Mechanism Design and Auctions for Electricity Network - Archive ouverte HAL
Pré-Publication, Document De Travail Année : 2016

Mechanism Design and Auctions for Electricity Network

Résumé

We present some key aspects of wholesale electricity markets modeling and more specifically focus our attention on auctions and mechanism design. Some of the results arising from those models are the computation of an optimal allocation for the Independent System Operator, the study of the equilibria (existence and unicity in particular) and the design of mechanisms to increase the social surplus. From a more general perspective, this field of research provides clues to discuss how wholesale electricity market should be regulated. We start with a general introduction and then present some results the authors obtained recently. We also briefly expose some undergoing related work. As an illustrative example, a section is devoted to the computation of the Independent System Operator response function for a symmetric binodal setting with piece-wise linear production cost functions.
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Dates et versions

hal-01315844 , version 1 (13-05-2016)

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  • HAL Id : hal-01315844 , version 1

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Benjamin Heymann, Alejandro Jofré. Mechanism Design and Auctions for Electricity Network. 2016. ⟨hal-01315844⟩
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