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Communication Dans Un Congrès Année : 2015

Integrated Sensor: A Backdoor for Hardware Trojan Insertions?

Résumé

Embedded system face a serious threat from physical attacks when applied in critical applications. Therefore, modern systems have several integrated sensors to detect potential threats. In this paper, we put forward a new issue where these sensors can open other security loopholes. We demonstrate that sensors, which are deployed to prevent faults, can be exploited to insert effective and almost zero-overhead hardware Trojans. Two case studies are presented on Xilinx Virtex-5 FPGA. The first case study exploits the in-build temperature sensor of Virtex-5 system monitors while the other exploits a user deployed sensor. Both the sensor can be used to trigger a powerful Trojan with minimal and at times zero overhead.
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Dates et versions

hal-01240221 , version 1 (08-12-2015)

Identifiants

Citer

Xuan Thuy Ngo, Zakaria Najm, Shivam Bhasin, Debapriya Basu, Jean-Luc Danger, et al.. Integrated Sensor: A Backdoor for Hardware Trojan Insertions?. Euromicro Conference on Digital System Design (DSD) 2015, Aug 2015, Funchal, Portugal. ⟨10.1109/DSD.2015.119⟩. ⟨hal-01240221⟩
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