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Emotional mechanisms of social (re)production

Since the 1960s various currents within social theory have been undermining the functionalist and structuralist conception of the human agent as a passive automaton moved by obscure forces. While the emerging picture emphasizes the part played by cognition, implicit skill and explicit knowledge, much less attention has been paid to the role of emotions in the active production and reproduction of the social world. The specialized sub-field known as the sociology of emotions has brought to sociological attention the topic of emotions but has been mostly preoccupied with how social structures of various kinds determine or constrain situated emotions. The aim of this programmatic article is to demonstrate the theoretical plausibility and the empirical viability of research on emotional mechanisms of social production and reproduction. On the basis of a critical reappropriation of the theory of structuration and interaction ritual theory, face-work and sacred-object establishment (or "enshrinement") arise as mechanisms of social production and reproduction to which situated emotions are inherently constitutive. The conclusion points to the need for social theory to develop a concept of motivation integrating the "pulling" and "pushing" duality of emotional intentions as expressed in situated action.

Mécanismes sociaux de (re)production sociale

Depuis les années 1960 plusieurs courants de théorie sociale remettent en question la conception fonctionnaliste et structuraliste qui fait de l'agent humain un automate passif mu par des forces obscures. Si la vision qui en résulte souligne le rôle de la cognition, qu'il s'agisse d'habileté implicite et de connaissance explicite, bien moins d'attention a été consacrée au rôle des émotions dans la production et reproduction active du monde social. Le sous-champ spécialisé connu sous le nom de sociologie des émotions a attiré l'attention sociologique sur le sujet des émotions mais elle s'est principalement occupé d'examiner comment des structures sociales diverses déterminent ou contraignent les émotions. Le but de cet article programmatique est de démontrer la plausibilité théorique et la viabilité empirique de la réalisation de recherches sur des mécanismes émotionnels de production et de reproduction sociale. Sur la base d'une réappropriation critique de la

théorie de la structuration et de la théorie des rituels d'interaction, le travail de figuration (*face-work*) et l'établissement d'objets sacrés (ou "consécration") émergent comme des mécanismes de production et de reproduction sociale pour lesquels les émotions sont inhéremment constitutifs. La conclusion invite à développer un concept de motivation tenant compte de la dualité *pulling-pushing* des intentions émotionnelles telles qu'elles s'expriment dans l'action située.

At least since the 1960s various currents of social theory have seriously put to task explanations of the social world based on a conception of the human agent as a passive entity moved by obscure forces[1]. Currents such as ethnomethodology, hermeneutics, interpretive sociology, and the ethnography of face-to-face communication have brought to light the subtle and pervasive skills that human agents deploy in their day-to-day activities in order to produce and reproduce the apparent stability of the social world. These currents have been undeniably effective in converting large sections of the academic community to the cause of an active conception of the human agent. But the understanding of the agents' activity has remained somewhat restricted to cognition, whether it refers to the ability to give explicit reasons for one's actions, or to mostly implicit procedural knowledge enabling the agent to smoothly "go on" in everyday activities.

While the inclusion of such dimensions of knowledge represent an important progress toward a more realistic understanding of agency, social theory has not paid much attention to an equally important dimension of the human agent: emotion. Surprisingly, even within currents that defend a picture of the active agent, talk of emotions not rarely raises the same sort of objection as the ones that "structural" social scientists used to address to the pioneers of a conception of the active agent: the topic is trivial, the topic pertains to psychology, the topic has no interesting implication for social theory. The force of such objections is difficult to discern, but the fact that the topic of emotions encounters a certain amount of resistance among those that could be expected to best understand its relevance is perhaps revealing of the vast implications that the systematic

[1] I thank Laurence Kaufmann, Albert Ogien, and Christian von Scheve for their useful comments on the first version of this article.

inclusion of emotions can have for our model of the social agent, and for social theory more generally. The present article sets out to explore some of the ways in which an understaning of the social agent as fundamentally emotional can help to illuminate some important social processes.

It would be unfair, of course, to state that sociology has entirely neglected emotions, for since at least the end of the 1970s a whole corpus of theoretical and empirical works have more or less explicitly contributed to the formation of what is currently known as the sociology of emotions (J. Turner and Stets 2005). But it is equally necessary to acknowledge that this emerging sub-field, mostly an American endeavor[2], has been largely dominated by a marked "structural" orientation. With some notable exceptions, the sociology of emotions has been mainly concerned with how structures of various kinds, be them "cultural" (e.g. Hochschild 1979) or related to power and status (e.g. Kemper 1978), constrain, shape, structure, or determine situated emotions. Overall, the sociology of emotions has certainly contributed to demonstrate the relevance of looking at emotions with a sociological eye. But it has devoted little effort to conceptualizing emotions as a constitutive dimension of agency, alongside explicit and procedural knowledge, reasons to act and rule-following. This article makes the first steps toward a redefinition of the social agent as fundamentally emotional and, *qua* emotional, not only constrained by, but also productive of, social structure.

The aim of the article is to indicate some of the ways in which situated emotions enter in the explanation of the production and reproduction of the social world. The general problem is that of what Anthony Giddens (1984) calls "structuration," that is the problem of understanding how it comes about that situated actions, including their emotional variants, become stretched in space and time to form discernable institutions, "systems," or "social practices." Drawing on a critical reading of Giddens' analysis of "routinization" I recognize a first emotional mechanism of structuration in the set of interactional techniques that Goffman (1967) placed under the heading of "face-work," which in turn I interpret in the light of novel empirical work partly inspired in the affective sciences. This mechanism mainly preserves social continuity, and to that extent

[2] but see in France the publication in 1995 of the collective volume *La couleur des pensées : sentiments, émotions, intentions* [The color of thoughts: feelings, emotions, intentions]. (Paperman and Ogien 1995)

it plays a socially reproductive role. In order to delineate a mechanism whereby situated emotions may constribute to the creation of "structure," and more precisely to the establishment of "sacred objects" or social norms, I critically reappropriate some elements of Randall Collins' (2004) theory of interaction rituals. I then integrate these elements with traditional "structural" sociological theorizing on emotions and apply the resulting mechanism to the field of interethnic relations *via* Herbert Blumer's (1958) concept of "sense of group position."

The thesis is that face-work and sacred-object establishment (for short, "enshrinement") are emotional mechanisms of structuration. Face-work appears to be more concerned with continuity and reproduction, while enshrinement connotes novelty and change. The aim is less to exhaust the list of possible emotional mechanisms of structuration than to programmatically indicate that their study is theoretically cogent and empirically viable.

Face-work as emotional mechanism of social reproduction

Although it has rightly been the target of many criticisms (e.g. J. Turner 1986; Sewell Jr 1992), I think that Giddens' (1984) theory of structuration remains a significant contribution even three decades after its publication. In this section I outline Giddens' view of the task of social science and the related concept of structuration. This prepares the ground for the discussion on routinization and face-work that forms the content of the following sections.

The argument is that emotionally accomplished face-work produces and reproduces social practices, systems or institutions stretching in space and time beyond the bounded encounters in which emotional face-work inescapably takes place. This is what is meant by saying that face-work is a mechanism of structuration. In order to argue that face-work is more precisely an *emotional* mechanism of structuration, I reinterpret Giddens' view that routinization is essentially concerned with emotion regulation in the light of recent cross-cultural field studies on emotional face-to-face communication in crowded public places.

Structuration

In the course of social life, institutions present themselves to experience as those objective and constraining entities that Durkheim had in mind when delineating the "social" or "moral" fact. Giddens' problem is to relate this experience of the social world as objective and constraining facticity to a conception of the social agent as actively producing and reproducing that social world. Inspired in various sources such as intepretive sociology, hermeneutics, Garfinkel's ethnomethodology, and Goffman's studies of the interaction order, the view of the social agent as an active producer of their social world that emerged in the 1960s seriously put to task the conception of the agent on which sociological functionalism and structuralism, including its marxian variants, was and is based. Tu put it bluntly, this is the idea that "all men and women (…) *are bloody silly*." (Thompson 1968, 40) Giddens intended to synthesize these various developments emphasizing the active character of human agency with a more classical sociological concern with the experienced fixity of social institutions. The challenge is to articulate an account in which the constraining objectivity of institutions is achieved not in spite of, but rather thanks to, active human agency.

Even though he discards the functionalist (and structuralist) picture of the human agent as an automaton, Giddens does not entirely jettison one of the central themes of functionalist sociology, namely the preoccupation with the unintended consequences of action as a principle of institutional (or "system") reproduction. However, he proposes to renew the analysis of the socially reproductive effects of unintended consequences of action by freeing it from the sway of functionalist concepts. The premises beneath are that agency is the capacity to transform the environment, and that what the agent effectively transforms through their agency may not be entirely known to the agent. That the agent is not aware of all the consequences of their action, and particularly of those consequences related to the reproduction of social institutions, does not mean that the agent is moved by external or unconscious "forces." It simply means that the understanding that the agent has of their action, at least in respect of its social reproductive implications, is bounded or incomplete. One important task of social science is therefore to demonstrate the intimate connection between situated actions and the larger spatial breath and temporal endurance of "objective" social institutions, especially in those cases in which agents do not clearly see the socially reproductive consequences of their situated actions. Giddens' additional

remark, and one I wish to endorse, is that the understanding that agents hold of the consequences of their actions is not without effect for the continued reproduction of social institutions. Awareness of the socially reproductive consequences of their actions may lead agents to act differently in the future if they happen to deplore the institution whose reproduction they have unintendedly facilitated in the past. Social science may contribute to precipitate this cognitive and pragmatic shift[3].

This conception of the task of social science is incompatible with the confortable division of labor between "macro-" and "micro-sociology". As Giddens points out, this manner of speaking of the relationship between institutions and situated actions is misleading insofar as it carries with it the connotation that macro- and micro-sociology, as "sub-fields" of the discipline, are concerned with essentially distinct phenomena. But institutions do not exist independent of, or reproduce themselves in spite of, situated actions: they *are* those situated actions, to the extent that the latter can be seen as "the same" actions across space and time[4]. This becoming "stretched" of situated activities across wide spans of time-space defines what Giddens calls *structuration*.

Conversely, the fleeting encounters that instantiate "the interaction order", one of the central notions in what is usually called micro-sociology, cannot be rendered intelligible without reference to longer-lasting and more widespread institutions or "social practices." Obvious examples are the rules of turn-taking and the face-saving techniques that confer situated gatherings their recognizable shape as social interactions.

Stating that institutions and action are conceptually interdendent is not terribly informative, though. What I take to make Giddens' originality in this respect is to formulate the problem of social order as concerned with the relationship between the integration of social interaction on the one hand, and the integration of larger "systems" or institutions on the other (but see Mouzelis 1989 for a criticism of this move). In order to do away with the dichotomy of the "macro" and the "micro", Giddens reformulated Lockwood's (1976) classical distinction between social and system integration. In this perspective, it is in the process of skillfully "doing" social interaction in a particular

[3] Of course, the argument assumes all along the modern view that social institutions are not given by made by us, and the concomitant *desideratum* that we may transform social institutions if we judge them unfair.
[4] This is the very idea of "social practice" as it is usually understood in post-wittgensteinian social theory (S. Turner 1994).

setting (understood as a spacial and temporal locale) that institutions or "systems" spanning across a range of settings are produced and reproduced. In other words, it is as a consequence of the successful "integration" of social interaction that the "integration" of social institutions (i.e. structuration) takes place. When the socially reproductive effects of "integrated" face-to-face encounters are unknown to their participants, those effects can be considered as unintended consequences of action. Alternatively, agents may be aware of the socially reproductive effects of their actions and even attempt to "steer" the process reflexively.

In this respect, Giddens invites to go beyond the usual confinement of micro-sociologists to the here-and-now situation, but also to avoid the usual blindness of macro-sociologists with regard to the inescapably situated enactment of "social structure" by active agents. *Pace* the tenants of functional analysis, the social agent is not an unreflective automaton moved by external or unconscious "forces." But *pace* the proponents of micro-sociology, neither are the consequences of their actions necessarily bounded by the local setting of any particular social interaction episode. Active social agents, in the skillful production of local interaction, reflectively or unintendedly bring about consequences that produce and reproduce larger social institutions.

I follow Giddens in the formulation of the general problem of "structuration", but I am less inclined to think that he has provided any convincing solution. In general, he has been more preoccupied with mechanisms of social reproduction than with mechanisms of social change, which in practice reduces structuration to reproduction. The concept of "routinization" is a case in point that I will address in detail in the following section, given the connections it suggests between day-to-day activity, institutions, and emotions. In particular, I think that the slogan of the "duality of structure" has made disproportionate noise as compared to its theoretical fecundity. In Giddens' glossary, "structure" does not refer to any actual institutions or social systems spanning across space and time but to "rules and resources" that have by definition only "virtual" existence, just in the way in which for Saussure *langue* is virtual as compared to the actuality of *parole*. So defined, "structure" is dual because it is at once medium and outcome of situated action. But as Sewell (1992) observes, Giddens' notion of "structure" as "rules and resources" is inconsistent, because even though "rules" (generalizable

procedures) can be easily thought of as "outside of space and time", no sense can be made of "resources" without reference to human bodies and physical objects, which by definition occupy space and endure through time. This flaw undermines the "theorem" of the duality of structure of which the notion of structure is a building block. It is important to note that the "theorem" of the "duality of structure" is conceptually independent from the formulation of the general problem of structuration. The shortcomings of the former do not immediately invalidate the latter.

The problem is then accounting for the fact that the active production of interaction in spatio-temporally bounded settings has as a consequence the production and reproduction of longer-lasting and more widespread institutions, "practices", or "social systems". This is the problem of structuration.

Routinization

The notion of "routinization" points to processes of social reproduction actively sustained by agents through their repetitive day-to-day activities. Routinization binds institutions, everyday activity, and the psychological needs of the human agent. The notion is relevant in the present context because it explicitly accords an active role to emotions in social reproduction.

Drawing on Erikson's (1962) theory of personality development, the thesis is that "ontological security", or "trust" or confidence in the continuity of the world, is a basic psychological need that agents can only satisfy through routine day-to-day activity. In a sense, routinization is a cunning of institutional reason: agents seek ontological security through habitual conduct, and in their striving they bring about social reproduction, with higher or lower awareness of the socially reproductive consequences of their habitual conduct.

Giddens states that habitual action is indirectly motivated by the need to sustain security and, concomitantly, to avoid the emotion of anxiety. This generalized motive is further assumed to be unconscious in the freudian sense that the agent is not able to put it into words. The need for ontological security thus defines the "deep" motivational component of Giddens' "stratification model" of individual personality, avowedly inspired in Freud's

classical id, ego and super-ego triad. In this model, the middle "stratum" is occupied by practical consciousness, which operates in circumstances in which people pay attention to events going on around them so as to relate their conduct to those events. On top of the stratification model lies discursive consciousness, which designates the agents' ability to provide linguistically articulated reasons for their actions. Whereas the need for ontological security defines the general unconscious motive of the agent, practical and discursive consciousness point to he bases of their "knowledgeable" or "reflexive monitoring" of action. The unconscious pushes blindly, and consciousness steers lucidly and skillfully.

Giddens sees in Goffman's (1967) "face-work" (which he renames "tact") an important mechanism for the maintenance of ontological security, and interprets Garkinkel's (1967) "experiments with trust" as the demonstration that breaches of routine bring to the surface of consciousness that deep uncounscious anxiety which agents actively seek to curb through day-to-day activity. He observes that another context for examining the ontological security-providing function of routine is the counterfactual study of "critical situations", e.g. the personality changes that Nazi concentration camp prisoners undergo as a result of the drastic disruption of their accustumed ways of conduct.

There can be no quarreling with the idea that the integration of personality and the perpetuation of day-to-day activity are interdependent, but I feel less persuaded by Giddens' assimilation of the distinction between (pushing) motive and (steering) knowledgeability on the one hand, to the distinction between the unconscious and the conscious on the other. Why assume that motive is unconscious? Colin Campbell (1996) recalls two traditional meanings of motive, the one referring to that which "motivates", "causes," or "moves" an action, and the other to the actor's reasons for acting, i.e. their end-in-view. However, in the history of sociology the final or end-in-view acception has obliterated the causal or dynamic understanding of motive. Campbell sees this state of affairs as resulting from a mistaken alignment of the dynamic meaning of motive with behaviorism, as though embracing the familiar idea that motives push to action amounted to disavowing the project of interpretive sociology with its stress on meaning and voluntarism.

Giddens seems to build on these assumptions when he states that while day-to-day conduct is "reflexively monitored," it is "not directly motivated." He does not entirely do away with the causal meaning of motive but neither does he integrate it with the "knowledgeable" side of the human agent. In positing that the avoidance of ontological anxiety is an unconscious motive, he preserves all the advantages of a causal explanation of habitual action without questioning the widespread but mistaken view that the causal acception of motive is irrelevant, if not radically inimical, to the project of interpretive sociology.

The prize of this move is high, however. For the explanation of habitual action as relying on unconscious motivation surreptitiously brings Giddens back to the picture of the human agent that he wished to discard in the first place. In lieu of the automaton of functionalist and structuralist sociology, moved by outer social forces, we find the automaton of psychoanalysis, moved by inner unconscious motives. Explaining action, *a fortiori* routine, as a result of unconscious motivation does no good to the construction of an account of enduring and widespread institutions in terms of situated active agency.

But the unconscious motive that Giddens has is mind is also wanting from an empirical point of view. His attempt to squeeze the results of Garfinkel's breaching experiments into the stratification model of the agent is not particularly convincing. First, one may wonder in what sense, as examples of what is involved in loss of ontological security, Garfinkel's isolated and after all innocuous disruptions of everyday scenes are comparable to the systematic and devastating effects of concentration camp life. But even if one overlooks this dubious parallel, it is hard to see how the manifold emotional reactions that Garkinfel reported can be plausibly reduced to the expression of undifferentiated anxiety. For example, Garfinkel notes that "reports were filled with accounts of astonishment, bewilderment, shock, anxiety, embarrassment, and anger". (Garfinkel 1963, 232) Everybody knows from common experience that the understanding of the situation and the motivation to act characteristic of astonishment and anger, to take only these examples, are largely different. What theoretical progress do we make by dilluting their specificity in an undifferentiated category of diffuse anxiety[5]?

[5] This is not to deny, of course, that the word "anxiety" may adequately describe a family of emotional states related to a negative assessment of perceived incertainty or ambiguity,

That unconscious motives bring us back to a passive picture of the agent, and that anxiety is inadequate to the description of breaches of routine does not mean, however, that motives cannot be invoked to explain action, and that emotions are inadequate to account for social control. It rather means that we need neither to assume that motives are unconscious, nor that anxiety is the be-all of emotion.

In fact, drawing on phenomenology and appraisal theory (Frijda 1986), emotions can be conceived of as motivational states of which the agent is always aware, in the sense that there is something "it is like" to be in an emotional state (Lambie and Marcel 2002). In Giddens' terms, emotional experience always presents itself in practical consciousness. The agent may have second-order awareness of the first-order experience of the emotion state, and thus the agent may be able to report on the phenomenology of (what it is like to be in) that emotion state. In Giddens' schema, this means that in some cases the experience of emotion may be accessible to discursive consciousness. Since the experience of emotion involves among its components the experience of a motivational state, it follows that emotional motives are always experienced in practical consciousness and sometimes available in discursive consciousness. Emotional motives need not be lodged in any inaccessible unconscious realm. They are better conceived of as states of the whole organism that carry with them the subjective experience of an urge to act and get outwardly expressed in visible bodily changes.

Again drawing on phenomenology and appraisal theory, in lieu of the indifferentiation of context-blind anxiety, the differentiation of emotions can be thought of in terms of the characteristic understanding of the situation that they imply or the kind of action that they solicit. In Frijda's (1986) theory, for example, that understanding always entails an evaluation of the situation or object of emotion, and that action appears as moved by an "action tendency" which is also describable by the end result it aims[6]. Seeing the object

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and manifest in extreme cases in sleepless nights and various forms of discomfort. But this emotion is neither diffuse nor indifferentiated, and far from being unconscious in the freudian sense there is always something "it is like" to be anxious (in other words, anxiety has a distinct phenomenology). I thank one anonymous reviewer for his or her remark on this point.

[6] Frijda's notion of action tendency thus embraces the two meanings of "motive" invoked above, namely the final/end-in-view and causal/dynamic acceptions. He also uses the more general notion of "action readiness change", which differs from action tendency in that it does not involve a definite end-in-view alongside a general preparation to act.

as an intolerable obstacle and experiencing (and bodily expressing) the urge to vigorously remove it is a way of beginning an analysis of some of the episodes that we usually consider to be instances of anger. Emotions differentiated by appraisal and action tendency need not be conflated under a general category of anxiety.

As much as phenomenology and appraisal theory provide a way to integrate differentiated emotions in practical and discursive consciousness, Garfinkel (1963) points to an alternative analysis of the need for ontological security. Giddens is probably right in positing that the integration of personality depends on experiencing the continuity of the world, which involves the active sustaining of that continuity through habitual conduct. But I do not think that we need to go very far to understand why people are motivated to produce the continuity of the world. In this respect, Garfinkel stresses the significance of analyzing "social affects" in terms of "background expectancies," observing that people portray themselves as concerned with how to conduct their daily affairs "so as to solicit enthusiasm and friendliness or avoid anxiety, guilt, shame, or boredom." (Garfinkel 1963, 233) Background expectancies are basic, mostly implicit anticipations as to how the world is to continue. Conforming to them preserves calmness or brings about positive emotions, while breaching them triggers negative emotions. We only need to understand that human agents prefer the ease of calmness and the euforia of positive emotions to the pangs of negative emotions[7] to understand why they conform to background expectancies, thereby sustaining the continuity of the world through habitual action. There is no need to conceptualize the search for ontological security in terms of an unconscious motive to avoid diffuse anxiety.

The role of emotions in face-work

To recap, even though I endorse Giddens' formulation of the problem of structuration as that of the stretching of "the same" situated actions across space and time, for the reasons presented above I think that his concept of routization is unconvincing. I have pointed at some ways in which this concept could be amended so as to make it compatible with a conception of the active human agent.

[7] Jon Elster (1999) has offered a similar explanation of why people conform to social norms. His thesis is that people conform in order to avoid the painful experience of shame.

I do think, however, that Giddens has identified a set of mechanisms whereby the routine character of day-to-day situated activity is sustained, namely the interactional techniques for expressing considerateness and maintaining self-respect that Goffman (1967) places under the heading of "face-work."

Keeping the above qualifications in mind, I also think that Giddens is right to complain that a significant drawback of Goffman's work is the studied absence of an account of motivation, especially because it has fostered the naive dramaturgical reading that participants to interaction are distanced actors deliberately playing scripts for the cynical manipulation of appearances. However, as we have seen, Giddens' postulation of an unconscious motive to avoid anxiety is not of much help in this respect. An additional shortcoming of Giddens' solution, not mentioned in the previous discussion, is that the alignment of emotion with anxiety, and of anxiety with the unconscious carries with it the misleading connotation that the occurrence of emotion reveals not the normal functioning but the breakdown of face-work or "interaction ritual." In this section I would like to provide some empirical support to the thesis that some specific emotions are essentially constitutive of face-work. Goffman (1967) did not entirely neglect the emotional dimension of face-to-face interaction, as his chapter on embarrassment and his sporadic use of the vocabulary of affect demonstrates. But neither did he attempt to systematically integrate emotions into his analysis of interaction.

Drawing on Goffman's sequential description of "corrective interchanges," Aranguren and Tonnelat (2014) in Paris, and later on Aranguren (forthcoming 2016) in Delhi, investigated how passengers of crowded metro trains accomplish face-work in the face of unavoidable "territorial" incursions due to unwanted physical contact during rush hours. These studies found that in such circumstances face-work is mostly enacted through nonverbal signals that the psychological literature interprets as expressions of emotions. In treating nonverbal expressions of emotions as interactional "moves," this research questions the implicit equation often made between interactional move and turn at talk. On the other hand, it considers expressions of emotions, usually treated formally and in isolation, from the point of view of their function in the larger context of interaction sequences.

In the Delhi and Paris metros corrective interchanges often involve the following sequence of moves between the toucher (the offender) and the touched (the victim). First, the offender touches the victim, which in most cases involves mutual contact on the surface of the shoulders or the upper back. Second, the touched simultaneously raises and lowers the brow, thereby displaying the upper face components of the facial configuration that participants to recognition tests agree to associate to the word "fear" (Ekman and Friesen 1975). There are no good reasons, however, to think that the touched experiences fear; in fact, the content analysis that Aranguren and Tonnelat (2014) present at the outset of their study rather suggests that passengers experience annoyance at being touched by a stranger[8]. Third, with the "fear" upper face on display, the touched turns their head and eyes toward the toucher.

In the complete repair sequence, the toucher then performs the fourth and last move by displaying some or all of the components of the facial configuration that participants to recognition studies agree to associate to the word "embarrassment" (Keltner 1995). The expression typically involves lowcast gaze, chin raising, and lips pressing. After this move on the part of the toucher, the touched returns their head and eyes to the initial position and the upper face components of the "fear" face disappear from their forehead. These changes are taken to mark the successful termination of the repair sequence. However, the sequence may unfold in a different manner with radically contrasting effects. The third move, namely the victim's turning of the head and eyes toward the offender, may not be followed by the offender's display of "embarrassment." If, in addition to this, the offender subsequently repeats the annoying touch, the victim may

[8] Some readers might find puzzling that a pattern characterized as the "fear" face could be actually expressing annoyance. This becomes less puzzling when one recalls the highly disputable basis for associating this expressive pattern to the word "fear" in recognition studies. Participants in this experimental task are presented with a sequence of static frontal pictures of facial expressions and requested to choose from a closed list of emotion terms the word that best characterizes each observed expression. Participants may agree to a greater or lesser extent on the emotion word that they choose to characterize any given observed expression. Claims about the universal expression of "basic" emotions are based on nearly 70% agreement rates. This procedure has been the target of acute methodological criticism (Russel 1994). An alternative approach to recognition studies, the study of components, seeks to associate expressions of emotions not to generic words chosen by distant observers but to the specific stimulus situations to which such expressions immediately respond. A host of field and laboratory studies have shown that the expressions actually displayed by people in response to specific emotional situations are sometimes markedly inconsistent with the results of recognition studies. See for example Fernández-Dols et al. (this publication). For a review of experimental components studies, see Aranguren and Tonnelat (2014), and for a review of field components studies, see Fernández-Dols and Crivelli (2013).

terminate the sequence not with a direct return to neutral but with a prior expression that participants to recognition studies associate to the word "contempt" involving the inward tightening of the lip corners. (Ekman and Friesen 1986; Izard and Haynes 1988)

From a functional perspective, the expressions are not primarily outward presentations of inward feelings, but actions transforming the environment[9] that together form a unitary emotional transaction. The victim's "fear" upper face is a request or demand, and its function is to coerce an apology from the offender. Similarly, the offender's "embarrassment" expression functions to give ritual satisfaction to the victim's demand. When this appeasing reply is not forthcoming, and the offender happens to repeat the touch, the victim's "contempt" expression effects symbolic exclusion or "degradation" (Garfinkel 1956) of the offender, assuming with Fischer and Roseman (2007) that the function of contempt is to exclude its target from the social world of the agent.

Thus, in the interaction sequences reported in these studies the expressions of "fear," "embarrassment," and "contempt," and their concomitant functions of coercion, appeasement and exclusion are indissociably intertwined with the workings of the repair sequence. Emotions are present not only when the repair sequence breaks down, as it is the case when repeat offense prompts the "contempt" expression, but also when remedial work is effective, as it is the case when the the victim's "fear" face successfully coerces the appeasing "embarrasment" expression of the offender.

These interactional episodes are not unrelated to the production and reproduction of specific sets of social pratices or institutions. At the more proximal level, emotionally accomplished face-work contributes to the social organization of the metro ride, and therefore to the reproduction of the metro network as a complex technical and social system of mass transportation. At the most distal level, but at the same time entering into the local organization of the metro ride itself, successful face-work reproduces the institution of individualism, that "cult" of the person that Durkheim deemed to be characteristic of modern society and that motivated Goffman to associate face-to-face interaction to ritual activity.

[9] This is why John Dewey (1894), complaining that William James' theory of emotion had not entirely quit the terrain of Darwin's, proposed to drop the term "expression" and adopt in its stead the term "attitude." I would employ "attitude" to stress the functional dimension of "expressions of emotions" if the term had not acquired the contemporary connotation of latent disposition – that is, just the opposite of the patent, occurrent act that Dewey had in mind.

It is important to note that even though face-work in general can be assumed to be a universal social mechanism, its form and function may present important variations across cultures and epochs, which in turn are related to the production and reproduction of specific social institutions. For example, as regards function it is unlikely that face-work will serve the same purposes in a society that dramatizes hierarchy as compared to a society which, like ours, dramatizes equality. In other words, face-work reproduces the status of interaction partners, and the expected status to be confirmed depends on the institutional background of the larger society or specific setting in which the encounter takes place.

Enshrinement as emotional mechanism of norm fixation

Face-work, understood as a vehicle of routine, exemplifies an emotional mechanism of structuration in the sense of social reproduction. The aim of repair, for exemple, is to restore a disrupted relationship, not to create a new one. Face-work is mainly about "saving" face (or status), and day-to-day routine, as produced through face-saving techniques, is therefore inherently conservative. But if structuration boiled down to social reproduction, we would be better adviced to stay by the latter, more usual term. In actuality structuration also involves novel patterning, that is the formation of new institutional arrangements. But Giddens does not provide any hint as to how to conceptualize the role of situated emotions in the production of novel patterning. This is why in order to examine how situated emotions may give rise to longer-lasting and more widespread arrangements I will leave aside the theory of structuration and engage with Randall Collins' (2004) theory of the interaction ritual.

To anticipate, I argue that face-to-face interaction episodes characterized by emotions may contribute to the establishment of emotional obligations with the power to constrain future encounters. I pick up from Collins the durkheimian idea that emotional obligations get stored in and are subsequently recalled by "sacred objects." Blumer's analysis of the "sense of group position" provides an apt middle-range translation of these abstract concepts as they might be applied to the particular field of interethnic relations. Local interactions in which participants ascribe one another to specific ethnic groups (e.g. We:

the French; They: the Roma from Eastern Europe) may give rise to intense emotions (e.g. fear of the individuals categorized as Roma). If these emotions are objectified or verbalized, they may by virtue of a process of dissemination (e.g. through the media) contribute to fix a dominant characterization of the ethnic groups involved (e.g. We, the French, are threatened by the Roma; They, the Roma, are dangerous). Insofar as these characterizations enter in the organization of experience as anticipatory schemas, in future encounters the members of the other ethnic group appear as "sacred objects" that recall emotional obligations. I propose to use the word "enshrinement" to summarize this complex process.

In what follows I first critically review interaction ritual theory, then discuss the notion of emotion rules, and finally introduce the concept of "sense of group position" before providing an outline of enshrinement as emotional mechanism of social (re)production.

Interaction ritual theory

An important achievement of Collins' theory is to have reinfused Goffman's analysis of face-work as "interaction ritual" with the emotions that Durkheim deemed characteristic of religious practice. Collins posits that interaction ritual is *the* mechanism of production and reproduction of society. Interaction rituals are bounded by particular situations, but their outcomes may "spill over" in time and space, thereby placing conditions upon the initial ingredients of future and distant interaction rituals. The concept that connects the outcomes of the here-and-now interaction ritual with the starting ingredients of future and distant interaction rituals is called "emotional energy."

The model of the interaction ritual thus distinguishes between ingredients and outcomes. The ingredients are physical copresence of two or more individuals, boundaries between insiders and outsiders, a common focus of attention, and shared (or collective) emotion. Collins contention is that when the common focus of attention and the shared emotion reinforce each other through "rythmic entrainment" the interaction ritual brings about solidarity (i.e. feelings of membership), changes in the level of emotional energy, group symbols or "sacred objects", and feelings of morality.

In order to identify a possible emotional mechanism of structuration as institutional creation, I will retain Collins' hypothesis that one outcome of interaction ritual may be the establishment of "sacred objects." However, in this respect the theory lacks the empirical detail that would make it immediately applicable. This is why discussion on sacred-object establishement, or "enshrinement" for short, will be deferred until a later section concerned with Herbert Blumer's (1958) middle-range theory of the "sense of group position." On the other hand, no sensible use of Collins' theory can be made without previous acknowledgement of its limitations. These are made explicit in the rest of the present section.

The most glaring shortcoming concerns the method of theory-building itself. Collins claims to bring forward testable hypotheses but all his materials are second-hand and produced for purposes very different from the ones he has in mind. As a result, the relationship between the ingredients and the outcomes in the interaction ritual model largely remain hypothetical constructs, as much as the notion of emotional energy. Additionally, Collins asserts that the relationship between rythmic entrainment and solidarity is of a causal nature, but it seems to me that all he demonstrates at best is that rythmic entrainment *expresses* solidarity. This is particularly apparent in his discussion of conversational turn-taking rules. He contends that conversations that follow the "no gap no overlap" pattern are the cause of solidarity. This argument would make sense if it were possible to separate the cause, the smooth rythmic coordination of turns, from the effect, the feelings of solidarity between the conversationalists, and then examine if the occurrence of the cause is followed by the occurrence of the effect. What Collins does, however, is indicate that synchronization expresses or manifests solidarity, just as a facial expression expresses or manifests an emotion. Conversely, lack of synchronization expresses lack of solidarity, so that "in angry arguments (…) both participants try to talk at the same time, typically speaking louder and faster in an effort to override the other." (Collins 2004, 70) Not that speaking louder and faster is the cause and lack of solidarity the effect: speaking louder and faster is simply a way of expressing lack of solidarity or hostility. It would be awkward to me to be told by a sociologist that my deliberate interruption of a person's turn at talk was not an expression but *the cause* of my hostility toward that person. Since the demonstrated link is expressive and not causal, the

inescapable conclusion is that the vocabulary of mechanism is inadequate to the relationship between rythmic entrainment and feelings of solidarity. More generally, as von Scheve (2011) points out, Collins offers only sparse hints as to how exactly shared or collective emotions are elicited and transmitted.

This is not to say that interaction rituals cannot in principle be shown to produce solidarity or, more precisely, to reconfigure the status of interpersonal relations (Parkinson, Fischer, and Manstead 2004). But rythmic entrainment alone does not seem to be the process responsible of this end result. Take the example of the repair sequence discussed above. The end result is to restore the relationship between the participants that was altered or disrupted by the offensive event. A specific mechanism does this job, namely the sequence of interactional moves that Goffman (1967) calls "corrective interchange." Goffman occasionally compares the "interchange" to a dance. I agree with Collins that rhythm is important, but nobody would suggest that a dance is only made of rhythm. The other essential component are the steps or, in goffmanian jargon, the "moves."

Now, looking at the moves of the repair sequence as instantiated in expressions of emotions leads to question a further component of Collins' model, namely the assumption that for interaction rituals to produce their outcomes the emotion generated must be *common* to the copresent individuals. The corrective interchange, when sufficient attention is accorded to its emotionally expressive components, is made of different emotions and not of only one. What is more, these different emotions are also *complementary*, as it is apparent in the relationship between the victim's annoyance, which functions to coerce an apology, and the offender's embarrassment, which acts to appease the victim. Of course, acknowledging that the emotions involved in interaction rituals may be complementary and not only common does not fundamentally invalidate Collins' and Durkheim's thesis that interaction rituals produce emotions. In durkheimian terminology, it only adds an "organic" variety of ritual emotion to the "mechanic" variety of the original model[10].

[10] Cf. von Scheve and Ismer (2013) for an up-to-date integrative account of collective (or "mechanic") emotions combining interaction ritual theory with contemporary psychological research in affective science.

The last critical comment I would like to make of Collins' model prepares the ground for the next section and concerns the process hypothesized to establish new "sacred objects." Collins thus summarizes the mechanism of sacred-object establishment: "There is the raw experience (…). Next comes the transformation of these experiences into symbols (…). Yet more temporally remote, and more remote, too, in the kinds of social networks involved, is a second order of circulation of newly created symbols among persons who are far away from the initial experiences." (Collins 2004, 95) In other words, first comes the situated emotions that arise in face-to-face interactions, second the symbolization of these situated emotions, and third a process of circulation, remote in time and space, of the disembodied symbols that stand for these situated emotions.

Interaction ritual theory contends that emotions emerge from the coordinated behaviors of copresent individuals and that these emotions (or the solidarity that they are supposed to bring about) may become symbolized or "stored" in the objects that were the common focus of attention at the time of intense emotion. In Berger and Luckmann's (1967) terms, the contention is that "objectified" emotions become "detached" from the local circumstances of their emergence. However, interation ritual theory adds little to the understanding of how emotionally charged objects become disembodied symbols that circulate in space-time sectors remote from the original situation of their emergence, with the eventual effect that such objects acquire the power to command the awe (e.g. the UNICEF logo) or the abhorrence (e.g. the Nazi Swastika) of large audiences. Not much is said about the latter effect either, and this is all the more unfortunate that the power of symbols to compel respect or rejection, rooted in situated emotions but stretching its influence across time and space, reconciliates interaction ritual theory with more traditional "structural" approaches in the sociology of emotions. Indeed symbols can be thought of as carriers of emotion rules, as I propose to rephrase Hochschild's (1979) "feeling rules." Otherwise put, as a result of interaction rituals and the subsequent process of circulation, symbols become compelling reminders of emotional obligations.

Emotion rules

Hochschild (1979) coined the phrase "feeling rules" to refer to sanctioned pairings of

types of emotions and types of situations. For example, the participants to a mariage must be happy; the participants to a funeral must be sad. "Feeling rules" are also hypothesized to govern the intensity and duration of situated emotions: a slighted person can be "too" angry or "for too long". "Feeling rules" determine situated emotions through "emotion work", i.e. the activity of aligning actual with expected emotion, especially in those cases in which actual emotions are utterly inappropriate (e.g. being amused in a funeral).

Hochshild's "feeling rules" that compel "emotion work" provide a useful account of how social structure determines or constrains situated emotions. But the terminological asymetry between rules that regulate "feelings" and a work that concerns "emotion" is not unimportant. It actually reflects Hochshild's internalist conception of emotion work, and of emotion processes more generally (see Aranguren 2014 for a review). The activity of conforming emotion to social norms operates on inner feelings ("deep acting"), and not on the outer behaviors that were at the center of Mauss' (1968) classical analysis of the obligatory expression of emotions. However, contemporary theories of emotions no longer separate "feeling", i.e. the content of emotional experience, from other components of emotion such as expressive behavior[11] (Lambie and Marcel 2002). I therefore retain Hochshild's emphasis on the normative constraints that regulate emotions but I suggest to drop the restrictive focus on inner feeling. This is why I prefer the phrase "emotion rules" to the original "feeling rules".

In sum, the process of sacred-object creation begins with situated emotions and ends with the establishement of emotion rules carried by definite symbols. In between, situated emotions are symbolized, and the resulting symbols enter a process of circulation. The challenge is to spell out the connections between the processes of situated emotion,

[11] It might be objected that this theory of emotions is unable to integrate the familiar fact that we sometimes successfully mask our emotions. For example, a guest in a cocktail party might smile and give the impression of being engrossed in the situation while being deeply (in the double sense of intensely and innerly) bored. I do not think that this places a serious objection on the theory that emotions are total organic states and not just inner feelings. It rather suggests that the masking of emotions is an interactional achievement that depends not only on the author but also on the recipient of the masking. In general, an analysis of deception is incomplete if it stays by the deceiver; we also need to understand how it comes about that the deceived falls into the trap. Some people are more proficient than others at deception production and recognition (Knapp et al 2014). In most successful episodes of emotion masking in everyday life we do a quite imperfect production job that comes off only because the recipient does still a more imperfect job of recognition. Such a circumstance is in my view insufficient to dismiss the theory that emotions are states of the whole organism that are always expressed, however subtle this expression turns out to be.

emotion symbolization, symbol circulation, and symbol enshrinement, a sequence which I take to embody an emotional mechanism of structuration. Herbert Blumer's (1958) concept of "sense of group position" provides an illuminating avenue in this respect.

The sense of group position: emotion rules in interethnic relations

In the domain of interethnic relations, an apt concept to stand for emotion rules is Blumer's (1958) "sense of group position". With this notion Blumer intends to sociologize the psychological concept of race prejudice as it applied to "race relations" between Blacks and Whites in the United States. Without denying the emotional character of race prejudice, Blumer contends that the feelings of antipathy, hostility, hatred, intolerance, and aggressiveness that enter into the traditional definition of prejudice are not the outcome of individual inclination but of a social process.

For Blumer, "[a] basic understanding of race prejudice must be sought in the process by which racial groups form images of themselves and of others." (ibid, p. 3) In this collective process of characterization "definitions are presented and feelings are expressed" (ibid, p. 5). The outcome of the process is a socially sanctioned "sense of group position" which governs the emotions that members of one racial group ought to have with regard to members of the other racial group. For example, in post-slavery race relations, the sense of group position implies the following components from the standpoint of Whites: 1) a feeling of White superiority, 2) a feeling that Blacks are intrinsically different and alien, 3) a feeling of White legitimate claim to certain areas of privilege and advantage, and 4) a fear and suspicion that Blacks threaten these privileges and advantages.

The sense of group position can be seen as a complex of socially enforced emotion rules. Conversely, these emotion rules come into being through a collective process of characterization in which situated emotions play an important role. "The happening that seems momentous, that touches deep sentiments, that seems to raise fundamental questions about relations, and that awakens strong feelings of identification with one's racial group is the kind of event that is central in the formation of the racial image." (ibid, p. 6) The definition process starts with the narrativization of situated emotions and

involves the circulation of narratives through various media such as stories, gossip, anecdotes, or pronouncements. These sediment in a stable characterization of one's and the other ethnic group when the interaction becomes circular and reinforcing. An additional aspect that Blumer highlights is the abstract and categorical quality of the characterization thus formed. Indeed, it is the very nature of the resulting stereotypes to make individuals into *symbols* of their social category who must therefore be treated not as singular persons but as undifferentiated embodiments of that category. The members of venerated or stigmatized social categories thus becomes "sacred objects" that command respect or rejection, awe or abhorrence, compassion or disgust.

Bringing together Collins' interaction ritual theory, Hochschild's emphasis on the structural determination of emotion, and Blumer's concept of the sense of group position, the following emotional mechanism of structuration appears to be relevant to the study of interethnic relations. Encounters between two or more individuals ascribing one another to different ethnic groups give rise to situated emotions. Within or after the encounter, such emotions are represented or symbolized in various media[12]. This involves among others the evaluative characterization of the relevant ethnic groups, and the corresponding emotional attitudes that one is expected to hold toward members of the groups so characterized. For example, a group characterized as offensive is the appropriate target of anger; a group held as superior, of awe; a group depicted as polluting, of disgust; a group seen as a victim, of compassion. These evaluative characterizations, including the emotional rules they imply, then become disembodied symbols that enter a process of interaction with other comparable disembodied characterizations. All these symbols are candidate sacred objects, but only those that reinforce each other to the extent of marginalizing competing depictions become enshrined, that is pervasive, recurrent, self-evident, or taken for granted. Since the enshrined caracterizations involve emotional obligations toward the members of such and such ethnic group, at the end of the process they arise as the embodiment of definite emotion rules that constrain by anticipation future and distant encounters with the members of those groups. For example, if the characterization of the Roma that becomes self-evident depicts this group as dangerous

[12] Jocelyne Arquembourg (this publication) provides a powerful perspective for analyzing the process of emotion categorization.

(vs. vulnerable), fear (vs. compassion) becomes the obligatory emotion that the non Roma are expected and expect to experience in encounters with the Roma. In this example, the individuals ascribed to the Roma category become symbols of mandatory emotions. This is why in interethnic contacts their presence commands fear, that is the tendency to avoid.

Note on the concept of mechanism

I have deferred this epistemological note on the concept of mechanism for two reasons. First, matters of epistemology logically depend on matters of ontology. Without a clear of understanding of what we are talking about, it makes little sense to try to stipulate the standards of appropriate knowledge of that "what." The second reason is strictly rhetorical. Many readers who might find appropriate to regard Goffman's "interchanges" as instances of social mechanisms might also be hostile toward an explicit formulation of the concept of mechanism, presumably because the latter involves causal assumptions, and causal assumptions are bound to be very bad for sociology based on an active picture of the agent. But whoever accepts that action is the capacity to transform the environment or the ability to "make a difference" has already endorsed causal assumptions about action, and *a fortiori* about the sociological significance of action.

The concept of mechanism on which I have relied throughout is one among others accepted within "analytical sociology": "a constellation of entities and activities that are linked to one another is such a way that they regularly bring about a particular type of outcome." (Hedström 2005, 11) Mechanisms are explanatory devices. They can be profitably used to explain how the active agent, through their situated actions, produces and reproduces institutions, "systems," or "social practices." The "entity" is the active agent, the "activity" is situated action, and the outcome is institutional, system, or practice production and reproduction (that is, structuration). In the particular case of the repair sequence, the entities are the victim and the offender, the activity the successive "moves," and the outcome the restoration of the disrupted relationship, that is maintenance of continuity in the social world. The mechanism of sacred-object creation in interethnic relations is a compound of two mechanisms. In the first place, the members

of mutually ascribed ethnic groups are the entities, their situated emotions the activities, and symbolization (narrativization) of these emotions the outcome[13]. In the second place, the media may be the entities, dissemination of the resulting characterizations the activity, and prevalence of one particular characterization (with its corresponding obligatory emotions) the outcome, that is "enshrinement" or establishment of emotion rules.

Although I am using analytical sociology's definition of mechanism as a way of defining what counts as a good explanation, I do not wish to endorse analytical sociology's additional claim that the be-all of sociology is mechanism-based explanation. Descriptive work in sociology is significant on its own, and there is no good reason to think that the only valid scientific aim is explanation.

Finally, while I follow the analytical sociologists in their understanding of action as a causally efficient event, I do not embrace their davidsonian view of action as behavior that "is explainable (…) by desires, beliefs and opportunities." (Hedström 2005, 38) I agree with Giddens that this approach confuses action, the capacity to transform the environment, with the giving of action-descriptions.

Conclusion

Within sociology, the picture of the active human agent promoted by hermeneutics, ethnomethodology, and studies on the interaction order since the 1960s has been besieging the functionalist and structuralist assumption of the "bloody silly" automaton. But the battle has been fought mainly on the front of cognition, under various headings such as discursive and practical consciousness, reasons to act, procedural knowledge, and rule-following. The part played by emotions in this renewed picture of the human agent has not received any comparable amount of attention.

[13] Nothing prevents this first part of the overall mechanism from beginning with face-work episodes, especially when the latter glaringly fail. Failed face-work may motivate activities of accusation and counter-accusation effecting *in situ* symbolization of the emotional interaction, which may provide the raw materials for the subsequent phases of detached circulation and normative enshrinement. I thank one anonymous reviewer for drawing attention to this interesting possibility.

On the other hand, the sociology of emotion has established the legimacy of the sociological study of affective phenomena, but the focus has been much more on the social or "structural" determination of emotions than on the active role of emotions in the establishment of novel social patterning or "structure." In this article I have attempted to outline two mechanisms, viz. face-work and enshrinement, whereby situated emotions actively produce and reproduce the social world, including institutions, "social systems," and "social practices."

The more general question for social theory is to draw all the implications of a conception of the human agent as not only knowledgeable but also *sentient*. Human agency is not only a matter of cognition, implicit skill, and explicit knowledge. It is also a matter of emotion, urges to act, and emotional transactions that change the environment. What is still missing is a cogent concept of motivation able to account for the familiar fact that emotion states carry with them the experience of being urged to act (or not to act) without reducing the understanding of this urge to a purely mechanical efficient cause.

In this respect, Magda Arnold's (1960) and Nico Frijda's (1986) concept of "action tendency" provides initial guidance for the construction of a concept of emotional motivation integrating the causal connotation of the experience of being "pushed" or "urged" to act with the finalistic reference to specific aims or end states as integral to the experience of these "pushes" and "urges." For example, action "pushed" by anger is action "pulled" by the end state of suppressing, harming, or destroying the annoying object. This line of thought could be fruitfully combined with Charles Taylor's (1979) view that "the natural expression of wanting is trying to get." There is no good theoretical reason to stipulate that behaviors "pulled" by end states cannot be at the same time behaviors "pushed" by motives, as the reference to "wanting" suggests in this well-known citation.

In fact, the very idea of situated emotion or emotional transaction presupposes this duality of simultaneously pulling and pushing states. In my view, with a well articulated concept of the duality of motive and intention in emotional agency we will be in a better position to draw the social theoretical implications of a revised conception of the human agent as not only knowledgeable but also sentient.

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