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Majority Judgment vs Majority Rule


The validity of majority rule in an election with but two candidates—and so also of Condorcet consistency—is challenged. Axioms based on measures—paralleling those of K. O. May characterizing majority rule for two candidates based on comparisons—lead to another method that is unique in agreeing with the majority rule on pairs of “polarized” candidates. The method—majority judgment—meets R. A. Dahl’s requirement that an apathetic majority does not always defeat an intense minority. It is a practical method that accommodates any number of candidates, avoids both the Condorcet and Arrow paradoxes, and best resists strategic manipulation.
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hal-01304043 , version 1 (19-04-2016)


  • HAL Id : hal-01304043 , version 1


Michel Balinski, Rida Laraki. Majority Judgment vs Majority Rule. 2016. ⟨hal-01304043⟩
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