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INCLUSIVE REPRESENTATION

Samuel Hayat

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SAMUEL HAYAT

Inclusive Representation

Insofar as political representation entails “making present [. . .] something which is nevertheless *not* present,”¹ it is always suspected of excluding the represented from the political scene.² By speaking on behalf of the people or a group, a political representative (elected or self-proclaimed) would render direct participation by the people or group unnecessary when it comes to decisions concerning them. Such suspicion is reinforced by the importance given to representation by the “minimalist” (or “realist”) theories of democracy that dominated postwar politics.³ In *Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy*, a reference work for these theories (despite the low importance it assigned to the issue of democracy), Schumpeter radically criticized direct participation – by asserting, for example, that “the typical citizen drops down to a lower level of mental performance as soon as he enters the political field”⁴ – at the same time that he defended a view of democracy that has the people as mere arbiter between representatives competing

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1. Hanna Fenichel Pitkin, *The Concept of Representation* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1972 [1967]), 8-9.
 2. An earlier draft of this paper benefited from comments by Marian Eabrasu, Frédérique Matonti, Yves Sintomer, and Julien Talpin, to whom the author expresses appreciation.
 3. Peter Bachrach, *The Theory of Democratic Elitism: A Critique* (Lanham: University Press of America, 1980); Barry Hindess, “Representation Ingrafted upon Democracy?” *Democratization* vol. 7, no. 2 (2000): 1-18.
 4. Joseph Alois Schumpeter, *Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy* (London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd, 1950), 262.

for state power. According to realist theory, political exclusion of the people goes along with representing them. Therefore, the prospect of constructing a more substantial democratic theory based on the inclusion of citizens, and aimed at creating political equality among them, generally involves denouncing representation.⁵ At the very most, representative democracy might be accepted as a “second best”⁶ or “defective substitute”⁷ for direct democracy. From this perspective, the political inclusion of citizens would be ensured above all else, outside of representation, or even in opposition to it, via participative devices, social movements, participation in public debates, etc.

Here we would like to bring into question this great divide between two views of democracy. The first accentuates the value of representation despite (or even because of) the political exclusion it creates. The other relies on the people’s direct political participation outside of any form of representation. This gap does in fact pose a threefold problem – historical, theoretical, and political. First, it naturalizes and masks the historical process of how the vocabulary of representation was monopolized by supporters of representative government, against other uses of the concept of representation.⁸ Then, from a theoretical standpoint, this division assimilates representation to the electoral mandate alone, thereby preventing thinking about the other meanings of the concept of representation (in particular as a demonstration of presence⁹), or about the other devices through which people speak and act for others aside from the governing/governed relationship.¹⁰ Finally, this divide creates a

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5. Carole Pateman, *Participation and Democratic Theory* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1970); Benjamin R. Barber, *Strong Democracy: Participatory Politics for a New Age* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984).
 6. Geoffrey Brennan and Alan Hamlin, “On Political Representation,” *British Journal of Political Science* vol. 29, no. 1 (1999): 111.
 7. Jane Mansbridge, “Rethinking Representation,” *American Political Science Review* vol. 97, no. 4 (2003): 515.
 8. Samuel Hayat, *Quand la République était révolutionnaire. Citoyenneté et représentation en 1848* (Paris: Seuil, 2014).
 9. Roger Chartier, “Le sens de la représentation,” *La vie des idées* (March 2013), available online at: <http://www.laviedesidees.fr/Le-sens-de-la-representation.html>; Yves Sintomer, “Les sens de la représentation politique: usages et mésusages d’une notion,” *Raisons Politiques* 50 (2013/2): 13-34.
 10. Michael Saward, *The Representative Claim* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010). In that respect, this paper falls within the contemporary movement to renew studies about representation, a first description of which can be found in Nadia Urbinati and Mark

political impasse for those who criticize institutions and desire them to be radically democratized, by forcing a choice between either submitting straightforwardly to the established forms of political competition, or invoking what they see as a “real” form of democracy wherein everyone would speak for themselves.

To challenge the dichotomy between representation of and direct participation by citizens, we would like to show that, as an act of speaking and acting for others, representation can function in two ways. On the one hand, it can be *exclusive*, that is, tending toward the monopolization of power by representatives and the exclusion of the represented from the political scene – as implemented especially by the institutions of representative government. It can then be used to justify the division of political work, the absence of citizen control over governance, and the complete suppression of any form of representation outside state institutions. However, representation can also be used *inclusively*, involving the represented in the decision-making process. When representatives – the governing, political professionals, as well as varied spokesmen and spokeswoman for the people or social groups – speak and act on behalf of others, those they represent become apparent on the political scene. In this use of representation, it is precisely because the representatives speak and act on behalf of the represented that the latter are invited to judge them, control them, and create alternative forms of representation. Seen this way, only the exclusive ways of using representation come into conflict with participation by those represented and with the prospect for the creation of substantial political equality. Conversely, the inclusive ways of using representation offer the means to broaden political participation, thereby making it possible for the voices of the dominated to be heard and perhaps for the democratic institutions to be radically transformed.

Meanwhile however, an imbalance exists between these two forms of representation. Since exclusive representation succeeded historically, it became a virtual given – embedded in the institutions of representative government in which the elected are rulers independent of their electors – and predominantly natural to our way of thinking about delegation, election, and all practices and

E. Warren, “The Concept of Representation in Contemporary Democratic Theory,” *Annual Review of Political Science* 11 (June 2008): 387-412.

situations in which individuals speak and act for others. The vast majority of research on political representation examines only these exclusive applications, following the direction inspired by Pitkin's classic work.

Therefore, thinking about representation in its inclusive sense requires the additional explication that this paper will introduce. To accomplish this, we must be attentive to theories that explore representation beyond representative government, the experiences of spokespeople other than those who govern, the forms of representation implemented before representative government succeeded in France in the nineteenth century, and the controversies that preceded this triumph, in particular during the first half of the nineteenth century, when various opposing concepts of representation were associated with conflicting interpretations of sovereignty.¹¹ The aim here, rather than to define inclusive forms of representation on which a more democratic system could be built, is to distinguish between various forms of inclusion through representation, in order to reveal the tensions and ambiguities inherent in the idea of inclusive representation, and the various ways of using it to think about representative government and its alternatives.

We begin by examining the definition of what inclusive representation is supposed to include, which will lead to identifying three forms of inclusion. The first, which we call "inclusion through politicization," is based on inclusion of citizens, irrespective of their social identity, through their participation in established political processes. We will distinguish between internal inclusion, based on actual mechanisms of representative government, and external inclusion, which relies on the construction of forms of representation outside the institutions of representative government. A second form of inclusion entails recognizing that exclusive forms of representation are unequally exerted on the various social groups, and therefore it is necessary to implement specific mechanisms (once again within or outside the representative government institutions) for including the dominated social groups. Finally, a third form of inclusion, through subjectivation, relies on the idea that what is to be included cannot

11. For two separate approaches, see Michèle Riot-Sarcey, *Le réel de l'utopie: essai sur le politique au 19e siècle* (Paris: A. Michel, 1998); and Pierre Rosanvallon, *La démocratie inachevée: histoire de la souveraineté du peuple en France* (Paris: Gallimard, 2003).

be defined a priori, therefore that inclusive representation participates in creating the social identities to be included.

Representation as Inclusion through Politicization

The reason why it is possible to characterize as exclusive the way in which representative government uses representation is that between one election and the next nearly all citizens – the represented – are excluded from political decision making. This division of political work is one of the elements of representative government in greatest conflict with the democratic idea.¹² For this reason, denouncing the oligarchic tendency of representative government is a constant in radical criticism of this political form¹³ – based on an assessment that political work inevitably results in the establishment of professional politician groups whose very existence excludes the majority of citizens. Thus the professionalization of politics goes hand in hand with exclusive representation, and with the construction of politics as a domain isolated from the citizenry. As noted by Gaxie, “the exercise of the political profession is associated with the manipulation of a specific language, which therefore becomes a language of professionals. The mastery of this language by political field agents is at the source of the relative incompetence of other social agents, and tends to dispossess them of their potential to be involved in political activities.”¹⁴ According to the very mechanisms of representative government, the exercise of politics by elected representatives results in the dispossession of the represented electorate, since political competence itself is defined by the ability to speak the language of professional politicians.¹⁵ From this perspective, political

12. François Dupuis-Déri, “L’esprit antidémocratique des fondateurs de la ‘démocratie’ moderne,” *Agone* 22 (1999): 95-113; Moses I. Finley, *Democracy Ancient and Modern*, (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1973).

13. Robert Michels, *Les partis politiques: essai sur les tendances oligarchiques des démocraties* (Paris: Flammarion, 1971).

14. Daniel Gaxie, *Le Cens caché: inégalités culturelles et ségrégation politique* (Paris: Seuil, 1978), 95.

15. Because of its exclusionary effects in particular, this notion of political competence has been questioned in recent works. For example, Loïc Blondiaux, “Faut-il se débarrasser de la notion de compétence politique?” *Revue Française de Science Politique* vol. 57, no. 6 (November 2007): 759-774; Yves Déloye, “Pour une sociologie historique de la compétence à opiner ‘politiquement’,” *Revue Française de Science Politique* vol. 57,

representation can be called inclusive when it enables citizens to fight against exclusion from professional politics by acquiring this language and by using it to intervene in decision-making processes from which they are excluded. This form of the inclusive use of representation can be designated as the inclusion of citizens through their politicization. Indeed, if politicization is considered to be a “process of realigning the most diverse social activities,”¹⁶ thereby enabling the excluded citizens to be included, then this amounts to their acquiring the ability to reclassify their activities politically – which involves the reframing of these activities according to a political language, in this case the language of professional representatives. Representation is inclusive here in the sense that those who are represented adopt a language that is not their own but which nevertheless allows them to make their views heard in the political arenas from which they were excluded.

Understood this way, inclusion through citizen politicization occurs within representative government and its institutions. The citizens represented are included by their interacting with the world of professional politicians and using their language. Consequently, there is little separation between exclusive and inclusive uses of representation here. This form of inclusive representation is indeed based on the idea that by itself, and in the established forms of representative government, representation is both exclusive (due to the monopolization of political power by the representatives) and inclusive (as the excluded represented to be included acquire the language of the representatives). Seen this way, political representation has a unique, intrinsically mixed meaning. This idea is implicitly advocated by Pitkin, who defines political representation as a relationship in which representatives are both independent of the represented and responsive to their wishes – representation thereby bearing both exclusive and inclusive aspects.¹⁷ In the same way, by applying his theories on aesthetic representation to political representation, Franklin Ankersmit concludes that representation inevitably produces a personality split in those represented: “[. . .] the faculty

no. 6 (November 27, 2007): 775-798; and Julien Talpin, “Ces moments qui façonnent les homes,” *Revue Française de Science Politique* vol. 60, no. 1 (March 2010): 91-115.

16. Jacques Lagroye, “Le processus de politisation,” in *La politisation*, ed. Jacques Lagroye (Paris: Belin, 2003), 360.

17. Hanna Pitkin, *The Concept of Representation*, 209-240.

of representation makes us into the inhabitants of two worlds, the private one (that we possessed already) and the public one (to which we can get access thanks to this faculty of representation).¹⁸ While the private world is supposed to have existed prior to representation, the public world is a construct opened up to the group represented by professional representatives. Mirroring the action of their representatives, the represented have their subjectivity split in two, thereby enabling them to move from the sphere of personal interest to that of political judgment. Therefore, this involves pointing out the existence of inclusionary effects that might be described as “internal” – representation by itself sets into motion processes that include those represented in the world of professional politicians. Just as, for Bernard Manin, representative government is essentially mixed – in that it is based on a procedure that is both democratic and aristocratic, the election¹⁹ – it can be said that, according to this notion of inclusion through politicization, representation is intrinsically both exclusive and inclusive.

This argument favoring representation is today widely promoted by authors who attempt to demonstrate the *a priori* compatibility between representation and democracy, including those who advocate a more substantial sense of representative democracy than electoral competition alone. According to one of the founding texts of this approach, “the opposite of representation is not participation. The opposite of representation is exclusion.”²⁰ Consequently, to represent is to include, and therefore to be represented is to be included. Thus the idea of representative democracy constitutes a true tautology.²¹ According to these theoreticians, the reason representation is intrinsically democratic is that it transforms the relationship of the governed with their governors. Appropriating the language of representation – the language of professionals – opens the door for citizens to pass judgment on their leaders. Consequently, representation enables the represented to question the words and actions of their representatives, regarding them as only temporary and fallible

18. Franklin Rudolf Ankersmit, “Political Representation and Political Experience: an Essay on Political Psychology,” *Redescriptions: Yearbook of Political Thought and Conceptual History* vol. 11 (2007): 27.

19. Bernard Manin, *Principes du gouvernement représentatif* (Paris: Flammarion, 1996), 191.

20. David Plotke, “Representation Is Democracy,” *Constellations* vol. 4, no. 1 (1997): 19.

21. Sofia Näsström, “Representative Democracy as Tautology. Ankersmit and Lefort on Representation,” *European Journal of Political Theory* vol. 5, no. 3 (July 2006): 321-342.

depositories of a state power that fundamentally does not belong to them. This power thus remains a “void” that characterizes representative democracies.²² Far from being the symptom of a supposed “crisis of representation,” the suspicion surrounding the discourse of representatives establishes, for Georges Kateb, the “moral distinctiveness” of representative democracy,²³ while for Didier Mineur it involves a need that is intrinsic to the concept of representation,²⁴ and according to Bruno Latour it is a consequence of the specificity of political speech.²⁵ Therefore, from the standpoint of inclusion through politicization of citizens, there is no need to search outside representative government for the means to make representation more inclusive: in and of itself, the relationship of representation between citizens and professional representatives contains all the necessary elements. Thus for Manin, that “public decisions are subject to discussion”²⁶ is one of the fundamental features of representative government, not an outlying democratic element. At the very most, those who are represented must be guaranteed the option of expressing judgments about the actions of representatives, within an open public forum.

Even though the concept of inclusion through politicization can be used as a tool for studying representative government and its metamorphoses, it cannot alone account for what can be called inclusive representation. In fact, at least two issues limit its heuristic capacity. The first is that the conception of politics on which representative government is based is focused entirely on the world of professional representatives. This leads to the conclusion that any form of involvement that does not revolve around the relationship between citizens and their established representatives is eliminated from the realm of representation. Therefore, the great divide between representation and democracy is merely shifted (not eliminated). The line is then to be drawn between democratic political representation (having exclusionary and inclusionary effects), and apolitical, unrepresented realms no longer defined as direct democracy, but rather as

22. Claude Lefort, *Essais sur le politique, 19e-20e siècles* (Paris: Seuil, 1986), 27.

23. George Kateb, “The Moral Distinctiveness of Representative Democracy,” *Ethics* vol. 91, no. 3 (April 1981): 357-374.

24. Didier Mineur, *Archéologie de la représentation politique: structure et fondement d'une crise* (Paris: Presses de la Fondation nationale des sciences politiques, 2010).

25. Bruno Latour, “Si l'on parlait un peu politique?” *Politix* vol. 15, no. 58 (2002): 143-165.

26. Manin, *Principes du gouvernement représentatif*, 18.

social movements, the expression of individual opinions, etc. The second issue is that, although this view of inclusive representation can to some extent account for what happens in the daily workings of institutionalized politics, it is incapable of integrating the breaking points, those events during which the institutions of representative government simply no longer function. The historical experience of these moments shows that the break with institutions of representation does not occur in opposition to the idea of representation or outside of any “representative claim”. On the contrary, during the 1848 Revolution – an example of a critical moment of questioning representative government – the brutal delegitimization of the July Monarchy is accompanied by the proliferation of rhetoric using the vocabulary of representation, along with the rapid establishment of alternative institutions of representation, differing from those of the representative government – in this case a provisional government, a democratized national guard, a federated revolutionary club movement, and a workers’ parliament in session at the Luxembourg Palace. Therefore, there are certain uses of representation that have nothing to do with the relationship between the citizen electorate and the elected professional representatives. Thus we might wonder to what extent these uses of representation participate in inclusive forms of representation that do not occur via the institutions of representative government.

An External Concept of Inclusion through Politicization

To address this matter, we can refer to analyses that start with the internal conception of inclusion through politicization, and attempt to reveal exactly what is missing, what results when these processes of inclusion go beyond the relationship of representation between citizens and their elected officials. In fact, not all theoreticians of representation who defend the existence of inclusion through politicization see in this an effect that is necessary and intrinsic to the relationship of representation. According to some authors, these inclusive effects of representation are potential effects only. They require an institutionalization process, which does not necessarily arise out of forms of representative government, or even result in representational institutions that conflict with those of the representative

government. Nadia Urbinati's work is a good example of a theorization that, starting with a study of the internal forms of inclusion through politicization, ultimately reveals the need for inclusionary effects that are external to representative government. The goal of her research is to distinguish between representative government and representative democracy. To accomplish this, she does not rely solely on the study of the existing relationship between the represented and their representatives, but also looks at the ways in which direct participation by the represented in the formation of public judgments is institutionalized.²⁷ According to Urbinati, the exercise of judgment by those who are represented over their representatives embodies the power of the people (just like election itself), popular sovereignty being "a diarchy of will and judgment."²⁸ Therefore, representative government can never alone define the entirety of politics. It is only one aspect of sovereignty, the other being the organization of judgment activity, which includes but is not limited to judging representatives' actions. Since politics is not limited to representative government, a crisis in representative government would not cause society to turn away from politics, but would rely on an aspect of sovereignty, namely judgment, against another aspect, namely delegation. According to Urbinati, far from being a borderline case, the possibility of a rupture between representatives and the represented is inherent to representative democracy – and not to representative government, which does not recognize the sovereignty of the people outside the electoral process. Politicization through representation then appears in the form of independent and sovereign judgment by the represented, which is not subject to the institutions of representative government, and the development of which could lead to the creation of alternative forms of representation:

When the *continuity* between the representatives and the citizens is *interrupted*, the latter are likely to generate extra-parliamentary forms of (self-)representation. Their aim is not to take back the decision-making power or reaffirm direct government by the people, however, but to disclose and denounce the political distance between

27. Nadia Urbinati, *Representative Democracy: Principles and Genealogy* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2006).

28. Nadia Urbinati, "Representative Democracy and Its Critics," in *The Future of Representative Democracy*, eds. Sonia Alonso, John Keane, and Wolfgang Merkel (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011), 26.

the “real” and the “legal” nation [. . .]. This [. . .] speaks for the permanence of the sovereign people’s *presence* in the form of *political judgment*, rather than the will.²⁹

The people is made present politically through representation, not only through the person of the representative – which would then involve exclusive representation based on the absence of the represented – but also through the judgment of those who are represented on actions taken by the representative on their behalf, a judgment that may be embodied in separate institutions of representation.

From this perspective, inclusion through politicization is not only internal but has external aspects as well; it lies in the ability of the represented to not merely adopt the language of the representatives to express their desires, but also to maintain their own authority to judge representatives, even after the dispossession that occurs as a result of the delegation of their power. Contrary to what occurs in the internal form of inclusion through politicization, election alone is not sufficient to ensure politicization. Society must also equip itself with a set of devices for the monitoring of representatives, forming judgments on their actions, and expressing these judgments – devices that can approximate what Pierre Rosanvallon calls “counter-democracy.”³⁰ However, to account for all phenomena arising from this aspect of inclusive representation, analysis must extend beyond how judgment of representatives’ actions (by those who are represented) is institutionalized. Even though Urbinati or Rosanvallon study the exercise of judgment by citizens in their relations with established representatives, other devices can be considered as external forms of inclusion through politicization. Citizens participate in politics not only by judging their representatives but also by expressing their will. In fact, participative devices or elements of direct or semi-direct democracy are not foreign to representation, but are places where an institutionalized discourse or action is produced in the name of the people or a portion of the people. However, the representation at work here is predominantly outside the world of

29. Nadia Urbinati, “Continuity and Rupture: The Power of Judgment in Democratic Representation,” *Constellations* vol. 12, no. 2 (2005): 198.

30. Pierre Rosanvallon, *La contre-démocratie: la politique à l’âge de la défiance* (Paris: Seuil, 2006).

professional representatives, which leads approaches focused on representative government and exclusive representation to regard them as being outside of representation, and therefore implicitly outside of politics. Considering inclusive forms of representation and the politicizing effects they produce (sometimes beyond the institutions of representative government) then proves necessary. This is the only way to avoid reproducing the division between democracy and representation or between democratic representation and the non-political realm, in the form of a new duality between will and judgment. Participative and/or deliberative devices must therefore be integrated into the external forms of inclusion through politicization, as these devices set into motion discursive and institutional mechanisms of representation, even and especially when they aim not only to produce a judgment but also to express a will.³¹

The institutional consequences of these two forms of inclusion through politicization are therefore completely different. According to the first form, which is based on the idea of the necessary and internal existence of inclusive effects of representation, the representative government by itself has inclusionary power aligned with the exclusive effects of representation – they cannot be separated one from the other. Conversely, in the second form of inclusion through politicization, the representative government must be improved or corrected by specific inclusionary devices, which oppose the exclusive effects of representation. This is, therefore, much more than a theoretical distinction. In the history of representative government, there is an on-going debate between the supporters of the inclusive effects of electoral representation and those who support adding other representative devices to electoral representation. In this regard, the 1848 Revolution was an excellent testing ground because of large-scale implementation of universal suffrage (despite continued

31. Loïc Blondiaux, *Le nouvel esprit de la démocratie: actualité de la démocratie participative* (Paris: Seuil, 2008); Yves Sintomer, *Petite histoire de l'expérimentation démocratique: tirage au sort et politique d'Athènes à nos jours* (Paris: La Découverte, 2011). For an analysis of contemporary participative devices relating to representation, Brazil is fertile ground, in particular because of the existence of devices on a national scale. For example, Thamy Pogrebinschi and Fabiano Santos, "Entre a Representação e Participação: As conferências nacionais e o experimentalismo democrático brasileiro," in *Série Pensando o Direito* (Brasília, Brazil: Ministério da Justiça, 2010); and Debora Rezende, "Representation as Political Process: The State-Society Relationship in a Democratic Brazil," 63rd Political Studies Association Annual International Conference (Cardiff, 2013).

exclusion of women). For some, the implementation of universal suffrage was sufficient to guarantee the inclusion of all (male) citizens in the Republic. This was Lamartine's position when speaking on behalf of the provisional government following the demonstration of March 17, 1848:

The election belongs to all without exception. As of the date of this [electoral] law, there are no longer any proletarians in France. Every adult Frenchman is a political citizen. Every citizen is a voter. Every voter is sovereign. The right is equal and absolute for all.³²

For Lamartine, universal suffrage was enough to guarantee the equal inclusion of all citizens, to the point of eliminating any class barrier, and any inequality between governors and governed. Conversely, other voices were raised, emphasizing that elections alone could not guarantee the inclusion of all citizens, and that it was therefore necessary to add external devices of popular participation to the institutions of representative government. These would achieve inclusion by allowing citizens to monitor the elected assemblies and express their will. In 1848, clubs played such a role.³³ After the February Revolution,³⁴ hundreds of clubs were created within a few weeks, and were massively attended by the people, with the number of club members estimated to have been 100,000 in Paris alone.³⁵ Some club leaders felt that this experience should last beyond the election of the National Assembly. Several of them went so far as to propose the establishment of a "Popular Convention," made up of club representatives, who would hold sessions on the premises of the former Chamber of Deputies – not to replace the National Assembly, but to play a specifically inclusive role that might be described as representing the represented, the convention would "translate [the] acts [of the Assembly], relay [to it] a faithful expression of the feelings that they aroused in the People," and become "a shelter for the great school of

32. *Actes du Gouvernement provisoire* (1848): 148-149.

33. Samuel Hayat, "Participation, discussion et représentation: l'expérience clubiste de 1848," *Participations* no. 2 (2012): 119-140.

34. The 1848 February Revolution ended the Orléans monarchy under Louis Philippe and led to the creation of the French Second Republic (1848-1851).

35. Peter H. Amann, *Revolution and Mass Democracy: the Paris Club Movement in 1848* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1975).

the people.”³⁶ This proposal is a good example of the external concept of inclusion through politicization, according to which electoral representation alone is not enough to guarantee the politicization of citizenry excluded through the division of political work. It must be intensified by different devices of representation that are specifically focused on inclusive politicization of the represented.

Therefore, there are two coexisting forms of inclusion through politicization. For the first, the internal form, representation necessarily has both inclusive and exclusive aspects. For the second, the external form, the exclusionary uses of representation must be offset by inclusionary devices outside representative government. However, one thing common about both conceptions of inclusion through politicization is that neither one can alone account for all forms of inclusive representation. They implicitly maintain that political representation excludes, in similar fashion, all citizens as a collective whole. Therefore, whether they are based solely on election or on other devices, the proposed mechanisms of inclusion prove blind to the fact that exclusion is exercised differently depending on the social characteristics of the represented. Returning to the example of the 1848 Revolution, inclusion through politicization can be accounted for by the extension of suffrage, the impact of electoral turnout, the importance of statements of principles by candidates (inclusion through internal politicization), as well as the enormous increase in newspapers and clubs, and the establishment of a democratized national guard and assembly of workers (inclusion through external politicization). However, this fails to provide a framework of analysis sufficient to explain speeches made in the name of specific social groups, in particular workers and women. There was indeed some form of representation here, in the sense that those who spoke on behalf of these groups considered themselves as their representatives and, particularly in the case of skilled workers, may sometimes actually have been elected by members of their social group. However, any analysis of this form of representation must consider the fact that it occurred within a social group, and not within the overall framework of the relationship between the citizen electorate and elected representatives.

36. Petition signed in May 1848 by *la Commission chargée du travail* (the commission responsible for labor) of the the Société des Droits de l’homme (Human Rights Society).

Inclusion of Social Groups

We must therefore modify our opinion on the definition of what is excluded by representation. Since the beginning of this paper, we have considered that all the represented are excluded from politics by the exclusive ways of using representation. However, a second, more sociological meaning can be added to this first definition of exclusive representation, which stems from the social conditions under which the political field is organized. Bourdieu's work on political representation thus makes it possible to understand that, if representation as implemented by representative government is exclusionary for nearly all citizens in a general sense, due simply to the division of political work, it also excludes the dominated in a specific sense, due to the "economic and cultural determinants of dispossession"³⁷ from which they suffer. Social actors less endowed with the cultural capital and free time required for political participation are indeed "left no choice but delegation – a misrecognized dispossession of the less competent by the more competent."³⁸ From this perspective, representation is the process by which governments not only do speak and act for the governed, but dominants also speak for the dominated, for whom representational exclusion is then doubled. Historically, suffrage based on the ownership of property accompanied representative government. For its theoreticians and practitioners during the first half of the nineteenth century, this form of suffrage was the legal framework for the double exclusion noted above. However, the extension of suffrage did not eliminate this exclusion. That is, instead of being excluded from suffrage or eligibility by poll tax requirements, the dominated were excluded because of their lower "political competence" (defined as an "aptitude to speak the language of the professionals"³⁹), thereby leading to their "radical dispossession."⁴⁰

Therefore, we must find a new answer to the question of whom to include through inclusive forms of representation, namely the dominated, who as it happens are doubly excluded from political

37. Pierre Bourdieu, *Distinction: A Social Critique of the Judgement of Taste*, trans. Richard Nice (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1984 and London/New York: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1986), 389.

38. Bourdieu, *Distinction*, 415. (The French citation varies from the translation in that it says "misrecognized and recognized [. . .]").

39. Gaxie, *Le Cens caché*, 83.

40. Gaxie, *Le Cens caché*, 95.

participation as citizens and as “less competent,” i.e., as less endowed with cultural capital. In this second sense then, inclusive representation would mean representation of the dominated. Specific inclusion would be required to confront their specific exclusion. According to Bourdieu, however, the path to specific representation of the dominated always runs the risk of continuing their exclusion, or even deepening it by giving the dominated the illusion that someone is speaking for them, since they would be “[. . .] at the mercy of the discourses presented to them [. . .]. At best, they are at the mercy of their own spokesmen, whose role it is to provide them with the means of repossessing their own experience.”⁴¹ Therefore, to include the dominated by representing them is to make them dependent on a trustee who can always pass off her own interest as theirs. In fact, in his writings on political representation, Bourdieu does not confine himself to an analysis of relationships of domination within the political sphere, but launches a radical criticism of the very position of a spokesperson. If providing the dominated with specific representatives to fight against their exclusion is likely to deepen the exclusion, it is not only because they are dominated, but is also due to a more general characteristic of representation, namely the potential for it to open the way for representatives to impose their own interests under the guise of their constituents’ interests.⁴² Since the dominated are excluded from representation, those who speak and act on their behalf can in fact be authorized by them, without the least assurance that these spokespeople are actually defending their interests. The primary thing, following Bourdieu’s analysis, is to grasp the effects of the existence of a device – the party or the union – that speaks in the name of the working class, but we might extend his analysis to include any situation in which the inclusion of excluded social groups is based entirely on the goodwill of the representatives who advocate for these group, whether from within the institutions of representative government, or outside them, in organizations that speak on behalf of these groups.⁴³

41. Bourdieu, *Distinction*, 464.

42. Bourdieu, “La représentation politique,” 5.

43. Nadia Urbinati, “Representation as Advocacy: A Study of Democratic Deliberation,” *Political Theory* 28, no. 6 (December 2000): 758-786. This form of representation can thus be assimilated to advocacy.

A significant historical example of this form of representation of the dominated through spokespeople arguing in their favor – with no guarantee that they are actually defending the interests of the represented or helping them to participate – can be found in France during the 1840s. This period saw how the combination of suffrage based on property ownership and the strict limitations for potential association or expression made workers largely dependent for their representation on the goodwill of deputies, who were not accountable to them nor required to acknowledge their suffrage. The career path of Alexandre Ledru-Rollin exemplified this construct well. As a young, bourgeois, Parisian attorney, he was elected in 1841 in the course of making an uncommonly radical statement of principles. He began by invoking the “miseries with which the poor classes were plagued.” He described the people as “a flock led by a few privileged beings,” justified its uprising at the start of the 1830s, compared it to Christ, and eventually advocated a break with the representative government.⁴⁴ In this statement of principles, which brought him immediate fame within radical circles, he presented himself as being authorized by the poor – considered here as the real people – and by worker insurrections, in order to proclaim his primary political aim, namely the struggle for the Republic. Speaking of the workers and the poor as the excluded, he demanded their inclusion, and more generally spoke out in defense of their rights. What gave force to Ledru-Rollin’s discourse was not the substance of what he proposed (a change in regime), but that he declared his objective to be the very goal of the workers, who he implied were at the point of uprising. It is this very movement that Bourdieu sees as being at the heart of the representation process: “[. . .] the speech of the spokesperson owes a part of its ‘illocutionary force’ to the force (the numbers) of the group that he helps to produce as such by the act of symbolization or representation; it is based on the metaphorical *coup de force* (forcefulness) with which the speaker invests his utterance, with all the power his utterance helps to produce by mobilizing the group to which it is addressed.”⁴⁵ The power in Ledru-Rollin’s discourse stems from the power of the group that he claimed to represent (the workers, the poor, the people), notwithstanding the absence of proof of any specific relationship between himself and this

44. Alexandre Ledru-Rollin, “Profession de foi,” *Revue du progrès politique, social et littéraire*, vol. 6, 3rd series, (1840), 52-3.

45. Bourdieu, “La représentation politique,” 14.

group other than its exclusion and his, Ledru-Rollin's, speaking on its behalf. That Ledru-Rollin spoke in the name of workers did not in and of itself create workers' inclusion – it is well within the exclusionary forms of representation that workers are represented here. In a certain way, their double exclusion, as citizens and as dominated persons, earned them the right to a specific form of inclusion (by Ledru-Rollin in this case), but this representation is once again more exclusive: as doubly excluded, they are doubly represented, without this double representation necessarily being inclusive. Eventually, in 1848, when workers appeared directly on the political scene, the spokesperson role established by Ledru-Rollin did not keep him from participating in repressing the same worker insurrections that he justified just a few years later.

In order to prevent the representation of dominated social groups from assuming exclusive forms, a specific form of representation of these groups must be put into place that does not assign representatives sole responsibility to defend their interests. In other words, representation of dominated social groups must be institutionalized. A primary way of carrying this out is to identify the groups that should receive specific representation, and then grant within the institutions of representative government a certain number of positions or seats to representatives from these groups. This is the method adopted by those who support (particularly feminists) group representation,⁴⁶ which is based on a descriptive concept of representation⁴⁷ that serves as a foundation of quota politics.⁴⁸ This form of representation assumes inclusion of dominated groups in the inclusionary form of the political game as it exists, based on

46. Melissa Williams, *Voice, Trust, and Memory: Marginalized Groups and the Failings of Liberal Representation* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000); Judith Squires, "Representing Groups, Deconstructing Identities," *Feminist Theory* 2, no. 1 (April 1, 2001): 7-27.

47. Anne Phillips, *The Politics of Presence* (Oxford, England: Clarendon Press, 1995); Dominique Leydet, "Représentation et présence: la démocratie représentative en question," *Politique et Sociétés* 21, no. 1 (2002): 67-88. Jane Mansbridge, "Should Blacks Represent Blacks and Women Represent Women? A Contingent 'Yes'," *Journal of Politics* vol. 61, no. 3 (1999): 628-657.

48. Judith Squires, "Quotas for Women: Fair Representation?" *Parliamentary Affairs* 49, no. 1 (1996): 71-88; Catherine Achin, "Représentation miroir' vs parité. Les débats parlementaires relatifs à la parité revus à la lumière des théories politiques de la représentation," *Droit et Société* 47, no. 1 (2001): 237-256; Virginie Dutoya, "La représentation de la nation à l'épreuve de la différence de genre: Quotas et représentation des femmes dans les Parlements de l'Inde et du Pakistan," PhD dissertation (IEP, Paris, 2012).

the following principle: “[. . .] a democratic public should establish mechanisms for actually recognizing and representing the individual voices and perspectives of those from these constitutive groups who are oppressed and disadvantaged.”⁴⁹ Therefore, recourse must be made to the egalitarian norms of the democratic system to ensure that the dominated or excluded social groups are included by representation in the legitimate political space. This demand for inclusion through group representation is not new. It was present in the inclusion strategies of the nineteenth-century workers’ movement, from the seminal 1832 article by the republican and Saint-Simonian Jean Reynaud with respect to “[. . .] the need for a special representation of the proletarians,” to the 1864 *Manifesto of the Sixty*, which advocated separate candidacies for workers in the elections.⁵⁰

However, this strategy is not the only possible option when thinking about the inclusion of dominated groups. It can also occur through forms of representation that are outside institutions of representative government. Correcting the exclusionary features of representation does not then occur by seeking greater inclusivity from established representation, but by constructing alternative means of representation that are external to the institutions but specifically dedicated to representing an excluded social group. Because of the lawful exclusion to which it was then subject, the workers movement of the 1830s was largely established around the right to association. This was understood to mean not only the individual right of workers to associate with one another, but also to create a federative association on the national level, grouping together the various corporations and therefore ensuring separate representation. A similar demand was seen in the women’s clubs of 1848, together with the demand for a broadening of suffrage. The exclusion practiced by institutionalized politics was thus challenged not only by demanding inclusion in the institutions of representative government but also by asserting the right of association, as women, in order to defend the interests and rights of women.⁵¹ In his *Capacité politique des classes*

49. Iris Marion Young, *Justice and the Politics of Difference* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990), 184.

50. Pierre Rosanvallon, *Le peuple introuvable: histoire de la représentation démocratique en France* (Paris: Gallimard, 2002 [1998]), 87-129.

51. Michèle Riot-Sarcey, *La démocratie à l'épreuve des femmes: trois figures critiques du pouvoir, 1830-1848* (Paris: Albin Michel, 1994).

ouvrières (1865), Proudhon responded to the *Manifesto of the Sixty*, and theorized about the strategy of a split, separated representation of the dominated groups. According to him, by establishing federative institutions separate from the state, workers could work collectively for their emancipation without waiting for an assembly of legislators to grant them the right to do so. This, for him, constituted the superiority of a differentiated representation strategy over the strategies of inclusion in the institutions of representative government. Therefore, the dichotomy between internal and external concepts of inclusion between social groups takes shape here. In the same way as it is possible to think about the inclusion of citizens by their politicization within or outside of institutions of representative government, the external and internal strategies of inclusion must be taken into account in order to account for the various forms of inclusion of dominated social groups.

Inclusion through Subjectivation

Nonetheless, if shifting from the inclusion of citizens to the inclusion of dominated social groups makes it possible to consider the specific exclusion into which these groups fall, one problem remains unsolved, namely the ways in which dominated groups are recognized. In order for a group to be represented, thus enabling its inclusion, it must first be recognized as being excluded. Taking the French working class as an example, its recognition as a class is the result of a political process, which preceded rather than followed the economic transformations that gave rise to a large industrial proletariat.⁵² Beginning with the 1830 Revolution, for an increasing number of workers, the term “proletarian” signified a class identity that was intrinsically linked to the situation of a producer and went beyond the limits of a trade. The various trades were

52. See William Hamilton Sewell, *Work and Revolution in France: The Language of Labor from the Old Regime to 1848* (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1980); Bernard H. Moss, *The Origins of the French Labor Movement: The Socialism of Skilled Workers, 1830-1914* (Berkeley, University of California Press, 1976); Alain Cottureau, “The Distinctiveness of Working-Class Cultures in France, 1848-1900,” in *Working-Class Formation: Nineteenth-Century Patterns in Western Europe and the United States*, eds. Aristide R. Zolberg and Ira Katznelson (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986), 111-154.

organized before 1830 by trade guilds, by structures inherited from the corporations of the Old Regime, mutual aid societies, which formed by the hundreds around the July Revolution, and by cooperative efforts. However, the majority of these forms of organization remained separated according to trade. It was only after the 1830 Revolution that some workers, who were admittedly a minority, began to rework their actions in terms that transcended the barriers of trades, in particular by establishing newspapers edited and written exclusively by workers – *L'Artisan*, “newspaper for the working class”; *Le journal des ouvriers* (the Workers’ Paper); and *Le Peuple* (The People), “a general newspaper for and written by workers.” Thus, worker identity was the result of an activity led by spokespeople, to the extent that it can be said that the worker was created as a political subject by those speaking in the name of workers. Although it is indeed possible here to speak of a representational activity, it is impossible to interpret it according to the previously seen forms of inclusion. It aimed not at the institutional inclusion of a social group, but first and foremost at its structure and recognition as a group. Therefore, our analysis of inclusive representation must be completed by this specific form of representation, which focuses on a collective subject and its recognition.

This form of inclusive representation can be described as inclusion through subjectivation. In two texts written in 1984, Bourdieu continues his analysis of representation by pointing out effects that appear to lay the foundations of conceptualization of this aspect of representation. Although he did not question his critique of the spokesperson role, which enables representatives to pass off their own interests as the interests of those they claim to represent, Bourdieu based this ability on a more fundamental disposition of spokespeople, that of creating groups in whose name they speak, through a “process of instituting, ordinarily perceived and described as a process of delegation, in which the representative receives from the group the power to make the group.”⁵³ The process of instituting, masked by the idea of delegation, is based on joint establishment of the representative and the represented, as an outcome of the activity of the emerging representative: “*Seemingly*, the group makes the man

53. Pierre Bourdieu, “Espace social et genèse des ‘classes,’” *Actes de la Recherche en Sciences Sociales* no. 52/53 (June 1984), 11.

who speaks on its behalf – this is the thinking in terms of delegation – whereas, *in reality*, it is nearly as true to say that the spokesperson makes the group. It is because the representative exists, because he *represents* (a symbolic action), that the represented, the symbolized group, exists, and in turn makes its representative the representative of a group.”⁵⁴ This shifting from a delegation-based argument to a representation-based argument makes it possible to understand the effects of subjectivation at work in representation processes. Unlike delegation, representation is not a transfer of power between two established social entities (the representatives and constituents), but rather the establishment, by an individual or signifier group, of a signified group, which thereby acquires the status of a political subject. The process of representation, as customarily understood in terms of delegation, is inverted – the representative is the one who brings the represented group into existence.⁵⁵

This form of representation appears then to push its exclusive features to the extreme – the spokesperson assumes the right, free of any control, to speak in the name of a social group. But this also involves an inclusive dimension, that of giving voice to groups that have thus far been deprived of any recognized social identity. It would not be enough by itself to ensure inclusion of citizens and groups excluded from representation, as this is only a means of making political subjects “appear.” To determine whether a subjectivation process is actually inclusive, the question is not to find out if the one who speaks or acts in the name of the group is indeed defending the group’s interests, truly expressing its ideas and desires, etc. In fact, these norms arise from exclusive forms of representation. This is because Bourdieu bases himself implicitly on these norms that inclusion through subjectivation remains predominantly marked by dispossession. If the dominated are included insofar as they are signified, they inevitably remain trapped in their situation of domination by the simple fact that someone speaks on their behalf.

However, if we consider the inclusive representation of the political subject constituted by its spokesperson, the result is completely

54. Pierre Bourdieu, “Délégation et fétichisme politique,” *Actes de la Recherche en Sciences Sociales* no. 52/53 (June 1984), 49.

55. Luc Boltanski, *Les cadres: la formation d'un groupe social* (Paris: Éditions de Minuit, 1982). For an example of implementing representation in the construction of a social group.

different. Representation is then measured according to the forms of inclusion noted above. The individuals and social groups created by representation are actually represented to the extent that this brings about politicization processes in those represented – intrinsic to representation (by passing judgment on representatives), or external to it (by establishing alternative forms of representation). Thus, for inclusive representation, a subjectivation process results in a group's representation insofar as the process gives rise to autonomous political activity on the part of members on whose behalf the representative speaks. It is only under this condition that we might say that the process of subjectivation through representation is inclusive, that is if it enables the subjects thus established to take on an ability to act accordingly.⁵⁶ Consequently, if subjectivation processes are inclusive, they continue to bring into question the established identities as new divisions appear within the social groups represented, as Anne Phillips explained in regard to the representation of women:

In the subsequent development of feminist politics, the question of who can best speak for or on behalf of another became a major source of tension, for once men were dislodged from their role of speaking for women, it seemed obvious enough that white women ought also to be dislodged from their role of speaking for black women, heterosexual women for lesbians, and middle-class women for those in the working class.⁵⁷

According to the concept of inclusive representation, the reason it can be said that the feminist movement actually represents women is that there were protests over the fact that some women spoke for others within the same movement. Thus, inclusive representation involves a necessarily dynamic view of social identities. Since groups

56. Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe, *Hegemony and Socialist Strategy: Towards a Radical Democratic Politics* (London: Verso 2001 [1985]), 176. These authors envision the establishment of “chains of equivalency” between the various battles against oppression. See also Iris Marion, *Young, Inclusion and Democracy* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), 121-153. This author seeks a path for group representation that does not essentialize social identities, by relying in particular on the Derridian concept of *différance* (temporization). More generally speaking, subaltern studies advocate the forms of reappropriation of subjectivation processes by the dominated – for example, John Beverley, *Subalternity and Representation: Arguments in Cultural Theory* (Durham: Duke University Press, 1999) – by referring, in particular, to the works of Michel Foucault, “Le sujet et le pouvoir” (1982), in *Dits et écrits*, vol.4 (Paris: Gallimard, 1994), 222-243.

57. Phillips, *Politics of Presence*, 9.

can be established through representational activity, the allocation of the ability to speak for the group cannot be set once and for all. Subjectivation processes constantly reveal new political subjects, who produce new dividing lines within the established social groups, thereby creating the need for new devices of inclusion.

Inclusive Representation Politics

At the end of this initial foray into inclusive forms of representation, it appears that the focus on studies devoted to political representation based solely on its exclusive aspects is misleading. Far from being a simple tool for justifying the division of political work, representation can also be understood as a means of including the represented. Exclusive representation assumes that the represented are absent, made present exclusively through the person of their representative. Inclusive representation, on the other hand, is measured by the fact that it motivates those represented to participate directly. This participation can assume various forms: it can come from politicized citizens or excluded social groups; it can insert itself into the institutions of representative government or take place independently of them. However, in every instance, it is not the activity of representatives, but the participation of the represented that constitutes representation. From this standpoint, inclusive representation appears to stand in opposition to exclusive representation and its norms. According to Pitkin, it is responsiveness on the part of the representative and the absence of conflict with those represented that constitute the signs of good representation – while it is the activity of the represented, going so far as to conflict with and break away from the representatives, that is the determining factor here.

With inclusive representation, a system is representative to the extent that the established representatives are subject to ongoing public judgment, competing with external forms of representation implemented by the represented themselves and by spokespeople for groups deemed poorly represented or not represented at all – spokespeople who are themselves contested by those in whose name they speak. What makes representation inclusive is not that representatives have been elected, that they resemble the represented or defend their interests, but rather that the represented appear directly on

the public stage, that they pass judgment, express their will, dispute what is said and done in their name, and construct alternative institutions. In this regard, inclusive representation policies would consist in multiplying the opportunities for the represented to become directly involved in the decision-making processes, thus defeating the exclusive reasoning of representative government and transforming the political system in a radically democratic way.

Samuel Hayat is a post-doctoral researcher at the Conservatoire national des arts et métiers. His dissertation (2011) focused on the history of political representation at the time of the Revolution of 1848 (2014, Editions du Seuil). He is a member of the AFSP (Association Française de Science Politique) group on political representation (GrePo), and serves on the editorial boards of two journals, *Tracés* and *Participations*. He is researching forms of political representation outside of representative government, and in particular via the history of the nineteenth-century workers' movement.

ABSTRACT

Inclusive representation

The standard opposition between political representation and participation is based on an exclusive conception of representation (excluding those represented). But a concept of representation that is inclusive can be understood, most notably through the history of representation before representative government succeeded in nineteenth-century France. Instead of preventing the direct participation of those represented, inclusive representation stimulates it. Inclusion through representation may first appear through the politicization of citizens, by their judging the action of representatives inside the institutions of representative government, or through the constructing of alternative representative devices outside these institutions. Inclusive representation may also specifically include dominated groups, inside or outside representative government institutions. Finally, inclusive representation may rest on processes of subjectivation, through which excluded social groups become political subjects.

RÉSUMÉ

La représentation inclusive

L'opposition traditionnelle entre représentation et participation directe repose sur une conception exclusive de la représentation. Or on peut mettre au jour, notamment par l'histoire de la représentation avant le triomphe du gouvernement représentatif, une autre conception, inclusive, où l'existence d'une relation de représentation stimule plutôt qu'empêche la participation directe des représentés. Cette inclusion par la représentation peut d'abord passer par la politisation des citoyens, au sein même des institutions du gouvernement représentatif, par la formulation d'un jugement sur l'action des représentants, ou à l'extérieur, par la construction de dispositifs alternatifs de représentation. La représentation inclusive peut aussi viser l'inclusion spécifique des groupes dominés, à l'intérieur ou à l'extérieur des institutions du gouvernement représentatif. Enfin, la représentation inclusive peut passer par des processus de subjectivation, par lesquels des groupes sociaux exclus deviennent des sujets politiques.