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# Characterizations of three linear values for TU games by associated consistency: simple proofs using the Jordan normal form 

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March 30, 2015


#### Abstract

This article studies values for cooperative games with transferable utility. Numerous such values can be characterized by axioms of $\Psi_{\varepsilon}$-associated consistency, which require that a value is invariant under some parametrized linear transformation $\Psi_{\varepsilon}$ on the vector space of cooperative games with transferable utility. Xu et al. (2008, 2009, Linear Algebra Appl.), Xu et al. (2013, Linear Algebra Appl.), Hamiache (2010, Int. Game Theory Rev.) and more recently Xu et al. (2015, Linear Algebra Appl.) follow this approach by using a matrix analysis. The main drawback of these articles is the heaviness of the proofs to show that the matrix expression of the linear transformations is diagonalizable. By contrast, we provide quick proofs by relying on the Jordan normal form of the previous matrix.


## 1 Introduction

A transferable utility (TU henceforth) game on a finite player set is a function which assigns a real number, called the worth, to each subset of players. A (single-valued) solution, often called a value, assigns a single payoff to each player in each TU game. The payoff received by a player in a TU game represents an assessment by this player of his or her gains for participating in this TU game. In the axiomatic characterization of values for TU games, consistency is an important principle. Roughly speaking, it indicates that the value is invariant under some plausible transformation of the TU game.

Hamiache (2001) introduces the parameterized linear transformation $H_{\varepsilon}, \varepsilon \in[0,1]$, on the vector space of TU games, and shows that the Shapley value (1953), the most popular linear value for transferable utility games is invariant under $H_{\varepsilon}$. He then characterizes the Shapley value by three axioms: $H_{\varepsilon}$-associated consistency, continuity and the inessential game axiom. The axiom of $H_{\varepsilon}$-associated consistency indicates that the value is invariant under $H_{\varepsilon}$; continuity stipulates that the value is continuous on the vector space of TU games; and the inessential game axiom indicates that the value assigns to each player his or her stand-alone worth in case the game is inessential / additive.

Hwang (2006) introduces an alternative parameterized linear transformation $H w_{\varepsilon}, \varepsilon \in[0,1]$, on the vector space of TU games, and shows that the Equal Allocation of Non-Separable Contributions, a wellknown value popularized by Moulin (1985), satisfies $H w_{\varepsilon}$-associated consistency. He then characterizes this value by using $H w_{\varepsilon}$-associated consistency, continuity, and three other standard axioms for TU games. Xu et al. (2013) define another parameterized linear transformation $K_{\varepsilon}, \varepsilon \in[0,1]$, and show that replacing $H w_{\varepsilon}$-associated consistency by $K_{\varepsilon}$-associated consistency in Hwang's axiomatic system yields the Center of gravity of Imputation Set, a value popularized by Driessen and Funaki (1991).

[^0]Recently, Xu et al. (2015) define two other parameterized linear transformations $X_{\varepsilon}$ and $L_{\varepsilon}, \varepsilon \in[0,1]$, in order to characterize the Equal Allocation of Non-Separable Contributions and the Center of gravity of Imputation Set, respectively. The Equal Allocation of Non-Separable Contributions is characterized by $X_{\varepsilon^{-}}$ associated consistency, continuity and the inessential game axiom. Replacing $X_{\varepsilon}$-associated consistency by $L_{\varepsilon}$-associated consistency yields the characterization of the Center of gravity of Imputation Set.

The key point behind the proof of these characterizations is to show that the sequences $\left(H_{\varepsilon}^{(t)}\right)_{t \in \mathbb{N}}$, $\left(H w_{\varepsilon}^{(t)}\right)_{t \in \mathbb{N}},\left(K_{\varepsilon}^{(t)}\right)_{t \in \mathbb{N}},\left(X_{\varepsilon}^{(t)}\right)_{t \in \mathbb{N}}$ and $\left(L_{\varepsilon}^{(t)}\right)_{t \in \mathbb{N}}$ are convergent sequences for sufficiently small $\varepsilon$. To do this, Xu et al. (2008, 2009, 2013), Hamiache (2010) and more recently Xu et al. (2015) use a matrix analysis. More specifically, they show that the matrix expression of each linear transformation is diagonalizable. From this point, it is easy to find the conditions under which each of the aforementioned sequences is convergent. Nevertheless, showing that the matrix expression of each of these linear transformations is diagonalizable is computationally demanding and not necessary at all. First, it is computationally demanding because the authors express the matrix with respect to the standard basis, which is not the most suitable basis to examine $H_{\varepsilon}, H w_{\varepsilon}, K_{\varepsilon}, X_{\varepsilon}$ or $L_{\varepsilon}$. Second, it is unnecessary to prove that the matrix is diagonalizable to study the corresponding sequences $\left(H_{\varepsilon}^{(t)}\right)_{t \in \mathbb{N}},\left(H w_{\varepsilon}^{(t)}\right)_{t \in \mathbb{N}},\left(K_{\varepsilon}^{(t)}\right)_{t \in \mathbb{N}},\left(X_{\varepsilon}^{(t)}\right)_{t \in \mathbb{N}}$ and $\left(L_{\varepsilon}^{(t)}\right)_{t \in \mathbb{N}}$. Indeed, it suffices to prove that (a) each eigenvalue $\lambda \neq 1$ of the linear transformation under consideration is such that $|\lambda|<1$; (b) the multiplicity of the eigenvalue $\lambda=1$, when the latter exists, is equal to the dimension of its eigenspace. These two properties can simultaneously be proved by exhibiting a basis in which the matrix expression of the linear transformation is triangular, which is a weaker condition than exhibiting a diagonal basis. At this step, it remains to put the matrix of the linear transformation in the Jordan normal form to obtain the desired convergence result.

In this article, we show that the Jordan normal form of each matrix associated with the four linear transformations can be quickly computed. As a byproduct, the proofs of convergence as well as the axiomatic characterizations can be dramatically shortened. In fact, these proofs become very simple and short as soon as a suitable basis for the vector space of TU games is chosen. Moreover, the choice of these bases appears quite natural.

The rest of the article is organized as follows. In section 2, notations, definitions and related notions are introduced. In section 3, we define the three different types of linear transformations on the space of transferable utility games, and state the axiomatic characterization results obtained by Hamiache (2001), Hwang (2006) and Xu et al. (2015). In section 4, we present the proof strategy behind the three abovementioned axiomatic characterization results. In section 5, we introduce what we call the Jordan normal form approach as opposed to the "matrix analysis to associated consistency for linear values" followed by Xu et al. (2008, 2009, 2013), Hamiache (2010) and Xu et al. (2015). In section 6, we use the Jordan normal form approach to construct a short and simple proof of each axiomatic characterization obtained by Hamiache (2001), Hwang (2006), Xu et al. (2013), and Xu et al. (2015), respectively.

## 2 Notations and definitions

Given a vector space $V$, its additive identity element will be denoted by $0_{V}$. If a vector space $V$ is the direct sum of the subspaces $V^{1}$ and $V^{2}$, i.e. $V=V^{1}+V^{2}$ and $V^{1} \cap V^{2}=0_{V}$, we write $V=V^{1} \oplus V^{2}$. If $\Psi: V \longrightarrow U$ is a linear transformation, then denote by $\operatorname{Ker}(\Psi)$ its kernel, i.e. the set of vectors $v \in V$ such that $\Psi(v)=0_{U}$.

Let $N=\{1,2, \ldots, n\}$ be a finite and fixed set of size $n$. An element $i \in N$ and a subset $S \subseteq N$ are called a player and coalition (of players), respectively. For each nonempty coalition $S \subseteq N$, its cardinality will be denoted by $s$. Denote by $\Omega_{N}$ the collection of all nonempty coalitions of $N$. Throughout this article, we assume that $\Omega_{N}$ is ordered according to some linear extension of the partial order $\subseteq$. Let $\sigma$ be a permutation on $N$ and let $\Sigma_{N}$ be the set of $n$ ! permutations on $N$. Throughout this article, we assume that $\Omega_{N}$ is ordered according to some linear extension of the partial order $\subseteq$. Let $V_{N}$ be the set all coalition functions or transferable utility (TU) games on $N, v: 2^{N} \longrightarrow \mathbb{R}$ such that $v(\emptyset)=0$. The real number $v(S)$ is interpreted as the worth that coalition $S$ can reach when all its members cooperate. A coalition function
$v \in V_{N}$ is inessential or additive if, for each $S \subseteq N$, it holds that $v(S)=\sum_{i \in S} v(\{i\})$. Denote by $I_{N}$ the set of inessential TU games. A TU game $v \in V_{N}$ is constant if there is $\alpha \in \mathbb{R}$ such that, for each $S \in \Omega_{N}$, $v(S)=\alpha$. Denote by $C_{N}$ the subset of constant TU games. For any $v \in V_{N}$ and any $\sigma \in \Sigma_{N}$ define $\sigma v \in V_{N}$ as: for each $S \in \Omega_{N}, \sigma v(\sigma(S))=v(S)$, where $\sigma(S)$ stands for $\cup_{i \in S} \sigma(i)$.

Let $v \in V_{N}, w \in V_{N}$ and $\alpha \in \mathbb{R}$. The sum game $v+w \in V_{N}$ is defined for each $S \subseteq N$ as $(v+w)(S)=$ $v(S)+w(S)$. The scalar product game $\alpha v \in V_{N}$, where $\alpha \in \mathbb{R}$, is defined, for each $S \subseteq N$, as $(\alpha v)(S)=\alpha v(S)$. The set $V_{N}$ together with the operations defined above has a (real) vector space structure of dimension $2^{n}-1$. Denote by $0_{V_{N}}$ its identity element, i.e. the null game. The standard basis for $V_{N}$ is the ordered collection of games $\mathcal{E}=\left(e_{R}\right)_{R \in \Omega_{N}}$, where each standard TU game $e_{R} \in \mathcal{E}$ is defined as: for each $S \subseteq N, e_{R}(S)=1$ if $S=R$, and $e_{R}(S)=0$ if $S \neq R$. Another well-used basis for $V_{N}$ is the ordered collection unanimity games $\mathcal{U}=\left(u_{R}\right)_{R \in \Omega_{N}}$, where each unanimity TU game $u_{R} \in \mathcal{U}$ is defined as: for each $S \subseteq N, u_{R}(S)=1$ if $S \supseteq R$, and $u_{R}(S)=0$ if $S \nsupseteq R$. Notice that $I_{N}$ is a $n$-dimensional subspace of $V_{N}$, the ordered collection of unanimity TU games $\mathcal{I}=\left(u_{\{1\}}, u_{\{2\}}, \ldots, u_{\{n\}}\right)$ is a basis for $I_{N} ; C_{N}$ is a one-dimensional subspace of $V_{N}$, and the TU game $c \in C_{N}$ defined as, for each $S \in \Omega_{N}, c(S)=1$, constitutes a basis for $C_{N}$. Finally, $D_{N}$ denotes the one-dimensional subspace of $V_{N}$ spanned by the unanimity TU game $u_{N}$. Thus, TU games in $D_{N}$ assign a zero worth to each coalition different from $N$.

A value on $V_{N}$ is a function $\Phi: V_{N} \longrightarrow \mathbb{R}^{n}$ that assigns a single real payoff vector $\Phi(v) \in \mathbb{R}$ to each $v \in V_{N}$. The payoff $\Phi_{i}(v)$ represents an assessment by $i$ of his or her gains for participating in the TU game $v$.

The best-known value for TU games is the value Sh, known as the Shapley value (Shapley, 1953), and defined as:

$$
\begin{equation*}
\forall i \in N, \quad S h_{i}(v)=\sum_{S \in \Omega_{N}: S \not \supset i} \frac{(n-s-1)!s!}{n!}(v(S \cup\{i\})-v(S)) . \tag{1}
\end{equation*}
$$

In particular, it is well known that, for each unanimity $T \mathrm{U}$ game $u_{R} \in \mathcal{U}$, it holds that:

$$
\begin{equation*}
\forall i \in R, \quad S h_{i}\left(u_{R}\right)=\frac{1}{r} \quad \text { and } \quad \forall i \in N \backslash R, \quad S h_{i}\left(u_{R}\right)=0 \tag{2}
\end{equation*}
$$

The Equal Allocation of Non-Separable Contributions (EANSC) is the value introduced by Moulin (1985) and defined as:

$$
\begin{equation*}
\forall i \in N, \quad E A N S C_{i}(v)=S C_{i}(v)+\frac{1}{n}\left(v(N)-\sum_{j \in N} S C_{j}(v)\right) \tag{3}
\end{equation*}
$$

where,

$$
\forall i \in N, \quad S C_{i}(v)=v(N)-v(N \backslash\{i\})
$$

is the marginal contribution of player $i \in N$ to the coalition $N$.
The Center of gravity of Imputation Set (CIS), introduced in Driessen and Funaki (1991), is the dual of the EANSC value where the dual $v^{D}$ of a TU game $v \in V_{N}$ is defined as:

$$
\forall S \in \Omega_{N}, \quad v^{D}(S)=v(N)-v(S)
$$

Therefore, the CIS value is given by:

$$
\begin{align*}
\forall i \in N, \quad C I S_{i}(v) & =\operatorname{EANSC}\left(v^{D}\right) \\
& =v(\{i\})+\frac{1}{n}\left(v(N)-\sum_{j \in N} v(\{j\})\right) \tag{4}
\end{align*}
$$

A value $\Phi$ on $V_{N}$ satisfies:
Linearity if $\Phi$ is linear.
Continuity if $\Phi$ is continuous.

Efficiency if, for each $v \in V_{N}$, it holds that:

$$
\sum_{i \in N} \Phi_{i}(v)=v(N) .
$$

Inessential game axiom if, for each inessential game $v \in I_{N}$, it holds that:

$$
\forall i \in N, \quad \Phi_{i}(v)=v(\{i\}) .
$$

Translation covariance if, for each $v \in V_{N}$ and each $w \in I_{N}$, it holds that:

$$
\Phi(v+w)=\Phi(v)+(w(\{1\}), \ldots, w(\{n\})) .
$$

Anonymity if, for each $v \in V_{N}$ and each $\sigma \in \Sigma_{N}$, it holds that:

$$
\forall i \in N, \quad \Phi_{\sigma(i)}(\sigma v)=\Phi_{i}(v) .
$$

Fact 1: the values Sh, EANSC and CIS satisfy all the above axioms. Note that Linearity implies Continuity, and the combination of Linearity and the Inessential game axiom implies Translation covariance.

## 3 Associated consistency and characterization of Sh, EANSC and CIS

Hamiache (2001) constructs a consistency axiom with respect to an associated TU game. Let $\Psi: V_{N} \longrightarrow V_{N}$ be a linear transformation which transforms any $v \in V_{N}$ into $\Psi(v) \in V_{N}$. The axiom of $\Psi$-associated consistency indicates that a value $\Phi$ is invariant with respect to the transformation $\Psi$. Formally:
$\Psi$-associated consistency Given a linear transformation $\Psi$, a value $\Phi$ on $V_{N}$ satisfies $\Psi$-associated consistency if, for all $v \in V_{N}$, it holds that $\Phi(v)=\Phi(\Psi(v))$.

In order to characterize Sh, Hamiache (2001) introduces, for each parameter $\varepsilon \in[0,1]$, the linear transformation $H_{\varepsilon}$ defined as:

$$
\begin{equation*}
\forall S \in \Omega_{N}, \quad H_{\varepsilon}(v)(S)=v(S)+\varepsilon \sum_{j \in N \backslash S}(v(S \cup\{j\})-v(S)-v(\{j\})) . \tag{5}
\end{equation*}
$$

Theorem 1 (Hamiache, 2001)
Assume that $0<\varepsilon<2 / n$. Then, the Shapley value $S h$ defined as in (1) is the unique value on $V_{N}$ satisfying $H_{\varepsilon}$-associated consistency, Continuity and the Inessential game axiom.

In order to characterize the value EANSC, Hwang (2006) introduces, for each parameter $\varepsilon \in[0,1]$, the linear transformation $H w_{\varepsilon}$ defined as:

$$
\begin{equation*}
\forall S \in \Omega_{N}, \quad H w_{\varepsilon}(v)(S)=v(S)+\varepsilon \sum_{j \in N \backslash S}\left(v(S \cup\{j\})-v(S)-S C_{j}(v)\right) . \tag{6}
\end{equation*}
$$

Theorem 2 (Hwang, 2006)
Assume that $0<\varepsilon<2 /(n-1)$. Then, the EANSC value defined as in (3) is the unique value on $V_{N}$ satisfying $H w_{\varepsilon}$-associated consistency, Continuity, Efficiency, Anonymity and Translation covariance.

Xu et al. (2013) suggest another parameterized linear transformation. For each $\varepsilon \in[0,1]$, they define the linear transformation $K_{\varepsilon}$ as follows:

$$
K_{\varepsilon}(v)(S)= \begin{cases}v(S)-\varepsilon \sum_{j \in S}(v(S)-v(S \backslash\{j\})-v(\{j\})) & \text { if } S \in \Omega_{N}, S \neq N,  \tag{7}\\ v(N) & \text { if } S=N .\end{cases}
$$

They obtain, within "Hwang's framework", i.e. by using $\Psi_{\varepsilon}$-associated consistency, Continuity, Efficiency, Anonymity and Translation covariance, the following characterization result.

Theorem 3 (Xu et al. 2013)
Assume that $0<\varepsilon<2 /(n-1)$. Then, the $C I S$ value defined as in (4) is the unique value on $V_{N}$ satisfying $K_{\varepsilon}$-associated consistency, Continuity, Efficiency, Anonymity and Translation covariance.

Recently, Xu et al. (2015) characterize the EANSC and the CIS value within "Hamiache's framework" i.e. by using $\Psi$-associated consistency, Continuity and the Inessential game axiom. To this end, the authors introduce, for each parameter $\varepsilon \in[0,1]$, two linear transformations $X_{\varepsilon}$ and $L_{\varepsilon}$ defined respectively as:

$$
\begin{equation*}
\forall S \in \Omega_{N}, \quad X_{\varepsilon}(v)(S)=v(S)+\varepsilon\left(\frac{s}{n}\left(v(N)-\sum_{j \in N} S C_{j}(v)\right)-\left(v(S)-\sum_{j \in S} S C_{j}(v)\right)\right) \tag{8}
\end{equation*}
$$

and

$$
\begin{equation*}
\forall S \in \Omega_{N}, \quad L_{\varepsilon}(v)(S)=v(S)+\varepsilon\left(\frac{s}{n}\left(v(N)-\sum_{j \in N} v(\{j\})\right)-\left(v(S)-\sum_{j \in S} v(\{j\})\right)\right) \tag{9}
\end{equation*}
$$

Theorem 4 (Xu et al., 2015)
Let $\varepsilon$ be such that $0<\varepsilon<1$.

1. The EANSC value defined as in (3) is the unique value on $V_{N}$ satisfying $X_{\varepsilon}$-associated consistency, Continuity and the Inessential game axiom.
2. The CIS value defined as in (4) is the unique value on $V_{N}$ satisfying $L_{\varepsilon}$-associated consistency, Continuity and the Inessential game axiom.

## 4 Proof strategy

The proof strategy of each of the aforementioned results is based, for some fixed $\varepsilon \in[0,1]$, on the study of the infinite sequences $\left(\Psi_{\varepsilon}^{(t)}(v)\right)_{t \in \mathbb{N}} \subseteq V_{N}$, where $\Psi_{\varepsilon}^{(1)}(v)=\Psi_{\varepsilon}(v)$, and for each $t \geq 2, \Psi_{\varepsilon}^{(t)}(v)=\Psi_{\varepsilon}\left(\Psi_{\varepsilon}^{(t-1)}(v)\right)$. For each result, the main step of the proof reduces to prove that each sequence converges to a TU game belonging to a certain subspace $E_{\Psi_{\varepsilon}}$ of $V_{N}$, provided that $\varepsilon$ is sufficiently small, i.e. for sufficiently small $\varepsilon$,

$$
\begin{equation*}
\forall v \in V_{N}, \quad\left(\Psi_{\varepsilon}^{(t)}(v)\right)_{t \in \mathbb{N}} \xrightarrow{t \rightarrow+\infty} v^{*} \in E_{\Psi_{\varepsilon}} \tag{10}
\end{equation*}
$$

Then, by $\Psi_{\varepsilon}$-associated consistency and Continuity, we obtain:

$$
\Phi(v)=\Phi\left(\Psi_{\varepsilon}^{(t)}(v)\right), \text { and } \lim _{t \rightarrow+\infty} \Phi\left(\Psi_{\varepsilon}^{(t)}(v)\right)=\Phi\left(\lim _{t \rightarrow+\infty} \Psi_{\varepsilon}^{(t)}(v)\right)=\Phi\left(v^{*}\right)
$$

and so

$$
\Phi(v)=\Phi\left(v^{*}\right)
$$

The second step consists in computing $\Phi\left(v^{*}\right)$ with the other axioms, using the fact that $v^{*} \in E_{\Psi_{\varepsilon}}$. There are some variations according to $E_{\Psi_{\varepsilon}}$.

- Regarding Theorems 1 and 4, we have $E_{\Psi_{\varepsilon}}=I_{N}$, where $\Psi_{\varepsilon} \in\left\{H_{\varepsilon}, X_{\varepsilon}, L_{\varepsilon}\right\}$, and, by the Inessential game axiom, we conclude that $\Phi$ is uniquely determined:

$$
\Phi(v)=\Phi\left(v^{*}\right)=\left(v^{*}(\{1\}), \ldots, v^{*}(\{n\})\right.
$$

- Regarding Theorem 2, we have $E_{H w_{\varepsilon}}=C_{N} \oplus I_{N}$. After some elementary computations, we obtain:

$$
\begin{equation*}
\forall S \in \Omega_{N}, \quad v^{*}(S)=\underbrace{\sum_{j \in S} S C_{j}\left(v^{*}\right)}_{\text {Inessential TU game }}+\underbrace{v^{*}(N)-\sum_{j \in N} S C_{j}\left(v^{*}\right)}_{\text {Constant TU game }} \tag{11}
\end{equation*}
$$

By Translation covariance, we obtain:

$$
\begin{equation*}
\Phi\left(v^{*}\right)=\left(S C_{1}\left(v^{*}\right), \ldots, S C_{n}\left(v^{*}\right)\right)+\Phi\left(c_{v}^{*}\right), \tag{12}
\end{equation*}
$$

where $c_{v}^{*}$ stands for the constant TU game in (11). By Anonymity and Efficiency apply to $\Phi\left(c_{v}^{*}\right)$, we obtain:

$$
\begin{equation*}
\Phi\left(c_{v}^{*}\right)=\left(\frac{c_{v}^{*}(N)}{n}, \ldots, \frac{c_{v}^{*}(N)}{n}\right) . \tag{13}
\end{equation*}
$$

By (12)-(13), $\Phi\left(v^{*}\right)$ is uniquely determined, so is $\Phi(v)$.

- Regarding Theorem 3, we have $E_{K_{\varepsilon}}=D_{N} \oplus I_{N}$. In particular, elementary computations give:

$$
\begin{equation*}
\forall S \in \Omega_{N}, \quad v^{*}(S)=\underbrace{\sum_{j \in S} v^{*}(\{j\})}_{\text {Inessential TU game }}+\underbrace{\left(v^{*}(N)-\sum_{j \in N} v^{*}(\{j\})\right) u_{N}(S)}_{\text {TU game of } D_{N}} . \tag{14}
\end{equation*}
$$

By applying Translation covariance, Efficiency, and Anonymity, we obtain:

$$
\begin{equation*}
\Phi\left(v^{*}\right)=\left(v^{*}(\{1\}), \ldots, v^{*}(\{n\})\right)+n^{-1}\left(v^{*}(N)-\sum_{j \in N} v^{*}(\{j\}), \ldots, v^{*}(N)-\sum_{j \in N} v^{*}(\{j\})\right) . \tag{15}
\end{equation*}
$$

By (15), $\Phi\left(v^{*}\right)$ is uniquely determined, so is $\Phi(v)$.
In any case, to complete the proof, it remains to apply Fact 1 and to verify that the value under consideration satisfies the $\Psi_{\varepsilon}$-associated consistency axiom, which is a routine exercise.

In Xu et al. (2008) and Hamiache (2010) a matrix approach has been applied to study the linear transformation $H_{\varepsilon}$. Xu et al. (2013) and Xu et al. (2015) also apply this matrix approach to study the linear transformations $K_{\varepsilon}, X_{\varepsilon}$ and $L_{\varepsilon}$. See also Hamiache (2013) for axiomatic characterizations of other values by using this approach.

The so-called matrix approach consists in studying the matrix expression $M_{\Psi_{\varepsilon}}^{\mathcal{E}}$ with respect to the standard basis $\mathcal{E}=\left(e_{R}\right)_{R \in \Omega_{N}}$ of the linear transformation $\Psi_{\varepsilon}$ defining the $\Psi_{\varepsilon}$-consistency axiom. The authors prove that $M_{\Psi_{\varepsilon}}^{\mathcal{E}}$ is diagonalizable by exhibiting its eigenvalues and by showing that the dimension of the eigenspace of each eigenvalue equals the multiplicities of the eigenvalue. As underlined in the introduction, a main drawback of this approach is that it is unnecessarily long and computationally demanding, mainly because the matrix of the linear transformation is expressed with respect to the standard basis. In section 6 , we show that the proof of convergence of (10) can be dramatically shortened by focusing the analysis on the linear transformation $\Psi_{\varepsilon}$. Considering alternative bases to $\mathcal{E}$ for which the matrix expression of $\Psi_{\varepsilon}$ is upper triangular, we directly conclude by using the Jordan normal form. This approach is detailed in section 5 . Section 6 applies this approach in order to provide a shorter proof of Theorems 1, 2 and 4.

## 5 Jordan normal form approach

In order to prove Theorems 1, 2, 3 and 4, we will use the Jordan normal form of a matrix (see Horn and Johnson (1990, chapter 3) for instance).

Theorem 5 (Jordan normal form) Let $V$ be a finite dimensional vector space (over an algebraically closed field) of dimension $n$ and let $\Psi$ be a linear transformation $\Psi: V \longrightarrow V$. Then, there exists a basis $\mathcal{B}$ for $V$ such that the matrix expression $M_{\Psi}^{\mathcal{B}}$ of $\Psi$ with respect to the basis $\mathcal{B}$ has the following form:

$$
M_{\Psi}^{\mathcal{B}}=\left(\begin{array}{cccc}
J_{1} & O & \ldots & O \\
O & J_{2} & \ldots & O \\
\vdots & \vdots & \ddots & \vdots \\
O & \ldots & O & J_{k}
\end{array}\right)
$$

where $O$ is a zero matrix, and, for each $p \in\{1, \ldots, k\}$, the matrix $J_{p}$, called a Jordan block, is $d_{p} \times d_{p}$ for some $d_{p} \in \mathbb{N}$ and has the upper triangular matrix form

$$
J_{p}=\lambda_{p} I_{d_{p}}+N_{d_{p}},
$$

where $\lambda_{p}$ is an eigenvalue of $\Psi, N_{d_{p}}$ is the upper triangular $d_{p} \times d_{p}$ matrix with 0 's on the main diagonal, 1's on the super diagonal and 0's above the super diagonal ; and $I_{d_{p}}$ is the $d_{p} \times d_{p}$ identity matrix with 1's on the main diagonal and 0's elsewhere. Furthermore, if $B_{\lambda}$ denotes the set of Jordan blocks associated with the eigenvalue $\lambda$, then the cardinality of $B_{\lambda}$ is equal to the dimension of the eigenspace associated with $\lambda$, and the sum of $d_{p}$ for $J_{p} \in B_{\lambda}$ is equal to the multiplicity of $\lambda$.
$>$ From Theorem 5, we obtain the following corollary
Corollary 1 Let $V$ be a finite dimensional real vector space of dimension $n$ and let $\Psi$ be a linear transformation $\Psi: V \longrightarrow V$. Assume that the following conditions hold.

1. 1 is an eigenvalue of $\Psi$ and the multiplicity of 1 is equal to the dimension of its eigenspace.
2. Each other eigenvalue $\lambda$ of $\Psi$ is such that $|\lambda|<1$.

Then,

$$
\forall v \in V_{N}, \quad\left(\Psi^{(t)}(v)\right)_{t \in \mathbb{N}} \xrightarrow{t \rightarrow+\infty} v^{*},
$$

where $v^{*}$ belongs to the eigenspace associated with the eigenvalue 1.
Proof: Consider the blocks $J_{p} \in B_{1}$ (see Theorem 5). On the one hand, because the multiplicity of 1 is equal to the dimension of its eigenspace, it follows that each $J_{p} \in B_{1}$ is a $1 \times 1$ matrix. All these blocks induce a submatrix $J_{1}^{\prime}$ of the Jordan normal form $M_{\Psi}^{\mathcal{B}}$ such that $J_{1}^{\prime}=I_{m}$, where $m$ denotes the multiplicity of 1 . Therefore,

$$
\begin{equation*}
J_{1}^{\prime(t)} \xrightarrow{t \rightarrow+\infty} I_{m} . \tag{16}
\end{equation*}
$$

On the other hand, for each Jordan block $J_{p} \in B_{\lambda}, \lambda \neq 1$, we have:

$$
J_{p}=\lambda I_{d_{p}}+N_{d_{p}} .
$$

Because $|\lambda|<1$, from standard computations, we obtain:

$$
\begin{equation*}
J_{p}^{(t)} \xrightarrow{t \rightarrow+\infty} O . \tag{17}
\end{equation*}
$$

The result follows from (16) and (17).
What we call the Jordan normal form approach by opposition to the matrix approach can be exposed as follows.

1. We choose a basis $\mathcal{B}^{\prime}=\left(b_{1}^{\prime}, \ldots, b_{2^{n}-1}^{\prime}\right)$ for $V_{N}$.
2. For each linear transformation $\Psi$ and for each $p \in\left\{1, \ldots, 2^{n}-1\right\}$, we compute the image $\Psi\left(b_{p}^{\prime}\right)$.
3. From step 2, we express the matrix of $\Psi$ with respect to $\mathcal{B}^{\prime}$ and conclude that it is upper triangular on the main diagonal. It follows that the entries on the main diagonal are the eigenvalues of $\Psi$.
4. We verify that the conditions 1 and 2 in the statement of Corollary 1 (of Theorem 5) are satisfied, which ensures the convergence result of the linear transformation $\Psi$.
5. We apply the proof strategy described in section 4.

## 6 Applications

### 6.1 Proof of Theorem 1

To prove Theorem 1, we have to show that (10) holds for $\Psi_{\varepsilon}=H_{\varepsilon}$ and $E_{H_{\varepsilon}}=I_{N}$. To this end, we choose the unanimity basis $\mathcal{U}=\left(u_{T}\right)_{T \in \Omega_{N}}$, mainly because it is well known that $\mathcal{U}$ is suitable for the study of the Shapley value. By the way, the seminal paper by Shapley (1953) uses this basis. Furthermore, given the expression of $H_{\varepsilon}$ given in (5), it is readily verify that $H_{\varepsilon}\left(u_{R}\right)=u_{R}$ in case $r=1$, meaning that 1 is an eigenvalue of $H_{\varepsilon}$, and $\mathcal{I}=\left(u_{\{1\}}, \ldots, u_{\{n\}}\right)$, a basis for $I_{N}$, contains (all) the eigenvectors associated with the eigenvalue 1. It remains to show that each other eigenvalue $\lambda$ is such that $|\lambda|<1$ for sufficiently small $\varepsilon$. This fact is a consequence of the statement of the next proposition.

Proposition 1 For $R \in \Omega_{N}$, the image $H_{\varepsilon}\left(u_{R}\right)$ is such that:

1. If $r=1, H_{\varepsilon}\left(u_{R}\right)=u_{R}$.
2. If $r \geq 2, H_{\varepsilon}\left(u_{R}\right)=(1-\varepsilon r) u_{R}+\varepsilon \sum_{i \in R} u_{R \backslash\{i\}}$.

We relegate the proof of Proposition 1 to the end of this section.
$>$ From Proposition 1, we see that the matrix expression $M_{H_{\varepsilon}}^{\mathcal{U}}$ of $H_{\varepsilon}$ with respect to the basis $\mathcal{U}$ is upper triangular. This allows us to quickly compute the eigenvalues of $H_{\varepsilon}$ as well as their multiplicities: 1 is an eigenvalue of multiplicity $n$, and, for $r \in\{2, \ldots, n\}, 1-\varepsilon r$ is an eigenvalue with multiplicity $\binom{n}{r}$. There is no other eigenvalue. At this step, we verify that conditions 1 and 2 in the statement of Corollary 1 hold.
(a) On the one hand $\mathcal{I}=\left(u_{1}, \ldots, u_{n}\right)$ is a basis for $I_{N}$. Thus, the dimension of the eigenspace associated with the eigenvalue 1 is at least equal to $n$. On the other hand, the multiplicity of the eigenvalue 1 is $n$. This enforces that $n$ is the dimension of the eigenspace associated with the eigenvalue 1 . In other words $I_{N}$ is the eigenspace associated with the eigenvalue 1 . So, condition 1 in the statement of Corollary 1 holds.
(b) For sufficiently small $\varepsilon$, actually $0<\varepsilon<2 / n$, for each $r \in\{2, \ldots, n\}$, it holds that $|1-\varepsilon r|<1$. So, condition 2 in the statement of Corollary 1 holds.

By (a)-(b) and Corollary 1, the convergence result (10) holds for $\Psi_{\varepsilon}=H_{\varepsilon}$. It remains to apply the proof strategy as described in section 4 and Theorem 1 is proved.

To establish Proposition 1, define the linear transform $\Upsilon: V_{N} \longrightarrow V_{N}$ as:

$$
\begin{equation*}
\forall S \in \Omega_{N}, \quad \Upsilon(v)(S)=\sum_{j \in N \backslash S}(v(S \cup\{j\})-v(S)-v(\{j\})), \tag{18}
\end{equation*}
$$

so that $H_{\varepsilon}$ is defined as the sum of the identity transformation and $\varepsilon \Upsilon$. Proposition 1 is a direct consequence of the following result.

Proposition 2 Let $R \in \Omega_{N}$.

1. If $r=1$, then $\Upsilon\left(u_{R}\right)=0_{V_{N}}$.
2. If $r \geq 2$, then

$$
\forall S \in \Omega_{N}, \quad \Upsilon\left(u_{R}\right)(S)= \begin{cases}1 & \text { if }|S \cap R|=r-1, \\ 0 & \text { otherwise } .\end{cases}
$$

3. If $r \geq 2$, it holds that:

$$
\begin{equation*}
\Upsilon\left(u_{R}\right)=\sum_{i \in R} u_{R \backslash\{i\}}-r u_{R} . \tag{19}
\end{equation*}
$$

Proof: Point 1. Pick any $R \in \Omega_{N}$ such that $r=1$. Given the expression (18) of $\Upsilon$ and the fact that $u_{R} \in I_{N}$, the results holds trivially.

Point 2. Pick any $R \in \Omega_{N}$ such that $r \geq 2$. For each $S \in \Omega_{N}$, we have to compute:

$$
\begin{equation*}
\sum_{j \in N \backslash S}\left(u_{R}(S \cup\{j\})-u_{R}(S)-u_{R}(\{j\})\right) . \tag{20}
\end{equation*}
$$

Because $r \geq 2$, for each $j \in N \backslash S, u_{R}(\{j\})=0$. Therefore, (20) rewrites:

$$
\begin{equation*}
\sum_{j \in N \backslash S}\left(u_{R}(S \cup\{j\})-u_{R}(S)\right) . \tag{21}
\end{equation*}
$$

Two exclusive cases arise depending on the choice of $S$.
(a) If $S$ is such that $|S \cap R|=r-1$. Denote by $j^{*}$ the unique player belonging to $R \cap N \backslash S$. We have $u_{R}(S)=0, S \cup\left\{j^{*}\right\} \supseteq R$ and so $u_{R}\left(S \cup\left\{j^{*}\right\}\right)=1$. Therefore, (21) is equal to 1 . (b) If $S$ is such that $|S \cap R| \neq r-1$, then it is obvious that $u_{R}(S)=u_{R}(S \cup\{j\})=0$ for each $j \in N \backslash S$ so that(21) is equal to 0 .

Point 2 follows from (a) and (b).
Point 3. It follows from point 2. Indeed, pick any $S \in \Omega_{N}$. If $|S \cap R|=r-1$, we have $u_{R \backslash\{i\}}(S)=1$ for exactly one $i \in R$, i.e. for the unique $i \in R \backslash S$, and thus:

$$
\sum_{i \in R} u_{R \backslash\{i\}}(S)-r u_{R}(S)=1-0=\Upsilon\left(u_{R}\right)(S) .
$$

If $|S \cap R|=r$, then we have:

$$
\sum_{i \in R} u_{R \backslash\{i\}}(S)-r u_{R}(S)=r-r=\Upsilon\left(u_{R}\right)(S) .
$$

If $|S \cap R|<r-1$, then we obviously have:

$$
\sum_{i \in R} u_{R \backslash\{i\}}(S)-r u_{R}(S)=0-0=\Upsilon\left(u_{R}\right)(S) .
$$

This completes the proof of point 3 .
Proof: (of Proposition 1). Recall that $H_{\varepsilon}$ is the sum of the identity transformation and $\varepsilon \Upsilon$. Pick any $R \in \Omega_{N}$. If $r=1$, then by point 1 of Proposition 2, we have $\Upsilon\left(u_{R}\right)=0_{V_{N}}$, so that $H_{\varepsilon}\left(u_{R}\right)=u_{R}$. If $r \geq 2$, then by point 3 of Proposition 2, we have:

$$
H_{\varepsilon}\left(u_{R}\right)=u_{R}+\varepsilon\left(\sum_{i \in R} u_{R \backslash\{i\}}-r u_{R}\right)=(1-\varepsilon r) u_{R}+\varepsilon \sum_{i \in R} u_{R \backslash\{i\}},
$$

as asserted.
For the sake of completeness, it is easy to verify that $\left(\Upsilon\left(u_{R}\right)\right)_{R \in \Omega_{N}, r \geq 2} \subseteq V_{N}$ is a basis for $\operatorname{Ker}(S h)$. Indeed, since Sh satisfies the Inessential game property, it is onto and so the dimension of $\operatorname{Ker}(S h)$ is equal to $2^{n}-1-n$. The above collection of TU games contains exactly $2^{n}-1-n$, and these TU games are linearly independent. At last, using the expression (19) of $\Upsilon$, the linearity of Sh , and the expression (2) of Sh for unanimity TU games, it is immediate to verify that $\operatorname{Sh}\left(\Upsilon\left(u_{R}\right)\right)=0_{V_{N}}$ for $r \geq 2$. $>$ From this fact, it follows that Sh satisfies $H_{\varepsilon}$-associated for each $\varepsilon \in[0,1]$.

### 6.2 Proof of Theorem 2

To prove Theorem 2, we have to show that (10) holds for $\Psi_{\varepsilon}=H w_{\varepsilon}$ and $E_{H w_{\varepsilon}}=I_{N} \oplus C_{N}$. By expression (6) of $H w_{\varepsilon}$, we see that $H w_{\varepsilon}(c)=c$ for the constant TU game $c$, and $H w_{\varepsilon}\left(u_{\{i\}}\right)=u_{\{i\}}$ for each $i \in N$, meaning that that the unique element of the basis $(c)$ for $C_{N}$ and the elements of the basis $\mathcal{I}=\left(u_{\{1\}}, \ldots, u_{\{n\}}\right)$ for $I_{N}$ are eigenvectors associated with the eigenvalue 1. Furthermore, consider the subspace of TU games $V_{n-2} \subseteq V_{N}$ such that each $v \in V_{n-2}$ is defined as:

$$
\forall i \in N, \quad v(N)=v(N \backslash\{i\})=0
$$

We see that $H w_{\varepsilon}(v)(N)=H w_{\varepsilon}(v)(N \backslash\{i\})=0$. Therefore, $C_{N}, I_{N}$ and $V_{n-2}$ are invariant subspaces under $H w_{\varepsilon}$. The standard basis for $V_{n-2}$ is $\mathcal{E}_{n-2}=\left(\delta_{R}\right)_{R \in \Omega_{N}, r \leq n-2}$. It turns out that that the ordered collection $\mathcal{B}^{(1)}=\left((c), \mathcal{I}, \mathcal{E}_{n-2}\right)$ constitutes a basis for $V_{N}$, so that $V_{N}$ is the direct sum of $C_{N}, I_{N}$ and $V_{n-2}$. All these facts provide a strong incentive to choose $\mathcal{B}^{(1)}$ to study the convergence of the linear transformation $H w_{\varepsilon}$. As a start, we prove that $\mathcal{B}^{(1)}$ is a basis for $V_{N}$.

Proposition 3 The ordered collection $\mathcal{B}^{(1)}$ is a basis for $V_{N}$. Thus, $V_{N}=C_{N} \oplus I_{N} \oplus V_{n-2}$.
Proof: The collection $\mathcal{B}^{(1)}$ contains exactly $2^{n}-1$ vectors, i.e. the dimension of $V_{N}$. It remains to prove that these vectors are linearly independent. So, pick any any linear combination

$$
\alpha_{c} c+\sum_{i \in N} \alpha_{i} u_{i}+\sum_{R \in \Omega_{N}: r \leq n-2} \alpha_{R} \delta_{R}=0_{V_{N}} .
$$

On the one hand, we have:

$$
\begin{aligned}
\alpha_{c} c(N)+\sum_{i \in N} \alpha_{i} u_{i}(N)+\sum_{R \in \Omega_{N}: r \leq n-2} \alpha_{R} \delta_{R}(N) & =\alpha_{c}+\sum_{i \in N} \alpha_{i} \\
& =0,
\end{aligned}
$$

and, for each $j \in N$,

$$
\begin{aligned}
\alpha_{c} c(N \backslash\{j\})+\sum_{i \in N} \alpha_{i} u_{i}(N \backslash\{j\})+\sum_{R \in \Omega_{N}: r \leq n-2} \alpha_{R} \delta_{R}(N \backslash\{j\}) & =\alpha_{c}+\sum_{i \in N \backslash\{j\}} \alpha_{i} \\
& =0 .
\end{aligned}
$$

Thus,

$$
\forall j \in N, \quad \sum_{i \in N} \alpha_{i}=\sum_{i \in N \backslash\{j\}} \alpha_{i}
$$

which implies, for each $j \in N, \alpha_{j}=0$, and so $\alpha_{c}=0$.
On the other hand, and taking into account that, for each $i \in N, \alpha_{i}=\alpha_{c}=0$, we have, for each $S \in \Omega_{N}$, $s \leq n-2$ :

$$
\begin{aligned}
\alpha_{c} c(S)+\sum_{i \in N} \alpha_{i} u_{i}(S)+\sum_{R \in \Omega_{N}: r \leq n-2} \alpha_{R} \delta_{R}(S) & =\alpha_{S} \\
& =0,
\end{aligned}
$$

which proves that the elements of $\mathcal{B}^{(1)}$ are linearly independent.

Proposition 4 Consider the basis $\mathcal{B}^{(1)}$ for $V_{N}$. The following facts hold.

1. $H w_{\varepsilon}(c)=c$.
2. For each $i \in N, H w_{\varepsilon}\left(u_{\{i\}}\right)=u_{\{i\}}$.
3. For each $R \in \Omega_{N}$ such that $r \leq n-2$,

$$
H w_{\varepsilon}\left(\delta_{R}\right)=(1-(n-r) \varepsilon) \delta_{R}+\varepsilon \sum_{i \in R} \delta_{R \backslash\{i\}} .
$$

Proof: Points 1 and 2 are obvious given the expression (6) of $H w_{\varepsilon}$.
Point 3. Pick any $R \in \Omega_{N}$ such that $r \leq n-2$. By (6) and definition of $\delta_{R}$ and $\mathrm{SC}_{j}$, we have:

$$
\begin{align*}
\forall S \in \Omega_{N}, \quad H w_{\varepsilon}\left(\delta_{R}\right)(S) & =\delta_{R}(S)+\varepsilon \sum_{j \in N \backslash S}\left(\delta_{R}(S \cup\{j\})-\delta_{R}(S)-S C_{j}\left(\delta_{R}\right)\right) \\
& =\delta_{R}(S)+\varepsilon \sum_{j \in N \backslash S}\left(\delta_{R}(S \cup\{j\})-\delta_{R}(S)\right) \\
& =(1-(n-s) \varepsilon) \delta_{R}(S)+\varepsilon \sum_{j \in N \backslash S}\left(\delta_{R}(S \cup\{j\}) .\right. \tag{22}
\end{align*}
$$

If $S=R$, then (22) is equal to:

$$
H w_{\varepsilon}\left(\delta_{R}\right)(R)=1-\varepsilon(n-r) .
$$

If $S=R \backslash\{i\}$ for some $i \in R$, then (22) is equal to:

$$
H w_{\varepsilon}\left(\delta_{R}\right)(R \backslash\{i\})=\varepsilon .
$$

In each other case, (22) is equal to:

$$
H w_{\varepsilon}\left(\delta_{R}\right)(R)=0 .
$$

Thus, for each $R \in \Omega_{N}$ such that $r \leq n-2$, it holds that:

$$
H w_{\varepsilon}\left(\delta_{R}\right)=(1-(n-r) \varepsilon) \delta_{R}+\varepsilon \sum_{i \in R} \delta_{R \backslash\{i\}},
$$

as asserted.
$>$ From Proposition 4, it is easy to conclude that EANSC satisfies $H w_{\varepsilon}$-associated consistency. >From Proposition 4, we also see that the matrix expression $M_{H w_{\varepsilon}}^{\mathcal{B}^{(1)}}$ of $H w_{\varepsilon}$ with respect to the basis $\mathcal{B}^{(1)}$ is upper triangular. This allows us to quickly compute the eigenvalues of $H w_{\varepsilon}$ as well as their multiplicities: 1 is an eigenvalue of multiplicity $n+1$, and, for $r \leq n-2,1-(n-r) \varepsilon$ is an eigenvalue with multiplicity $\binom{n}{r}$. There is no other eigenvalue. At this step, we verify that conditions 1 and 2 in the statement of Corollary 1 hold.
(a) On the one hand, $\left(c, u_{1}, \ldots, u_{n}\right)$ is a basis for $C_{N} \oplus I_{N}$. Thus, the dimension of the eigenspace associated with the eigenvalue 1 is at least equal to $n+1$. On the other hand, the multiplicity of the eigenvalue 1 is $n+1$. This enforces that $n+1$ is the dimension of the eigenspace associated with the eigenvalue 1. In other words, $C_{N} \oplus I_{N}$ is the eigenspace associated with the eigenvalue 1 . So, condition 1 in the statement of Corollary 1 holds.
(b) For sufficiently small $\varepsilon$, actually $0<\varepsilon<2 /(n-1)$, it holds that, for each $r \leq n-2,|1-(n-r) \varepsilon|<1$. So, condition 2 in the statement of Corollary 1 holds.

By (a)-(b) and Corollary 1, the convergence result (10) holds for $\Psi_{\varepsilon}=H w_{\varepsilon}$ and $E_{H w_{\varepsilon}}=I_{N} \oplus C_{N}$. It remains to apply the proof strategy as described in section 4, and Theorem 2 is proved.

### 6.3 Proof of Theorem 3

To prove Theorem 3, we have to show that (10) holds for $\Psi_{\varepsilon}=K_{\varepsilon} E_{K_{\varepsilon}}=D_{N} \oplus I_{N}$. By expression (7) of $K_{\varepsilon}$, we immediately see that $K_{\varepsilon}\left(u_{\{i\}}\right)=u_{\{i\}}$ for each unanimity TU game $u_{\{i\}}, i \in N$, and $K_{\varepsilon}\left(u_{N}\right)=u_{N}$ for the unanimity TU game $u_{N}$, meaning that these $n+1$ unanimity TU games are eigenvectors associated with the eigenvalue 1 . So, let us choose the collection of unanimity TU games as a basis for $V_{N}$. For convenience, we order the unanimity TU games as follows $\left(u_{N},\left(u_{i}\right)_{i \in N},\left(u_{R}\right)_{R \in \Omega_{N}, r \geq 2, r \neq n}\right)$. Denote this basis by $\mathcal{U}^{(1)}$.

Proposition 5 Consider the basis $\mathcal{U}^{(1)}$ for $V_{N}$. The following facts hold.

1. $K_{\varepsilon}\left(u_{N}\right)=u_{N}$.
2. For each $i \in N, K_{\varepsilon}\left(u_{\{i\}}\right)=u_{\{i\}}$.
3. For each $R \in \Omega_{N}$ such that $r \in\{2, \ldots, n-1\}, K_{\varepsilon}\left(u_{R}\right)=(1-r \varepsilon) u_{R}+r \varepsilon u_{N}$.

Proof: Points 1 and 2 are immediate by expression (7).
Point 3 Pick any $R \in \Omega_{N}$ such that $r \in\{2, \ldots, n-1\}$. By (7) and $r \geq 2$, we have:

$$
\begin{align*}
\forall S \in \Omega_{N}, S \neq N, \quad K_{\varepsilon}\left(u_{R}\right)(S) & =u_{R}(S)-\varepsilon \sum_{j \in S}\left(u_{R}(S)-u_{R}(S \backslash\{j\})-u_{R}(\{j\})\right) \\
& =u_{R}(S)-\varepsilon \sum_{j \in S}\left(u_{R}(S)-u_{R}(S \backslash\{j\})\right), \tag{23}
\end{align*}
$$

Two cases arise:
(a) Consider any coalition $S \supseteq R, S \neq N$. For each $j \in R \cap S$, we have:

$$
u_{R}(S)-u_{R}(S \backslash\{j\})=1-0=1
$$

For each For each $j \in S \backslash R$, we have:

$$
u_{R}(S)-u_{R}(S \backslash\{j\})=1-1=0 .
$$

Therefore, for $S \supseteq R, S \neq N$, (23) writes:

$$
\begin{equation*}
K_{\varepsilon}\left(u_{R}\right)(S)=(1-r \varepsilon) u_{R}(S)+r \varepsilon u_{N}(S) \tag{24}
\end{equation*}
$$

(b) Consider any coalition $S \nsupseteq R$. We obviously have:

$$
\forall j \in S, \quad u_{R}(S)=u_{R}(S \backslash\{j\})=0
$$

It follows that (23) writes:

$$
\begin{align*}
K_{\varepsilon}\left(u_{R}\right)(S) & =0 \\
& =(1-r \varepsilon) u_{R}(S)+\varepsilon r u_{N}(S) . \tag{25}
\end{align*}
$$

It remains to consider the case $S=N$. By (7), we have:

$$
\begin{align*}
K_{\varepsilon}\left(u_{R}\right)(N) & =u_{R}(N) \\
& =1 \\
& =(1-r \varepsilon) u_{R}(N)+r \varepsilon u_{N}(N) . \tag{26}
\end{align*}
$$

Point 3 follows from (24), (25) and (26).
$>$ From Proposition 5, it is easy to verify that CIS satisfies $K_{\varepsilon}$-associated consistency. Because CIS is a linear value, it is sufficient to verify that CIS satisfies $K_{\varepsilon}$-associated consistency on the elements of the basis. In particular, for $r \in\{2, \ldots, n-1\}$, by linearity of the CIS value, we have:

$$
\forall i \in N, \quad C I S_{i}\left(K_{\varepsilon}\left(u_{R}\right)\right)=(1-r \varepsilon) C I S_{i}\left(u_{R}\right)+r \varepsilon C I S_{i}\left(u_{N}\right)
$$

But by (4), $C I S_{i}\left(u_{R}\right)=C I S_{i}\left(u_{N}\right)=n^{-1}$, so that

$$
C I S_{i}\left(K_{\varepsilon}\left(u_{R}\right)\right)=(1-r \varepsilon) n^{-1}+r \varepsilon n^{-1}=n^{-1}=C I S_{i}\left(u_{R}\right),
$$

as desired. Next, from Proposition 5, we also see that the matrix expression $M_{K_{\varepsilon}}^{\mathcal{U}^{(1)}}$ of $K_{\varepsilon}$ with respect to the basis $\mathcal{U}^{(2)}$ is upper triangular. This allows us to quickly compute the eigenvalues of $K_{\varepsilon}$ as well as their multiplicities: 1 is an eigenvalue of multiplicity $n+1$, and, for $r \in\{2, \ldots, n-1\}, 1-r \varepsilon$ is an eigenvalue with multiplicity $\binom{n}{r}$. There is no other eigenvalue. At this step, we verify that conditions 1 and 2 in the statement of Corollary 1 hold.
(a) On the one hand, $\left(u_{N}, u_{1}, \ldots, u_{n}\right)$ is a basis for $D_{N} \oplus I_{N}$. Thus, the dimension of the eigenspace associated with the eigenvalue 1 is at least equal to $n+1$. On the other hand, the multiplicity of the eigenvalue 1 is $n+1$. This enforces that $n+1$ is the dimension of the eigenspace associated with the eigenvalue 1. In other words, $D_{N} \oplus I_{N}$ is the eigenspace associated with the eigenvalue 1. So, condition 1 in the statement of Corollary 1 holds.
(b) For sufficiently small $\varepsilon$, actually $0<\varepsilon<2 /(n-1)$, it holds that, for each $r \in\{2, \ldots, n-1\},|1-r \varepsilon|<1$. So, condition 2 in the statement of Corollary 1 holds.

By (a)-(b) and Corollary 1, the convergence result (10) holds for $\Psi_{\varepsilon}=K_{\varepsilon}$ and $E_{K_{\varepsilon}}=D_{N} \oplus I_{N}$. It remains to apply the proof strategy as described in section 4 , and Theorem 5 is proved.

### 6.4 Proof of Theorem 4

To prove point 1 of Theorem 4, we have to show that (10) holds for $\Psi_{\varepsilon}=X_{\varepsilon}$ and $E_{X_{\varepsilon}}=I_{N}$. For similar reasons to Theorem 2, we choose the same basis for $V_{N}$, with the difference that here $X_{\varepsilon}(c) \neq c$. For this reason, we order the elements of this basis as follows: $\left(\mathcal{I}, c, \mathcal{E}_{n-2}\right)$. This change can be made without loss of generality, and it is more convenient to express the matrix of $X_{\varepsilon}$ as an upper triangular matrix. We denote this basis by $\mathcal{B}^{(2)}$.

Proposition 6 Consider the basis $\mathcal{B}^{(2)}$ for $V_{N}$. The following facts hold.

1. For each $i \in N, X_{\varepsilon}\left(u_{\{i\}}\right)=u_{\{i\}}$.
2. $X_{\varepsilon}(c)=(1-\varepsilon) c+\varepsilon n^{-1} \sum_{i \in N} u_{i}$.
3. For each $R \in \Omega_{N}$ such that $r \leq n-2, X_{\varepsilon}\left(\delta_{R}\right)=(1-\varepsilon) \delta_{R}$.

Proof: Point 1. For each $i \in N$ and each $j \in N, S C_{j}\left(u_{\{i\}}\right)=u_{i}(\{j\})$. By definition of $X_{\varepsilon}$ as given by (8), it follows that:

$$
\begin{aligned}
\forall S \in \Omega_{N}, \quad X_{\varepsilon}\left(u_{\{i\}}\right)(S) & =u_{\{i\}}(S)+\varepsilon\left(\frac{s}{n}\left(u_{\{i\}}(N)-\sum_{j \in N} u_{i}(\{j\})\right)-\left(u_{\{i\}}(S)-\sum_{j \in S} u_{i}(\{j\})\right)\right) \\
& =u_{\{i\}}(S),
\end{aligned}
$$

which proves point 1.

Point 2. Consider the constant TU game $c$. For each $j \in N, S C_{j}(c)=0$. We have:

$$
\begin{aligned}
\forall S \in \Omega_{N}, \quad X_{\varepsilon}(c)(S) & =c(S)+\varepsilon\left(\frac{s}{n} c(N)-c(S)\right) \\
& =(1-\varepsilon)+\varepsilon \frac{s}{n}
\end{aligned}
$$

Therefore,

$$
X_{\varepsilon}(c)=(1-\varepsilon) c+\frac{\varepsilon}{n} \sum_{i \in N} u_{i}
$$

as asserted.
Point 3. Pick any $R \in \Omega_{N}$ such that $r \leq n-2$. Because $r \leq n-2$, for each $j \in N, S C_{j}\left(\delta_{R}\right)=0$ and $\delta_{R}(N)=0$. Thus, we have:

$$
\begin{aligned}
\forall S \in \Omega_{N}, \quad X_{\varepsilon}\left(\delta_{R}\right)(S) & =\delta_{R}(S)+\varepsilon\left(-\delta_{R}(S)\right) \\
& =(1-\varepsilon) \delta_{R}(S)
\end{aligned}
$$

which proves point 3 .
$>$ From Proposition 6, it is easy to conclude that EANSC satisfies $X_{\varepsilon}$-associated consistency. $>$ From Proposition 6, we also see that the matrix expression $M_{X_{\varepsilon}}^{\mathcal{B}^{(2)}}$ of $X_{\varepsilon}$ with respect to the basis $\mathcal{B}^{(2)}$ is upper triangular with non-zero entries. This allows us to compute the eigenvalues of $X_{\varepsilon}$ as well as their multiplicities: 1 is an eigenvalue of multiplicity $n$, and, for $1-\varepsilon$ is an eigenvalue with multiplicity $2^{n}-1-n$. There is no other eigenvalue. At this step of the proof, we verify that conditions 1 and 2 in the statement of Corollary 1 hold.
(a) As for the proof of Theorem 1, we conclude that $I_{N}$ is the eigenspace associated with the eigenvalue 1. So, condition 1 in the statement of Corollary 1 holds.
(b) For each $\varepsilon$ such that $0<\varepsilon<1$, it holds that $|1-\varepsilon|<1$. So, condition 2 in the statement of Corollary 1 holds.
$>$ From (a)-(b), the convergence result (10) holds for $\Psi_{\varepsilon}=X_{\varepsilon}$ and $E_{X_{\varepsilon}}=I_{N}$. It remains to apply the proof strategy as described in section 4 and point 1 of Theorem 4 is proved.

Remark. By Proposition 6, each vector of the basis $\mathcal{B}^{(2)}$ is an eigenvector associated with an eigenvalue except the vector $c$. To obtain a basis of eigenvectors, it suffices to choose the basis $\left(\left(c-n^{-1} \sum_{i \in N} u_{i}\right), \mathcal{I}, \mathcal{E}_{n-2}\right)$ instead of $\mathcal{B}^{\prime}$. In that case, by linearity of $X_{\varepsilon}$, we have:

$$
\begin{aligned}
X_{\varepsilon}\left(c-n^{-1} \sum_{i \in N} u_{i}\right) & =X_{\varepsilon}(c)-n^{-1} \sum_{i \in N} X_{\varepsilon}\left(u_{i}\right) \\
& =(1-\varepsilon) c+\varepsilon n^{-1} \sum_{i \in N} u_{i}-n^{-1} \sum_{i \in N} u_{i} \\
& =(1-\varepsilon)\left(c-n^{-1} \sum_{i \in N} u_{i}\right)
\end{aligned}
$$

which proves that $c-n^{-1} \sum_{i \in N} u_{i}$ is an eigenvector associated with the eigenvalue $1-\varepsilon$.
To prove point 2 of Theorem 4, we have to show that (10) holds for $\Psi_{\varepsilon}=L_{\varepsilon}$ and $E_{L_{\varepsilon}}=I_{N}$. By expression (9) of $L_{\varepsilon}$, we see that, for each $i \in N, L_{\varepsilon}\left(u_{\{i\}}\right)=u_{\{i\}}$ meaning that that the elements of the basis $\mathcal{I}=\left(u_{\{1\}}, \ldots, u_{\{n\}}\right)$ for $I_{N}$ are eigenvectors associated with the eigenvalue 1. Furthermore, consider the subspace of TU games $V_{2, n-1} \subseteq V_{N}$ such that each $v \in V_{2, n-1}$ is such that:

$$
\forall i \in N, \quad v(\{i\})=v(N)=0
$$

By using (9), we see that $L_{\varepsilon}(v)(N)=v(N)=0$ and $L_{\varepsilon}(v)(\{i\})=v(\{i\})=0$. Therefore, $I_{N}$ and $V_{2, n-1}$ are invariant subspaces under $L_{\varepsilon}$. The standard basis for $V_{2, n-1}$ is $\mathcal{E}_{2, n-1}=\left(\delta_{R}\right)_{R \in \Omega_{N}, 2 \leq r \leq n-1}$. By similar arguments than those used to prove Proposition 3, we obtain $I_{N} \oplus V_{2, n-1}$. To obtain a basis for $V_{N}$, we complete the ordered collection $\left(\mathcal{I}, \mathcal{E}_{2, n-1}\right)$ by adding the constant TU game $c$. For the rest of this section, we thus consider the basis $\mathcal{C}=\left(\mathcal{I},(c), \mathcal{E}_{2, n-1}\right)$. This fact is summarized in the following proposition. We omit the proof since it is similar to the proof of Proposition 3.

Proposition 7 The ordered collection $\mathcal{C}$ is a basis for $V_{N}$. Thus, $V_{N}=I_{N} \oplus C_{N} \oplus V_{2, n-1}$.
Proposition 8 Consider the basis $\mathcal{C}$ for $V_{N}$. The following facts hold.

1. For each $i \in N, L_{\varepsilon}\left(u_{\{i\}}\right)=u_{\{i\}}$.
2. $L_{\varepsilon}(c)=(1-\varepsilon) c+\varepsilon n^{-1} \sum_{i \in N} u_{i}$.
3. For each $R \in \Omega_{N}$ such that $r \in\{2, \ldots, n-1\}, L_{\varepsilon}\left(\delta_{R}\right)=(1-\varepsilon) \delta_{R}$.

The proof of Proposition 8 is similar to the proof of Proposition 6 and so it is omitted. The rest of the proof of point 2 of Theorem 4 follows the same arguments as the proof of point 1 of this theorem.

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