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Communication Dans Un Congrès Année : 2016

Dismantling Real-World ECC with Horizontal and Vertical Template Attacks

Papachristodoulou Louiza
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Zakaria Najm
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Jean-Luc Danger
Sylvain Guilley

Résumé

Recent side-channel attacks on elliptic curve algorithms have shown that the security of these cryptosystems is a matter of serious concern. The development of techniques in the area of Template Attacks makes it feasible to extract a 256-bit secret key with only 257 traces. This paper enhances the applicability of this attack by exploiting both the horizontal leakage of the carry propagation during the finite field multiplication, and the vertical leakage of the input data. As a further contribution, our method provides detection and auto-correction of possible errors that may occur during the key recovery. These enhancements come at the cost of extra traces, while still providing a practical attack. Finally, we show that the elliptic curve algorithms developed for PolarSSL, and consequently mbedTLS, running on an ARM STM32F4 platform is completely vulnerable, when used without any modifications or countermeasures.
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Dates et versions

hal-01362466 , version 1 (08-09-2016)

Identifiants

  • HAL Id : hal-01362466 , version 1

Citer

Margaux Dugardin, Papachristodoulou Louiza, Zakaria Najm, Lejla Batina, Jean-Luc Danger, et al.. Dismantling Real-World ECC with Horizontal and Vertical Template Attacks. Constructive Side-Channel Analysis and Secure Design - COSADE 2016, Apr 2016, Graz, Austria. pp 88-108. ⟨hal-01362466⟩
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