nartayan bhaṅgībhir
vividhābhir ātmahṛdayaṃ pracchādya saṃkrīḍase |
yas tvām āha jaḍaṃ jaḍaḥ sahrdayaṃ manyatvaduḥśikṣito manye 'muṣya
jaḍātmatā stutipadaṃ tvatsāmyasaṃbhāvanāt ||*³

O whole of things! Since you play at forcibly⁴ grabbing hold of the hearts of men, as does an actor with his various costumes, and at hiding your heart that is the Self, he who calls you unconscious is himself unconscious: wrongly believing that he is endowed with a heart (*sahrdaya*), he has not completed his education. Nevertheless, his very unconsciousness, I think,⁵ is praiseworthy, since we do imagine him (*saṃbhāvana*) as identical to you.

The stanza is explicitly organized by the theatrical metaphor. We will see how remarkable it is in its complex construction and in the different levels of meaning that inform it.⁶

Being an apostrophe to the *bhāvavrāta*, the “whole of things,” or phenomenal diversity, the stanza appears as a drama with three characters: the *bhāvavrāta*, the *jana* (the ordinary man whom the TĀV turns into a *vādin*, an “interlocutor,” that is, here an adversary; see below, p. 38), and the “I” of the main verb, *manye*, through which Abhinavagupta, exponent of the Trika, makes his voice heard. The “I” of *manye* thus addresses phenomenal diversity as he would the deity – this is the interpretation of both the TĀV (below, pp. 40, 45-47) and the *Locana* (below, p. 60) – and introduces an effect of *mise en abyme* with the reported speech attributed to the *jana*.

The meter is *śārdūlavikrīḍita*, frequent in lyrical poetry, and such is indeed the tone of this address to the *bhāvavrāta*, which amounts to a celebration – a lyricism that again expresses itself through the “I” of *manye*, in which Abhinavagupta manifests himself as the representative of the Śaivas.

³ Sanskrit texts are quoted as they appear in the reference edition – I have not corrected the *sandhi*.

⁴ Note that *haṭhāt* has the double meaning: “by force” and “invincibly.”

⁵ Compare D. Shulman’s paper in this volume on the use of *jāne*: according to Abhinavagupta (commenting on a verse quoted in the *Dhvanyālokavṛtti* ad III 43), *jāne* “is often a marker of the figure *utprekṣā*, ‘flight of fancy,’ but [...] here [...] its literal meaning is what matters.”

⁶ For examples of Tantric usages of the theatrical analogy, see J. Törzsök’s contribution to this volume.

Moreover, as Jayaratha observes as if in passing, the stanza is organized by the *aprustutaprasāṃsā* figure. This is a remark that Jayaratha exploits only partially, focussing on the denoted meaning, which is the *aprustuta*, or non-pertinent topic, whereas the *Locana* gives the *aprustutaprasāṃsā* all its meaning and weight, as we shall see (see below, pp. 48ff.).

Among figures of speech, the *aprustutaprasāṃsā* is one of those in which suggestion is in operation: while something non-pertinent or irrelevant (*aprustuta*) to the speaker and the listener is being described (*prasāṃsā*),⁷ what is really meant, that is, the suggested meaning, is something pertinent or relevant (*prastuta*) to them; besides, the relationship between the non-pertinent and the pertinent can be of three types⁸ (in the case of our stanza, similarity – *sārūpya*).

That stanza (as well as its commentaries by Abhinavagupta, Jayaratha or Bhāskara) plays, in particular, on the polysemy of the adjective *jaḍa*, since *jaḍa* means, among several equivocations i) insentient, ii) unconscious (Jayaratha glosses it by *acetana*), iii) devoid of reason, that is stupid, or even iv) insane (as we shall see about the *Locana*'s analysis).

In the light of its commentaries, the stanza appears as a remarkable illustration of the way Śaiva thought merges philosophical and aesthetic registers within one another. One can see here a movement, a turn of mind, inherent in that system of thought which offers us the essential lineaments of Indian aesthetic theory.

I would like to show that, in the two occurrences of the stanza, aesthetics and poetics (to which the *Locana* explicitly refers) serve as a speculative paradigm for the doctrine of which Abhinavagupta is one of the foremost exponents.

Jayaratha goes no further than a philosophical interpretation of the stanza, which coincides with the expressed meaning alone: everything is sentient. And in order to establish that fundamental truth of Kashmirian non-dualist Śaivism, Jayaratha develops the dramatic metaphor of the first hemistich.

⁷ See GEROW 1971, p. 317: “mention made of a topic irrelevant to the subject” and INGALLS ET AL. 1990, who understands: “praise by means of the extraneous,” and identifies it as the allegory.

⁸ The three types of relationship between *aprustuta* and *prastuta* being that of cause and effect, general and particular and similarity; see *Dhvanyāloka* I 13 and *Locana*.

The *Locana* proposes the same reading of the stanza: everything is sentient, including, first and foremost, the object wrongly said to be insentient, but the *Locana* goes beyond this statement by hinting at a second meaning, more esoteric, and for that very reason only suggested, thus taking the *aprustutaprasāṃsā* as an example of *dhvani*, specially, *vastudhvani* (see below, p. 50).

Nevertheless, since Jayaratha identifies the stanza as an *aprustutaprasāṃsā*, there should be a suggested meaning, which would be the *prastuta*. Although Jayaratha does not emphasize it, I propose to find that suggested meaning in the *avataṅṅikā* to the exegetical passage and in its conclusion (see below, p. 37). On the basis of an understanding of that *aprustutaprasāṃsā* as organized by similarity (as shown by the *Locana*, which gives two examples of the figure and refers to our stanza as a case of *aprustutaprasāṃsā* based on similarity; see below, p. 48), the expressed *aprustuta* would be, beyond the apostrophe to the *bhāvavrāta*, the postulation of the equal sentience of the subject (here the *paśu*) and the object (in the form of all the objects, the *bhāvavrāta*). The suggested *prastuta* would be – by means of Jayaratha’s rather unexpected identification of the *paśu* with the *vādin*, the “opponent” – the Śaivas’ non-dualist attack against all opponents of their doctrine, with the ultimate intention of ridiculing all of them and establishing the Śaiva non-dualism as supreme.

Now, the question remains that, in the TĀ’s context and according to Jayaratha’s exegesis (who cares little, it seems, for the subtleties of Abhinavagupta’s reasonings in the *Locana*), the *aprustutaprasāṃsā* is here to be understood as a mere figure of speech, and not as a case of *vastudhvani*, as claimed by Abhinavagupta in his *Locana* quoting the same verse. If one follows Ānandavardhana’s exposition in the *vṛtti* ad I 13⁹ and Abhinavagupta’s commentary thereon, this means that, in the context of the TĀ, the direct expressed meaning (the apostrophe to the *bhāvavrāta*) is considered predominant (the criterium for such a distinction being that it is the expressed meaning that, in this case, creates *camatkāra*, “wonderment”), whereas the suggested meaning (the ridiculing and defeat of the adversaries) is subordinated. We shall see the whole process in detail further on (pp. 48ff.).

⁹ I admit, with Ingalls, that Ānandavardhana is as well the author of the *vṛtti*; see INGALLS ET AL. 1990, pp. 25-27.

Thus, in the TĀ, the *aprustutaprasāṃsā* is considered as a mere figure of speech and mainly serves a polemical purpose.

It is in this way that we can understand Jayaratha's *avatarāṅikā*:

*idānīm asya śāstrasya paraṃ gāmbhīryaṃ manyamāno granthakṛt, etad-
arthasatattvam ajānānair api anyair anyathābodhena yatkiṃcid uttānam
eva anyathā ucyate, tān prati aprustutaprasāṃsayā upahasitum āha...*

Now, considering the extreme depth of the [preceeding] teaching, [and, also,] that others, though ignorant of its essential meaning, persist in making erroneous and non-sensical pronouncements, as an effect of an understanding itself erroneous, the author of the treatise contradicts them, using the [following] *aprustutaprasāṃsā*, for ridiculing them [...],

as well as the conclusion, in which sarcasm intends to denounce any other system of thought as erroneous, and to reaffirm the infaillibility of the non-dualist Śaiva doctrine:

*evaṃ prakṛte 'pi asya granthasya yas tattvaṃ na jānāti mā jñāsīt, pratyuta
anyathāpi yatkiṃcana vakti ity asāv eva jaḍo, na punar asya granthasya
kaścid doṣaḥ ity arthaḥ |*

In order to come back to our subject, such is its meaning: the one who does not know the truth [expounded] in this treatise – let him not know it! And even more if he utters nonsense and falsehood, it is he himself who is the unconscious idiot; this treatise is not at fault in any way. This is the meaning.

1. THE *TANTRĀLOKAVIVEKA* AD *TANTRĀLOKA* I 332

I will limit myself to a synthesis of the analysis of the TĀV, whose text I give in Appendix-1.

The reasoning of the stanza is tightly woven and plays with paradox, as so often in this system of thought:

1. Everything is sentient. This is why (*yat*)...
2. ... the one who says phenomenal diversity is insentient and stupid is himself insentient and stupid, blinded by his very ignorance, that is, by his being unable to recognize the identity of the subject and the object;
3. Nevertheless, since we Śaivas imagine – by virtue of the principle of non-duality – that such an ignorant fool is similar to you, O *bhāvavrāta*, the blame that he puts on you and that we

have just transferred to him (since he is the fool) turns to praise.

The entire philosophical point of the stanza lies in this last statement, the locus of a paradoxical mockery: it is because the *jana* partakes of this consciousness which he wrongly believes to be unconscious that he is really a *sahṛdaya*,¹⁰ not for the reason he thinks (his sentience contrasting with the insentience of the objects).

The TĀV develops this line of thought and makes it clear that the stanza is a formulation of the non-dualism of the doctrine, which is precisely the main issue of the first chapter of the TĀ where our stanza appears.

The novelty of the TĀV's interpretation consists in reading, under the *jana* of the stanza (who appears again in the relative clause: *yas tvām āha...*), a *vādin*, that is, an "interlocutor" and therefore an opponent of Trika monism (note that the term *vādin* appears three times in the TĀV ad I 332; see Appendix-1, in bold). Jayaratha gives the content of the experience, inner struggles and impotence of that *vādin*, through a rather enigmatic (and unidentified¹¹) stanza showing him doing battle with the dualizing thoughts (*vikalpas*), whatever the school in which they have been theorized:

*adyāsmān asataḥ kariṣyati sataḥ kiṃ nu dvidhā vāpy ayaṃ
kiṃ sthāsnūn uta naśvarān uta mithobhinnān abhinnān uta |
iṭhaṃ sadvadanāvalokanaparair bhāvair jagadvartibhir
manye maunaniruddhyamānahṛdayair duḥkhena taiḥ sthīyate ||*

Now, will it [dialectics (according to the context of the stanza in the ĪPVV)] make us existent or nonexistent, or even both? Will it make us permanent or destructible, different from each other or nondifferent? In my view, thus [confronted with such dilemmas], beings remain in pain: they who live in this world, immersed in contemplating the face of the Being, have their hearts closed by the silence [to which they are reduced,

¹⁰ On this reasoning, see the *Locana* ad *Dhvanyāloka*vṛtti I 13 quoted below, p. 61. On the notion of *sahṛdaya(tā)* in the aesthetic register, see esp. BANSAT-BOUDON 1992a, pp. 148-149, 151; also (for its use in both aesthetic and spiritual registers), 2012a, pp. 225-233; and below, n. 33.

¹¹ Although Abhinavagupta could well be its author, due to the similarity of structure with TĀ I 332 (stanza organized by "manye"), as well as to the presence of the same stanza in another text by Abhinavagupta, namely the *Īśvarapratyabhi-jñāvivṛtivimarśinī* (henceforth ĪPVV); see the following §.

unable as they are to see that the opposition *sat-asat* is meant to dissolve in the awareness of the supreme Self (*paramātman*)¹²].

Let us note that the ĪPVV I 1, 1, Abhinavagupta's commentary on Utpaladeva's *Vivṛti* (most of which has been lost), has already cited this stanza in a condensed form, in an extremely sarcastic passage denying dialectics (*tarka*) the power of attaining supreme Reality.¹³ Only "Recognition" (*pratyabhijñā*) of one's identity with the supreme principle or reality can ensure one's access to it, hence to liberation.

Thus every dualist doctrine is reduced to the level of inferior thought, tinged with very ordinary prejudices, characterizing the common man who knows nothing at all (*akiñcijñā*), says the TĀV, and who can be shown to be a fool of the first order.¹⁴ And yet one

¹² On this implied meaning, see ĪPVV I 1, 1 (translated below) and *Bhagavadgītā* [BhG] II 16 [= II 17, in the Kaśmīr recension] and Abhinavagupta's commentary thereon (in particular his gloss for *antaḥ*).

¹³ ĪPVV, vol. I, p. 9: *evaṃ parameśvarasvarūpe samāviśya granthakāraḥ sūtra-vṛttyarthaṃ pūrvapakṣottarapakṣaiḥ samudghāṭayiṣyan tarko 'pratiṣṭhaḥ iti apratiṣṭhatā, adyāsmān asataḥ kariṣyati sataḥ sthāsnūn atho naśvarān iti, sva-śaktipradarśanamātrasāratayā gomayapāyasīyanāyopahāseṇa paramārthān-upayogitā | aho dhīg vyākhyātrgraham itarahevākabhṛtakam aho tarkasyāntaḥ kvacid api na labhyaś ca vibudhaiḥ |*. "Having thus immersed himself in the nature of *parameśvara* and preparing to reveal the meaning of the verse and its commentary through a series of *prima facie* views and established conclusions, the author [Utpaladeva] says: 'Dialectics has no foundation.' The lack of foundation [of dialectics is explicit in the verse]: 'Now, will it [dialectics] make us existent or nonexistent? [...] Will it make us permanent or destructible?' [Trying to express] the supreme meaning [through logical terms] is pointless, according to [the verse]: 'Alas! The understanding of dialecticians [only] results in another whim [to analyze]! Alas! For scholars, there is no end to dialectics!' [Here the emphasis is on] the derisory nature [of dialectics when employed for the purpose of attaining the supreme meaning; it is as absurd as the reasoning criticized] in the saying that assimilates 'the cowpat and the milk' [on the basis that they both have a bovine origin], given that the essence [of the supreme principle can only be perceived] when one sees its energy [at work behind the products that constitute empiric reality]."

¹⁴ See in particular Abhinavagupta's *Paramārthasāra* (henceforth PS) 27, which presents other systems of thought as mere practical and provisional truths (*vyavahāramātram etat paramārthena tu na santy eva*, for which Yogarāja glosses *vyavahāramātram* by *samvṛtyarthaṃ*) and as such inferior to Abhinavagupta's doctrine (see BANSAT-BOUDON AND TRIPATHI 2011, p. 152, n. 656). See also the famous analogy used by Kṣemarāja in his PH 8 (BANSAT-BOUDON AND TRIPATHI 2011, pp. 160-161, n. 689), where the different schools are described as

sees the final pirouette which consists in the reversal of blame into praise.

Already, in the *avataraṇikā*, as we have seen, the TĀV shows how the stanza partakes of the polemic construction of the Traika system. Not only does this polemical tone persist throughout the commentary, but Jayaratha shows a violence which is foreign to the stanza itself and which culminates in the final condemnation, almost an imprecation (see above, p. 37).

Thus there is no way out for the cornered adversary. And if, despite everything, he resists – so what! His position, now ruined, is of no consequence.

I would have liked to show how, in the context of such a general attack on all dualism, one could read at least a partial refutation of the Sāṃkhya. But this it is not the place for such a digression, nor for comparing the way both Trika and Sāṃkhya use the theatrical metaphor. I shall limit myself to reminding the reader of *Sāṃkhya-kārikā* (henceforth SK) 59, 61, 65-66, where *prakṛti*, unconscious yet active, is said to be playing before the *puruṣa*, conscious yet inactive – it is indeed an actress (*nartakī*; SK 59), since the *Gauḍapā-dīyabhāṣya* speaks of the *rasas* she is enacting.

Intent upon his demonstration of non-dualism, Jayaratha unfolds the dramatic metaphor of the first hemistich, showing how the analogy at work in the stanza poetically condenses the underlying argument of the passage: objects are sentient (*aḥaḍa*), but the deity which presides over their manifestation disguises that sentience as make-believe insentience (*jaḍatva*), so much so that it succeeds in deceiving the insensitive man (*aḥṛdaya*): the world displays its splendors to the finite being who is its deluded and impotent spectator. Thus Jayaratha unfolds the web of significations associated with the notion of *sahṛdayatā*, “sensibility,” understood as an aesthetic notion.

One should observe, however, that Jayaratha forces the meaning of the stanza by making it serve his exegetic project, infringing on its morphology and syntax, and even on its metrics.

the many “roles” (as well as “levels” of realization of the ultimate truth, *bhūmikā*) taken on by the Supreme Lord as an actor and are seen as hierarchical levels arranged along the scale of the *tattvas* – culminating with the eleventh and highest *bhūmikā* or *sthiti*, which is that of Trika philosophers.

It seems, for instance, that he understands the present participle *nartayan* not as a causative, but as a sort of denominative (the equivalent of a *nartāyate*), inasmuch as *nartayan* is glossed by *naṭavat*. Similarly, he dislocates the syntax by making *nartayan* govern the group in the instrumental: *vividhābhir bhaṅgībhiḥ*, when one expects that an instrumental accompanying *pracchādyā* might more naturally express *means* (unless the instrumental is considered as the complement of means applied to both gerunds and also to *nartayan*); moreover, the expected syntactic order would thus coincide with the metrical organization of the stanza, namely, with the second *pāda*, whereas *nartayan*, at the end of the first *pāda*, would take a direct object: *janasya hrdayāni*, which is shared with the gerund *ākramya*.¹⁵

Jayaratha persists in his bold interpretation, since the syntactic segment thus reorganized is again glossed by an equivalent one: *vividhābhir bhaṅgībhiḥ nartayan yat saṃkrīḍase – naṭavat atāttvikena rūpeṇa samullasasi*. Thus, *vividhābhir bhaṅgībhiḥ* is explained as *atāttvikena rūpeṇa* (“taking on a non-real form”), *nartayan* as *naṭavat*, “in the way of an actor,” and *saṃkrīḍase* as *samullasasi* (“he plays”).¹⁶

In the same vein, the term *bhaṅgī* is to be understood here more as “costumes” (one of its meanings) than as “twists” or “bends”¹⁷ (or emotional “modes,” as understood in the *Locana*; see below, p. 61) – such costumes representing the various roles played by the actor. Let us remember that the *āhāryābhinaya* – costume and make-up – although it has “to be borrowed” (*āhārya*) from the external world before the actor enters the stage, is conceived as a full-fledged register of acting (*abhinaya*).¹⁸

¹⁵ This will be the syntactical order of the stanza in Abhinavagupta’s self-exegesis of the same verse in the *Locana*; see below, p. 58: *haṭhād eva lokam yathecchaṃ vikāraḥkārāṅābhir nartayati*.

¹⁶ Lit., “Since (*yat*) you play (*saṃkrīḍase* = *samullasasi*), in the way of an actor (*nartayan* = *naṭavat*), with various costumes, i.e. with a form that is not real (*vividhābhir bhaṅgībhiḥ* = *atāttvikena rūpeṇa*).”

¹⁷ Cf. Padoux’s translation: “O Totalité des choses! De force, Tu t’empares des cœurs humains et Tu joues, tel un acteur, à *cache* sous de multiples détours (my emphasis) le cœur du Soi [...]”; transl. SILBURN AND PADOUX 1998, p. 126.

¹⁸ On the four registers of *abhinaya*, see BANSAT-BOUDON 1990; also BANSAT-BOUDON 1992, pp. 145-155, 341-387.

The verb itself, *saṃkrīḍase* (glossed as *samullasasi*), is also to be understood in the sense of dramatic acting, when it evokes the divine actor, the *naṭarāja* – or his *śakti*, as we shall see.

We should note with what coherence the stanza and its commentary spin out the metaphor, in conformity with the essential lineaments of the aesthetic theory defended by Abhinavagupta and the Śaiva tradition, including the key notion of *sahrdayatā* and its antonym, *ahrdayatā*.

Both texts manifest the tension between the two protagonists of the aesthetic experience as lived out in the theatre, that is, the actor and the spectator. Nothing is left out of the process. On one side, the actor, master of himself and of the universe (if I can borrow from Corneille, *Cinna*, Vth act!), that is, master of the splendors lucidly displayed to the spectator's eyes (since, like the divine actor, he *causes* the objective world *to be* on stage);¹⁹ master also of that spectator's heart, which he moves “forcibly” (*hathāt*), that is, “at will” (*yatheccham*, as we shall see in the *Locana* quoted below, p. 61), and who hides his Self in order to assume the variety of his roles. On the other side, the spectator, more specifically the unqualified spectator, the *ahrdaya*, who sees nothing but the diversity of the world in the variety of those roles.

Such a spectator – who is a figure of the opponent in the interpretation of the TĀV – is, in fact, deceived, unable to discern the reality beneath appearances. And he is all the more deceived since he overestimates himself – wrongly believing, due to his presumptuousness (a way of translating the philosophical notion the Trika inherits from the Sāṃkhya, namely *abhimāna*,²⁰ the sentiment of the ego, and not of the Self), that he is a *sahrdaya*.

On the philosophical level, the insensibility (*ahrdayatā*) of that deceived spectator represents *avidyā* (or *ajñāna*), metaphysical ignorance, as it manifests itself in a double error (*bhrānti*) consisting, in Śaiva reasonings and particularly in Abhinavagupta's PS (30-31 and 39-40), in taking the Self for the non-Self, that is, in forgetting the unity of the Self and in placing before itself the object, namely phenomenal diversity (to which also belong the multiplicity of the

¹⁹ On Śiva as the unique Agent and Actor and the reasonings on the “beingness” (*astitva*) of the phenomenal world, see BANSAT-BOUDON 2014, pp. 64-73.

²⁰ See PS 19 in BANSAT-BOUDON AND TRIPATHI 2011, pp. 138ff.

*paśus*²¹), before just as wrongly taking the non-Self (the body, the breath, etc.) as the Self – which amounts to being an error heaped upon error, “darkness upon darkness” (*timirād api timiram idam*), or a “great pustule upon a boil” (*gaṇḍasyopari mahān ayaṃ sphoṭaḥ*), as PS 31 says.²²

Incidentally, it is interesting to note that at some point in the ĪPVV (ad II 4 19, vol. III, p. 244)²³ it is the error itself (*bhrama*)²⁴ which plays on the stage:

sa ca bhramo nāṭyatulyasya aparamārthasato 'tyaktasvarūpāvaṣṭambha-
nanaṭakalpena parameśvaraprakāśena pratīgocarīkṛtasya saṃsārasya
nāyakaḥ sūtradhāraḥ pradhānabhūtaḥ pravartayitā itivṛtte nāyako vā,
yallagnaṃ viśvetivṛttam ābhāti; tata eva prathamah |

²¹ On this point, see especially *Spandanirṇaya* I 1 (quoted and translated in BANSAT-BOUDON AND TRIPATHI 2011, pp. 330-331) which states that Śiva takes on the role of the seven *pramāṇs* and of the objects which they bring into being.

²² On the double error, see BANSAT-BOUDON AND TRIPATHI 2011, pp. 24-25, 161-169, 191-192 and n. 848; also, below, n. 24.

²³ Quoted in RATIÉ 2011, pp. 559; see also J. Törzsök's contribution to this volume.

²⁴ Here “*bhrama*” must be construed as “*bhrānti*,” “error,” and refers to the Traika conception of a two-levelled error. According to Abhinavagupta and his commentator in the PS, the first level of error is to mistake the Self for the non-Self, i.e., in forgetting one's own plenitude and in apprehending oneself as a finite subject, defined in relation to an object (see PS 25 and 30 in BANSAT-BOUDON AND TRIPATHI 2011). Thereupon intervenes the second level of error: taking the non-Self (body, *buddhi*, etc.) to be the Self, that is, predicating the Self of the non-Self, so that we assert ‘I am fat,’ ‘I am intelligent,’ etc. (see PS 31 in BANSAT-BOUDON AND TRIPATHI 2011). On the interpretation of *bhrama* here, in the ĪPVV, as an error on two levels – of which the first, more fundamental one is to mistake the Self for the non-Self – I somewhat differ from Ratié and Törzsök (see above, n. 23). See, for instance, Yogarāja's *Paramārthasāravivṛti* (henceforth PSV) ad 61: *bhrāntiḥ dvayarūpo bhramah*, “the ‘error,’ i.e., the illusion formed of duality,” and PSV 39, who describes how the dissolution of the second level of error is the condition for the vanishing of the first and main grade of error: *yāvad anātmani dehādāv ātmābhimāno na galitas tāvat svāmaprathārūpe 'pi jagati bhedaprathāmoho na vilīyate*. “As long as the conceit that locates the Self in the non-Self – the body, etc. – does not dissipate, so long does the delusion not dissolve that consists in valorizing difference (lit. ‘display of difference’) in this world, [the things of] which are even so but the display of one's own Self.” (Transl. BANSAT-BOUDON AND TRIPATHI 2011, p. 192.) Here that first grade of error is described as *bhedaprathāmohaḥ*, the “delusion that consists in valorizing difference.”

The drama (*nāṭya*) that the world of transmigration is [i.e. the phenomenal world subjected to the cycle of rebirth] (*saṃsāra*),²⁵ though ultimately deprived of reality, can only be experienced insofar as it is the manifestation of the supreme Lord who, like the actor (*nāṭa*), never gives up his own, immutable nature. [Metaphysical] error²⁶ is the hero (*nāyaka*)²⁷ of the drama; in other words, it is the *sūtradhāra*, the leader of the company, whose preeminent function is both that of instigator of the plot (*itivr̥tta*) and protagonist of the play. It is in its close connection with metaphysical error that the plot of the universe (*viśvetivr̥tta*) appears. This is why metaphysical error is “primary.”

Error here is nothing but nescience (*avidyā*), namely the mistaking of the Self for the non-Self which in turn will lead to an even deeper error, that of mistaking the non-Self for the Self. Like the *sūtradhāra*, both the leader and first actor of a theatre group who plays the main role (*nāyaka*), *avidyā* leads the plot of the universe (*viśvetivr̥tta*) on the stage of the world of transmigration (*saṃsāra*). Better than *viśva* in the alternative analogy, that of the drama of the universe (*viśvetivr̥tta*), *saṃsāra* is able to represent the target in the metaphor of the “world as a theatre”: in the endless flow of reincarnations, empirical beings take on one role after another. And although, in Śaiva terms, the play (*nāṭya*) is not ultimately “true” (*aparamārthasat*),²⁸ it has enough power of illusion to fool the spectators, so long as these remain in the condition of *paśu*. At the source of this dramatic illusion is Parameśvara, the Supreme Agent²⁹ and Supreme

²⁵ Lit. “the world of transmigration comparable to a play.”

²⁶ “Error” here is in the sense of nescience (*avidyā*); see below.

²⁷ With a play on the word *nāyaka*, “the one who leads,” which in dramaturgy also refers to the “hero.” So error leads the dramatic plot of the universe in the same way as the *sūtradhāra* leads it on the stage: it is both its instigator and main protagonist. For the *sūtradhāra* is the character *de rigueur* in the prologue which introduces the dramatic fiction as well as the first protagonist of the play (see LÉVI 1890, p. 378 and BANSAT-BOUDON 1992, p. 83 et 219). He is also the true incarnation of theatricality in that he appears as the very figure of the Actor in the *pūrvavaṅga*, the half-ritualistic and half-dramatical “preliminaries” to the performance of the dramatic fiction which are described in the fifth chapter of the *Nāṭyaśāstra* (see BANSAT-BOUDON 1992, pp. 74-76).

²⁸ Cf. above, p. 41, Jayaratha’s notation: *atāttvikena rūpeṇa*, “taking on a non-real form.”

²⁹ On Śiva as the Agent *par excellence*, see BANSAT-BOUDON 2014, pp. 65-71. See also ĪPV II 4 19 (vol. II, p. 200): *iti cidrūpasyaiva karṭṛtvam upapannam abhinasya bhedāveśasahiṣṇutvena kriyāśaktyāveśasambhavāt*, “Thus, only what is

actor, who, in disguising himself, plays at being other than himself without ever being affected by it (*atyaktasvarūpāvaṣṭambhanaṭa*).³⁰ This is possible because such a change of appearance, far from being due to particular circumstances, stems from Parameśvara's power to hide at will. This ability is one of his *śaktis*, his *tirodhānaśakti*, his concealment energy.³¹ Thus the disguisement of the Self is a correlate of its sovereign freedom, its *svātantryaśakti*, the first of its energies.³² The notation "*ātmahṛdayaṃ pracchādya*" (TĀ I 332) is therefore an essential element of the playful process of self-subjugation which can be read between the lines of the stanza.

One can see that the stanza and its commentaries transpose metaphysical ignorance to the aesthetic register: thus the TĀV conceives of *ajñāna* as *ahṛdayatā*, which implies an imperfect education (*duḥśikṣita*), as opposed to the perfect education that characterizes

undivided consciousness can be an Agent, for, being capable of taking on different forms, it can exercise the power of action."

³⁰ On the main characteristic of the Lord, i.e. that his essential nature cannot be altered whatever form he takes on, see in particular PSV 1 quoting *Spandakārikā* (henceforth SpK) I 3 (see BANSAT-BOUDON AND TRIPATHI 2011, pp. 66-67, and n. 253); also PS 34 (and PSV ad loc.) and PS 36. This is also the case with ordinary, empirical, actors who never forget that they themselves are not the characters or at least not fundamentally so. This they never – or should never – ignore, since they would otherwise risk being possessed by the deity whose role they are playing or start doing for real what should remain fiction, for example killing a fellow actor who happens to be playing the part of an enemy (see the anecdotes in TARABOUT 1998, pp. 296ff.). See also ĪPV II 4 19 (quoted above, n. 29) which asserts that, although capable of being many, the Lord (or consciousness, *cit*) remains one and unaffected by the multiplicity he himself creates. It is in this context that the passage of the ĪPVV (vol. III, p. 244) quoted above, p. 43, uses the metaphor of the error as *sūtradhāra*.

³¹ See HULIN 1978, p. 308, n. 5, who translates by "énergie de cèlement." The *tirodhānaśakti* is one of the *pañcakṛtya*, Śiva's five cosmic functions (see BANSAT-BOUDON AND TRIPATHI 2011, p. 100, n. 413).

³² See PSV 5 commenting on "Śiva himself, who takes on the condition of a fettered soul": "Thus, that Lord who has been described above as a uniform mass of blissful consciousness, and whose nature is freedom (*svātantrya*), Śiva himself, whose essence is now the veiling of his own true nature (*svarūpagopana*), takes on the role (*bhūmikā*) of a cognizer endowed with a body, according to his own will, as though he were an actor (*naṭa*) and, since he is [henceforth] to be maintained and treated as a domestic animal [that is, as a tethered beast], he is now distinguished by his existence as a fettered subject (*paśu*"); on *svarūpagopana*, see also also PS 15 (on *māyāśakti*) and PSV ad loc.: BANSAT-BOUDON AND TRIPATHI 2011, pp. 126-129, and n. 529.

the *sahṛdaya*, in aesthetics.³³ The height of ignorance and bewilderment (*moha*) is to think of oneself as sensible and sensitive, as well as perfectly educated.

On the one hand, therefore, we have that deceived spectator; on the other, the sovereign actor. But who is this actor who is the object of comparison for the *bhāvavrāta*? “He” is, in fact, an actress, even if in veiled terms. Abhinavagupta himself gives this interpretative key in his *ĪPV* ad *ĪPK* I 1, 4:³⁴ the actor *par excellence*, that is, the agent of phenomenal manifestation, is the *māyāśakti*, herself an hypostasis of Śiva’s Śakti, therefore indissociable from him:³⁵

... *teṣāṃ “jaḍabhūtānāṃ” cinmayatve ’pi māyākhyayā īśvaraśaktiyā jā-
ḍyaṃ prāpitānāṃ jīvantaṃ pramātāram āśritya pratiṣṭhā... |*

[...] Although made of consciousness, the “insentient entities” are made insentient by the work of the Lord’s Śakti named *māyā*. Their foundation depends on the living being, that is, on the cognizing subject [...].

It is that *māyāśakti* (who “measures” out the empirical world) that the Śaiva doctrine presents, with the organization of the thirty-six *tattvas*, as governing the phenomenal manifestation, called *meya* – a derivative of the same root *mā*, “to measure,” “to construct.”

In this respect, and in this respect only, *māyā* is comparable to the *prakṛti* of the Sāṃkhya, who shows herself on the stage of the world³⁶ by assuming, one after the other, those roles that are her “evolutes” or “products,” the remaining twenty-three *tattvas* – the difference consisting in that *prakṛti* is unconscious, whereas *māyā*,

³³ See Abhinavagupta’s famous definition of the *sahṛdaya* in *Locana* ad *Dhvany-
āloka*, *vṛtti* ad I 1 (CSS ed., pp. 38-39; INGALLS ET AL. 1990, p. 70): *yeṣāṃ kā-
vyānuśīlanābhyaśavaśād viśadībhūte manomukure varṇanīyatanmayībhavana-
yogyatā te svahṛdayasaṃvādabhājah saḥṛdayāḥ*; for the use of *sahṛdayatā* in
both aesthetic and spiritual registers, see BANSAT-BOUDON 2012a, pp. 225-233.

³⁴ See the text of the stanza, *ĪPK* I 1, 4, in Appendix-3.

³⁵ See, for instance, Abhinavagupta’s *maṅgala* to his *Locana* on Ānandavardha-
na’s *avataraṇikā* to III 1 (CSS ed., p. 288; INGALLS ET AL. 1990, p. 369): *smā-
rāmi smarasaṃhāralīlāpāṭavaśālināḥ | prasahya śambhor dehārdhaṃ harantīm
parameśvarīm ||* “I remember the Supreme Goddess who stole half of Śambhu’s
body after he had shown his effortless skill in playing at annihilating Smara
himself.”

³⁶ See SK 59 and above, p. 40; also BANSAT-BOUDON AND TRIPATHI 2011, pp. 52-
53.

Śīva's hypostasis³⁷ (in other words, the hypostasis of Consciousness), is conscious throughout.

This is the reason why the stanza is a hymn to the deity which sets in motion the *bhāvavrāta*. Besides, in this non-dualism, it makes little difference whether it is an actor (Śīva) or an actress (*māyā*).³⁸

It is worth noting that the passage of the ĪPV I 1, 4 that offers that interpretative key to TĀ I 332 is precisely the one a propos of which Bhāskara, commenting on it, in his turn, several centuries later, finds it appropriate to cite the same stanza, although with a tiny variant (see Appendix-4). Thus the philosophical point of the stanza, in the TĀ, at least, is strengthened by the usage Bhāskara makes of it.

Let us come back to the long-drawn-out metaphor. When it is said of this actor, or this actress, that he/she hides his/her Self, one cannot help seeing here a reference to the notion of *sākṣātkāraḥ papratīti* (or *pratyakṣakalpapratīti*) a “quasi direct perception,”³⁹ essential to the success of the aesthetic process meant to culminate in *rasa*.

In effect, *sākṣātkāraḥ papratīti* is a way to condense in one term the complex process that manifests on the stage a person (or a fancy) who, being neither entirely the actor nor entirely the character, allows the spectator to see everything with impunity, in a distanced rapture. As such, the “quasi direct perception” governs the next step of the aesthetical process when considered from the point of view of the audience, namely *sādhāraṇīkaraṇa* or “generalization.” *Sādhāraṇīkaraṇa*, the depersonalization of emotions free of any reference to a specific ego (and thus their universalization), enables the audience to enjoy a controlled and purified identification (*tanmayībhāva*), the source of delight and bliss.⁴⁰

As for the influence cast over the hearts of men, it is a way of alluding to *rasa*, the irresistible aesthetic rapture which, when transposed onto the ontological level, merges with the beatific experience

³⁷ See PS 15 in BANSAT-BOUDON AND TRIPATHI 2011, pp. 126-129, where *māyā* is described as *devī māyāśaktiḥ*; also BANSAT-BOUDON 2008, pp. 60-62.

³⁸ See TĀV VIII 333: *devīti devābhinnatvāt*.

³⁹ The notion is found at several places in the *Abhinavabhāratī* ad *Nāṭyaśāstra*; see BANSAT-BOUDON 1992, pp. 150-152; 2012, pp. 224-225.

⁴⁰ On the stages of the aesthetic process as analyzed by Abhinavagupta in his *Abhinavabhāratī*, see BANSAT-BOUDON 1992, pp. 152-155, 1992a and 2012, pp. 214-215.

of “repose in the Self” (*ātmaviśrānti*)⁴¹ preliminary to the experience of “liberation in this life” (*jīvanmukti*). I have shown several times how the aesthetic experience works as a propaedeutics to the spiritual.⁴² I shall thus not linger on this question, but we will return to it a propos the *Locana* (see below, pp. 50-55).

To conclude this part: phenomenal diversity in the form of the *māyāśakti* plays *before* the spectator, and plays *with* him as well, if he happens not to be a *sahṛdaya*, making him wrongly believe in the dichotomy subject/object.

2. THE *LOCANA*⁴³ AD *DHVANYĀLOKAVṚTTI* I 13⁴⁴

Let us come to the *Locana*. The broader context is that of the exposition of *dhvani*; the narrower context, that of the definition of the *aprustutaprasāṃsā*, more precisely, of the third category of *aprustutaprasāṃsā*, based on the similarity of the expressed (which is, in this case, *aprustuta* – what is non-pertinent to the speaker and the listener) and the suggested (which is *prastuta* – what is pertinent to them), in order to establish where and when the figure works as such or as a case of *dhvani*.

What Ānandavardhana wants to show is that he has discovered something new, not a new name for categories already recognized, and so he goes through a number of such well-known categories – *alaṃkāras* that involve an element of suggestion (including the *aprustutaprasāṃsā*) – and shows that they are not at all identical with his new concept of *dhvani*. He is thus led to defend his new theory, namely that the *ālaṃkārika* register is delimited by the predominance of the literal meaning, whereas that of the *dhvani* is defined by the predominance of the suggested meaning. Therefore, taking the *aprustutaprasāṃsā* as an example, he concludes (CSS ed., pp. 126-129; INGALLS ET AL. 1990, p. 159):

⁴¹ On the notion of *ātmaviśrānti*, see below, p. 72 and n. 100; also BANSAT-BOUDON AND TRIPATHI 2011, pp. 56, 71, 321.

⁴² See, esp., BANSAT-BOUDON 2004, pp. 280-283; 2012, pp. 231-233.

⁴³ CSS ed., pp. 127-132; INGALLS ET AL. 1990, pp. 160-163, 165-167.

⁴⁴ CSS ed., pp. 125-132; INGALLS ET AL. 1990, pp. 158-165.

... yadā tu sārūpyamātravaśenāprastutaprasāmsāyām aprakṛtaprakṛtayoḥ
 sambandhas tadāpy aprastutasya sarūpyābhidhīyamānasya prādhānyenā-
 vivakṣyāṃ dhvanāv evāntarbhāvaḥ | itarathā tv alaṃkāṛāntaratvam eva |
 tad ayam atra saṃkṣepaḥ –
 vyañgyasya yatrāprādhānyaṃ vācyamātrānuyāyinaḥ |
 samāsoktyādayas tatra vācyālaṅkāṛtayaḥ sphuṭāḥ ||
 vyañgyasya pratibhāmātre vācārthānugame 'pi vā |
 na dhvanir yatra vā tasya prādhānyaṃ na pratīyate ||
 tatparāv eva śabdārthau yatra vyañgyaṃ prati sthītau |
 dhvaneḥ sa eva viśayo mantavyaḥ saṅkarōjjhitaḥ ||

[...]. But when, in an *aprastutaprasāmsā*, the relation of extraneous and germane is based only on similarity, then, if the extraneous expressed idea (*aprastuta*) bearing similarity is not intended to be predominant, the case falls in the area of *dhvani*. Otherwise,⁴⁵ it will just be one of the figures.⁴⁶ Here then is the summary of the matter:

“Wherever the suggested meaning (*vyañgya*) does not predominate, but is merely ancillary to the literal sense (*vācyā*), it is clear that such instances are only figures of the literal sense, such as *samāsokti* and others,”

“In places where there is just a glimmer of the suggested or where the suggested is just subservient to the expressed, or where its preeminence is not clearly discernible, there is no *dhvani*,”

“Only those instances wherein word and meaning are solely directed towards the suggested should be regarded as the area of *dhvani* – which admits no admixture of [any figure of speech].”⁴⁷

In his *Locana*,⁴⁸ Abhinavagupta goes further (CSS ed., pp. 127-128; INGALLS ET AL. 1990, pp. 162-163). For some reason, he considers that the capacity to arouse wonder (*camatkāṛakāritva*) in the listener is the criterion for determining which of the explicit or suggested meanings prevails. Moreover, he seems to link or even subordinate the ability to create a sense of wonder in the listener with the plausibility of the meaning, be it literal or suggested.

⁴⁵ I.e., if it is the *aprastuta* that is intended to be predominant.

⁴⁶ Transl. INGALLS ET AL. 1990, p. 159 (slightly modified).

⁴⁷ My translation; see *Locana* ad loc., where *anupraveśa* comments on *saṅkara*: *saṅkareṇālaṅkāṛānupraveśasaṃbhāvanayā ujjhīta ity arthaḥ*. Ānandavardhana and his exegete will take up the question again, in *Dhvanyāloka* ad III 40 and *Locana* thereon; see below, § 3.

⁴⁸ *Locana* ad the *vṛtti* (CSS ed., pp. 126ff.): *yadā tu sārūpyamātravaśenāprastuta-prasāmsāyām...*

Giving the example of a stanza whose protagonist is a *vetāla*, Abhinavagupta argues that the believability of the literal meaning – which seems to be the source of the listener’s sense of wonder – is a factor in the decision to consider it predominant.⁴⁹ That first segment of the passage (see complete text in Appendix-2) reads as follows:

atra yady api sārūpyavaśena kṛtaghnaḥ kaścid anyañ prastuta ākṣipyate, tathāpy aprastutasyaiva vetālavṛttāntasya camatkāra-kāritvam | na hy acetanopālabhavad asaṃbhāvyamāno ’yam artho na ca na hṛdya iti vā-cyasyātra pradhānatā | ...

Here, although some other ingrate is suggested as the pertinent subject (*prastuta*), by the power of similarity, the capacity of causing wonder⁵⁰ lies in the story of the *vetāla*, which is extraneous. The sense is not impossible as would be a reproach against an insentient being, and it is not without attraction. So the predominance here lies in the literal sense.⁵¹

However, says the second segment of the *Locana*, if the literal meaning is entirely implausible, that goes hand in hand with a suggested meaning that is the source of the verse’s main charm – which would then make it a *vastudhvani*, namely the “suggestion of some narrative item or ‘content.’” This is where (CSS ed., p. 127; INGALLS ET AL. 1990, p. 162) Abhinavagupta makes a self-citation of his own stanza (“*bhāvavrāta haṭhāj...*,” already present in TĀ I 332):

... yadi punar acetanādinātyantāsambhāvyamānatadarthaviśeṣaṇenāpra-stutena varṇitena prastutam ākṣipyamāṇaṃ camatkārakāri tadā vastu-dhvanir asau | yathā mamaiva – “bhāvavrāta haṭhāj...” |

But if the pertinent subject [of the utterance] (*prastuta*) [i.e., the speaker’s intention which he wants to convey to the listener, therefore, the suggested meaning he has in his mind] is a source of wonder (*camatkārakārin*), [although] suggested (*ākṣipyamāṇa*) by means of [another] that is non-pertinent (or irrelevant) (*aprastuta*) to the speaker and the listener – insofar as that [other irrelevant subject] is insentient, etc., or described in such a way that its particularities are entirely unimaginable (*atyantāsambhāvyamāna*) for such a result [namely, suggesting the real meaning] – then, we have a

⁴⁹ The point is further discussed below, *Dhvanyāloka*vṛtti III 40; see below, p. 67, and n. 91.

⁵⁰ Underlined passages are my emphasis.

⁵¹ Transl. INGALLS ET AL. 1990, p. 162 (slightly modified).

case of *vastudhvani*, as in this verse of my own: “O whole of things, forcibly...”⁵²

Let us examine these two stanzas, which Abhinavagupta gives as examples of the category of *aprustutaprasāṃsā* based on similarity.⁵³

1. The first one, which shows a *vetāla* killing his benefactor, ironically celebrates the former as the Prince of gratitude. That is the expressed/explicit meaning. The suggested meaning aims at some other ingrate, of whom we know nothing in the absence of context, or at any other ingrate.⁵⁴ Nevertheless, it is the expressed meaning, the colourful story of the *vetāla*, which is a cause of wonder (*camat-kāarakārin*), while it is all the more credible (hence convincing) as *vetālas*’ stories are a recurrent motive in narrative literature.

Thus, as one may infer from the next passage of the *Locana*, one can recognize here an instance of *aprustutaprasāṃsā*, since ingratitude is common to the explicit and implicit subjects of the utterance, but it is an *aprustutaprasāṃsā* pertaining to the *ālamkārika* register, since there is something striking and convincing in the description of the non-pertinent *vetāla*, which makes that literal meaning predominant (*vācyasyātra pradhānatā*).

2. The second stanza given as an example, which Abhinavagupta says that he composed himself, without giving its source, is the stanza under examination: “*bhāvavrāta haṭhāj...*” Abhinavagupta explains that, the expressed meaning being completely impossible, i.e., implausible (how to address the mass of the objects and to consider them as sentient?),⁵⁵ the suggested meaning prevails over it, thus creating wonder and establishing the stanza as a case of *vastudhvani*.

⁵² My translation. See below, p. 57, for an extended translation of the same passage, which applies to the verse itself (“*bhāvavrāta*,” etc.) and shows its implications once the suggested meaning has been identified.

⁵³ Ānandavardhana and Abhinavagupta will take up the question again in III 40; see below, § 3.

⁵⁴ The verse, which addresses the *vetāla* (a *śārdūlavikrīḍita*, with two irregularities: the 8th syllable is long; there is one syllable too many, at the beginning of the second *pāda*; it should read “*kandhe*” instead of “*svakandhe*”), reads as follows: *prāṇā yena samarpitās tatra balād yena tvam utthāpitaḥ svakandhe yasya ciraṃ sthīto ’si vidadhe yas te saparyām api | tasyāsya smītamātrakeṇa janayan prāṇāpahārikriyām bhrātaḥ pratyupakāriṇām dhuri param vetāla līlayase ||*

⁵⁵ See the passage of the *Locana* quoted immediately above, which emphasizes that the “particularities” ascribed to the *aprustuta* (the *bhāvavrāta*) are “entirely unimaginable” (*atyantāsambhāvyaṃ*).

Otherwise, it would indeed be a case of *aprustutaprasāṃsā* based on similarity, but this *aprustutaprasāṃsā* would pertain to the rhetorical register alone (as in the stanza of the *vetāla*).

This is what Ānandavardhana teaches (CSS ed., pp. 128-129, quoted above, p. 49). It is, as well, what Abhinavagupta develops (CSS ed., p. 128; INGALLS ET AL. 1990, p. 163):

“*itharathā tv iti*” | *itarathaiva punar alaṅkāraṅtaratvam alaṅkāraviśeṣa-
tvaṃ na vyaṅgyasya kathaṃ cid api prādhānya iti bhāvaḥ* |

“But, otherwise...” – Otherwise, it will just be another figure of speech, that is, the particular figure of speech [named *aprustutaprasāṃsā*]; but this is not the case when the suggested meaning is prevalent in any way whatsoever. Such is the deeper meaning.⁵⁶

Now, what is this suggested meaning? Abhinavagupta reveals it first, immediately after quoting his stanza: under the description of the *bhāvavrāta*, one should read the detailed and very lively evocation of a *mahāpuruṣa*, a “great being” – a “great being” who puzzles Ingalls (see, below, p. 63), and in whom I propose to recognize the figure of the *jīvanmukta*, who is “liberated while living.” In effect, all the epithets qualifying that *mahāpuruṣa* might apply to the *jīvanmukta*.

Here comes the third part of the passage, which deals with the figure of the *jīvanmukta*, i.e., the unfolding of the suggested meaning:

... *kaścin mahāpuruṣo vītarāgo 'pi sarāgavad iti nyāyena gāḍhavivekālo-
katiraskṛtatimirapatāno 'pi lokamadhye svātmānaṃ pracchādayaṃ loka-
kaṃ ca vācālayann ātmany apratibhāsam evāṅgikurvaṃs tenaiva lokena
mūrkho 'yam iti yad avajñāyate tadā tadīyaṃ lokottaraṃ caritaṃ prastu-
taṃ vyaṅgyatayā prādhānyena prakāśyate...*

I summarize the passage, which is given entirely in the Appendix. The statement that first gives the key to such correspondences is that the *mahāpuruṣa*, “although living in this world” (*lokamadhye*; precisely what makes the *jīvanmukta* a living oxymoron), has dispelled the darkness of metaphysical ignorance (*gāḍhavivekālokatiraskṛtatimirapatāno 'pi*). He nonetheless hides his Self (*svātmānaṃ pracchādayan*), in conformity with the modes of life of a renunciate: although dispassionate (*vītarāgo 'pi*), he behaves as if still in the grip

⁵⁶ My translation. Note that the topic will be taken up again by Ānandavardhana and his exegete in III 40, and further clarified (see below, § 3).

of ordinary passions (*sarāgavad*); by so doing he is the object of innumerable comments and gossips (*lokaṃ ca vācālayan*), which he accepts without trying to deny them (*ātmany apratibhāsam evāṅgīkurvan*). This is why people regard him as a fool or madman (*mūr-kha*) and despise him (*avajñāyate*) for it. Such is, Abhinavagupta concludes, the extraordinary, supra-mundane conduct (*lokottaraṃ caritam*) of so extraordinary (*kaścit*)⁵⁷ a man.

This is a remarkable text, probably one of the most complete descriptions of the *jīvanmukta*, whose main feature is that he is *lokottara*. In which way? Although living in this phenomenal world, *he sees through it* and accedes to ultimate reality, as taught by *Bhagavadgītā* (henceforth BHG) II 71 (according to the numbering of the Kashmirian version; see Lakshman Joo's edition), which Anandavardhana quotes as an example for *Dhvanyālokaṃ* ad III 1 (see below, p. 56):

yā niśā sarvabhūtānām tasyām jāgarti saṃyamī |
yasyām jāgrati bhūtāni sā rātrih paśyato muneh ||

That which is night⁵⁸ for all beings, in that the self-controlled ascetic is awake. That in which all beings are awake is night for the sage who sees.

In this way, “supramundanity” is associated with supralucidity,⁵⁹ with the result that the *jīvanmukta* remains indifferent to the ordinary world, its affects, prescriptions and prohibitions. We observe many ways of referring to the *jīvanmukta*'s *alaukika* or *lokottara* character, besides the use of the term itself, among which are the recourse to paradox, as in the verse of the BHG just quoted, and such exclamations as “*iti citram*,” “how wonderful!”, by which the *Gītārthasaṃgraha* comments on it⁶⁰ – another way of expressing that everpresent *camatkāra*, “wonder,” “wonderment,” which is also a criterion, as we have seen, for determining which of the explicit or

⁵⁷ On this connotation of *kaścit*, see notably D. Shulman's paper in this volume.

⁵⁸ “Night” is a metaphor for *māyā*, as explained by the *Gītārthasaṃgraha*. See the entire passage ad loc.

⁵⁹ See also *Locana* on *Dhvanyālokaṃ* ad III 1 (quoted below, p. 56), commenting on BHG II 71.

⁶⁰ *Gītārthasaṃgraha* ad BHG II 71: ... *paśyata eva sā rātrir iti citram* | *vidyāyām cāvadhate yogī yatra sarvo vimūḍhaḥ* | *avidyāyām tv abuddhaḥ yatra janah prabuddhaḥ – ity api citram*.

suggested meanings prevails, hence, whether the verse belongs to the *dhvani* register or to that of the *alaṅkāras*.⁶¹

All similar features specific to the *jīvanmukta* are variously emphasized in the texts, especially in Śaiva texts.

The way the *jīvanmukta* makes others talk about him (*lokaṃ ca vācālayan*), without trying to explain himself – so much so that he is, for ordinary men, an object of scandal and contempt – is described in *Gītārthasaṃgraha* ad BHG XIV 26:

*yas tu phalaṃ kiñcid apy anabhilaṣyan kim etad alīkam anuṭiṣṭhasi iti pa-
ryanuyujyamāno 'pi nirantarabhaḡavadbhaktivedhavidrutāntaḡkaraṇata-
yā kaṇṭakitaromavān vepamānatanur visphāritanayanayugalaparivarta-
mānasalilasamṡpātaḡ tūṣṇimbhavenaivottaraṃ prayacchati |*

Harassed by his circle, who cannot bear not to understand him: “Why such an untrue behaviour?” (which is in some way an echo of “hiding his Self” – *svātmānaṃ pracchādayan* – of the *Locana*), the yogin answers through silence to the crowd of the *paśus*, immersed as he is in the mystical experience of *bhakti*, whose symptoms are thrilling with joy, quivering and an uninterrupted flow of tears from his wide open eyes.

This is of course more than what the common man can understand and tolerate. Therefore the *jīvanmukta* is harassed, mocked and despised for being stupid (*mūrkhā*), insensible or insentient (*jaḡa*), or even insane (*unmatta*).⁶²

Similarly, *kārikā* 71 (an *āryā*) in the PS, also a work of Abhinavagupta, asserts:

*madahaṡakopamanmathaviṣāḡadabhayaḡlobhamohaparivarjī |
niḡstotravaṡaṡkāro jaḡa iva vicared avāḡdamatiḡ ||*

Living without self-deception, excitement, anger, infatuation, dejection, fear, greed, or delusion; uttering neither praises [of the gods] nor ritual formulae and having no opinions whatever, he should behave as one insensible (*jaḡa*).

This vision of the *jīvanmukta* is the same as in the *Locana* and the *Gītārthasaṃgraha*. It is worth noting that the “*jaḡa*” of the stanza is glossed by Yogarāja as “*unmatta*” – “insane” in the eyes of the world

⁶¹ On *camatkāra*, see BANSAT-BOUDON AND TRIPATHI 2011, p. 320.

⁶² See below.

– which implies that “having effectively conquered himself, considering that all is *brahman*, he should disport himself for purposes of play.”⁶³

Such a description of the *jīvanmukta*, although marked as Śaiva, is nonetheless shared by other schools, as the Vedāntic *Āgamaśāstra* (II 36b-37) clearly shows.⁶⁴

In the same vein, the *Bālapriyā* subcommentary of the *Locana* cites a stanza, probably a proverb, which describes the way the world (or the common man) and the *jīvanmukta* (here the “one who knows the reality” – *jñātataṭṭva*) consider each other as a *piśāca*, conventionally perceived as insentient (*jaḍa*) and insane (*ummatta*):

jñātataṭṭvasya loko 'yaṃ jaḍonmattapiśācavat |
jñātataṭṭvo 'pi lokasya jaḍonmattapiśācavat ||

For the one who knows the reality, this world is like an insentient and insane *piśāca*, but, for this world, it is the one who knows the reality who is like an insentient and insane *piśāca*.⁶⁵

⁶³ Commenting on PS 71: *jaḍa iva vicared avādamatiḥ*, “He should just behave as one insensible, having no opinions whatever,” Yogarāja observes: *pūrṇatvād ākāṅkṣāvīrahāc conmatta ivetikartavyatārūpe śāstrīye karmaṇi pramāṇopapānne vā prameyasatattve pramāṭṛbhiḥ sahedam upapannam idaṃ neti vicārabāhiṣkṛtabuddhir... iti dāntaprāyo bhūtvā sarvaṃ brahmāvalokayan krīḍārthaṃ vihared eveti jaḍatvena nirūpitaḥ |*. “Since he is himself replete, due to the absence of all expectations, he is like one at a loss (*ummatta*); his mind has banished considerations having to do with actions taught in the injunctive treatises, such as those that specify the manner of accomplishing [rituals, etc.] or [those that involve] the existence of something to be apprehended in conformity with some mode of correct apprehension (*pramāṇa*) and requiring an accompanying apprehender (*pramāṭṛ*), such as ‘this [conclusion] is proven, this [one] is not’ [...]. Thus, having effectively conquered himself, considering that all is *brahman*, he should disport himself for purposes of play. For this reason, he has been described here as insensible (or insane).” On the ascetic seen as *ummatta* in Tantric texts, see J. Törzsök’s contribution to this volume.

⁶⁴ *Āgamaśāstra* II 36cd-37: ... *advaitaṃ samanuprāpya jaḍaval lokam ācaret || nistutir nirnamaskāro niḥsvadhākāra eva ca | calācalaniketaś ca yatir yādṛcchiko bhavet ||*. “Having realized nonduality, one should behave as a fool among people. Giving no praise, paying no homage, nor pronouncing *svadhā* [i.e., not offering libations to the Manes/Ancestors], with an unfixed home, and acting spontaneously [without willing anything] (*yādṛcchika*), one should become an ascetic.” (Transl. BHATTACHARYA 1989, modified as to the meaning of *yādṛcchika*.)

⁶⁵ Same quote in *Jñānaśrīmitranibandhāvali, pariccheda* 3, p. 419.

Nevertheless, that so-called insentience and stupidity of the *jīvanmukta*, as he appears in the eyes of the uncomprehending common man, is but the corollary of the “supramundanity” (*lokottaratva/alaukikatva*) that is the very mark of the accomplished yogin, the *jīvanmukta*. This runs like a red thread in Abhinavagupta’s works. In his *Gītārthasaṃgraha*, he interprets BHG II 66-70 (according to the numbering of the Kashmirian version) as referring to the *sthītaprajña*, himself portrayed as the *jīvanmukta*, as made obvious by the quotation (from an unidentified source): “*yogī ca sarvavyavahārān kurvāṇo ’pi lokottaraḥ*” – “Extraordinary is the yogin, even when he attends to worldly transactions” –, which qualifies such a yogin as *lokottara*, as is the case in the passage of the *Locana* we are dealing with.⁶⁶

That “supramundanity” (*lokottaratva/alaukikatva*) appears again in the *Locana* commenting on *Dhvanyālokavṛtti* ad III 1. In his *vṛtti*, Ānandavardhana deals with the type of *dhvani* where the literal sense is not intended (*avivakṣitavācya*) – that is, where it is entirely set aside,⁶⁷ and cites precisely the same BHG II 71 which Abhinavagupta comments upon in his *Gītārthasaṃgraha* (see above, p. 53, and n. 60). Ānandavardhana’s *vṛtti* (CSS ed., p. 294; INGALLS ET AL. 1990, p. 376) reads as follows:

anena hi vākyena niśārtho na ca jāgaraṇārthaḥ kaścīd vivakṣitaḥ | kiṃ tarhi? tattvajñānāvahītatvam atattvaparāṇmukhatvaṃ ca munehḥ pratipādyata iti tiraskṛtavācyaśyāsya vyañjakatvam |

For in this sentence the meanings “night” and “waking” are not at all intended. What then? What is communicated is rather the attention of the sage to the knowledge of ultimate reality and his disregard for what is not

⁶⁶ *Gītārthasaṃgraha* ad BHG II 66-70: [*rāgadveṣetyādi pratiṣṭhitety antam*] *yas tu manaso niyāmakah sa viṣayān sevamāno ’pi na krodhādikallolair abhibhūyate iti sa eva sthītaprajño yogīti tātparyam | “yogī ca sarvavyavahārān kurvāṇo ’pi lokottaraḥ” – iti nirūpayatā parameśvarena saṃkṣipyāsya svarūpaṃ kathyate. “He who controls his mind is not thrown about by the waves of wrath, etc., even when he perceives the sense-objects; hence he alone is a yogin, a man-of-stabilized-intellect; such is the intended meaning. As has been said: ‘Extraordinary is the yogin, even when he attends to worldly transactions.’”*

⁶⁷ See also, in this volume, D. Shulman’s paper, examining *Dhvanyāloka* III 40 and III 43.

that reality. Thus the subjective force is of [the sub-type where] the literal meaning is entirely set aside.⁶⁸

Here is another opportunity for Abhinavagupta to comment again on BHG II 71, this time in the context of the *dhvani* exposition, and to focus on the same *lokottaratā* to which he refers in his *Gītārtha-saṃgraha* on this verse. His *Locana* on *Dhvanyālokavṛtti* ad III 1 thus reads (CSS ed., p. 294; INGALLS ET AL. 1990, p. 376):

*tasmād bādhitāsvārtham etad vākyaṃ saṃyamino lokottaratālakṣaṇena
nimittena tattvadṛṣṭāv avadhānaṃ mithyādṛṣṭau ca parāṇmukhatvaṃ
dhvanati |*

Therefore this sentence, its primary meaning being obstructed,⁶⁹ suggests that the self-controlled ascetic, because of his extraordinary nature, is attentive to the perception [lit. “vision”] of ultimate reality and disregards false perception.⁷⁰

Let us come back to *Locana* ad I 13, which cites our stanza: “*bhāvavrāta*, etc.” It is that extraordinary conduct of the yogin which is a source of wonder (see also the use of *kaścit* qualifying *mahāpuruṣa*), and it is why the suggested meaning (the *jīvanmukta*) prevails over the expressed one (the *bhāvavrāta*), thus making the *aprasutapraśamsā* a case of *dhvani*. Such is the meaning of Abhinavagupta’s *avataraṇikā* to his exegesis of his own stanza (“*bhāvavrāta*, etc.”), as we have seen.⁷¹

Although the passage has already been quoted (above, p. 50), I come back to its interpretation, whose implications may be further developed now that the suggested meaning has been identified:

But if the true subject [of the utterance] (*prastuta*) [i.e., the speaker’s intention which he wants to convey to the listener, therefore, the suggested meaning he has in his mind, namely, the evocation of the *jīvanmukta*] is a source of wonder, [although] suggested (*ākṣipyamāṇa*) by means of [another subject] that is non-pertinent or irrelevant (*aprastuta*) [to the speaker

⁶⁸ Transl. INGALLS ET AL. 1990, p. 376 (slightly modified). A similar eviction of the literal meaning, in order to establish a suggestion based on metaphoric usage, is found in *Meghadūta* 31, quoted by the *vṛtti* ad III 43, in which the word *maitrī*, “friendship,” applied to the breeze, must be taken metaphorically, since no breeze is ever literally “friendly” (see, in the volume, D. Shulman’s analysis of the verse).

⁶⁹ Since “night” and “waking” must not be taken literally here.

⁷⁰ Transl. INGALLS ET AL. 1990, p. 376 (slightly modified).

⁷¹ Note a variant, *pāda* c: *sa tvām āha jaḍaṃ tatah...*

and the listener, namely, the *bhāvavrāta*] – that other subject being insentient, etc., or described in such a way that its particularities are entirely unimaginable for such a result [namely, suggesting the real meaning and thus arousing a sense of wonder, as does the *prastuta*, i.e., the portrayal of the *jīvanmukta*] – then, we have a case of *vastudhvani*.

Now that the *mahāpuruṣa* is identified as a *jīvanmukta*, let us come to the functioning of the figure, based on the similarity of the “suggested” meaning, pertinent or relevant (*prastuta*) to the speaker and listener, and the “suggesting” (or “expressed”) meaning that is not pertinent to them (*aprastuta*), and to the examination of the expressed meaning, which consists in the description of the *bhāvavrāta*.

The next segment of the *Locana* reads as follows:

... jaḍo 'yam iti hy udyānendūdayādir bhāvo lokenāvajñāyate, sa ca prastuta kasyacid virahiṇa autsukyacinādūyamānamānasatām anyasya praharṣaparavaśatām karotīti haṭhād eva lokam yathecchaṃ vikārakāraṇābhīr nartayati | ...

In Jayaratha's TĀV (and in Abhinavagupta's ĪPV ad I 1, 4, as we have seen, p. 46), the *bhāvas* of the *bhāvavrāta* denote the objects of experience (apparently external and internal) that are “blue” (and “pleasure,” according to the pan-Indian definition).⁷² Hence, the so-called materiality of the empirical world is at stake – which is the point of departure for Jayaratha's demonstration of what is, in Śaiva doctrine, the ultimate reality: the non-duality of the subject and the object.

For its part (see the Sanskrit text quoted immediately above), the *Locana* limits the notion of *bhāva*(s) to the class of entities, apparently insentient, which are called *vibhāvas*, “determinants” or “stimulants” in aesthetic theory. The examples given by Abhinavagupta, the garden (*udyāna*) or moonrise (*indūdaya*), belong to the subcategory named *uddīpanavibhāvas*, “inflaming causes.” The *uddīpanavibhāvas* arouse such and such *vyabhicāribhāvas*, “transitory

⁷² See (Appendix-1) TĀV I 332: *he bhāvavrāta nīlādyartha[h]*. “Blue” [or “yellow” (*pīta*), etc.] is the standard example of the external form grasped by the sense-organs, whereas *sukha*, “pleasure,” is that of the internal, grasped by the *antaḥkāraṇa*. Therefore, the syntagm *nīlasukhādi* represents the “knowable” (*vedya*), or “objectivity” insofar as it is an object of consciousness, whether external or internal. Such reasonings are common to Buddhist idealists and to the Trika, even though the latter (see SPK I 4) reaches the opposite conclusion: the existence of a permanent Subject, a substratum for the impermanent, incidental experiences of pleasure and pain, etc.

affects.” In other words, as taught in the *rasasūtra* (*Nāṭyaśāstra* VI),⁷³ a given combination of *vibhāvas* (or “determinants”), *anubhāvas* (or “consequents”) and *vyabhicāribhāvas* (“transitory affects”), constitutive of a given *sthāyibhāva*, “permanent affect” (although the *sthāyibhāva* is not mentioned in the *rasasūtra*), culminates in the advent of a given *rasa*.⁷⁴

For this very reason, not all *vibhāvas* are a source of delight, as Abhinavagupta underlines it (here and at other places),⁷⁵ since the same garden and the same moonrise are capable of arousing two opposite emotions, nostalgia or exultation, according to the condition of the lover who contemplates them, that is, according to the emotional status of the *ālambanavibhāva*, the “substantial cause” that is the hero himself – whether he is separated from (*virahin*) his

⁷³ *Nāṭyaśāstra* VI, *rasasūtra*, vol. I, pp. 271ff.: *vibhāvānubhāvavyabhicārisaṃyogād rasaniṣpattiḥ*, “*rasa* is the result of the combination of ‘determinants,’ ‘consequents’ and ‘transitory affects.’”

⁷⁴ On all these categories and the way they contribute to the whole of the aesthetic process, see BANSAT-BOUDON 1992, pp. 109-117; 1992a, pp. 141-145. On *ālambanavibhāvas* and *uddīpanavibhāvas*, see below, n. 75; also BANSAT-BOUDON 1992, p. 113, 1992a, pp. 141-142; and, in this volume, D. Shulman’s paper.

⁷⁵ *Abhinavabhāratī* ad *Nāṭyaśāstra* VI, *rasasūtra*, vol. I, p. 282 (including the corrections made by GNOLI 1968, p. 20): *tatrānubhāvānām vibhāvānām vyabhicārinām ca pṛthak sthāyini niyamo nāsti | bāṣpāder ānandākṣirogādījatvadarśanāt | vyāghrādeś ca krodhabhayādīhetuvāt śramacintāder utsāhabhayādyanekasahacaravāvalokanāt | sāmagrī tu na vyabhicārīṇī | tathā hi bandhuvinaśo yatra vibhāvaḥ paridevitāśrupātādis tv anubhāvaś cintādāinyādīś ca vyabhicārī so ’vaśyaṃ śoka eveti*. “The *anubhāvas*, *vibhāvas*, *vyabhicārins*, taken separately, are not restricted to a particular *sthāyin*, as one sees, for instance, tears caused by happiness or an eye disease; since, for instance, a tiger may create anger or fear; since one notices that fatigue and restlessness can accompany more than one *sthāyin*, such as ardour or fear. However, any given combination [of these three factors] is necessarily associated to one specific *sthāyin* [lit. “does not deviate from the *sthāyin*.”] Thus, when the death of a relative is the “determinant,” when lamentations and tears are the “consequents,” when anxiety and despondency are the “transitory affects,” it is necessarily the [*sthāyin* that is] sorrow which is at stake.” Such psychological considerations are so widespread as to be almost conventions, or *topoi*, as shown, for instance, by Gauḍapāda’s commentary ad SK 12: a beautiful and virtuous woman (here an *ālambanavibhāva*) is a source of joy to all, but a source of sorrow to her co-wives and of stupefaction to passionate beings; a dharmic king (also an *ālambanavibhāva*) inspires happiness in the good and unhappiness in the wicked; clouds (an *uddīpanavibhāva*), although inanimate, generate joy in the world, when they bring rain and thus urge the ploughman to plough, but they produce stupefaction in separated lovers (... *meghāḥ... jagataḥ sukhām utpādayanti te vṛṣṭyā karṣakāṇām karṣaṇodyogam janayanti virahiṇām moham*).

beloved or not (CSS ed., p. 128: ... *sa ca pratyuta kasyacid virahina autsukyacintādūyamānamānasatām anyasya praharṣaparavaśatām karotīti...*).⁷⁶

This is how the essential features of Indian aesthetic and dramatic theory come through in the exegesis Abhinavagupta proposes for the expressed meaning of his own stanza.

The *Locana* thus presents the same scheme of interpretation as does the TĀV, namely, the exploitation of the dramatic analogy, but at the cost of a slight shift from the evocation of Śakti, the divine actress, to that of the *vibhāvas* and their “powers.”

It is nonetheless possible to recognize the figure of the deity as an actor/actress, in a more subtle way, under the web of meanings that implies, in a Śaiva context, the metaphoric notion of *hṛdaya*, the Heart – in other words the supreme and unique principle of phenomenal manifestation. I shall come back to this.

For this is not all. Such an aesthetic interpretation of the *bhāva-vrāta* is subordinated to a superior ambition, of a philosophical order.

As is the case in the TĀV, the *Locana* wants to show that it is wrong to ascribe the status of an insentient, therefore stupid, entity to phenomenal diversity. This is demonstrated by the fact that those *bhāvas*, understood as apparently insentient *vibhāvas* (here *uddīpanavibhāvas*), have a complete and irresistible (*haṭhāt*) hold over the ordinary man. Thus the dramatic metaphor is again entirely applicable here. These all-powerful *vibhāvas* cause men (the hearts of men) to play as they wish, as does an actor (*haṭhād eva lokam yathecchaṃ vikārakāraṇābhir nartayati*). They are the source of men’s emotions. They move them. One thinks of Zola’s statement in *La faute de l’Abbé Mouret*: “Ils cédèrent aux exigences du jardin” – “They gave in to the demands of the garden.” There is nothing more sentient, more sensible and more intelligent than these *vibhāvas*.

Here, Abhinavagupta introduces an amazing development, in the form of a digression, about the “heart” (*hṛdaya*) of the *bhāvas*, which, in his first comment of the text, he had described as the “wordly objects” of the *bhāvavrāta*, the “totality” of them; here however *bhāva* is understood in the limited sense of the *vibhāvas* of the *uddīpana* category, i.e. gardens, moonrises and so on.

⁷⁶ Compare Ingalls’ analysis, below, p. 64.

... *na ca tasya hṛdayam kenāpi jñāyate kīdr̥g ayam iti, pratyuta mahāgam-
bhīro ’tividagdhaḥ suṣṭhugarvahīno ’tiśayena krīḍācaturaḥ...*

The ordinary man does not know anything about their hearts, since he is still unaware that they have one, whereas he allows himself a heart, convinced that he is a *sahṛdaya*, “endowed with a heart.” However, the Śaiva thinker and mystic knows well that the object also is “endowed with a heart.”

The passage in which Abhinavagupta describes that heart, which he has the privilege to know, is of great beauty, perhaps also by virtue of its paradoxical character. That heart is “most deep” (*mahā-gambhīra*), “very intelligent” (*atividagdha*), “entirely devoid of conceit” (*suṣṭhugarvahīna*) – the conceit, *abhimāna*, that characterizes the common man who claims to be a *sahṛdaya* – and “skillful at play” (*krīḍācatura*). In the final analysis, it means that the object is not different from consciousness, hence, not different from Śiva, himself “most deep,” etc., and “skillful at play,” just like an actor. We have come full circle.

Let us observe also that Abhinavagupta undoubtedly understands the present participle *nartayan* as a fullfledged causative that governs *janasya hṛdayāni* in the stanza⁷⁷ – he comments on “*haṭhāj janasya hṛdayāni nartayan*” of his verse as: “*haṭhād eva lokam yathe-
cchaṃ vikāraḥ kārāṇābhīr nartayati.*”

The “whole of things” (here understood as the totality of the *vi-
bhāvas*) *causes* the hearts of men *to play*, just as it deceives or dupes them, making them feel the entire range of emotions. This is the reason why I propose, in this context, a slightly different translation of the stanza, of which I give only the first hemistich here:

O whole of things [such as the “determinants” that are gardens or moon-
rise]! Since, hiding your heart that is the Self [as does an actor], you play,
while you forcibly grab hold of the hearts of men, by causing them to
enact (*nartayan*) the variety of [emotional] modes,⁷⁸ he who calls you un-
conscious is himself unconscious, etc. [...]

The preeminence of suggestion (the evocation of the *jīvanmukta*) does not prevent the expressed meaning from being tightly coherent

⁷⁷ Contrary to Jayaratha, who understands it as a kind of denominative; see above, p. 41.

⁷⁸ Lit., “by causing them to enact (*nartayan*) through the variety of [emotional] modes...”, unless one considers the instrumental as being the complement of means applying to the gerund *ākramya*.

and articulated. It is even a *sine qua non* condition for establishing a term-by-term correspondence between what suggests and what is suggested. The stanza is indeed built on an *aprustutaprasaṃsā* of the third category, that of the relationship of similarity between the non-pertinent and the pertinent; yet, if one follows Ānandavardhana and his exegete, since the aesthetic balance is tilted towards the suggested meaning, it is not the mere figure of speech known as “*aprustutaprasaṃsā*,” but a case of *vastudhvani*. The following chart shows the symmetry of the two meanings (denoted and suggested; non-pertinent and pertinent):

<i>BHĀVAVRĀTA: THE APRASTUTA</i>	<i>JĪVANMUKTA: THE PRASTUTA</i>
<i>ātmahr̥dayaṃ pracchādya</i> (in the verse)	<i>svātmānaṃ pracchādayan</i>
The series of epithets qualifying the heart of the <i>bhāvavrāta</i> : “very deep,” “very intelligent”... (in the exegesis of the verse)	<i>gāḍhavivekāloka</i> ^o ...
“skillful at play” (<i>krīḍācatura</i>) in the exegesis of the verse + <i>haṭhāj janasya hr̥dayāni... nartayan</i> (in the verse) and <i>haṭhād eva lokam yathecchaṃ vikārakāraṇābhir nartayati</i> (in the exegesis of the verse)	<i>lokam vācālayan</i>
The consequence being that such <i>bhāvas</i> are regarded as insentient and foolish, and despised for it: <i>jaḍo ’yam iti... bhāvo lokenāvajñāyate</i> ... (in the exegesis of the verse)	With the same consequence: <i>tenaiva lokena mūrkho ’yam iti yad avajñāyate</i>

I leave aside the rest of the exegesis (see complete text in Appendix-2) that focusses on the paradoxical mockery, already emphasized in the TĀV, by means of which the accusation of insentience made

against phenomenal diversity discredits the accuser, who is in his turn accused of being more than stupid:

... *sa yadi lokena jaḍa iti tata eva kāraṇāt pratyuta vaidagdhya-sambhāva-nanimittāt sambhāvitaḥ | ātmā ca yata eva kāraṇāt pratyuta jāḍyena sambhāvyas tata eva saḥṛdayaḥ sambhāvitas tad asya lokasya jaḍo 'sīti yad ucyate tadā jāḍyam [jāḍyam corr. : jaḍyam CSS ed.] evamvidhasya bhāvavratasyāvidagdhasya prasiddham iti sā pratyuta stutir iti | jaḍād api pāpīyān ayaṃ loka iti dhvanyate |*

Moreover, in the reversal of blame into praise, the dichotomy of subject and object dissolves.

Indeed, I am tempted to say, distancing myself from Ānandavardhana's theory and Abhinavagupta's exegesis, that in the *Locana* it is not only the suggested meaning which is *camatkāra-kārin*, but the articulation of both the suggested and expressed meanings. By means of this articulation, the deceived spectator – namely, the common man who is the subject of the directly expressed meaning (as also analyzed in the TĀV) – and the emancipated spectator⁷⁹ – namely, the *jīvanmukta* evoked through the suggested meaning unveiled in the *Locana* – are turned into symmetrical figures, actually mirroring one another.⁸⁰

Thus my interpretation differs from that of Ingalls, who does not seem to have understood who that *mahāpuruṣa* really is, except when, almost without realizing it, he identifies the *mahāpuruṣa* as a Pāśupata, basing himself on the sole evidence of the syntagm *lokaṃ vācālayan* (“making people speak”) which qualifies the *mahāpuruṣa*. According to Ingalls, this *mahāpuruṣa* deliberately makes ordinary men talk about him, seeking to arouse their disapproval, as a provocative Pāśupata will do.⁸¹

Ingalls shows his uneasiness, or even his irritation, in his note (n. 4, pp. 163-164), which seems to miss the point, if only for the reason that he refers to a “second meaning” without identifying it explicitly:

⁷⁹ Phrase borrowed from the title of RANCIÈRE 2008, although Rancière's perspective is different.

⁸⁰ See BANSAT-BOUDON AND TRIPATHI 2011, pp. 55-56.

⁸¹ INGALLS ET AL. 1990, p. 164: “But the great man does conceal his thoughts. His causing the tongues of men to wag, in the case of the Pāśupatas and I dare say of any Tantrics, was a premeditated instigation of reproach” – and, for that, Ingalls refers to INGALLS 1962. See also J. Törzsök's contribution to this volume.

What is one to make of Abhinava's account of his own verse? The literal meaning of the stanza is not difficult. "Men who decry, as do the non-Tantric philosophers, the delights of love and of the senses, calling them brute pleasures, are really stupider than the pleasure they run down. So I will not copy them by calling names. To call them stupid would be to compliment them." Now it is true that the literal meaning is impossible from the realistic point of view [...]. Neither garden nor moonrise, being insentient, actually makes the heart dance, nor do they conceal their own heart, for they have none. So one is forced to look for a second meaning. To pass to that second meaning is more difficult. Abhinavagupta has thrown what seems to me a needless stumbling block in our way by the discrepancy between the plurality of delights (or stimulants, *bhāvavrāta*) and the singularity of the great man (*mahāpuruṣa*).⁸²

I would object to Ingalls' observations that i) the *Locana* asserts that those insentient objects do have a heart and ii) there is no discrepancy between a plural and a singular, since the term *bhāvavrāta* is a neuter singular, working as a collective name.

In any case, it seems to me that one can give credit to Abhinavagupta. Exegete of the *Dhvanyāloka* and author of several fundamental texts of his school, he knows what he wants to say, and his exegesis is perfectly articulated. Needless to say, one is free not to always agree with Abhinavagupta's position. Nevertheless, in my view, the question is not whether we agree or not with Abhinavagupta's interpretation, but how to understand and convey it as that of an important witness, testifying, not only to a given current of thought at a given time, but also to the way that thought results from previous debates. Hence it seems necessary to try to understand Abhinavagupta's sometimes intricate thought.

Moreover – would it be an irrefutable argument?⁸³ – he, as *author of the stanza*, certainly knows best what he speaks of. He is surely the most authorized to know the *tātparya*, the author's intention.

⁸² My emphasis.

⁸³ For there is scope as well for an antagonist position, as hold by the Telugu *cāṭu* verse mentioned to me by David Shulman in a private correspondence – a very contemporary position, indeed, quite in tune with the theory of literature: 'The beauties of a poem, / are best known by a critic. / What does the author know? / The beauties of a woman are known / only to her husband. / What does a father know?'. Yet such emphasis on the preeminent role of the reader (a *sahṛdaya* compared to a husband), the Telugu verse is less radical than the view expressed by Mallarmé (*Quant au livre*), who goes so far as to deny any hermeneutic authority to both author and reader: "Impersonnifié, le volume, autant qu'on s'en

As to Ingalls' interpretation of our stanza, I would add that it is a bit hasty to liken those *bhāvas* that are *vibhāvas* to "delights" alone – which contradicts both the theory expounded in the *Nāṭyaśāstra* and the *Locana* itself: not all *vibhāvas* are a source of delight, as we have seen (see above, p. 59).

Thus it seems to me that Ingalls goes astray when he suggests that the stanza refers to a liberation to be obtained by the path of *bhoga*, "enjoyment." Rather, in my view, and in the light of Abhinavagupta's self-exegesis, the stanza implicitly refers to the kind of *mukti* which is *jīvanmukti*, a central notion in Kashmirian non-dualist Śaivism.⁸⁴ After all, Abhinavagupta's point of view is that of the Trika, not of the Pāśupata doctrine.

At the end, let us reconsider a question of chronology. Pandey asserted that Abhinavagupta's philosophical works predated his aesthetic texts, his main reason being a reference to the TĀ in the *Locana*. Ingalls (p. 32) refutes Pandey's opinion by showing that this so-called reference to the TĀ is in fact a corrupt reading: the correct reading, according to Ingalls, is *Tattvāloka* instead of *Tantrāloka*. In any case, however we resolve the question of the reading, the stanza under examination ("*bhāvavrāta*, etc.") proves that Abhinavagupta cites his own TĀ, which thus must be prior to his *Locana*. For it would be difficult to reverse the reasoning, namely, that a stanza, composed ad hoc by Abhinavagupta for his commentary on *Dhvaṇyāloka*, would have been reused in the TĀ, in such a manner as to fit so perfectly into it.⁸⁵

sépare comme auteur, ne réclame approche de lecteur. Tel, saché, entre les accessoires humains, il a lieu tout seul : fait, étant. Le sens enseveli se meut et dispose, en cœur, des feuillets." ("Disembodied, the book, inasmuch as the author detaches himself from it, does not require a reader's approach. Thus of all human accessories, it happens by itself: once made, there it is. Know: the buried meaning is moving and altogether arranges the pages.").

⁸⁴ On *jīvanmukti* as the main goal and concern of the non-dualist Śaiva doctrine, see BANSAT-BOUDON AND TRIPATHI 2011, pp. 32-37.

⁸⁵ Isabelle Ratié has suggested (personal communication) that the huge TĀ might not have been composed in one go but that here and there Abhinavagupta might have incorporated parts of his early works, possibly including one that contained the *bhāvavrāta* stanza; see, for instance, RATIÉ 2011, p. 329, about the existence of an early *Bhedavādaśāstra*, now lost, of which a segment of Chapter 10 of the TĀ seems to be a paraphrase. Obviously one cannot be categorical on this.

3. *DHVANYĀLOKAVṚTTI* III 40⁸⁶ AND *LOCANA* THERE-
ON,⁸⁷ OR FURTHER OBSERVATIONS ON THE QUESTION
OF THE *DHVANI*

Allow me a last point: the text which David Shulman has given to this volume mainly deals with the *Dhvanyāloka* theory of subordinate suggestion and considers as well the symmetrical case of subordinate denotation and enhanced suggestion. In a post-script, the paper refers, apropos *Dhvanyālokavṛtti* III 40, to Dharmakīrti's two stanzas cited and commented by Ānandavardhana (CSS ed., pp. 487-490; INGALLS ET AL. 1990, pp. 625-626) – which announce the autobiographical verse he gives in his *vṛtti* ad III 43: *yā vyāpā-ravatī...* (CSS ed., pp. 507-510; INGALLS ET AL. 1990, pp. 653; see D. Shulman's contribution to this volume).

In effect, *Dhvanyāloka* III 40⁸⁸ and its *vṛtti* give Ānandavardhana an opportunity to come back to the *aprustutaprasāṃsā*, in this case the *aprustutaprasāṃsā* belonging to the same category as the one which characterizes our stanza, that is, an *aprustutaprasāṃsā* based on the similarity of *prastuta* and *aprustuta* (CSS ed., pp. 487-489; INGALLS ET AL. 1990, pp. 625-626).

Here is the first stanza (a *sārdūlavikrīḍita*) ascribed to Dharmakīrti,⁸⁹ which Ānandavardhana quotes in support of his demonstration:

lāvānyadraviṇavyayo na gaṇitaḥ kleśo mahān arjitaḥ
svacchandaṃ carato janasya hṛdaye cintājvaro nirmitaḥ |
eṣāpi svayam eva tulyaramanābhāvād varākī hatā

⁸⁶ CSS ed., pp. 483-494; INGALLS ET AL. 1990, pp. 624-634.

⁸⁷ CSS ed., pp. 483-494; INGALLS ET AL. 1990, pp. 628-631, 634-635.

⁸⁸ The text of the *kārikā* is given below, p. 68.

⁸⁹ As pointed out by Isabelle Ratié (personal communication), modern philology considers that the first stanza is only “hypothetically ascribed to Dharmakīrti” (see STCHERBATSKY 1930-1932, vol. I, pp. 35-36), since it is nowhere to be found in any of Dharmakīrti's known works, whereas the second stanza, which has long been well-known, appears in the reference edition of the *Pramāṇa-vārttika* by Miyasaka (see PV, *Parārthānumāna* 286). That the first stanza should only be “hypothetically ascribed to Dharmakīrti” seems to have been a point of contention at the time of Ānandavardhana and Abhinavagupta: in his *vṛtti*, Ānanda describes it as “commonly ascribed to Dharmakīrti” (see below) whereas for Abhinavagupta it is “indubitably (*nirvivāda*) [the work of Dharmakīrti]”. However, it is obvious that for both the two stanzas are by Dharmakīrti, since this is the key argument in their demonstration that the second stanza is a direct expression of the first, itself a case of *dhvani*.

ko 'rthaś cetasi vedhasā vinihitas tanvyās tanuṃ tanvatā ||

Since David Shulman has translated this intricate (and somewhat enigmatic) stanza,⁹⁰ I will only summarize its meaning: what was the creator's/Brahman's goal when he formed such a matchless girl? For, not only have such perfections created a feverish anxiety in the hearts of men, but the girl herself, not having found a lover worthy of her, is left to languish, unrecognized and unattended.

Ānandavardhana, in his *vṛtti* (*loc. cit.*, CSS ed., pp. 487-488), reveals the suggested meaning to be read beneath the expressed one, which is described as highly implausible: such words can neither be those of a lover (*rāgin* – since a lover could not regard himself as inferior to his beloved) nor of the symmetrical figure of the ascetic (*nīrāga* – since love and beauty are none of his concerns).⁹¹

And Ānandavardhana concludes (CSS ed., p. 489; INGALLS ET AL. 1990, p. 625):

... tasmād aprastutaprasaṃseyaṃ | yasmād anena vācyena guṇībhūtātmanā nissāmānyaguṇāvalepādhmātasya nijamahimotkarṣajanitasamatsarajanajvarasya viśeṣajñam ātmano na kañcid evāparaṃ paśyataḥ paridevītam etad iti prakāśyate |

Therefore, it must be an *aprastutaprasaṃsā*, for by the subordination of the literal sense there appears [the suggestion] of a lament (*paridevīta*) by a man puffed up with pride in his uncommon talents (*nissāmānyaguṇa*^o), on seeing that others fail to recognize his qualities (*viśeṣajñam ātmano na kañcid evāparaṃ paśyataḥ*) because he has fired their jealousy by the degree of his brilliance (*nijamahimotkarṣa*^o).⁹²

Thus is the *aprastutaprasaṃsā* clearly established. Moreover, according to the theorization and exemplification at work in the *vṛtti* ad *Dhvanyāloka* I 13, that particular use of the *aprastutaprasaṃsā*

⁹⁰ See his contribution to this volume: “It was a huge effort, and he spared no expense./ A hungry fire now burns in the hearts of men/ who were happy before./ And as for her, poor girl, she’s left to languish/ because no lover could ever/ be her equal. So what was God thinking/ when he turned his mind/ to fashioning **her** body?”

⁹¹ On this important factor of the plausibility of the *aprastuta*, see above, p. 50. Nevertheless, Abhinavagupta ad loc. (CSS ed., p. 488; INGALLS ET AL. 1990, pp. 630-631) – *nanu ca rāgīno 'pi...* – raises possible objections to this line of argument, but only to explain the reason why Ānandavardhana in his *vṛtti* unveils the implicit meaning of Dharmakīrti's verse.

⁹² Transl. INGALLS ET AL. 1990, p. 626, with my suppletions.

in Dharmakīrti's first stanza should constitute a case of *dhvani*, in the manner of the stanza “*bhāvavrāta*, etc.”: in both cases, the suggested meaning prevails over the literal sense.

Nevertheless, here (*Dhvanyāloka* III 40, with its *vṛtti*), Ānandavardhana's point about the status of the *aprastutaprasaṃsā* is not explicitly stated, for *Dhvanyāloka* III 40 adopts a somewhat different perspective, which is that of subordinate suggestion, and refers to *dhvani* in this context alone:

prakāro 'yaṃ guṇībhūtavyaṅgyo 'pi dhvanirūpatām |
dhatte rasādītāparyaparyalocanayā punaḥ ||

This type of poetry also, where the suggestion is subordinated, may take on the nature of *dhvani* when regarded from the viewpoint of its final meaning, if that meaning is *rasa*, etc.⁹³

Yet, in the course of his demonstration (CSS ed., pp. 486-487; INGALLS ET AL. 1990, p. 625), Ānandavardhana comes to deal with a more general statement, which invites the *sahṛdaya* to distinguish between the three areas of i) mere rhetoric, namely, the figures of speech, ii) *dhvani* and iii) subordinate suggestion (*guṇībhūtavyaṅgya*):

vācyavyaṅgyayoḥ prādhānyāprādhānyaviveke paraḥ prayatno vidhātavyaḥ, yena dhvaniḡuṇībhūtavyaṅgyayor [dhvaniḡuṇībhūtavyaṅgyayor corr. : dhvanir guṇībhūtavyaṅgyayor CSS ed.] alaṅkāraṅāṃ cāsaṅkīrṇo viṣayaḥ sujāto bhavati |

It is in that general context that Ānandavardhana cites Dharmakīrti's first verse as a case of *dhvani* (although the term *dhvani* is not mentioned, it is undoubtedly what Ānandavardhana means, since he shows that the literal sense is subordinated to the suggested one), and not as a case of a mere (“pure” – *śuddha* – as stated by Abhinavagupta thereon) *alaṅkāra*.⁹⁴ Moreover, the force of the previous definitions (*vṛtti* ad *Dhvanyāloka* I 13; see CSS ed., pp. 125-132; INGALLS ET AL. 1990, pp. 158-165 and above, pp. 49ff.) allows the

⁹³ *Dhvanyāloka* III 40 (transl. INGALLS ET AL. 1990, p. 624).

⁹⁴ *Locana* ad *vṛtti* on III 40 (CSS ed., p. 486; INGALLS ET AL. 1990, p. 629): *yatra vyaṅgyaṃ nāsty eva tatra teṣāṃ śuddhāṅāṃ prādhānyam* | “Where there is no suggested element at all, the predominance is of pure figures of speech.” (Transl. Ingalls et al.)

reader of the *Dhvanyāloka* to come to the conclusion that Dharmakīrti's stanza, as an *aprustutaprasāmsā*, is indeed a case of *vastudhvani*.

This is confirmed by Abhinavagupta who, in his turn, goes even farther in demonstrating the soundness of Ānandavardhana's exegesis: Dharmakīrti's first stanza, being an example of *aprustutaprasāmsā* in which the suggested meaning is made predominant, is to be seen as a case of *dhvani* (as in the stanza "*bhāvavrāta*, etc."). Commenting on *kārikā* 40, he observes in the first place (CSS ed., p. 483; INGALLS ET AL. 1990, p. 628):

etad eva nirvāhayan kāvyātmavṇam dhvaner eva paridīpayati |

Carrying this line of argument to its conclusion, he [Ānanda] brings into full light the doctrine that *dhvani* is the soul of poetry. (Transl. Ingalls et al.)

For, as emphasized by Abhinavagupta, Ānandavardhana's *vṛtti* makes clear that the accomplished yet neglected girl is none other than the metaphoric transposition of a man immensely talented yet entirely misunderstood as such. Methodically, Abhinavagupta relates each of the four notions forged by Ānandavardhana with each of the four *pādas* of the verse in order to show a term-by-term correspondence between the denoted meaning (which is anyway *aprustuta*) and the suggested meaning (which is *prastuta*).

Thus, the four *pādas* hint respectively at i) the uncommon perfection (*nissāmānya*) of that great man, *for which the creator has spared no effort, nor expenses* (*pāda* 1); ii) his extreme brilliance (*nijamahimā*), *of which other men are jealous* (= *pāda* 2); iii) therefore, due to this very jealousy, the non-recognition of his merits (*viśeṣajñam [ātmano na kañcid evāparaṃ paśyataḥ]*), which turns his glory into *a miserable fate* (= *pāda* 3: *vārakī hatā*, with the necessary transposition of the expressed feminine to the suggested masculine); iv) the bitter lament (*paridevita*) of such a man, *who rebels against the Creator himself* (= *pāda* 4: *ko 'rthas cetasi vedhasā...*).⁹⁵ This shows that the suggested meaning is to be considered as prevalent.

⁹⁵ *Locana* (CSS ed., p. 489; INGALLS ET AL. 1990, p. 630): *nissāmānyeti nijamahimeti viśeṣajñam iti paridevitam ity etaiś caturbhir vākyakhaṇḍaiḥ krameṇa pādacatuṣṭayasya tātparyam vyākhyātam* | "By the four sentence-elements *nissāmānya* (uncommon), *nijamahimā* (his brilliance), *viśeṣajñam [na paśyataḥ]* ([seeing that others fail] to recognize his qualities), and *paridevitam* (a lament), our author explains the [suggested] meaning of each successive line in the stanza." (Transl. Ingalls et al.) Compare Ānandavardhana's analysis, above, p. 67.

Let us come back to the *vr̥tti*. Ānandavardhana (CSS ed., p. 489; INGALLS ET AL. 1990, pp. 625-626) immediately validates his interpretation by means of a second stanza by Dharmakīrti, which, according to him, directly expresses the suggested meaning of the first, namely the bitter and candid complaint of a man considering himself a misunderstood genius – and, what is more, that complaint is that of Dharmakīrti himself, speaking in the first person:

*tathā cāyaṃ dharmakīrteḥ śloka iti prasiddhiḥ | sambhāvyate ca tasyaiva |
yasmāt –
anadhyavasitāvaḡāhanam analpadhīsaktināpy adṛṣṭaparamārthatattvam
adhikābhīyogair api |
mataṃ mama jagaty alabdhasadr̥ṣapratigrāhakaṃ prayāsyati payonidheḡ
paya iva svadehe jarām ||
ity anenāpi ślokenaivaṃvidho 'bhīprāyaḡ prakāśita eva |*

Moreover, the [first] verse is commonly ascribed to Dharmakīrti and this is just as one might expect, for in the [following] other verse he reveals the same (*evamvidha*) intention (*abhiprāya*):⁹⁶

No one in this world
has fathomed my thought.
Even the best minds that engaged with it
with all their strength
failed to see my truth.
Not even one worthy reader
really got it.
Like water in the ocean,
my ideas will grow old
inside my body.⁹⁷

Therefore, not only does the second stanza work as an exegesis of the first, but it is a self-exegesis, hence unquestionable (*nirvivāda*^o), as says Abhinavagupta in his *Locana* thereon.

For Abhinavagupta again supports Ānandavardhana's demonstration (CSS ed., p. 489; INGALLS ET AL. 1990, p. 630). It is in order to contradict a fancied objector asking: "what proof is there of this interpretation?", and again: "what if the stanza is [commonly ascribed to Dharmakīrti]?", that "with this in mind, he [Ānanda] shows the meaning of *this* stanza [the first one] by means of the meaning

⁹⁶ Transl. INGALLS ET AL. 1990, p. 625.

⁹⁷ The meter is *pr̥thivī*. Transl. D. Shulman (see his contribution to this volume).

furnished by *that* [other] verse [the second one], which is indubitably [the work of Dharmakīrti].”⁹⁸

By quoting the two stanzas of Dharmakīrti, Ānandavardhana thus gives, so to speak, the “proof by author,” even though here the exegete and the author called in to help are two – himself and Dharmakīrti. So does Abhinavagupta with the “*bhāvavrāta*” stanza, in his *Locana* ad I 13, and all the more convincingly so since the author of the commentary and that of the stanza are one and the same person.

Then, commenting on the *evaṃvidho ’bhiprāyaḥ* of the *vṛtti* on the second stanza, Abhinavagupta (CSS ed., p. 490; INGALLS ET AL. 1990, p. 631) offers a very lucid interpretation of the respective ultimate issues of the two stanzas, showing that the first stanza belongs to the *dhvani* register, the second to that of the *alaṅkāras*. Moreover he gives a stunning description of the *dhvani* process that makes us fully grasp in which way the *aprustutaprasaṃsā* he quoted in I 13 (“*bhāvavrāta*, etc.”) is a case of *vastudhvani* – in other words, how *dhvani* is at work there, as it is at work here:

“*evaṃvidha*” *iti* | *paridevitam viṣaya ity arthaḥ* | *iyati cārthe aprastuta-prasaṃsopamālakṣaṇam alaṅkāradvayam* | *anantaram tu svātmani vismayadhāmatayādbhute viśrāntiḥ* | *parasya ca... svātmani kuśalakāritāpra-darśanayā dharmavīrasparśena vīrarase viśrāntir iti mantavyam* |

By “the same [intention],” he means that the object [of the second stanza] is [explicitly] a “lament” [which gives the clue to the first one]. The literal sense so far [in Dharmakīrti’s two stanzas] is a couple of figures, namely *aprustutaprasaṃsā* [in the first] and simile (*upamā*) [in the second]. But [in the case of the first stanza], immediately after [apprehending the figure of speech as an *aprustutaprasaṃsā*], there is [for the listener] repose in one’s own self (*svātmani viśrāntiḥ*), that is, in the *adbhuta* [*rasa*], the “Marvelous,” for he is filled with wonder (*vismaya*) [at the advent of the suggested meaning, which prevails on the literal]. As for the other [stanza], one should understand that there occurs [the listener’s] repose in one’s own self (*svātmani viśrāntiḥ*), that is, in the *vīrarasa*, the “Heroic,” for [the stanza] is concerned with [lit., “is touched by”] the [subcategory of *vīrarasa* which is the] *dharmavīra*[*rasa*],⁹⁹ the heroic sentiment arising

⁹⁸ *Locana* (CSS ed., p. 489; INGALLS ET AL. 1990, p. 630) – following): *nanv atrāpi kiṃ pramāṇam ity āśaṅkyāha – “tathā cetī” | nanu kiṃ iyatety āśaṅkya tadāśa-yena nirvivādatadīyaślokarpitenaśyāśāyaṃ saṃvadati – “saṃbhāvvyata itī”* | (My translation.)

⁹⁹ Note the implicit play on words: Dharmakīrti is by his very name destined to incarnate the *dharmavīrarasa*, the heroic *rasa* based on observing *dharma*.

from *dharma*, by showing [Dharmakīrti's] benevolence [towards men to be instructed in the ultimate reality].¹⁰⁰

However, it is noteworthy that the statement remains somewhat elliptical since, in this passage, Abhinavagupta does not explain (contrary to his exegesis of “*bhāvavrāta*, etc.”) that, if the listener of Dharmakīrti's first stanza experiences the *adbhutarasa*, and thus *āt-maviśrānti*, it is due to that capacity of “creating wonderment” (*ca-matkāarakāritva*) in the listener which characterizes the suggested meaning of the verse. For this very reason, the statement also implies that the suggested meaning prevails over the literal – a scheme that we have seen at play in the “*bhāvavrāta*” verse quoted in the *Locana* ad I 13, in which the emphasis was, however, put on the *dhvani* process rather than on the *rasa* process, as is the case here. Moreover, such an ellipsis is quite appropriate in connection with a commentary (ad III 40) that refers to *rasas* (see the text above, p. 68).

Symmetrically, the second stanza is to be read as a mere figure of speech (an *upamā*, in which the *target* is Dharmakīrti himself, the *ground* the ocean, where the same water flows through water, endlessly and in vain), in which no suggested meaning is to be found and therefore, neither any predominance of a suggested meaning, nor any *dhvani*, but only a candidly direct expression of a lament. It nevertheless leads to the experience of a given *rasa*, here the *vīra-rasa*.

Thus, my investigation has taken the paths of intertextuality and intratextuality. On the one hand, Abhinavagupta's *bhāvavrāta* stanza is reproduced by Bhāskara, several centuries later, whereas Jayaratha's TĀV quotes the full text of a stanza of which Abhinavagupta's ĪPVV gives only the first hemistich in a condensed form (see above, p. 39 and n. 13). On the other hand, the *bhāvavrāta* stanza, originally a part of the TĀ, is later on quoted by Abhinavagupta in

Indeed Dharmakīrti, although he is in despair at being underestimated, does not swerve from his dharmic duty which is to enlighten men.

¹⁰⁰ My translation. It seems that Ingalls misses the point by failing to recognize the key notion of *āt-maviśrānti* in *svātmani... viśrāntiḥ*. Moreover the process of aestheticization which turns the *sthāyibhāva* named *vismaya* into the corresponding *rasa* called *adbhuta* is misunderstood; this is apparent in the awkwardness of Ingalls' translation which seems to omit *svātmani*: “one becomes filled with amazement at the speaker himself, and so the aesthetic sense [of the reader] comes to rest in the *rasa* of wonder” (unless *svātmani* is rendered as “... with amazement at the speaker himself,” which is not acceptable).

his *Locana* ad I 13, that too, with a self-exegesis rather different from that offered by Jayaratha. Thus a web of analogies, characteristic of all Sanskrit literature, and of Sanskrit exegetical literature in particular, has taken shape. In this respect, it is a happy coincidence that David Shulman's contribution to this volume and mine should enter into consonance with one another.

In conclusion, I would say that the question of *sahṛdayatā*, to be taken in its aesthetic as well as philosophical acceptation, has proved to be central in the whole discussion. It follows from comparing the TĀV with the *Locana* on the same stanza that the difference of interpretation has something to do with the "taste" of the listener, that is, with his degree of *sahṛdayatā* – itself, in Śaiva reasonings, the expression of one's sovereign freedom, *svātantrya*. Thus, one is free to consider the literal meaning as preeminent, like Jayaratha in support of the doctrinal (and polemical) point which he is making, or on the contrary, like Abhinavagupta, to regard the implicit sense as prevalent over the literal, thereby taking the reader into the ever-resounding domain of the *dhvani* and giving him access to an even deeper philosophical and spiritual meaning.

APPENDIX

1. TĀV ad I 332 (KSTS 23, pp. 305-307)

*idānīm asya śāstrasya paraṃ gāmbhīryaṃ manyamāno granthakṛt,
etadarthasatattvam ajānānair apy anyair anyathābodhena yatkiṃcit
uttānam eva anyathā ucyate, tān prati aprastutaprasāmsayā upaha-
situm āha –*

*bhāvavrāta haṭhāj janasya hṛdayāny ākramya yan nartayan bhaṅgībhir
vividhābhir ātmahṛdayaṃ pracchādya saṃkrīḍase |
yas tvām āha jaḍaṃ jaḍaḥ saḥṛdayaṃmanyatvaduḥśikṣito manye 'muṣya
jaḍātmā stutipadaṃ tvatsāmyasambhāvanāt ||*

*he bhāvavrāta nīlādyartha | ātmano hṛdayaṃ tena ātmatathyaṃ rū-
paṃ gopayitvā janasya sarvasyaiva vādīno hṛdayāni āśayān balāt-
kāreṇa ākramya –*

*adyāsmān asataḥ kariṣyati sataḥ kiṃ nu dvidhā vāpy ayaṃ kiṃ sthāsnūn
uta naśvarān uta mithobhinnān abhinnān uta |
iṭhaṃ sadvadanāvalokanaparair bhāvair jagadvartibhir manye maunani-
ruddhyamānahṛdayair duḥkhena taiḥ sthīyate ||*

*ityādīsthyā vivīdhābhir bhaṅgībhiḥ nartayan yat saṃkrīḍase – na-
 tavat atāttvikena rūpeṇa samullasasi, ataḥ sa sarvo vādī asahṛda-
 yam api ātmānaṃ sahrdayatvena manyamāno 'ta eva duḥśikṣito mi-
 thyābhimānāt akiṃciñjñāḥ, tvām bhāvavrātam, jaḍam – acetanam
 āha, ato 'smābhir utprekṣyate – yat amuṣya vādino vastutaś caita-
 nyasvabhāvena bhavatā yat sāmyaṃ tasya sambhāvanāt bhāvavat-
 tvam eva jaḍātmā iti yady ucyate sā asya nindāsthāne stutiḥ | bhāvā-
 nām hi vastutaś caitanyam eva rūpam acetyamānatve hi teṣāṃ na
 kiṃcidrūpaṃ syāt, atas tad eva ye na jānate te jaḍebhyo 'pi jaḍāḥ iti
 kathaṃ ca teṣāṃ cetanātmakair bhāvaiḥ nindāparyavasāyi sāmyaṃ
 syāt iti bhāvāḥ | evaṃ prakṛte 'pi asya granthasya yas tattvaṃ na
 jānāti mā jñāsīt, pratyuta anyathāpi yatkiṃcana vakti ity asāv eva
 jaḍo, na punar asya granthasya kaścid doṣaḥ ity arthaḥ ||*

2. Locana ad Dhvanyālokaṣṛṭti I 13

(CSS ed., pp. 127-128)

*atra yady api sārūpyavaśena kṛtaghnaḥ kaścid anyāḥ prastuta ākṣi-
 pyate, tathāpy aprastutasyaiva vetālavṛttāntasya camatkāra-kāri-
 tvam | na hy acetanopālabhavad asaṃbhāvyamāno 'yam artho na
 ca na hr̥ḍya iti vācyasyātra pradhānātā | yadi punar acetanādināty-
 antāsambhāvyamānatadarthaviśeṣaṇenāprastutena varṇitena pra-
 stutam ākṣipyamānaṃ camatkāra-kāri tadā vastudhvanir asau | yathā
 mamaiva –*

*bhāvavrāta haṥhāj janasya hr̥ḍayāny ākramya yan nartayan bhaṅgībhir
 vivīdhābhir ātmahr̥ḍayaṃ pracchādya saṃkrīḍase |
 sa tvām āha jaḍam tataḥ sahr̥ḍayaṃ manyatvaduhśikṣito manye 'muṣya ja-
 ḍātmātā stutipadaṃ tvatsāmyasambhāvanāt ||*

*kaścin mahāpuruṣo vītarāgo 'pi sarāgavad iti nyāyena gādhavive-
 kālokatiraskṛtatimirapratāno 'pi lokamadhya svātmānaṃ pracchā-
 dayam lokaṃ ca vācālayann ātmany apratibhāsam evāṅgīkurvaṃs
 tenaiva lokena mūrkhō 'yam iti yad avajñāyate tadā tadīyaṃ lokot-
 taraṃ caritaṃ prastutaṃ vyaṅgyatayā prādhānyena prakāśyate | ja-
 ḍo 'yam iti hy udyānendūdayādir bhāvo lokenāvajñāyate, sa ca pra-
 tyuta kasyacid vīrahiṇa autsukyacintādīyamānamānasatām anyasya
 prahaṣaparavaśatām karotīti haṥhād eva lokaṃ yathecchaṃ vikā-
 rakāraṇābhir nartayati | na ca tasya hr̥ḍayaṃ kenāpi jñāyate kīḍṛg
 ayaṃ iti, pratyuta mahāgambhīro 'tividagdhaḥ suṣṭhugarvahīno 'ti-
 śāyena krīḍācaturāḥ sa yadi lokena jaḍa iti tata eva kāraṇāt pratyuta*

*vaidagdhyasambhāvananimittāt sambhāvitaḥ | ātmā ca yata eva kā-
raṇāt pratyuta jāḍyena sambhāvya tata eva saḥḍayaḥ sambhāvitas
tad asya lokasya jaḍo 'sīti yad ucyate tadā jāḍyam¹⁰¹ evaṃvidhasya
bhāvavrātasyāvidagdhasya prasiddham iti sā pratyuta stutir iti | ja-
ḍād api pāpīyān ayaṃ loka iti dhvanyate | tad āhā – “yadā tv” iti |
“itarathā tv” iti | itarathaiva punar alaṃkāṅtaratvam alaṃkāṅravi-
śeṣatvaṃ na vyaṅgyasya kathamcid api prādhānya iti bhāvah ||*

3. ĪPK I 1, 4

*tathā hi jaḍabhūtānāṃ pratiṣṭhā jīvadāśrayā |
jñānaṃ kriyā ca bhūtānāṃ jīvatāṃ jīvanaṃ matam ||*

4. Bhāskarī ad ĪPV I 1, 4

*antaryāmiśuddhacittattvavaśenendriyāṇāṃ sā śaktir astīti cet sa-
tyam, sarvatra tadvaśenaiva sāsītīti sarvaṃ jaḍam evocyatām, aja-
ḍam eva veti kiṃ viśeṣakalpanābhiḥ | paramārthavicāre tu,*

*bhāvavrāta haṭhāj janasya hṛdayāny ākramya yan nartayan bhaṅgībhīr
vividhābhīr ātmahṛdayaṃ pracchādya saṃkrīḍase |
yas tvām āha jaḍam svayaṃ saḥḍayaṃ manyatvaduḥśikṣīto manye 'muṣya
jaḍātmatā stutipadaṃ tvatsāmyasambhāvanāt ||*

*iti nītyā sarveṣāṃ bhāvānāṃ svarūpam api cinmayam eveti ekapra-
kāśavād eva sarvatra supratīṣṭhitaḥ | yas tu granthakṛtā viśeṣa uktaḥ
sasphuṭatvāspphuṭatvakṛtaḥ, athavā jaḍānāṃ upadeśānahatvam ape-
kṣyaivam uktam iti na virodha ity alam |*

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¹⁰¹ Typo in CSS ed.: *jaḍyam*.

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[*Paramārthasāra*] See BANSAT-BOUDON AND TRIPATHI 2011

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