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Communication Dans Un Congrès Année : 2013

Self-licensing and financial rewards: is morality for sale?

Résumé

This paper studies the role of financial rewarding prior good deeds on incentives for self-licensing. A paper-pencil in-between classroom experiment consisted of an adapted dictator game (the receiver being an environmental organisation) preceded by a pro-environmental task. The aim was to establish moral credential through doing good for the environment, which was either done for free or rewarded. We found that prior 'moral rectitude' establishment may license more selfish behavior, when a good deed has been done for free previously. The payment of a good deed dampens licensing effects subsequently. We show that the prior good task has more effect on the binary option (either to give something or not to give at all), than on the amount donated. Indeed, engaging in a good deed for free encourages purely selfish behavior (i.e. subject keeping the whole amount for themselves), whereas it has little effect on the donated amount. Data also suggests a gender effect, with women more willing to donate to charity and to volunteer. Also, men and women react oppositely to financial incentives: payments attenuate the licensing effect among women, and strengthen it among men.
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Dates et versions

hal-01189989 , version 1 (01-09-2015)

Identifiants

  • HAL Id : hal-01189989 , version 1
  • PRODINRA : 264361

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Sophie Clot, Gilles Grolleau, Lisette Ibanez. Self-licensing and financial rewards: is morality for sale?. 20. Annual Conference of the European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists (EAERE). INT., Jun 2013, Toulouse, France. ⟨hal-01189989⟩
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