





MODEL-BASED RISK ANALYSIS OF HUMAN-ROBOT INTERACTIONS AND SAFETY ARGUMENT CONSTRUCTION

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Model-based Safety Assessment Workshop
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Summary

- Human-robot interaction: MIRAS project
- Model-based risk analysis: HAZOP-UML
- Safety argument construction using GSN

A Rehabilitation Robot: The MIRAS Robot

The MIRAS project: A robotic strolling assistance

GOAL

- Assists patient in standing up, walking and sitting down
- For people suffering from gait and orientation problems

MEANS

- Motorised base and moving handlebar
- Sensors to detect patient's position and health condition



MIRAS: Multimodal Interactive Robot for Assistance in Strolling

Building a safe system...


- Building a zero-risk system...
 - Totally correct specification
 - All hazardous situations predicted
 - All hazardous situations correctly handled
 - Totally correct design and implementation
- · ... is actually impossible
 - Justified confidence that the specification covers the most hazardous situations
 - Justified confidence that the design includes adequate protection techniques
 - Justified confidence that the system is correctly implemented

Building a safe system...


- Safety: absence of unacceptable risk [ISO-Guide51]
- Risk management: systematic application of management policies, procedures and practices to the task of analysing, evaluating, controlling and monitoring risk [ISO 14971]

Risk management process

- ISO/IEC Guides 51 &73
- ISO/FDIS 14971



Risk management process



Argumentation process

 Safety case: A structured argument, supported by a body of evidence that provides a compelling, comprehensible and valid case that a system is safe for a given application in a given operating environment. [1]

Safety requirement



Safety Evidence

[1] U.K Ministry of Defence, Defence Standard 00-56 Issue 4: Safety Management Requirements for Defence Systems. HMSO, 2007

Systematic model-based approach

Model-based risk assessment


 Adapt the classical risk management process by using UML (Unified Modelling Language) to model the system, including the user

Why UML?

- De facto standard
- Use case, sequence diagram and statechart are easily understandable by non-experts (transdisciplinary models)
- Diagrams can also be used for development process
- Models include the user

Unified Modeling Language


- Use cases
 - Describe the intended use of the robot
 - Completed with conditions



Unified Modeling Language


Sequence diagrams

- Describe nominal scenarios corresponding to the use cases
- Messages are either actions (self-messages) or interactions



Unified Modeling Language


- Statechart
 - Describe different system's state
 - Completed with conditions




UML Models

HAZOP Guidewords


Risk analysis HAZOP-UML




Use Case Diagram



Sequence Diagram




Statechart





| lement Hribute) | Guide word | Deviation The robot receives soverall different orders | a. Use Case Effect b. Real World Effect a. Whong order taken into soccurs b. Whong lank, bad synctro- rication between robot and user, could result in collision | Severity Moderate | Failure of HAW for order reception Human error | Integrity level Requirements | New Safety Requirements | Remarks Means for construction tetroen rotos and user needs to be defined for the PHRENGS use case (speach graphical HMI, vision, etc.) | |
|---|---------------------------------|---|--|----------------------|---|--|---|--|--|
| teceive and itempret order edisuoci) | More than i as well as | | | | | HIW for order reception should be SIL1 | User education and training Define a protocol for communication between user and robot (in.g., acknowledgment massages, user can check interpretation of the order) | | |
| fut the gripper is open the user and robot can gripper edisuod: gripper Before give the object cause collision to the robot before the latter fall / The arm | | synchronization between user and robot can cause collision b. The object can fall / The arm and human can | Savece | Human | None | The robot should keep the gripper dosed until the arm movement is finished | The procedure in the seq. diag is as fedova: the robot opera its gigger than the robot opera its gigger than the robot amount towards the user hand. Only then the user can place the object in the solect gigger. A safer procedure is the volted should loop the gripper closed until arm proveners is finished—modify sequenced disposition. | | |

HAZOP-UML



Example of HAZOP-UML application

Project : PHRIENDS

HAZOP number : UC4/SD4

Entity: Sequence Diagram 4 (sd4) "Take an object from the user's hand"

Date: June-01-2008
Prepared by: Ofaina Taofifenua
Revised by: Jérémie Guiochet
Approved by:

| | 1 | | | | | | | Approved by: | |
|---|---------------------------------|--|--|----------|---|---|--|--|-----------------|
| Element (attribute) | Guide word | Deviation | a. Use Case Effect b. Real World Effect | Severity | Possible Causes | Integrity level Requirements | New Safety Requirements | Remarks | |
| Receive and interpret order (pred/succ) | More than / as well as | The robot receives several different orders | a. Wrong order taken into account b. Wrong task, bad synchronization between robot and user, could result in collision | Moderate | Failure of H/W for order reception Human error | H/W for order reception should be SIL1 | User education and training Define a protocol for communication between user and robot (e.g. acknowledgment messages, user can check interpretation of the order) | Means for communication between robot and user needs to be defined for the PHRIENDS use case (speech, graphical HMI, vision, etc.) | |
| Put the object in the gripper (pred/succ) | Before | Since the gripper is open the user can give the object to the robot before the latter is ready | a. Bad synchronization between user and robot can cause collision b. The object can fall / The arm and human can collide | Severe | Human error | The robot should keep the gripper closed until the arm movement is finished Is as follows: the its gripper then the moves towards the Only then the use the object in the robot should keep the guntil arm movement. | | The procedure in the seq. diag. is as follows: the robot opens its gripper then the robot arm moves towards the user hand. Only then the user can place the object in the robot gripper. A safer procedure is: the robot should keep the gripper closed until arm movement is finished -> modify sequence diagram | 2, 19, 20 |

Results in the MIRAS project

- First iteration of the process
 - 11 use cases, 12 sequence diagrams
 - 297 interpreted deviations
 - 13 hazards identified
 - 29 recommendations for design modifications
- → New specification and design of the robot



- Second iteration of the process on the new UML model
 - 1 modified use case, 4 new use cases, 4 new sequence diagrams
 - 215 interpreted deviations
 - 1 new hazard identified
 - 28 new recommendations for design modifications

Hazard list

| HN | Description | РНА | Use Case Diagram | Sequence Diagram | Statechart |
|------|---|-----|---------------------|---------------------|------------|
| HN1 | Incorrect posture of patient during movement | 2 | 4 | 3 | 4 |
| HN2 | Patient fall during robot use | | 29 | 27 | 30 |
| HN3 | Robot shutdown during use: patient is not assisted | 1 | 2 | | 5 |
| HN4 | Patient fall without alarm or with a late alarm | | 11 | 13 | 32 |
| HN5 | Physiological problem of the patient without alarm or with a late alarm | | 15 | 10 | |
| HN6 | Patient fall caused by the robot | 10 | 51 | 37 | 10 |
| HN7 | Failure to switch to safe mode when a problem is detected, the robot keeps moving | | 8 | | |
| HN8 | Robot parts catching patient or clothes | 3 | 5 | 4 | |
| HN9 | Collision between the robot (or robot part) and the patient | 2 | 14 | 14 | |
| HN10 | Collision between the robot and a person other than the patient | | 5 | 14 | 2 |
| HN11 | Disturbance of medical staff during an intervention | | 1 | | |
| HN12 | Patient loses her balance | 11 | 1 | 70 | 1 |
| HN13 | Patient fatigue | 12 | 1 | 53 | 21 |
| HN14 | Patient injury caused by sudden movements of robot while carrying the patient | | | 3 | |


Safety case construction using GSN

- Goal Structuring Notation
 - A graphical notation developed at University of York
 - Mostly used in safety cases
- Argument elements
 - Requirement
 - Claim
 - Evidence
 - Context


Goal Structuring Notation

| « To show how goals | are broken down into sub-goals, | | | | | | |
|--|----------------------------------|--|--|--|--|--|--|
| and eventually supported by evidence (solutions) | | | | | | | |
| whilst making clear the strategies adopted, | | | | | | | |
| the rationale for the approach (assumptions, justifications) | | | | | | | |
| and the context | in which goals are stated. » [2] | | | | | | |

[2] T. P. Kelly & R. A Weaver, *The Goal Structuring Notation – A Safety Argument Notation*, Dependable Systems and Network Workshop on Assurance Case, July 2004




Development of a strategy




How did we treat HN12?

- What is HN12?
 - The patient loses her balance
- MIRAS assistance
 - Moves back or forward to help patient to find her balance
- What is the hazard?
 - Loss of balance not detected in time
 - Improper compensation

Development of a goal






Which values of c_{min} and λ_{max} ?


$$\lambda \approx \lambda_{HN12} - (1 - c)^*\alpha$$

 $\alpha \approx 4*10^{-2}$ per hour



System compensation efficiency c

UML models



Thank you for your attention!







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