



HAL
open science

Foreign Migrant Workers in Mediterranean Intensive Farming: Labour Relations in a Quality Labelled Commodity Production (Haute-Corse, France), (New Harvard TSI Working Paper Series 2)

Josepha Milazzo

► **To cite this version:**

Josepha Milazzo. Foreign Migrant Workers in Mediterranean Intensive Farming: Labour Relations in a Quality Labelled Commodity Production (Haute-Corse, France), (New Harvard TSI Working Paper Series 2). 2015. hal-01310060

HAL Id: hal-01310060

<https://hal.science/hal-01310060>

Preprint submitted on 6 Mar 2024

HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of scientific research documents, whether they are published or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in France or abroad, or from public or private research centers.

L'archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire **HAL**, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d'enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés.



TSI WORKING PAPER

NO 2 / MARCH 2015

JOSEPHA MILAZZO

Foreign Migrant Workers in Mediterranean Intensive Farming: Labour Relations in a Quality Labelled Commodity Production (Haute-Corse, France)

WORKING PAPER SERIES

Pushing the Boundaries of Migration Studies:
Perspectives from the U.S. and France

The Transnational Studies Initiative is a Weatherhead Center
for International Affairs Seminar at Harvard University.





NO 2 / MARCH 2015

TSI WORKING PAPER SERIES

PUSHING THE BOUNDARIES OF MIGRATION STUDIES:
PERSPECTIVES FROM THE U.S. AND FRANCE

FOREIGN MIGRANT WORKERS IN MEDITERRANEAN INTENSIVE FARMING: LABOUR RELATIONS IN A QUALITY LABELLED COMMODITY PRODUCTION (HAUTE-CORSE, FRANCE)

JOSEPHA MILAZZO

AIX-MARSEILLE UNIVERSITY, BARCELONA AUTONOMOUS UNIVERSITY

Published by the Transnational Studies Association, a Weatherhead Center for International Affairs Seminar at Harvard University. The author bears sole responsibility for this paper. The views expressed in the TSI Working Paper Series are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect those of TSI, the WCFIA, or Harvard University. Copyright by the author(s).

Contact: <http://seminars.wcfia.harvard.edu/tsi> | Peggy Levitt and Jocelyn Viterna, Transnational Studies Initiative Co-Director

Use Policy: Papers may be downloaded for personal use only. Comments and suggestions for improvements directed to the author(s) are welcome. TSI Working Papers may be quoted without additional permission.

Submissions: Transnational Studies Initiative affiliates and attendees are encouraged to submit papers to the Working Paper Series. Manuscripts are assessed on the basis of their scholarly qualities—the extent of original research, the rigor of the analysis, the significance of the conclusions—as well as their relevance to contemporary issues in transnational studies. Please visit the TSI website for manuscript formatting guidelines.



TSI WORKING PAPER SERIES / MARCH 2015

PUSHING THE BOUNDARIES OF MIGRATION STUDIES: PERSPECTIVES FROM THE U.S. AND FRANCE

NO 1 EVREN YALAZ

Immigrant Political Activism: Political Opportunities, Group Resources, and Inter-Ethnic Context

NO 2 JOSEPHA MILAZZO

Foreign Migrant Workers in Mediterranean Intensive Farming: Labour Relations in a Quality Labelled Commodity Production (Haute-Corse, France)

NO 3 CLARA RACHEL EYBALIN CASSEUS

Cross-border Mobility and Haitian Entrepreneurial Dynamism Between French Guiana, Suriname and Brazil

NO 4 ILKA VARI-LAVOISIER

Social Remittances as Mimetic Diffusion Processes: From Homophily to Imitation in Transnational Networks

NO 5 SIHÉ NÉYA

From Diaspora to *Diaspo* (ra): An “Unwelcome” Reverse Transnationalism among Burkinabè Return Migrants from Côte d’Ivoire to their Country of Origin

NO 6 CYNTHIA SALLOUM

Diasporas and Statecraft: The Salient Relevance of a Concept

NO 7 GUILLAUME MA MUNG

Situations of Ethnic Trade and Arrangements of Space in Château Rouge and Brixton

NO 8 ANNE BOUHALI

The Effects of Transnational Trade on Urban Settings: The case of the al-Muski Market, Cairo, Egypt

NO 9 MATTHIEU MAZZEGA

Defining and Denouncing Racism through Socio-Cultural Repertoires: Boundary-work, Morality and Ordinary Anti-Racism in France

Series Editors: Amandine Desille (PhD Student, Poitiers University & Tel Aviv University) amandine.desille@gmail.com; Thomas Lacroix, CNRS Research Fellow (University of Poitiers), Associate Researcher (Oxford University), thomas.lacroix@univ-poitiers.fr; Guillaume Ma Mung (PhD Candidate, Université Paris Ouest Nanterre La Défense, LAVUE-Mosaïques), guillaume.mamung@gmail.com; Kathleen Sexsmith (PhD Candidate, Cornell University, kjs256@cornell.edu); Sadio Soukouna (PhD Candidate, University Paris 1 Pantheon Sorbonne), sadiosoukouna@gmail.com; Evren Yalaz (Visiting researcher, Institut Barcelona d’Estudis Internacionals), evrenyalaz@gmail.com.

Series: Papers discussed at the Conference “Pushing the Boundaries of Migration Studies: Perspectives from the U.S. and France” hosted by the Transnational Studies Initiative at the Weatherhead Center, Harvard University (organized by Thomas LaCroix, Peggy Levitt, Nancy Khalil, Kathleen Sexsmith, Sadio Soukouna, and Evren Yalaz). The conference was sponsored by the Social Science Research Council; and by Harvard University’s Transnational Studies Initiative, Center for European Studies, Center for American Political Studies, and Department of Anthropology. The organizers sincerely thank Josh DeWind, Marika Dunn, Peggy Levitt, Thomas LaCroix, the many conference student presenters and faculty participants, and their DPDF program faculty field leaders and cohort mates for their ongoing support.

Foreign Migrant Workers in Mediterranean Intensive Farming: Labour Relations in a Quality Labelled Commodity Production (Haute-Corse, France)¹

Josepha Milazzo

Aix-Marseille University, Barcelona Autonomous University

The paper analyses impacts of certification schemes on workforce recruitment and working relations in intensive farming. It discusses how migrants' competence may be an argument to the recruitment of a foreign group, whereas foreign migrants are rather usually seen as odd-job men in intensive farming. In the context of a quality policy applied to French Corsican clementine farming, Moroccan labour migrations' patterns were partly reshaped: farmers managed to obtain a dispensation for Moroccans recruitment, putting forward as a pretext their skills, acquired within long-lasting labour relations. Moroccan migrations participated to *Corsican Eastern Plain's* agrarian development, by linking the quality of a labelled commodity into the context of its production, i.e. in relying on Moroccans' skills, be these so-called or not, *hard* or *soft*. This case has thus compelling implications for further research on labour relations studies in intensive farming contexts. It suggests that forms of labour domination could be found and / or explained by a 'quality turn' within labelling policies applied to the intensive farming production of a commodity, rather than by productivist logics, as often stated in dominant literature. This research is based on different evidences from a fieldwork carried out in Corsica, France, from 2008 to 2010.

¹ Josepha Milazzo. Corresponding author: jjomilazzo@gmail.com. I am very grateful to Peggy Levitt for her wise and helpful comments on an earlier draft version of this working paper discussed in Cambridge, Weatherhead Center at Harvard University, Boston, in May 2014, as part of the *DPDF Alumni in International Fields in Migration Studies* workshop "Building Careers as Migration Studies Scholars", sponsored by the Social Science Research Council, the Transnational Studies Initiative, the Centre for European Studies, the Centre for American Political Studies, and the Department of Anthropology at Harvard University. Special thanks are due to Kathleen Sexsmith, Amandine Desille and Guillaume Ma Mung for their constructive remarks. I give the biggest thanks of all to interviewees who gave insights that serve to a better understanding of the studied territory. I thank a lot in advance any comment I would receive on this working paper, whose research avenues are still being developed and improved. I dedicate this working paper to Xavier.

INTRODUCTION

Plot

In the French department of Haute-Corse, Moroccan migrants became, since the early 2000s, the major officially channelled and hired seasonal workforce in local intensive citrus-fruit farming, mainly in clementine farming, and to a lesser extent in grapefruit and kiwifruit farming (Milazzo 2012). As I will demonstrate it, this agricultural subsector employs, for tasks of harvesting, packing and other related activities, a majority of Moroccans who come and work as seasonal farm labour in Haute-Corse agriculture. Moroccan labour migration to France, in any economic sector more generally, is part of international long-lasting bilateral agreements on workforce recruitment that France signed with a few countries², and whose first agreement with Morocco dates from 1963 (OCDE 1998). Moroccan workers in Haute-Corse agriculture date from the quite same 1960s period. At that time, Algerian Independence in 1962 resulted in repatriation and settlement of some Algerian-born French in Corsica isle. The part of these people, who worked in North African vast farms, participated then to a coinciding major agricultural development undertaken by French state in the isle's eastern area, - the *Corsican Eastern Plain*. The aim was to implement here a productivist orientated intensive wine growing. To do so, these newly settled farmers began to bring to Corsica Moroccan workers they used to employ there. Since then, the *Corsican Eastern Plain* remains the isle's main agricultural area (see figures 1 and 2). Moroccan workers presence in Haute-Corse agriculture is thus a historical and a long-lasting one. Nevertheless, these labour migrations have been mainly taking place until the 2000s within quite un-official, informal, to see illegal networks and employment procedures. In order to remedy the local lack of farm labour, the Corsican regional case has not been sharing thus the French historically tradition to resort to foreign labour employment, - among of it Moroccans, via official recruitment channels.

Why and how did patterns of Moroccans recruitment change in such a way for Haute-Corse clementine farming from the early 2000s, in being then officially channelled? My research associates this change with some important turning point *Corsican Eastern Plain* agriculture knew again, after about forty years. From around the 2000s, several local and regional actors considered indeed producing under quality improvement policies, and within quality orientated approaches, certain local agricultural commodities. This paper is particularly concerned with the Protected Geographical

² International bilateral labour agreements are part of a supply and demand system institutionalised by French government from 1945, notably with the creation of the National Office for Immigration. In the rebuilding post-war context, the aim was to stop with certain inter-war period practices; until then, main initiatives were indeed the ones of private associations related to large industrial employers and to agricultural sector's interests. Controlling and modelling foreign labour inflows was then a way towards a strict rationalisation in order to meet the specific workforce needs required per French region and / or per economic sector. It was also a way for French state to express itself through explicit policies against illegal practices of foreign employment and illegal forms of migration.

Indication (P.G.I.³) quality label of “the Corsican clementine”, - a commodity mainly grown in the community of Antisanti, in *Corsican Eastern Plain* territory. It is a significant choice. First, the Corsican clementine P.G.I. label was the first one spearhead of projects of quality improvement carried out in Haute-Corse agriculture. Concerned farmers, growing clementine since years, began before the 2000s developing certification schemes and improving their production ways in order to meet the quality requirements of the Corsican clementine P.G.I. label they finally obtained in 2007. More recently, farmers obtained a Red Label in 2014 for the clementine variety named “fines de Corse”. Second, clementine farming in this context, being part or not of quality labelling programs, is a form of intensive farming production. One can define fresh fruit and vegetable intensive farming by “significant workforce requirements per hectare, unevenly distributed during the year” (Berlan 1986: 15). This point is important, for fresh fruit and vegetable intensive farming generally still depend on numerous workforce, mostly for seasonal harvesting task, except when this last is mechanised. In the study context, it is a form of intensive farming, in its traditional version: it relies generally on family farms of about 10 hectares surface, which work according to sustainable farming logics.



FIG. 1.—*Corsican Eastern Plain* seen from the historical fort of Aléria (Aléria municipality, Haute-Corse, France, Milazzo, J., 2009).

³ According to the National Institute for Origin and Quality (<http://www.inao.gouv.fr/>), the P.G.I. was born from the European desire to extend the commodity identification system through the *origin*. The P.G.I. is a quality label between others, which distinguishes a commodity whose all phases of development are not necessarily carried out in the eponymous geographical area. But the commodity has a link to a territory and a renown; a commodity with a P.G.I. label has its own characteristics due to its geographical origin, which makes it distinguishable from other commodities. The geographical area of a P.G.I. label is clearly spatially delimited. In order to be marketed, a commodity with a P.G.I. label is subject to a control device ensuring that P.G.I. label's quality requirements are precisely met in the commodity; the commodity production and the resulting commodity thus need to indeed respect some quality requirements, - in our case, such as gustatory ones, appearance ones, and / or production techniques ones.




FIG. 2.—Location map of *Corsican Eastern Plain* and fieldwork details.

One can then rightfully wonder if this agricultural ‘quality turn’ raised critical questions about the availability and the qualification of farm labour to be employed to meet P.G.I. quality requirements, or not. The hypotheses behind are that such forms of non-conventional intensive farming, whose production logics are not productivist ones, might have to respect stricter production modalities, - specific to a particular commodity, to a particular territory, with stricter labour conditions, etc. Production steps may need specific know-hows of workforce. Labour relations, actors’ strategies and concerns in non-conventional farming production systems might also be different. Who are the Moroccan workers employed in local P.G.I. clementine farming since the 2000s? Do they (need to) have specific skills or experience? This agricultural ‘quality turn’ raises interrogations about its possible influences in reconfiguring patterns of international labour migration employment and labour relations in intensive farming. The paper’s interest centres thus on some relational explanations and implications of

this double coinciding sudden about-turn, - the now massive officially channelled employment of Moroccan migrants working in Haute-Corse clementine farming, and the progressive implementation of measures to meet quality requirements of the Corsican clementine P.G.I. label.

Introducing Theoretical Considerations from this Inductive Research Study

Morice (2008b), talking about the recent spread of Moroccan seasonal workers employment “in Corsica, for some strange reason” (Morice 2008b: 20), precisely wondered the reason for such an evolution in recent employment modalities in Corsica. He argues that Corsican novelty and exception in terms of Moroccan labour recruitment modalities may be one more telling example of some French farmers’ widespread economic logics which impinge on workers’ rights: these logics are said to be maintained by French state through labour laws and through “certain legal provisions, which make possible the development and the rise of fraudulent practices” (Morice 2008a: 22). In supposing that Corsican agriculture could also be concerned by such practices, Morice (2008b) joins thus the same conclusion that several empirical cross-Mediterranean study-cases reach to: one can observe similar recruitment modalities and working conditions foreign farm labour is generally facing in Mediterranean intensive farming (notably see the works of Forum Civique Européen eds. 2002: Gisti eds. 2008: Michalon and Morice eds. 2008: Mésini 2009).

On this point, some researchers recently developed the heuristic framework of “global agro-migration complex”, in order to precisely explain dynamic links between agricultural production systems, global labour migration modalities and related working conditions (Gertel and Sippel eds. 2014). To them, intensive farming production systems are progressively integrated according to a same spreading agricultural development mode, - productivist and whose working conditions for farm labour are quite precarious: in a supra-regional-scale competition between French intensive farming and Moroccan and Spanish ones, “the right ‘adjustment variable’ which can bear the decrease of costs / benefices ratio is the workforce cost” (Morice 2008a: p.8, *original quotation marks*).

In the vein of similar conclusions, another work states then that a same “workforce model” has been spreading even outside European Union, - “a kind of ideal-type of agricultural workers” in intensive farming contexts, in reason of their interchangeability, submissiveness and multi-functionality (Morice and Michalon 2008: 14). There is an important point to catch here: one cannot deny the undisputable economic and geographical domination associated to this agro-migration system in place. But one should to beware, when observing such phenomena in Mediterranean diversified contexts, of the eventual dangerous reductionism of transposing any conceptualised or constructed object of analysis, to other spaces. There is indeed a risk of carrying out excessive generalisation through applying, as a reverse syllogism to any context of intensive farming, this double ‘top-down’ approach of converging labour migrations and of a generalised productivist type of intensive farming, through globalisation’s prism.

Along with Morice's (2008b) previous hypothesis about the Corsican case, newly modalities of Moroccan workers recruitment might then logically implicate fraudulent practices; and if we follow the scheme, one could find a local productivist type of intensive farming in Haute-Corse. This research resulted yet in stating that during the past fifty years, Moroccan presence longevity, as the main hired farm labour, has been characterising Haute-Corse agriculture. And newly modalities of Moroccan workers employment in *Corsican Eastern Plain* have to be partly linked to a peculiar reconversion intensive clementine farming is knowing: this agricultural change is undertaken according to a 'quality turn', at the great difference than a productivist type of development.

This case has then compelling implications for heuristic frames linking labour relations, working conditions and types of intensive farming, like the "agro-migration complex" one. Forms of labour domination, as an example, could be explained and / or observed, in our study-case, in the context of an agricultural 'quality turn', rather than by productivist logics of agricultural development. On this point, Lamanthe and Rau (2014), talking about the impacts of standardisation and certification of products and services on workforce recruitment and working conditions in intensive farming, state that: "increased control and traceability systems have led to a broader formalisation of labour recruitment [...], and working conditions as well as security and health in the workplace have been improved, [*while in other situations one can observe*] precarious and informal work relations. More generally, however, existing studies reveal how new forms of domination based on norms and standards are established, as standards are put in place and affect relations between people. [...] New divisions of labour and new competences arise [...]" (Lamanthe and Rau 2014: 61-62). This paper calls thus for further investigation about diversity and similarity of socio-spatial realities behind logics which shape different types of intensive farming. It supports the idea that historical circumstances do play a key role in a peculiar understanding of distinct processes of globalisation, and of networks shaped in every place (Cid-Aguayo 2010). Darpeix (2013), about Moroccan seasonal farm labour hired in France, particularly stresses that local circumstances may interact with national policies and global interests, and shape departmental numerical and ethnical differences in the locally hired workforce. She mentions several key elements of explanation, like local demand for labour, availability of rural population and local labour offer, and migration history. "But directions' departmental policy and local power relationships can also lead to adapted local decisions" (Darpeix 2013: 282). This paper will specifically show how some of such elements combined to shape the Corsican departmental difference in terms of Moroccan farm labour recruitment, and thus in terms of Moroccan local presence.

Data sources

Different kinds of evidences make the point. I base my argument on both official French State circulars laws and Haute-Corse Memoranda of Understanding between the Prefect and Chamber of Agriculture on foreign seasonal workers in the agricultural sector, from 1999 to 2013. The core of the paper also covers findings and quotes 2004 to 2007

internal unpublished qualitative and quantitative annual agricultural end of year statements in Haute-Corse, and working papers of local state services obtained from interviewed persons in Haute-Corse recruitment agencies. These data are all the more instructive: one hand actors' intentionality is here a relevant issue, and on the other hand quantitative data by nationality are usually not publicly accessible in France to a large extent; only a few are available, in targeted official reports on relatively diverse topics, which can only provide researcher with a partial view of any migration phenomenon. Analysis also relies on about fifty interviews carried out from 2008 to 2010 with recruitment agencies, *Corsican Eastern Plain* employers, policy makers and Moroccan hired workers in Haute-Corse; they gave insights on labour relations and recruitment strategies. On this point, main comprehension elements come from interviews with P.G.I. clementine growers, for labelling farming is one of the main centres of interest of the paper. Some other farmers' speeches also gave key contextual elements, which permitted to better understand agrarian reconfigurations and on-going changes in foreign labour migrations in *Corsican Eastern Plain*. Public and unpublished quantitative data obtained from state agencies, and quantitative data compiled from about twenty payrolls of P.G.I. clementine growers, both permitted an evaluation of Moroccan presence in Haute-Corse as hired farm labour. The most critical readers might state a certain lack of correspondence, in workforce numbers, between quantitative data acquired from different types of data sources, - which is quite interesting and raises questions, but which is beyond the scope of this study.

Research problem and hypotheses

This study will thus seek to answer the following question: why and how does Moroccan farm labour presence continue, despite this agricultural major change Corsican Eastern Plain is knowing, with the progressive implementation of measures to meet the quality requirements of Corsican clementine P.G.I. label? The implicated question here is did (and how if yes) P.G.I. labelling schemes intervene in reconfiguring patterns of hired foreign farm labour? To answer the above question, I propose two major assumptions; they are avenues of research: (1) Although it continues, the presence of Moroccan farm labour, because being almost reduced to the one clementine farming, does not continue 'despite', but precisely within the contextual 'quality turn' this commodity production is facing. (2) A reconfiguration of Moroccan labour migrations is necessary for their persistence, given the new context brought by the 'quality turn' clementine farming is facing.

Plan

The matter raised within this research, - namely the continuing presence of Moroccan farm labour in *Corsican Eastern Plain* agriculture, and the two assumptions proposed above, bring a two parts development:

The first part of the paper will focus on providing some answers to the 'why' of Moroccan persistent presence in *Corsican Eastern Plain* agriculture in the context of the 'quality turn' clementine farming is knowing. It will, on one hand, directly question this

maintenance, in evaluating it, in relation to changes in *Corsican Eastern Plain* agricultural development. It will, on the other hand, qualify this maintenance, in addressing some causes of Moroccan persistence in *Corsican Eastern Plain* clementine farming. Elements of answer have to be found in employers' speeches and practices. Through employers' strategies of Moroccans recruitment and retention, the paper will thus shed light on the way they justify their preference for hiring Moroccans rather than any other farm labour. A particular attention will be given to if Corsican clementine P.G.I. schemes and quality requirements intervene, or not really, in their justifications for mainly employing Moroccans to work in this commodity production.

The second part of the paper proceeds further with the analysis of Moroccan presence maintenance: it will wonder if it is a matter of simple maintenance or if there is a renewal of this presence, - partly driven by the 'quality turn' clementine farming is knowing. It will thus give some answers to the 'how' of the Moroccan persistent presence in *Corsican Eastern Plain* agriculture. This part will confront practices of P.G.I. clementine growers to socio-political processes, within negotiations about recruitment modalities of foreign workers, from the early 2000s to 2010. The aim is to understand if such negotiations bring a change in the selection of foreign farm workers and in labour relations, which take thus place within a framework partly shaped by policies of workforce selection. And do P.G.I. schemes participate to it? Consequently, the paper is finally referring the reader back to the first part of the paper, in a kind of "we have come full circle" way: it states that these on-going labour relations, which take place now within legal frames, go on playing a key part in consolidation ways of this renewed Moroccan presence.

A TAKEN FOR GRANTED PRIORITY OF MOROCCAN FARM LABOUR IN *CORSICAN EASTERN PLAIN* AGRICULTURE

This first part questions Moroccan presence maintenance in *Corsican Eastern Plain* agriculture. It demonstrates Moroccan farm labour presence indeed continues. Being almost reduced to the one citrus farming subsector, - mainly clementine farming, Moroccan farm labour presence does not continue 'despite', nor in fact 'thanks to' the 'quality turn' that this commodity production is facing. Rather, Moroccan farm labour presence does continue 'within' contextual rationalisation measures undertaken in Haute-Corse with the aim of modernising clementine farming. Then, why are Moroccan labour migrations continuing? This part explores some of the reasons of such a maintenance of Moroccan presence along Haute-Corse agricultural changes; for the recent period, such changes are thus partly en relation with the contextual 'quality turn' clementine farming is knowing. It shows how advantageous long-lasting labour relations of Corsican farmers with Moroccan migrants, are *bedecked with the mask of* specific competences of Moroccans, hired as main farm labour in this newly quality labelled local commodity production.

“That was the beginning of ‘the era of the wine heavy stuff.’ [In an interview carried out in 2010 with a P.G.I. clementine grower, municipality of Antisanti, Haute-Corse, France.]

The independence of Algeria pronounced, many French persons born in Algeria and owning farms in the country were repatriated in Corsican Eastern Plain, bringing with them Moroccan farm workers with whom they worked. Neglected for a long while but offering rare agrarian opportunities in Corsica, the Eastern Plain was in the early 1960s subject of specific development attention, when the interest of French returnees from North Africa was beginning to precisely awaken for Corsica. With the isle’s main cities of Ajaccio and Bastia, Corsican Eastern Plain is the area in Corsica which was the most influenced by returned French persons. With the help of large contingents of Moroccan workers, in a few years Corsican Eastern Plain experienced a spectacular agricultural development: the local creation of 550 farms can be attributed to returned French persons. Under their leadership, the vineyard grew up to cover 18,000 hectares and to produce 800,000 hectolitres of wine per year. 2,000 hectares were also allocated to citrus trees, mainly pre-existing clementine trees. Large surfaces were also devoted to fruit orchards and vegetable crops. The previous extensive farming type, traditional food-producing and community-organised, within which agro-pastoral economy relied until then on plain and mountain complementarity, gave then way to an imported agricultural model from Algeria: a type of mono-cultural and productivist one (Renucci 1974). In a few years this excitement faded, in revealing practices of sugaring wine. This widely prevalent practice demonstrated the inadequacy of such a farming type to the territory.

Corsican Eastern Plain agricultural development knew then again a reorganisation step with the uprooting of thousands of vines and a moving towards agricultural specialisation. As an example, in an interview carried out in 2010, a citrus grower reveals how in the 1960s, her father’s 800 hectares of vines land, situated in the municipality of Ghisonaccia, employed about a thousand Moroccan workers. After land restructuring, this farmer only grows today a dozen citrus planted acres, and work mainly with a few Moroccan workers along the year. *Corsican Eastern Plain* agrarian development model has thus basically changed from a productivist approach to a quality one, applied to local intensive farming. Priority was then given to the production of high added value and quality commodities, and to the promotion of local specialities; Corsican clementine obtained a P.G.I. certification in 2007 and kiwi and pomelo farming are still objects of certification procedures. We will see why these still require, to some extent, Moroccan workers assistance.

If following elements are rather serving the argumentation within the second part of the paper, I can nevertheless already give some information enabling the reader to simply understand how the question of recruiting foreign farm labour arises on its own. French farmers faced with a shortage of local labour have the possibility to ask for recruiting foreign labour via a supply and demand institutionalised system which takes place within bilateral agreements on foreign workers, as briefly stated in the introductory part. Basically, up to 2010, for a foreign worker, obtaining a work permit is subject to

the signing of a work contract with an employer, through recruitment agencies. Seasonal foreign workers have a special status, with a work contract authorising them to work up to eight months over a period of twelve consecutive months in France; we then talk about “seasonal contract” or “short term work contract”. Permanent workers have work contracts of an indefinite term and a residence permit of one year, renewable (Regnard 2006). Another type of work contract, - “temporary authorisation”, does exist. But it is beyond the paper’s interest, even if it may appear in some tables which serve here the argumentation. This supply and demand institutionalised system involves several actors including migrant workers, employers, and a range of public employment services which mediate between migrants and employers: in the case of Moroccan migrants, it involves French and Moroccan recruitment agencies, French Office for Immigration and Integration (OFII since 2009, previously and successively known as ONI, OMI, and ANAEM) and Haute-Corse Prefecture and Departmental Labour Direction (Milazzo 2010). Before I consider in the second part of the paper some recent modalities of Moroccan presence maintenance in Haute-Corse agriculture, I must first give evidences of this continuous presence, within the contextual background previously presented. Elements of evaluation and explanation of Moroccan persisting presence in Haute-Corse agriculture are discussed hereafter.

A dominant and continuous Moroccan farm labour presence along Haute-Corse agricultural changes

Today, in *Corsican Eastern Plain*, is installed a mechanised and intensive form of agriculture, concentrated on trees, vineyards and vegetable crops. In addition to lower average incomes, the importance of agriculture in the local economy remains a decisive criterion for *Corsican Eastern Plain* distinction, in the Corsican larger context. Other features give this territory a typical Mediterranean and rural character, like an ageing population, many secondary residencies, low employment rates, especially for women, and the domination in the economic fabric of small businesses and sectors which require intensive labour, - like building, tourism and also thus agriculture. Corsican agriculture is precisely the highest sector *in tension*; a few demands are recorded compared to jobs offers, which means there is a high lack of local workforce for doing such jobs. In Haute-Corse Bastia and Corte population centres, agricultural jobs which require most applicants are agricultural support to fruit production, horticulture, tuck farming, arboriculture and viticulture, - mainly for harvesting task among other ones. It would be thus legitimate to wonder if in such a context farmers may resort or not to foreign farm labour.

The figure 3 illustrates Haute-Corse types of agricultural production which require seasonal foreign migrant workers recruitment from 2002 to 2011. It shows that citrus-fruit and kiwi-fruit farming in Haute-Corse agriculture represent each year more than 80 % of farmers’ demands for foreign seasonal migrant workers introductions. These agricultural subsectors are thus the main agricultural productions employing foreign migrant workers. But you can also see how the other Haute-Corse agricultural productions bring relatively constant workforce each year, while numbers asked for citrus-fruit and kiwi-fruit farming are more volatile. It is because for these two last ones,

numbers are evolving according to workforce specific needs for crop each year. Indeed, what the graph does not show you is that other agricultural tasks of citrus-fruit and kiwi-fruit farming, like pruning and disbudding, do need relatively constant workforce too. In Haute-Corse agriculture, citrus-fruit and kiwi-fruit farming crops employ thus the most foreign workforce. In fact, these subsectors need the most workforce, which reveals to be foreign labour precisely because of local lack of workforce to do such jobs.




FIG. 3.— Haute-Corse types of agricultural production requiring seasonal foreign migrant workers recruitment (Haute-Corse, France, 2002-2011).

A quite interesting point is then that almost all foreign migrants recruited to work in Haute-Corse agriculture are thus going to farms whose commodities productions are (already or not) part of quality certification schemes, - notably for kiwi and clementine farming, as mentioned before. Thus, the issue of the role of certification in the reconfiguration of international migration dynamics arises even more effectively. According to existing bilateral agreements on foreign workforce recruitment with France, who are then the seasonal foreign migrant workers who come and work in Haute-Corse agriculture?

Between initial applications, accepted ones and effective hired migrants in Haute-Corse from 2004 to 2007, data are quite missing in the quantitative information presented in the table 1 and obtained in 2008 from Haute-Corse Departmental Direction of Labour internal unpublished annual agricultural end of year statements. Yet these raise the indisputable numerical predominance of Moroccans hired in agriculture over Polish and Tunisian presences, - a fact moreover confirmed during interviews: hired Polish workforce reaches at best only 2, 9 % of the agricultural foreign workforce introduced in 2007, with only about fifteen of the 500 persons recruited in total. Tunisian presence

seems doomed to disappear, because of the random and sporadic nature of the very small hired numbers.

TABLE 1
SEASONAL FOREIGN MIGRANT WORKERS IN HAUTE-CORSE AGRICULTURE, BY NATIONALITY,
FROM 2004 TO 2007

	2004			2005			2006			2007		
	T	P	M	T	P	M	T	P	M	T	P	M
Number of initial applications	<i>nd</i>	<i>nd</i>	<i>nd</i>	1	21	817	<i>nd</i>	<i>nd</i>	<i>nd</i>	0	24	535
Number of accepted applications	2	0	798	<i>nd</i>	<i>nd</i>	<i>nd</i>	3	105	777	0	17	478
Number of hired workers	2	0	758	<i>nd</i>	<i>nd</i>	<i>nd</i>	<i>nd</i>	<i>nd</i>	<i>nd</i>	0	14	477
<i>Total of workers who came</i>	760			<i>nd</i>			<i>nd</i>			491		

NOTE.—Sources of data: data collected from Haute-Corse Departmental Direction of Labour's internal annual agricultural reports, 2004-2007, data obtained in 2008, author processing. (T: Tunisia / P: Polish / M: Moroccan / *ND*: not defined, missing data)

I thus first stated that citrus-fruit and kiwi-fruit farming in Haute-Corse agriculture are the main agricultural productions which rely on the recruitment of seasonal foreign migrant workers. I secondly showed that in annual agricultural end of year statements for Haute-Corse, Moroccans reveal to be the nearly only one foreign group hired among nationally diversified seasonal foreign migrant workers. By inference, we can say that most seasonal foreign migrants hired in Haute-Corse citrus-fruit and kiwi-fruit farming are thus Moroccans.

In Haute-Corse agricultural context of lacking workforce, because citrus-fruit and kiwi-fruit farming are the agricultural productions which need the most workforce and which rely then on the most recruitment of seasonal foreign migrant workers, Moroccan presence can only be concentrated in these agricultural subsectors; in any case, Moroccans are the main foreign nationality locally hired within bilateral labour agreements. Given their numerical predominance, Moroccan seasonal workers are for sure also employed in Haute-Corse other types of agricultural production. These other types resort to lower seasonal foreign migrant workers. In their cases, harvesting task is mechanised and do not need important workforce (like local wine growing), and / or because yields need lower workforce (like local glasshouse growing). It is what the table 2 highlights in showing respective number of Moroccan migrant workers officially hired as seasonal farm labour by agricultural types of jobs, in Haute-Corse from 2000 to 2008. Moroccan seasonal workers are mostly present in fruit and vegetable harvesting tasks (and clementine and kiwi-fruit farming are precisely the nearly only ones cultures whose harvesting need workforce) and in "agricultural multi-works". These last ones

refer to distinct tasks like pruning and disbudding, and to different farm maintenance works. These concern thus different cultures, among others clementine and kiwi-fruit farming.

TABLE 2
NUMBER OF MOROCCAN MIGRANT WORKERS OFFICIALLY HIRED AS SEASONAL FARM
LABOUR BY AGRICULTURAL TYPES OF JOBS, IN HAUTE-CORSE, FRANCE (2000 TO 2008)

AGRICULTURAL WORKS	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008
Fruit and vegetable harvesting	0	15	263	434	657	427	543	326	225
Agricultural multi-works	10	24	104	152	160	95	219	107	320
Arboriculture, planting, tree nurseries	3	8	47	59	30	5	2	3	24
Other agricultural works with each few hired Moroccans (Market gardening and glasshouse growing, Forester work, Other agricultural works, Grape harvest)	2	0	0	16	17	55	9	35	31
<i>Total of Moroccans recruited per year</i>	15	47	414	661	864	582	773	471	600

NOTE.—Sources of data: unpublished statistical data from OFII, data obtained in 2009, author processing.

Moroccan presence in many farming tasks is confirmed by a comment in 2007 Haute-Corse Departmental Direction of Labour internal unpublished annual agricultural end of year statement: the document points out that seasonal foreign workers seem to be nationally distributed according to specific agricultural subsectors, - even if we did state the lesser Polish presence compared to the Moroccan one: “Polish nationals are employed exclusively in vegetables and gardening sector. Moroccan nationals are employed in all agricultural subsectors”.

One can observe at French and Haute-Corse scales this predominance of Moroccans hired as foreign workforce, in the agricultural sector and particularly within seasonal work contracts. The Table 3, about Moroccan migrant workers officially hired in France and Haute-Corse distinct economic sectors in 2008, shows how French agriculture attracts almost all Moroccan workers who leave Morocco for France: 90 % of nationally established work contracts and 96 % of those in Haute-Corse are within agricultural sector. In 2008, Moroccan presence in Haute-Corse agriculture amounts to nearly one-tenth of agricultural Moroccan workers present throughout the French national territory, which represent about 6,000 individuals. The data I obtained, which are thus only partly presented here, are from 2000 to 2008, and show relative similar proportions along the period. One should note that most Moroccans hired in French agriculture exert essentially seasonal activities. Agriculture in general and seasonal jobs

in particular are thus the main gateway for Moroccan workers in France: 88 % of migrants introduced nationally and 94 % of those present in Haute-Corse are recruited within seasonal work contracts, as stated in the table 3.

TABLE 3
NUMBER OF MOROCCAN MIGRANT WORKERS OFFICIALLY HIRED IN FRANCE AND HAUTE-CORSE DISTINCT ECONOMIC SECTORS IN 2008

SECTORS	FRANCE				HAUTE-CORSE			
	Work contract type				Work contract type			
	TA	S	P	Total	TA	S	P	Total
All sectors	180	5916	366	6462	1	602	35	638
Farming sector	43	5718	31	5792	0	600	15	615
		88%		90%		94%		96%
All sectors without farming one	137	198	335	670	1	2	20	23

NOTE.—Sources of data: unpublished statistical data from OFII, data obtained in 2009, author processing. (TA: Temporary Authorisation / S: Seasonal / P: Permanent)

The main idea to keep here is thus that citrus-fruit and kiwi-fruit farming are the agricultural productions which rely on the most Haute-Corse hired seasonal foreign workers, who prove to be essentially Moroccans. Moroccan presence is lesser in any other Haute-Corse cultures. Therefore, Moroccans presence in Haute-Corse, like in France more generally, as seasonal foreign labour recruited within such types of bilateral agreements, is directly related to the development of these agricultural subsectors within which they are hired.

In this subsection, in evaluating Moroccan presence in relation to changes in *Corsican Eastern Plain* agricultural development, I first proved that Moroccan presence in Haute-Corse agriculture indeed continues: Moroccans are the foreign migrant group mainly recruited, quite the only one, as farm labour in Haute-Corse agriculture. They are mainly and mostly concentrated in the dominant intensive and no-mechanised agricultural activity, and thus mostly requiring workforce, - clementine farming. The majority of *Corsican Eastern Plain* clementine farms is involved in certification schemes, so we can rightfully say that a majority of Moroccans is thus employed in P.G.I. clementine farming. Moroccan presence persistence in Haute-Corse agriculture is thus to a certain extent directly related to the evolution of this agricultural subsector as stated before. In Haute-

Corse, after the failure of the 1960s agricultural development model, the progressive mechanisation and the reduction of cultivated lands resulted in revising downwards needs in terms of workers. So indeed, the presence of Moroccan farm labour, because being almost reduced to and concentrated in clementine farming, does continue within the contextual 'quality turn' this commodity production is facing.

But why such a specific maintenance of Moroccan presence? The prevalence and the persistence of their presence in this agricultural sector raises questions about the reasons for such a predominance. Before addressing, in the second part of the paper, how logics of recruitment agencies and stakes of migration policies participate in shaping this reality, I propose answering some of the causes of Moroccan persistence in *Corsican Eastern Plain* in peculiar clementine farming subsector, - which drives us to the second subsection of this first part. Without thus being worrying about issues of legal frames in the coming subsection, we can simply for the moment wonder if Moroccan presence is a matter of farmers' relational preferences. The following subsection will then address how clementine growers justify their preference for hiring Moroccans rather than any other farm labour, through a contextualisation and a study of some logics which go on shaping labour relations. I will focus the attention on employers' speeches about Moroccan workers and on their strategies of recruitment and retention. Do clementine P.G.I. schemes and quality requirements intervene in farmers' justifications for mainly employing Moroccans to work in the production of this labelled commodity?

Foreign migrants in intensive agriculture... who are not exchangeable: on-going retaining practices of Moroccan workers and the strengthening of an occupied economic niche

The only one Haute-Corse municipality of Antisanti, locally deemed to be "the French and Corsican Clementine heartland", houses today the whole national clementine production, whose 90 % of grown lands are under P.G.I. label. Clementine shows a strongly marked seasonality with a three-months harvesting basically from mid-October to mid-January, and which requires thus the most workforce concentrated in a relatively short term. Most Moroccan seasonal workers in *Corsican Eastern Plain* are thus hired in Antisanti farms. The rest of the year requires less farm labour, for tasks of pruning, disbudding, and different farm maintenance works. Do P.G.I. clementine farming tasks need particular hard skills? The study of official documents of specification and points to master for a P.G.I. clementine grower highlights that tasks done by Moroccans and which eventually require particular skills, - except the ones more common to whatever farming, are P.G.I. clementine farming harvesting, pruning and disbudding tasks. P.G.I. clementine harvesting requires several successive pickups: fruits need to be picked with a number of sheets and a colour that make its specificity and guarantees its gustative quality and cannot therefore suffer nor a mechanised collection nor a deferred packaging. The fruit has thus to be picked at a precise moment, when it reached its natural colouring and maturity. Pruning and disbudding tasks are also critical for they condition to a certain extent the quality of coming year fruits (see figure 4).



FIG. 4.— Moroccan seasonal and permanent farm workers in clementine harvesting and packaging tasks (a P.G.I. clementine farm in Antisanti municipality and the associated packaging unit situated in Aléria municipality, Haute-Corse, France, Milazzo, J. 2010).

Do Moroccans hired as seasonal foreign labour in P.G.I. clementine farming have specific competences compared to Moroccans hired in clementine farming with no label, and even to Moroccans hired in local glasshouse growing, as an example? If it is about wondering if Moroccans hired on a P.G.I. clementine farm did progressively acquire competences in doing tasks they have been learning in working here repeatedly, along farmer's advices and expectations, for sure the answer is they do have "specific competences", - compared in fact to anybody. But if it is about wondering if Moroccans hired on a P.G.I. clementine farm are persons who were asked to come because of their specific skills meeting P.G.I. quality requirements, like if they would had followed some specialisation learning, then the answer is no, - to a large extent of what I could observed during fieldwork.

Analysis of interviews with P.G.I. clementine growers and farmers in general reveals that this preference for Moroccans is justified nor really by Moroccans' *origin*, nor by some specific know-hows proper to labelling requirements that Moroccans would have. Clementine farmers justify hiring Moroccans rather by longstanding labour

relationships in agriculture that it happens some of them have been having with Moroccans in particular, given historical circumstances. I mean that I could also observed such longstanding labour relationships in *Corsican Eastern Plain* between local farmers with Tunisian and Algerian workers, but in a lesser proportion, simply because these are less present than Moroccans in Haute-Corse. And paradoxically, social representations that underlie some employers' speeches on foreign workers in agriculture are referring to the geographical origin of migrants. One can state a relatively widespread ethno-professional categorisation that distinguishes professional skills of foreign farm workers according to their geographical origin. Moroccans are generally considered as men who work hard and do not rebel against employers' demands nor against the relatively physical conditions imposed by agricultural work. Farmers award distinctive professional agricultural know-hows to them and appreciate their self-system of co-optation, advantageous for farm management. In contrast, Poles are generally perceived as unskilled, scandals makers and are reputed to have a high propensity for alcohol and labour-union strikes. It is quite interesting and revealing to state that the few P.G.I. clementine growers who employ Polish workers are not part of these long-lasting labour relations some farmers developed. These last ones associate rather geographic origin with a form of economic, cultural and professional proximity. They would share in the inheritance with Moroccans similar Mediterranean systems of socio-spatial, economic and cultural organisations that they would implicitly participate in perpetuating in working in agriculture. These speeches are based on relationships built over the long term, between generations of Corsican and Moroccan families working successively in *Corsican Eastern Plain* quite same farms, since the 1960s local agricultural development. For the peculiar descendants of Algerian-born French persons, this perception of proximity is often even more palpable that some of their ancestors were already working in agriculture with Moroccans before their common arrival to Corsica. Some of them estimate they shared the same foreigner status, in some part of the local Corsican population's eyes.

This is about memorial speeches that one must obviously put into perspective; the recent majority of Moroccans locally hired not only lives on agriculture in Morocco. But these speeches legitimate to a certain extent a professional preference for Moroccans in the employers' eyes, in rebuilding a socio-cultural and professional proximity based on the relative glorification of a common past. Having said that, these speeches, relatively shared by Moroccans who mention "an acquired priority" to be locally hired, also reflect underlying economic considerations. To farmers, long-lasting relations and loyalty practices are guarantees of know-hows, techniques and work ways that precisely have to meet their own labour requirements, - and which are then all the more important in the context of a labelled commodity production.

These practices implicate thus obvious farmers' economic logics. To determine the number of seasonal contracts according to term depends on a marketing logic. Increasing the term of a seasonal work contract avoids the multiplication of charges payable by the employer for each additional hired worker. The longest seasonal contracts, from four to six months, involve more technical tasks such as pruning and

disbudding after harvesting. These tasks can be done over longer periods within the year, unlike harvesting' rush. These tasks are satisfied with a limited number of workers. This concretely means that all workers, whatever be the term of their work contract, begin in participating to the harvesting. Employers distinguish workers according to their skill level. And they modulate then work contracts term according to workers' relative versatility to perform successive and diverse tasks like picking, packing or pruning. This partly explains why only a few Moroccans are hired permanently and whose job is to manage the whole activities involved in the annual maintenance operations of a farm.

Moroccans hired in a farm acquire such an experience within quite widespread on-going farmers' practices of familial retaining recruitment. Such practices deeply participate in making of hired Moroccans an even more loyal foreign farm labour in Haute-Corse agriculture; Moroccan workers are not exchangeable to a certain extent. Hiring and retaining close and remote family members as workforce on a farm benefit both to employers and migrant workers, from some financial and sociable points of view. First, cohabitation is said to be easier for migrants who know each other's, while it can, at the same time and depending on contexts, worsen conflictive situations. Additionally, employing several members of a same family means a greater input of money for hired workers, even if profits are not necessarily pooled. Farmers benefit from the hierarchy established *de facto* among a same family members, - which is said to facilitate farm management. Seasonal workers, i.e. workers hired with short term work contracts, are generally guided by permanents who have a special status by their seniority. Most Moroccan permanent workers have generally been employed since several years, to see for decades; usually, they were already working in current employer's parents' farm or locally, in another *Corsican Eastern Plain* farm. Permanent workers are often initiators of labour migration chains. They often vouch for the persons they recommend their employers to hire, who are usually members of their own family, friends or neighbours in Morocco. Tensions and competition can arise between migrants, apart from any relationship more or less distant. Far from wanting to streamline the intra-family hiring logics, the term of work contracts is generally function and tends to increase with worker qualification, affinities with farmer and seniority in employment. Seniority is seen, by farmers, as a guarantee for the two first ones, *skills* and *affinities*. The use of familial, friendly and professional networks, often established over several generations thus, is deeply part of farmers' procedures of migrant workers selection. Workers loyalty finally leads to a form of familial emigration and labour circulation, - of "commuting movements", with the creation of a Moroccan migration space whose working relies thus on a form of secular migration.

This first part aim was to answer the following question: do clementine P.G.I. schemes, - basically labelling, is a weighty variable in the Moroccan maintaining presence in *Corsican Eastern Plain* agriculture? For giving some first conclusions from this part, I propose answering several points hereafter.

Would Moroccan workers presence continue if clementine farming would disappear? We could state that Moroccan presence is now quite concentrated and thus reduced to

the nearly only one clementine farming; it is the main remaining agricultural subsector asking for workforce in Haute-Corse, for simply not being mechanised. But other growers in Haute-Corse require and resort to Moroccan workers too, like kiwi growers, because they also lack of farm labour within this no-mechanised culture. So, we can with legitimacy imagine that without such cultures needing farm labour, Moroccan workers presence in Haute-Corse agriculture could quite vanish if clementine farming would disappear.

Would Moroccan workers presence continue if clementine farming would not have known certifications schemes? By a happy coincidence, clementine farming, which requires numerous workforce, is a subsector which knew a 'quality turn' in Haute-Corse. But it must said that there are some clementine growers who do not produce under certification schemes for economic reasons and / or for lack of sufficient farm lands. They also rely on Moroccan workforce, when they need to. So Moroccan workers presence would certainly continue even if clementine farming would not have known certifications schemes, and in a local context of lacking workforce.

Do Moroccan workers in P.G.I. clementine farming have peculiar skills? The 'quality turn' this commodity production faced is only a background context within which Moroccan presence is continuing, - simply because this commodity still needs workforce. In fact, Moroccan farm labour presence is continuing quite independently of the logic of this agricultural rationalisation that clementine farming is knowing, be this logic quality oriented or productivist. Interviews revealed that the real reason behind farmers' discourses about their preference for Moroccans is their widespread mutual long-lasting labour relations in agriculture and the associated advantages: Moroccans with who farmers are working are experienced in agricultural tasks and well informed of their employers' working ways. These are weighty explaining facts to farmers' preference for Moroccans, - more than specific hard skills that would have to meet certification requirements.

It is not my intention to paint a rosy picture of these longstanding labour relations in Haute-Corse context. Forms of labour domination may exist in any context, be a context of labour relations built over the long term and / or be a context of a commodity production subject to quality improvement initiatives. In addition, *Corsican Eastern Plain* farmers who grow clementine do not all share such a common past of long-lasting labour relations with Moroccan workers. And nevertheless, it is the historical nature of Moroccan presence in *Corsican Eastern Plain* agriculture more generally, which raised political considerations within negotiations about foreign labour recruitment issues. Most of recent configurations of Moroccan workers' migrations indeed draw on ancient migratory pathways, thereby reactivating uses of network practices: contacts are established between recent migrants and Moroccan communities settled in Haute-Corse, in the continuity of immigration waves started in the 1960s. Interviews and data compiled from payrolls of P.G.I. clementine growers revealed that Moroccan hired workers usually come from the same regions to see from the same families. These labour migrations rely on forms of solidarity mainly around family and professional spheres and are at the heart of financial transactions, as stated before. The historical

characteristic of this Moroccan presence, as the second part of the paper will stress, partly played in favour of Moroccan on-going persistence.

RENEWAL AND CONSOLIDATION WAYS OF MOROCCAN FARM LABOUR PRESENCE IN *CORSICAN EASTERN PLAIN* LABELLED CLEMENTINE FARMING

This second part goes deeper in the analysis of Moroccan presence maintenance in *Corsican Eastern Plain* agriculture. It demonstrates a reconfiguration of Moroccan labour migrations was necessary for their persistence, given the new context brought by the 'quality turn' clementine farming was facing. How are patterns of Moroccan migrations renewing? This part explores some of the modalities of such a renewal and consolidation of Moroccan presence, - partly in relation with the 'quality turn' clementine farming is knowing. It shows how farmers with migrant workers' longstanding labour relations were a weighty argument within an exchange of friendly services: I present the negotiations process as a two-act play of a regional special dispensation about foreign labour recruitment, with clementine P.G.I. labelling schemes as a background (2000-2010).

From the 2000s, administrative powers' attitude vis-à-vis hired workforce employed in agriculture in Haute-Corse evolves. *Corsican Eastern Plain* had been knowing until then a situation of relative freedom in terms of migrant flows. Facing an aging local available workforce or put off by the difficulty of offered jobs, farmers usually resort to foreign seasonal workers, mostly Moroccans, beyond legal frames. Many farmers have to do with this seasonal workforce irregularity, which may undermine the crops. Meanwhile, governments seek ways to reduce undeclared work, which is considered particularly important in Haute-Corse agriculture.

Given the situation, state services and professional organisations tried to find a common solution to meet farmers' satisfaction in terms of seasonal labour requirements, which be in compliance with employment rules. The dialogue launched, clementine growers insisted on specific and binding modalities of their productions, which account for nearly sixty percent of Haute-Corse tree production, and which was entering certification schemes needing rationalisation, - namely, development of technical organisation to its best. As we stated it before, clementine shows a strongly marked seasonality, with a two to three months harvesting period. Clementine harvesting is not mechanised and requires thus numerous workforce, on a relatively short period of time, during the winter. Given the lack of job seekers on local, national and E.U. job markets, employers can ask for recruiting seasonal workers from countries who signed bilateral workforce agreements with France (i.e. Morocco, Tunisia and Poland). However, recruitment procedures for these countries proved to be relatively unsuited to clementine farming.

In August 2002, the signing of a departmental experimental protocol allowed then clementine growers to legally recruit Moroccan seasonal workers for two and three months short term work contracts, instead of four months as the minimum normally

allowed. This change is of a great significance for the reshaping of Moroccan migrants' workspace and presence in Haute-Corse: from then, the selection of Moroccan migrants takes place under increasingly stringent conditions of inflows regulation. The establishment of these new recruitment modalities knew two major steps under the considered period of this study (the early 2000s to 2010), - whose implications for Moroccan persisting presence are discussed hereafter.

First Act. "Moroccans wanted!" How exceptional short-term work name contracts for Moroccans led to illegal migration practices

Moroccan migrants in clementine farming owe to a certain extent their persistent employment and presence to clementine growers. A reconfiguration of Moroccan labour presence was indeed necessary for her persistence: this reconfiguration was asked and initiated by clementine growers, in order Moroccan migrants could be employed according to their wishes. Clementine growers could employ Polish workers for two to three months. But we could state before the predominance of farmers' preference for Moroccan hired farm labour, compared to any other workforce in clementine farming, and in most cultures in fact. Indeed, by a negative turn of events, whereas farmers used to work with Moroccans in agriculture, as we saw before, current recruitment rules for Moroccans did not match adequately clementine farming requirements, notably for the harvesting period: clementine growers could not employ Moroccans as they intended to, particularly for short term work contracts, given the restrictions of legal recruitment modalities. Clementine growers, under P.G.I. schemes or not, negotiated thus from the early 2000s with recruitment agencies the possibility to change the modalities of Moroccans recruitment to adapt these to clementine farming requirements. They were given by state services the possibility to employ specifically Moroccans under particular modalities, within short term work name contracts, unlike usual national recruitment policies:

"Seasonal workers from Morocco or Tunisia, as originating from "distant countries", - the term of their work contract cannot be less than four months. However, given the mismatch between local labour market and seasonal labour needs expressed by clementine growers and kiwi growers, the Prefect undertakes, in accordance with requirements of Circular 5-76 of 16 March 1976, to grant an exception for two to three months hiring contracts for tasks like citrus and kiwi harvesting, once employers pay returning travel to their country of origin for concerned employees."

[In Memorandum of Understanding between Haute-Corse Prefect and Haute-Corse Chamber of Agriculture, on recruitment modalities of seasonal foreign workers for 2002].

One has to see this derogation as a compromise, as an exchange of friendly services between state, farmers unions and Chamber of Agriculture: it was indeed at the same time a mean for French state to legalise widespread illegal recruitment practices in Corsica, - in entering a transparency dialogue with employers on the situation. It was showing a gesture of good-will and a consideration of farmers' point, in the newly context of a progressive rationalisation asked in parallel by P.G.I. certification schemes. It is what partly suggests the following interview extract carried out with the General

Secretary of Haute-Corse Labour, Employment and Vocational Training Regional Department in 2008. This last one also underlines how this exceptional agreement expresses national, departmental and local expectations to bring from the early 2000s *Corsican Eastern Plain* agriculture into compliance with national standards, while at the same time considering local specificities:

“We asked them [farmers] “but how do you bring them here? They are coming by boat and someday there will be a scandal. Corsica will not be strengthened by that, Corsican farmers will not be strengthened by that. We absolutely have to move forward.” And the idea was to try to listen to their expectations, and on our side, how we were going to try to answer and find some administrative solutions [...] to lead them to legal practices, since as National Employment Agency and Labour Department, there is no other possible way. Solution was not obvious and we also investigated the way our services worked. [...] We thus tried to define a method and a 2002 calendar. It is to say in the year 1999-2000 we tried to establish first contacts which were then established in the year 2001 and we wondered how to plan ahead of time 2002 harvesting. One must know that we received help from Chamber of Agriculture as they wished at the same time to start a quality procedure and they had already referred the matter to authorities as regards Corsican clementine quality label recognition. Labelling must be balanced with production planning. In production planning, the ‘labour variable’ must be considered. What it used to be, they explained us [farmers], it is that for a few money more, the whole labour team sometimes left overnight the farm for the nearby one. Harvest was completely thus matching it [lack of labour organisation]. The results did not meet expectations as regards *Corsican Eastern Plain* orchard.” [From an interview carried out in 2008, with General Secretary of Haute-Corse Labour, Employment and Vocational Training Regional Department, in Ajaccio, Corse-du-Sud, France].

This derogation also stresses the consideration of long-lasting labour relations with Moroccan workers and of the role played by historical informal networks in their recruitment. These two last ones were seen by recruitment agencies, like by farmers actually, as facilitating facts in a transitional context of change. And a critical point to mention here, is that employers had the possibility to recruit migrant workers by name, whatever be the term of work contracts. Agricultural rationalisation clementine farming was undertaking with P.G.I. schemes could thus justified even more to agree farmers’ will to go on employing, within legal frames, Moroccan migrants they were used in fact to working with before. It is a point quite clearly underlined in 2004 internal unpublished qualitative and quantitative annual agricultural end of year statement in Haute-Corse:

“Due to reduced opportunities offered by local labour market, workers introduced by the Office of International Migrations constitute the bulk of the seasonal wage labour. They represent between 60 and 70 % of those employed. For historical reasons: ties between Morocco and Corsica since the Second World War, the installation in *Corsican Eastern Plain* in the late 1950s and in the early sixties of many farmers from North Africa, and because of professional practices; ‘co-optation’ of people coming from the same region of permanent employees and working together for decades; this group is almost exclusively composed of Moroccans.”

[From 2004 internal unpublished qualitative and quantitative annual agricultural end of year statement in Haute-Corse, France.]

This protocol proved to be relatively against national policy's aim to limit the number of first time coming migrants; in the early 2000s, Moroccans employed for short term work name contracts were often first time coming migrants simply because farmers, facing this transitional organisation step on their own farms, had to meet the numerous workforce asked for the harvesting. Generally, for convenience, they asked for recruiting persons from the same extended family than the repeat workers employed in their farm. Farmers often asked to employ a brother, a cousin, a close relative of one of their workers; this last one vouched for the seriousness rather than the qualification of the newly one coming worker. This was totally legal: until 2007, recruitment rules clearly specify the fact that any work contract request must be name specific, i.e. persons are selected by employer himself, with recruitment agencies' agreement. In such a context, one of the effects of the protocol was to increase illegal foreign labour migration: most of migrants, hired with a first time short term name contract, simply did not go back to Morocco once their contract ended, or they never arrived to the farm. This protocol had not originally be designed to become permanent, in reason of these foreseen eventualities. It had been indeed concluded for one year, as an experimental procedure, and its eventual renewal should take account of the balance sheet precisely at the end of 2002. From 2002 to 2006, the Protocol was continued, in large measure because it was in fact the best compromise answering local situation constraints and requirements.

In this subsection, I showed how a dominant will among Haute-Corse clementine growers to go on working with a specific foreign community, namely Moroccans, led to a specific place-based exceptional memorandum of agreement on recruitment procedures for seasonal labour workforce, specifically for Moroccans employed in clementine farming. This protocol was signed with the condition of French state goals' achievement. It had to be a way to regulate illegal foreign migrant labour in rationalising recruitment procedures, while at the same time meeting clementine growers' requirements and preferences for their farm workforce needs. This protocol, adopted from 2002 and in full contradiction with national policy, finally led to illegal migration practices. It resulted then in launching new labour regulation adjustments and in raising thus another negotiations about modalities of workers selection, - which drives us to the second subsection of this second part.

Second Act. "Mandatory procedure: anonymous first time contracts!" How unknown recruitment procedure led to recruitment quality policies and reinforced employers' loyalty practices towards Moroccan workers

"In order to fight against seasonal contracts selling and to encourage the return of workers to their home countries after their employment period, the Population and Migration Direction has decided, after consulting professional organisations and with Prefect's agreement, to establish again in Corsica, as an experiment, the anonymous contracts procedure for the recruitment of Moroccan first migrants. Given the increasing number, since 2002, of first migrants' introductions, given also

the very low rate of migrants' returns to Morocco, this procedure has two advantages. First, it guarantees to each farmer a skilled workforce and liable to come back and work the following years; secondly, it allows state agencies to fight against illegal immigration and to clean up practices related to agricultural seasonal farm labour's introductions."

[From 2007 internal unpublished qualitative and quantitative annual agricultural end of year statement in Haute-Corse, France.]

From 2007, the French state's desire to curb clandestine recruitment channels increases, when at the same time migrant workers' loyalty practices from farmers are encouraged. 2007 internal unpublished qualitative and quantitative annual agricultural end of year statement in Haute-Corse states that indeed about 80 % of Moroccan first time work contracts do not report their return to Morocco once the season is finished. These statistics are yet to be taken with utmost reservations: interviews revealed that some Moroccan migrants, when returning to Morocco, simply do not take the time to make a detour by Moroccan state agencies to testify that they indeed returned.

In any case, the selection of first coming Moroccan workers is from now on delegated to a certain extent to French and Moroccan recruitment agencies and authorities:

"Contracts will necessarily be anonymous for less than three months term. For three to six months contracts, employers have the possibility to propose first time migrants name contracts, by a maximum of 35 % of recruited workforce in the farm."

[In Memorandum of Understanding between Haute-Corse Prefect and Haute-Corse Chamber of Agriculture, on recruitment modalities of seasonal foreign workers for 2007].

An employer has no longer the possibility to ask short term work name contracts. For long term work contracts, it is still possible to a certain extent, but generally, it is quite rare employers recruit first time migrants for long term work contracts: repeat workers, with some experience, already occupy these long term work jobs in the farm. If a farmer, from one season to another, needs a larger workforce than its repeat one, there is no other way for him than asking for recruiting anonymous workers so.

This has important implications for the selection process of foreign farm labour in general and thus for modalities of Moroccans presence. The only ones farmers no longer have the monopoly they had in terms of workers selection. Selection now involves many services: French and Moroccan public recruitment agencies, French National Agency for the Reception of Foreigners and Migrants (ANAEM at this time), European Union MEDA project "Institutional Support to Persons' Movement", and Haute-Corse Prefecture and Departmental Direction of Labour. In reintroducing anonymous work contracts procedure for first time migrants, the skills issue joined then the negotiations; employers could not chose anymore the workers constituting their whole working team and were preoccupied with the results. Despite the reluctance of farmers regarding the qualification of anonymous selected workers, this new protocol was signed.

Concretely, as regards the selection process within this new 2007 protocol, recruitment agencies, in agreement with *Corsican Eastern Plain* clementine growers, participated in elaborating migrant profiles according to specific criteria of recruitment. The selection took into account age (men from 35 to 50 years old) and family situation of Moroccan candidates, mostly in order to limit no returns rates to Morocco when hiring period comes to its end. It also intended to meet farmers' specific needs in terms of workers qualification: persons had to be experienced in farm labour tasks. For this purpose, the procedure included that two farm teams' advisers of Haute-Corse recruitment agencies, and who knew farmers and locally proposed jobs, move to Casablanca in Morocco to carry out interviews with workers preselected by Moroccan recruitment agencies. Moroccans' needs in terms of work demands and socio-economic local development were also considered: Moroccan recruitment agencies tended to preselect migrant workers from in trouble agricultural areas, a fortiori when agricultural calendar of these regions met the *Corsican Eastern Plain* hiring period. In June 2007, Moroccan recruitment agencies preselected thus 500 persons from Moroccan agricultural important regions of Agadir - Taroudant, Ouarzazate, Boulemane and Berkane. In November 2007, about 170 Moroccan first migrants were thus hired for two to four months term work contracts, distributed in thirty different Haute-Corse farms.

The results in terms of migrants' returns to Morocco proved to be positive. Then all involved actors agreed to extend the new protocol conditions to 2008-2009 period, while also proposing some improvements to workers selection procedure. Precisely, farmers' interviews generally highlighted that anonymous workers selection did not bring the overall satisfaction. This surely explains that farmers' intention to go on retaining practices of repeat best workers be subtly mentioned in the following extract:

"Most of met farmers were satisfied with the procedure of anonymous contracts for first time migrants recruitment: they say they want that the experience started in 2007 be continued, and they expressed their intention to retain the best workers from now on, in offering them a contract renewal in 2008."

[From 2007 internal unpublished qualitative and quantitative annual agricultural end of year statement in Haute-Corse, France.]

The figure 5 underlines how the implementation in Haute-Corse from 2007 of unknown person recruitment procedure met State's aims in terms of regulating illegal foreign labour: the rate of migrants' returns to home country increases from one third in 2005 to among 95 % in 2010. You can also state that there is an important decrease of first time anonymous work contracts numbers from 2007 to 2010, which reveals farmers' employment practices of labour loyalty, as previously mentioned.

For 2008-2009 period, improvements in selection process of Moroccan migrants were specifically concerned with their qualification. In order to answer farmers' reluctance regarding the qualification of anonymous selected workers, advisers of Haute-Corse recruitment agencies worked with farmers in order to identify more accurately offered jobs across Haute-Corse agriculture and farmers' expectations in terms of workers qualification. They gave Moroccan workers hired in *Corsican Eastern Plain* farms some technical tests, with the aim to establishing a "calibration of farmers' skills criteria".

During interviews with preselected persons in Morocco, they notably then used a Simulation Recruitment Method to identify the most “skilled” candidates for elaborated tasks like pruning.




FIG. 5.—Effect of unknown person recruitment procedure for Moroccan two to three months first time contracts, on both regulation of hired workforce and farmers' workforce loyalty practices (workers hired in clementine and kiwi-fruit farming in Haute-Corse, France, 2005-2010).

The recruitment agencies' aim here was to create “a skilled breeding ground”, whose workers could be progressively repeat, in order to limit first migrants' employment, whatever be within short or long term work contracts. This is clearly expressed in official texts, even from 2007. The aim is clearly to move towards loyalty practices of repeat workers, still stressed in 2013 official texts:

“An assessment will be made at the end of the year: if the return rate of first time migrants recruited within name work contracts is not less than the one of first time migrants anonymously recruited by Moroccan recruitment agencies, this possibility will be maintained in 2008, within the limits of 25 % of the vacancies.” (It is to say, no longer 35 % as we saw before, but now only 25 %...)

[In Memorandum of Understanding between Haute-Corse Prefect and Haute-Corse Chamber of Agriculture, on recruitment modalities of seasonal foreign workers for 2007].

“Anonymous work Contracts / name work contracts: the contract must be anonymous when it concerns a Moroccan employee who did not come during the previous three

years, for the same employer, and if he is employed in clementine or kiwi farming for less than 4 months. In all other cases, it can be a name work contract. When a farmer asks for recruiting workers anonymously, while he had employed workers the previous year, he must provide any useful explanation of this situation (reason for the increase in employees number, reason why he does not ask for a returning employee who already came previous year ...). *Increasing of seasonal workers number*: any increasing in workforce asked, compared to previous year, must be justified; if it is linked to an increase of cultivated lands, employer will have to justify it (notably in sending a topographical survey)."

[In official Haute-Corse circulars laws on seasonal farm workers recruitment modalities, for 2013].

These new recruitment quality policies in Moroccan farm workforce selection were an opportunity to expand criteria selection to other highly sought-after skills in *Corsican Eastern Plain*, within and even beyond clementine farming scope, due to the scarcity of local farm labour. According to an interview carried out in 2009 with an adviser of an Haute-Corse recruitment agency, as an example, there was an important lack of workers skilled in tractor manoeuvring and in technical agricultural equipment maintenance. So each year, these are jobs which raise a problem when recruiting Moroccan migrants. These skilled tasks are generally assigned to permanent workers in farms, as we could state it before and as captured (see figure 6). The lack of such a skilled labour for doing these tasks is even more especially critical that a majority of permanent workers hired in *Corsican Eastern Plain* were said to approach retirement age.

The one question of this second part was - did clementine P.G.I. schemes, - basically labelling, directly intervene in such negotiations to change recruitment modalities of foreign workers? It is quite hard to decide on the matter. Concretely, all clementine growers, be (already) involved or not in P.G.I. schemes, were at first given the same possibility to employ Moroccan farmers (and Tunisian) for short term work name contracts. But we saw Tunisian presence in Haute-Corse agriculture was already almost vanished. In fact, P.G.I. clementine farming, or clementine farming with no label, both show relatively similar seasonality and need thus the most workforce for harvesting on the quite same short period. So this derogation, which permits special conditions of Moroccans recruitment to clementine growers, is not a matter of workers' adequate skills to label quality requirements. Again, it is rather about the recognised convenience of long-lasting relational practices of local farmers working with Moroccans. This is even more underlined by the fact the derogation was also valid for kiwi growers, as suggested before in the 2002 Memorandum of Understanding. Kiwi growers also entered certification schemes at almost the same time than clementine growers, but with less concrete results in obtaining a label, lower productions and then lower hired Moroccans as needed workforce.



FIG. 6.—Moroccan permanent farm workers manoeuvring tractor before clementine harvesting and before packaging task (a P.G.I. clementine farm in Antisanti locality, Haute-Corse, France, Milazzo, J., 2010).

Coming back to this weighty argument of long-lasting labour relations, we could indeed state in the first part of the paper that these remain relatively similar, even if they have to take place from now on within legal frames. It is precisely with reference to this argument of long-lasting labour relations with Moroccans, that clementine growers (and kiwi growers) managed to obtain an exceptional derogation from recruitment agencies, rather than to Moroccans' so-called hard skills adapted to requirements of a labelled commodity production. So one cannot consider in the absolute that farmers used concretely 'hard-skills-for-labelling' as an excuse for modifying Moroccans' possibilities of recruitment. But one cannot deny either Moroccan repeat workers' experience, acquired for sure on the long term, in working with farmers in local intensive farming.

Patterns of Moroccan migrations were thus renewed through rationalisation of recruitment modalities: legalisation of employment and clear estimation of workforce needs for each clementine farm. The renewal of Moroccan presence is more due to this rationalising step in recruitment procedures than to the concrete 'quality turn' clementine farming faced. It is not label quality schemes which directly influenced a reshaping of Moroccan labour migrations. But for sure, certification schemes even more asked for, and brought in return rationalising practices among clementine growers. On this point, we could state how the real issue of "skills" entered the negotiations only when were reintroduced anonymous work contracts for first time migrants; farmers were afraid they simply be given a workforce they were not used to working with, - workers they imagined they could not rely on because they were not a family member of their repeat workers. Moroccan regions where anonymous persons were selected from 2007 were indeed quite distinct than the historically ones linked to Corsica. In a certain sense, this could had introduced a significant break from the consolidation of the Moroccan-Corsican migratory space created since the 1960s and linking particular Moroccan families from North-East Moroccan regions to *Corsican Eastern Plain*

agriculture. But it could also open a new migratory space. We can state here how foreign migrations national legalisation and local agricultural requirements mixed up in rationalisation measures; these last ones play a key part in shaping migration geographies both in sending and destination countries.

In this sense, the maintaining of Moroccan farm labour presence also depends then on the nature of labour relations this double legalisation and rationalisation process participated in developing, -notably in terms of perpetuating and favouring pre-existing advantageous practices of retaining repeat migrants. Thus, the paper highlights how labelling program in this study-case justifies in return to employ repeat workers, and to perpetuate long-lasting labour relations, in order to ensure the continuing presence of a farm labour who finally became indispensable to local agriculture:

“Regular contacts with professional organisations are planned to adjust the economic (tree growers’ development strategy who want to be part of quality schemes in order they obtain the Corsican clementine certification), with the social (employees declaration and social contributions payment, respect for working hours and salary of the Collective Agreement of Haute-Corse farms). [...] The 2006 and renewed 2007 initiatives’ aim were to drain labour towards seasonal jobs available in the public employment areas of the eastern coast, where almost all clementine and kiwi farms are located. We must recognise the relative failure of it, which is due in part to the negative perception of seasonal jobs in agriculture in general opinion, and which is also partly due to the attitude of some employers, who value recruiting rather foreign workers, by invoking the need for a consistent and cohesive team, whose members were recruited via their farm permanent worker.

In this context, the obligation to employ anonymously Moroccan first migrants, should allow, in the medium term, the creation and retention of high-performance teams of workers, who return each year to their country of origin when their contract come to an end. *It is the price to concretely set up the business development strategy designed by tree growers and which aims to be part of a quality approach in order that clementine be the flagship product of island’s agriculture.*”

[From 2007 internal unpublished qualitative and quantitative annual agricultural end of year statement in Haute-Corse, France.]

CONCLUSIVE REMARKS

From the case of Moroccan farm labour hired in *Corsican Eastern Plain* agriculture, the paper analysed linkages between changes in workforce recruitment patterns and a turning point toward the quality orientated production of a local agricultural commodity since the 2000s, - the Corsican clementine. It addressed some labour relations logics in the production of such a Protected Geographical Indication (P.G.I.) labelled commodity.

The paper main contribution was in showing how Moroccan labour migrations are going on participating to, while being also reconfigured, according to *Corsican Eastern Plain* steps of agrarian development: from the 2000s, most clementine growers linked

the quality of this new envisaged agricultural commodity directly into the context of its production: they defended in some way the argument of skills specific to Moroccans. They argued then that these were the most adapted workforce they should recruit to precisely meet quality requirements of P.G.I. clementine production. The paper discussed the real reasons behind why most of *Corsican Eastern Plain* clementine growers, (already) involved or not in P.G.I. quality labelling schemes, adopted such a discourse in labour recruitment negotiations with state services: they did so in order to better justify their wish to go on employing a beneficial workforce some of them were precisely used to working with in agriculture since a while. Such long-lasting labour relations had been taking place within relatively un-official historical migration networks since the 1960s, and were taking place since the 2000s through officially channelled ones. In fact, the case showed the very important current relevance farmers gave to the historical participation of Moroccans to *Corsican Eastern Plain* agrarian reconfigurations. Such long-lasting labour relations are surely the one real weighty argument to farmers, which go on justifying to particularly employ Moroccans in local agriculture. In effect, similar long-lasting employment strategies, which serve quite comparable priorities, could be observed among Haute-Corse clementine growers, involved or not in quality labelling programs, and among other commodities growers. For labelled clementine growers, quality commodity was thus associated by farmers with specific farming know-hows, acquired on the long term by retained Moroccans. This justified their officially on-going recruitment in the eyes of recruitment agencies, a fortiori in the context of a labelled commodity production. Indeed, the paper showed how recruitment agencies also gave a certain relevance to historical Moroccans presence: these long-lasting labour relations were politically taken into account, in permitting a special dispensation for Moroccan labour recruitment, mainly for clementine growers.

The paper mainly showed how Moroccan labour migration has been being part of *Corsican Eastern Plain* agrarian reconfigurations and played thus a role in the negotiated development of this rural territory in globalisation context. It thus partly answered the call for more studies on the peculiar role of international migration in producing localities other than urban ones (Glick Schiller and Çağlar eds. 2011). While the analysis did not aim to centre on it, this paper could also offer some first insights for further research on place-based studies of “processes of globalisation [...] as they are experienced by rural localities” (Woods 2007: 491). On Rogaly’s recommendations (2008) to investigate “labour relations in the production of particular commodities” (Rogaly 2008: 507), I analysed interactions between P.G.I. labelling schemes in intensive farming, foreign farm labour selection and labour relations in such a context. Results highlighted the diversified social realities one can find behind Mediterranean “global agro-migration complexes”, - yet in a context of progressive global integration both of agricultural businesses and of labour recruitment circuits. The paper argues thus in favour of further research on the influence that quality policies in commodities productions may have in shaping both labour relations and migration geographies; study-cases could be interested in quality policies both in intensive and alternative

forms of agriculture(s) on one hand, and in non-processed and processed food contexts on the other hand.

Another quite interesting point for further research this case stressed would be to investigate the different dimensions of a commodity quality: where do national and local customers situate foreign workforce in their social representations about a particular labelled commodity quality? Do they even know Moroccan migrants are playing a key part in labelled Corsican clementine growing, - this, in a French region disparaged to be one of the most racist of France and where Moroccans in Corsica are precisely more generally said to be the main “minority of the minority” (Luciani 1995)? Corsican clementine does not tell a story of ‘food from nowhere’, for being precisely linked to Corsican territory within a P.G.I. label, whose renown partly lies on specific local and traditional know-hows. But the main human forces, whose local presence is a lasting one, and who contribute to this localised quality commodity production, could yet be seen as totally ‘exogenous’, for precisely being foreign migrants.

REFERENCES

- Berlan, Jean-Pierre. 1986. “Agriculture et migrations.” *Revue Européenne des Migrations Internationales* 2(3) : 9-32.
- Cid-Aguayo, Beatriz E. 2010. “Global Villages and Rural Cosmopolitanism: Exploring Global Ruralities.” *Globalizations* 5(4): 541-54.
- Darpeix, Aurélie. 2013. “La main-d’œuvre salariée en agriculture: histoire d’une invisibilité.” *Cahiers Demeter*: 269-96.
- Forum Civique Européen, eds. 2002. *Le goût amer de nos fruits et légumes. L'exploitation de migrants dans l'agriculture intensive en Europe*. Château Arnoux : Informations et Commentaires. Le développement en question.
- Gertel, Jörg and Sarah R. Sippel, eds. 2014. *Seasonal Workers in Mediterranean Agriculture. The Social Costs of Eating Fresh*. Croydon: Routledge.
- Gisti, eds. 2008. “Saisonniers en servage.” *Plein droit* 78(3).
- Glick Schiller, Nina and Ayse Çağlar, eds. 2011. *Locating Migration. Rescaling Cities and Migrants*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
- Lamanthe, Annie and Victor Rau. 2014. “Fruit production in France and Argentina. Globalizing standards and labour markets.” Pp. 61-70 in *Seasonal Workers in Mediterranean Agriculture. The Social Costs of Eating Fresh*, edited by J. Gertel and S.R. Sippel. Croydon: Routledge.
- Luciani, Marie-Pierre. 1995. *Immigrés en Corse. Minorité de la minorité*. Paris: L’Harmattan.
- Mésini, Béatrice. 2009. “Enjeux des mobilités circulaires de main-d’œuvre: l’exemple des saisonniers étrangers dans l’agriculture méditerranéenne.” *Méditerranée* 113: 105-13.
- Michalon, Bénédicte and Morice, Alain, eds. 2008. “Travailleurs saisonniers dans l’agriculture européenne.” *Etudes rurales* 182(2).
- Milazzo, Josepha. 2012. “Migrations d’hier, circulations internationales d’aujourd’hui. La mise en valeur agricole de la Plaine orientale corse au travers des dynamiques migratoires (Maroc-Corse).” *Etudes Corses* 75: 179-202.

- Morice, Alain. 2008a. "Quand l'État organise la violation du droit." *Plein Droit* 78(3): 17-21.
- Morice, Alain and Bénédicte Michalon. 2008. "Les migrants dans l'agriculture: vers une crise de main-d'œuvre?" *Etudes rurales*, 182(2): 9-28.
- Morice, Alain. 2008b. "Quelques repères sur les contrats OMI et ANAEM." *Etudes rurales* 182(2): 61-68.
- OCDE. 1998. *Migrations, libre-échange et intégration régionale dans le bassin méditerranéen*. Paris: Conférences de l'OCDE.
- Regnard, Corinne. 2006. *Immigration et présence étrangère en France en 2005*. Rapport annuel de la Direction de la Population et des Migrations. (http://travail-emploi.gouv.fr/IMG/pdf/rapport_immigration_2005.pdf)
- Renucci, Janine. 1974. *Corse traditionnelle et Corse nouvelle, la géographie d'une île*. Lyon: Audin.
- Rogaly, Ben. 2008. "Intensification of workplace regimes in British horticulture: the role of migrant workers." *Population, Space and Place* 14(6): 497-510.
- Woods, Michael. 2007. "Engaging the global countryside: globalization, hybridity and the reconstitution of rural place." *Progress in Human Geography* 31(4): 485-507.

BIOGRAPHY

Joseph Milazzo is a French PhD Candidate in Geography. She is currently carrying an international co-thesis at Aix-Marseille University, France, and at Barcelona Autonomous University, Spain. Her doctoral dissertation is interested in showing how Bolivian labour migrations participate in renegotiating the model of locality production in the Spanish global village of Cadaqués. She holds a Master's degree in Geography from Aix-Marseille University with 'Globalisation and Development' as a special field. Her thesis research received support from the Institute of the Americas in 2011 and from the Social Science Research Council in 2012. She worked as a Research Superior Technician for the Migrations Research Group, Department of Geography, at Barcelona Autonomous University in 2012, and as a full-time Temporary Teacher and Researcher in Geography at Corsican University in 2013-2014. Her research interests are concerned with links between international labour migration and urban-rural fringe, observed in rural spaces, small localities and villages of high income countries, as arrival and immigration places for foreign migrants. She aims to analyse how these processes, - between others, the situated trans-local practices of migrants, take place in globalisation context, and contribute to (re)build locality.