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Intrusion-Tolerant Broadcast and Agreement Abstractions in the Presence of Byzantine Processes

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Abstract

A process commits a Byzantine failure when its behavior does not comply with the algorithm it is assumed to execute. Considering asynchronous message-passing systems, this paper presents distributed abstractions, and associated algorithms, that allow non-faulty processes to correctly cooperate, despite the uncertainty created by the net effect of asynchrony and Byzantine failures. These abstractions are broadcast abstractions (namely, no-duplicity broadcast, reliable broadcast, and validated broadcast), and agreement abstraction (namely, consensus).

While no-duplicity broadcast and reliable broadcast are well-known one-to-all communication abstractions, validated broadcast is a new all-to-all communication abstraction designed to address agreement problems. After having introduced these abstractions, the paper presents an algorithm implementing validated broadcast on top of reliable broadcast. Then the paper presents two consensus algorithms, which are reductions of multivalued consensus to binary consensus. The first one is a generic algorithm, that can be instantiated with unreliable broadcast or no-duplicity broadcast, while the second is a consensus algorithm based on validated broadcast. Finally, a third algorithm is presented that solves the binary consensus problem. This algorithm is a randomized algorithm based on validated broadcast and a common coin. The presentation of all the abstractions and their algorithms is done incrementally.

Keywords: Abstraction level, Agreement, Asynchronous message-passing system, Broadcast abstraction, Byzantine process, Common coin, Consensus, Distributed algorithm, Fault-tolerance, Intrusion-tolerance, Message validation, Reliable broadcast, Signature-free algorithm.

1 Introduction

Distributed computing Distributed computing is the part of computing that considers that (a) the computing entities (usually called nodes, processors, processes, agents, sensors, etc.) are geographically distinct, and (b) each entity has only a partial knowledge of the many parameters involved in the problem to be solved [1, 15, 24, 25, 26]. In the following, we use the term *process* to denote any computing entity. From an operational point of view this means that the processes of a distributed system need to exchange information, and agree in some way or another, in order to cooperate to a common goal. When designing a distributed algorithm, a main difficulty comes from the fact that no process can capture instantaneously the global state of the application it is a part of. As a simple example, it is impossible to distinguish a crashed process from a very slow process in an asynchronous system prone to process crashes. Said another way, a central issue of distributed computing consists in coping with the uncertainty created by asynchrony and

failures. As in sequential computing, a simple approach to facilitate the design of distributed applications consists in designing appropriate abstractions. With such abstractions, the application designer can think about solutions to solve problems at a higher conceptual level than the basic send/receive communication level.

Byzantine failure This failure type has first been introduced in the context of synchronous distributed systems [13, 22, 25], and then investigated in the context of asynchronous distributed systems [1, 15, 24]. A process has a *Byzantine* behavior when it arbitrarily deviates from its intended behavior (Byzantine failure) [7, 13]. Otherwise it is non-faulty. Let us notice that process crashes (unexpected halting) define a strict subset of Byzantine failures. An example of a bad behavior consists for a process to send different messages to distinct subset of processes, while it is assumed to send the same message to all¹.

Communication and agreement abstractions One of the most important communication abstractions encountered in fault-tolerant distributed computing is *Reliable Broadcast* [1, 5, 6, 8, 15, 24, 27]. Roughly speaking, reliable broadcast allows processes to broadcast messages, in such a way that all the non-faulty processes eventually deliver the same set of messages, and this set includes *all* the messages they have broadcast plus a subset of messages broadcast by faulty processes. *Consensus* is the most important agreement abstraction of fault-tolerant distributed computing [11]. Assuming each process proposes a value, it allows the non-faulty processes to agree on the same value, which has to satisfy some validity condition depending on both the proposed values and the failure model [15, 25].

Byzantine-tolerant broadcast abstractions This paper presents communication and agreement abstractions suited to distributed systems made up of n processes, and where up to t processes may exhibit Byzantine failures.

As far as communication is concerned, three abstractions are presented. The first two, which have been introduced in [3, 28], are one-to-all broadcast abstractions. (Albeit not new, we present them for completeness in order to have a self-contained paper. This provides us with a global view, which favors understanding and makes reading easier.) Both these abstractions ensure that a message broadcast by a non-faulty process is delivered by all the non-faulty processes. They differ in their requirement on the message broadcast by faulty processes. More precisely, we have the following.

- **No-duplicity broadcast (ND-broadcast).** As far as a message broadcast by a Byzantine process p is concerned, ND-broadcast ensures that no two non-faulty processes deliver different messages from process p [28]. Let us observe that this delivery rule allows some non-faulty processes to deliver the same message m from the faulty process p , while others deliver no message from p .
- **Reliable broadcast (RB-broadcast).** This abstraction is stronger than the previous one. As far as a message broadcast by a Byzantine process p is concerned, the RB-broadcast abstraction ensures that all the non-faulty processes deliver the same message from p , or none of them delivers a message from p [3]. This is an “all-or-none” delivery rule.

¹As noticed in [13], when designing Byzantine-tolerant algorithms, we are not concerned by the cause of the bad behavior. This bad behavior can be intentional (malicious) or simply the result of a transient fault that altered the local state of a process, thereby modifying its behavior in an unpredictable way. Some intentional bad behaviors are security flaws, which can be detected with appropriate security techniques. These security issues are out the scope of the paper.

Let us notice that, in both previous broadcast abstractions, if a message is delivered from a faulty process p , there is no requirement on its content. If the sender is correct, the content of a message that is delivered is the one that should be sent; if the sender is faulty, the content of the message can be arbitrary.

While the previous communication abstractions are one-to-all abstractions, the third abstraction (called VB-broadcast) is an all-to-all communication abstraction.

- Validated broadcast (VB-broadcast). Each process is assumed to broadcast a message. For a message to be delivered by a non-faulty process, its content needs to be *validated* [19]. A message content is validated by its sender as soon as it knows that at least one non-faulty process broadcast a message with the same content. As a process does not know if it is faulty or not (e.g., while it executes correctly its algorithm, a process may crash unexpectedly), a message content is validated by its sender as soon as it has received messages with the very same content from $(t + 1)$ distinct processes (such a set contains at least one non-faulty process). If the message broadcast by a process cannot be validated, the default value \perp is delivered instead of it.

Each of these three broadcast abstractions requires $t < n/3$, and are consequently resilience-optimal (with respect to the maximal number of processes that can be faulty) [3, 24, 28]. Moreover, (as we will see) an algorithm implementing RB-broadcast can be obtained by using a relatively simple “echo” mechanism [3, 27, 28], and an algorithm implementing each of the n internal broadcasts of a VB-broadcast instance can be obtained from two instances the RB-broadcast abstraction.²

Content of the paper: Byzantine-tolerant agreement abstraction The most important agreement abstraction encountered in distributed systems prone to process failures is consensus ([1, 5, 15, 26], to cite only books). It is well-known that consensus is impossible to solve in the basic asynchronous message-passing system model prone to even a single process crash failure [11]. This means that solving consensus despite both asynchrony and Byzantine processes requires to enrich the system with additional computational power. We consider here that this additional power is given by an underlying algorithm solving the binary consensus problem (consensus instance where the only values that can be proposed are 0 and 1). Such an algorithm (in short BBC, for Binary Byzantine Consensus) is described in the paper. This algorithm assumes that the processes can access an oracle called *common coin*, which outputs random numbers [23]. It is signature-free, resilience-optimal ($t < n/3$), and its expected number rounds is four.

The paper presents three multivalued Byzantine consensus algorithms (i.e., consensus algorithms where the set of values is not restricted to the values 0 and 1, and processes can be Byzantine). These algorithms, whose constructions are highly modular, are based on the previous broadcast abstractions and (as announced) a BBC algorithm. More precisely, The first two multivalued Byzantine consensus algorithms are obtained from a generic algorithm whose genericity parameter is a broadcast abstraction (namely, UB-broadcast –which captures unreliable broadcast–, and ND-broadcast). The third algorithm is based on the VB-broadcast abstraction. Interestingly, all these algorithms are signature-free, i.e., no underlying cryptography mechanism is used.

These Byzantine consensus algorithms differ in their cost (number and size of messages they use), and their requirement on t , from a “lower bound on t ” (or resilience) point of view. The instance of the generic

²As already indicated, differently from validated broadcast, no-duplicity broadcast and reliable broadcast are not new. We present them in this paper to have a self-contained paper, which facilitates understanding and provides us with a global picture of broadcast abstractions.

Byzantine consensus algorithm based on UB-broadcast requires $t < n/5$, while its instance based on ND-broadcast requires $t < n/4$. Finally, the Byzantine consensus algorithm based on VB-broadcast requires $t < n/3$, and is consequently resilience-optimal.

Intrusion-tolerant Byzantine consensus The previous algorithms have a noteworthy property, namely, if the faulty processes collude and propose the very same value v , while no non-faulty process proposes it, then v cannot be decided. This property is called *intrusion-tolerance* in [19]. More generally, when the most proposed value is proposed by too few non-faulty processes, a default value denoted \perp may be decided.

Road map The paper is made up of 8 sections. Section 2 presents the computation model. Then Section 3 presents the broadcast abstractions which have been previously sketched, and algorithms implementing them. Section 4 presents the intrusion-tolerant Byzantine consensus problem. Then, sections 5 and 6 present a suite of intrusion-tolerant multivalued Byzantine consensus algorithms that differ mainly in the underlying broadcast abstraction they use. Section 7 presents a new binary consensus algorithm based on random bits and the VB-broadcast abstraction. Finally, Section 8 concludes the paper.

2 Computation Model

Asynchronous processes The system is made up of a finite set Π of $n > 1$ asynchronous sequential processes, namely $\Pi = \{p_1, \dots, p_n\}$. “Asynchronous” means that each process proceeds at its own speed, which can vary arbitrarily with time, and remains unknown to the other processes.

Communication network The processes communicate by exchanging messages through an asynchronous reliable point-to-point network. “Asynchronous” means that a message that has been sent is received by its destination process after a finite time, i.e., there is no finite bound on message transfer delays. “Reliable” means that the network neither loses, duplicates, modifies, nor creates messages. “Point-to-point” means that there is a bi-directional communication channel between each pair of processes. Hence, when a process receives a message, it can identify its sender.

A process p_i sends a message to a process p_j by invoking the primitive “send TYPE(m) to p_j ”, where TYPE is the type of the message and m its content. To simplify the presentation, it is assumed that a process can send messages to itself. A process receives a message by executing “receive()”.

Failure model Up to t processes can exhibit a *Byzantine* behavior. A Byzantine process is a process that behaves arbitrarily: it can crash, fail to send or receive messages, send arbitrary messages, start in an arbitrary state, perform arbitrary state transitions, etc. Hence, a Byzantine process, which is assumed to send a message m to all the processes, can send a message m_1 to some processes, a different message m_2 to another subset of processes, and no message at all to the other processes. Byzantine processes can collude to “pollute” the computation. Let us notice that, as each pair of processes is connected by a channel, no Byzantine process can impersonate a correct process (otherwise, no non-trivial computation can be done). Moreover, it is assumed that the Byzantine processes do not control the network.

Terminology A process that exhibits a Byzantine behavior is called *faulty*. Otherwise, it is *non-faulty*. Given an execution, \mathcal{C} denotes the set of processes that are non-faulty in that execution, and \mathcal{F} denotes the set of faulty processes.

Multiset Distributed algorithms presented in the paper use multisets. A *multiset* (also called *bag*) differs from a set in that it can contain several copies of the same value. Given a multiset rec_i managed by a process p_i , the operation $\#equal(v, rec_i)$ issued by p_i denotes the number of occurrences of v in rec_i , while $\#differ(v, rec_i)$ denotes the number of occurrences of values different from v in rec_i , namely, $\#differ(v, rec_i) = |rec_i| - \#equal(v, rec_i)$.

Notation This system model is denoted $\mathcal{BZ}\text{-}\mathcal{AS}_{n,t}[\emptyset]$. In the following, this model is enriched with a constraint on t and a specific broadcast abstraction. As an example, $\mathcal{BZ}\text{-}\mathcal{AS}_{n,t}[t < n/5, \text{RB}]$ is $\mathcal{BZ}\text{-}\mathcal{AS}_{n,t}[\emptyset]$ in which at most $t < n/5$ processes are faulty, and processes communicate using the RB-broadcast abstraction.

Remark Making realistic assumptions on the reliability of the asynchronous network, and the fact that Byzantine processes cannot impersonate a correct process, are requirements on the computation model built by the underlying system layer [15, 24, 26]. The model parameter t states that the algorithms are guaranteed to work only when there are at most t Byzantine processes.

3 Broadcast Abstractions

This section defines the broadcast abstractions sketched in the Introduction, and presents algorithms implementing each of them. The first two, ND-broadcast and RB-broadcast, are from [28] and [3], respectively.

All these broadcast abstractions are implemented from the basic send/receive network primitives, which means that, while they provide us with distinct abstraction levels, they do not provide processes with additional computing power.

Notation When considering the broadcast abstraction XX (where XX stands for UB, ND, RB, or VB), we say that a process “XX-broadcasts” or “XX-delivers” a message.

Unreliable broadcast The simple broadcast (UB-broadcast) is defined by a pair of operations denoted $UB_broadcast()$ and $UB_deliver()$. $UB_broadcast\ TYPE(m)$ is used as a shortcut for

for each $j \in \{1, \dots, n\}$ **send** $TYPE(m)$ **to** p_j **end for**,

and $UB_deliver()$ is synonym with $receive()$. This means that a message UB-broadcast by a non-faulty process is UB-delivered at least by all the non-faulty processes. Differently, while it is assumed to send the same message to all the processes, a faulty process can actually send different messages to distinct processes and no message to others. Hence the name “unreliable broadcast” (sometimes also called “best effort broadcast”). Trivially, an invocation of $UB_broadcast\ TYPE(m)$ costs one communication step and n messages. The corresponding system model is denoted $\mathcal{BZ}\text{-}\mathcal{AS}_{n,t}[\text{UB}]$.

Remark When measuring the cost of a broadcast abstraction we do not take into account the size of the “data message” that is broadcast. This is because this size is application-dependent. Consequently, we only consider the size of the additional control information required by the corresponding broadcast implementation.

The no-duplication property The definition of each XX-broadcast abstraction includes the following no-duplication property: a non-faulty process p_i XX-delivers at most one message from any process p_j . This property states that the corresponding XX-broadcast abstraction is not allowed to create message duplicates. As this property follows trivially from the implementation of each broadcast abstraction, it is no longer mentioned in the following.

A preliminary lemma The following lemma is used in the correctness proof of the algorithms implementing the ND-Broadcast and RB-broadcast abstractions (Theorem 1 and Theorem 2). It is stated here to help better understand the description of the corresponding algorithms.

Lemma 1. *Let $t < n/3$. We have*

- (a) $n - t > \frac{n+t}{2}$,
- (b) *any set containing more than $\frac{n+t}{2}$ distinct processes, contains at least $(t + 1)$ non-faulty processes, and*
- (c) *any two sets Q_1 and Q_2 of at least $\lfloor \frac{n+t}{2} \rfloor + 1$ processes have at least one correct process in their intersection.*

Proof Proof of (a). $n > 3t \Leftrightarrow 2n > n + 3t \Leftrightarrow 2n - 2t > n + t \Leftrightarrow n - t > \frac{n+t}{2}$.

Proof of (b). We have $\frac{n+t}{2} \geq \frac{4t+1}{2} = 2t + \frac{1}{2}$, from which it follows that any set of more than $\frac{n+t}{2}$ distinct processes contains at least $2t + 1$ processes. The proof then follows from the fact that any set of $2t + 1$ distinct processes contains at least $t + 1$ non-faulty processes.

Proof of (c). Notice that $(x > \frac{n+t}{2}) \equiv (x \geq \lfloor \frac{n+t}{2} \rfloor + 1)$.

- $Q_1 \cup Q_2 \subseteq \{p_1, \dots, p_n\}$. Hence, $|Q_1 \cup Q_2| \leq n$.
- $|Q_1 \cap Q_2| = |Q_1| + |Q_2| - |Q_1 \cup Q_2| \geq |Q_1| + |Q_2| - n \geq 2(\lfloor \frac{n+t}{2} \rfloor + 1) - n > 2(\frac{n+t}{2}) - n = t$.
Hence, $|Q_1 \cap Q_2| \geq t + 1$, from which it follows that $Q_1 \cap Q_2$ contains at least one correct process.

□*Lemma 1*

3.1 The no-duplicity broadcast abstraction

No-duplicity broadcast The ND-broadcast communication abstraction, introduced by Toueg [28], is defined by the operations ND_broadcast() and ND_deliver(), which provide the processes with a higher abstraction level than UB-broadcast but do not add computational power ($\mathcal{BZ}\text{-}\mathcal{AS}_{n,t}[\text{UB}]$ and $\mathcal{BZ}\text{-}\mathcal{AS}_{n,t}[\text{ND}]$ have the same computational power, namely the same power as $\mathcal{BZ}\text{-}\mathcal{AS}_{n,t}[\emptyset]$).

Considering an instance of ND-broadcast where ND_broadcast() is invoked by a process p_i , this communication abstraction is defined by the following properties.

- ND-Validity. If a non-faulty process ND-delivers a message from a correct process p_i , then p_i invoked ND-broadcast.
- ND-no-duplicity. No two non-faulty processes ND-deliver distinct messages from p_i .

- ND-Termination-1. If the sender p_i is non-faulty, all the non-faulty processes eventually ND-deliver its message.

Let us observe that, if the sender p_i is faulty, it is possible that some non-faulty processes ND-deliver a message from p_i while others do not. The no-duplication property prevents the non-faulty processes from ND-delivering different messages from a faulty sender.

An algorithm implementing ND-broadcast Assuming $t < n/3$, Algorithm 1 (from [28]) implements the ND-broadcast abstraction. It is shown in [28] that $t < n/3$ is an upper bound on the model parameter t when one has to implement ND-broadcast in an asynchronous message-passing system prone to process Byzantine failures.

```

operation ND.broadcast MSG( $v_i$ ) is
(01) UB.broadcast INIT( $i, v_i$ ).

when INIT( $j, v$ ) is UB.delivered do
(02) if (first UB.delivery of INIT( $j, -$ ))
(03)   then UB.broadcast ECHO( $j, v$ )
(04) end if.

when ECHO( $j, v$ ) is UB.delivered do
(05) if (ECHO( $j, v$ ) UB.delivered from more than  $\frac{n+t}{2}$ 
         different processes and MSG( $j, v$ ) not yet ND.delivered)
(06)   then ND.deliver MSG( $j, v$ )
(07) end if.

```

Algorithm 1: Implementing ND-broadcast ($t < n/3$) [28]

The algorithm considers that a process is allowed to ND-broadcast only one message. Adding sequence numbers allows processes to ND-broadcast several messages. In that case, the process identity associated with each message has to be replaced by a pair made up of a sequence number and a process identity.

When a process p_i wants to ND-broadcast a message whose content is v_i , it UB-broadcasts the message INIT(i, v_i) (line 01). When a process p_i receives (UB-delivers) a message INIT($j, -$) for the first time, it UB-broadcasts a message ECHO(j, v) where v is the data content of the INIT() message (line 02). If the message INIT(j, v) received is not the first message INIT($j, -$), p_j is Byzantine and the message is discarded. Finally, when p_i has received the same message ECHO(j, v) from more than $(n + t)/2$ processes, it locally ND-delivers MSG(j, v) (lines 05-06).

Theorem 1. *Algorithm 1 implements the ND-broadcast abstraction in the system model $\mathcal{BZ_AS}_{n,t}[t < n/3, \text{UB}]$. (Proof in [20, 28].)*

It is easy to see that this implementation uses two consecutive communication steps and $n(n + 1)$ underlying messages (n in the first communication step, and n^2 in the second one). Moreover, the size of the control information added to a message is $\log_2 n$ (sender identity).

Remark Let us notice that replacing at line 06 “more than $\frac{n+t}{2}$ different processes” by “ $(n - t)$ different processes” leaves the algorithm correct. As $n - t > \frac{n+t}{2}$ (Item (a) of Lemma 1), it follows that using “more

than $\frac{n+t}{2}$ different processes” provides a weaker ND-delivery condition than “ $(n - t)$ different processes”, and consequently a more efficient algorithm from a “message ND-delivery” point of view. As a simple numerical example, considering $n = 21$ and $t = 2$, we have $n - t = 19$, which is much greater than the required value 12 ($> \frac{n+t}{2} = 11.5$).

3.2 The reliable broadcast abstraction

Reliable broadcast The RB-broadcast abstraction has been proposed by G. Bracha [3]. It is proved in [4] that $t < n/3$ is an upper bound on t when one has to implement such an abstraction. RB-broadcast provides the processes with the operations `RB_broadcast()` and `RB_deliver()` defined by the following properties.

- **RB-Validity.** If a non-faulty process RB-delivers a message from a correct process p_i , then p_i invoked the operation `RB_broadcast()`.
- **RB-no-duplicity.** No two non-faulty processes ND-deliver distinct messages from p_i .
- **RB-Termination-1.** If the sender p_i is non-faulty, all the non-faulty processes eventually ND-deliver its message.
- **RB-Termination-2.** If a non-faulty process RB-delivers a message from p_i (possibly faulty) then all the non-faulty processes eventually RB-deliver the same message from p_i .

RB-broadcast is ND-broadcast plus the RB-Termination-2 property. Hence, not only two non-faulty processes cannot RB-deliver different messages from a given process, but it is no longer possible that one of them RB-delivers a message while the other does not. $\mathcal{BZ_AS}_{n,t}[\text{RB}]$ and $\mathcal{BZ_AS}_{n,t}[\emptyset]$ have the same computational power.

An algorithm implementing RB-broadcast Algorithm 2, which assumes $t < n/3$, implements RB-broadcast. It is a simple variant of an algorithm proposed in [3]. It is presented here in an incremental way from the previous ND-broadcast algorithm.

While ND-broadcast Algorithm 1 requires two sequential communications steps (message `INIT()` followed by messages `ECHO()`), the implementation of RB-broadcast requires three consecutive communications steps: message `INIT()`, followed by messages `ECHO()`, followed by messages `READY()`.

The first seven lines of the algorithm are similar to the corresponding lines of the ND-broadcast algorithm. The only difference lies in the lines 05-06, where the ND-delivery is replaced by the UR-broadcast of the message `READY(j, v)`.

The aim of the last step of the algorithm (lines 08-13) is to ensure that all or none of the non-faulty processes RB-deliver the message `MSG(j, v)` from p_j . To that end, the RB-delivery predicate requires that p_i UB-delivers $(2t + 1)$ copies of `READY(j, v)`, which means at least $(t + 1)$ copies from non-faulty processes (line 11).

Theorem 2. *Algorithm 2 implements the RB-broadcast abstraction in the system model $\mathcal{BZ_AS}_{n,t}[t < n/3, \text{UB}]$. (Proof in [3, 20].)*

As we have seen, this algorithm uses three consecutive communication steps and $n(2n + 1)$ underlying messages (n in the first communication step, and n^2 in each of the second and third steps). Moreover, the size of the control information added to a message is $\log_2 n$ (sender identity).

```

operation RB_broadcast MSG( $v_i$ ) is
(01) UB_broadcast INIT( $i, v_i$ ).

when INIT( $j, v$ ) is UB_delivered do
(02) if (first UB_delivery of INIT( $j, -$ ))
(03)   then UB_broadcast ECHO( $j, v$ )
(04) end if.

when ECHO( $j, v$ ) is UB_delivered do
(05) if (ECHO( $j, v$ ) UB_delivered from more than  $\frac{n+t}{2}$ 
different processes and READY( $j, v$ ) not yet UB_broadcast)
(06)   then UB_broadcast READY( $j, v$ )
(07) end if.

when READY( $j, v$ ) is UB_delivered do
(08) if (READY( $j, v$ ) UB_delivered from  $(t + 1)$  different processes
and READY( $j, v$ ) not yet UB_broadcast)
(09)   then UB_broadcast READY( $j, v$ )
(10) end if;
(11) if (READY( $j, v$ ) UB_delivered from  $(2t + 1)$  different processes
and MSG( $j, v$ ) not yet RB_delivered)
(12)   then RB_deliver MSG( $j, v$ )
(13) end if.

```

Algorithm 2: Implementing RB-broadcast ($t < n/3$) [3]

3.3 The validated broadcast abstraction

Validated broadcast The VB-broadcast communication abstraction is an *all-to-all* communication abstraction designed to be used in the implementation of distributed agreement abstractions. VB-broadcast integrates a notion of message *validation*, namely, assuming that each non-faulty process VB-broadcasts a message, it requires that, for a message to be VB-delivered, its content v be validated; otherwise the default value \perp is VB-delivered instead of it. For a message with content v to be valid, a message with the same content v has to be VB-broadcast by at least one non-faulty process. As no process p_i knows if it is itself faulty or non-faulty (e.g., if a process executes correctly its algorithm and then unexpectedly crashes, it is faulty), for a message m to be valid in the presence of up to t faulty processes, messages with the same content need to be VB-broadcast by “enough” processes, where “enough” means “at least $(t + 1)$ ” (including its sender p_i). As already indicated, if a message is not validated, the default value \perp is delivered instead of it.

VB-broadcast provides the processes with two operations denoted VB_broadcast() and VB_deliver(). In a VB-broadcast instance each non-faulty process invokes VB_broadcast() once, and VB-delivers messages from at least $(n - t)$ distinct processes. The content of a message that is VB-delivered can be a value that has been VB-broadcast or the default value \perp . VB-broadcast is defined by the following properties.

- VB-Validity. As previously, this property relates the outputs (VB-delivered messages) to the inputs (VB-broadcast messages). It is made up of two sub-properties.
 - VB-Justification. Let p_i be a non-faulty process that VB-delivers a message m as the value VB-broadcast by some (faulty or non-faulty) process. If $m \neq \perp$, there is at least one non-faulty

- process that invoked `VB_broadcast` $MSG(m)$.
- VB-Obligation. If all the non-faulty processes `VB_broadcast` the same value v , each non-faulty process `VB-delivers` $m = v$ from each non-faulty process.
 - VB-Uniformity. If a non-faulty process `VB-delivers` a message from p_i (possibly faulty), all the non-faulty processes eventually `VB-deliver` the same message from p_i (which can be a validated non- \perp value or the default value \perp).
 - VB-Termination. If p_i is non-faulty and `VB-broadcasts` m , all the non-faulty processes eventually `VB-deliver` the same message m' , where m' is m or \perp .

3.4 An algorithm implementing VB-broadcast

Assuming $t < n/3$, Algorithm 3 implements the all-to-all VB-broadcast abstraction. Let us recall that all-to-all means here that all the non-faulty processes are assumed to invoke `VB_broadcast()`. As already said, a process `VB-delivers` at least $n - t$ messages. This implementation uses consecutively two RB-broadcast abstractions. It is made up of two parts.

```

operation VB_broadcast( $v_i$ ) is
(01) RB_broadcast INIT( $i, v_i$ );
(02) let  $rec_i$  = multiset of values RB-delivered to  $p_i$ ;
(03) wait until ( $|rec_i| \geq n - t$ );
(04) if ( $\#equal(v_i, rec_i) \geq n - 2t$ ) then  $aux_i \leftarrow$  "yes"
(05)   else  $aux_i \leftarrow$  "no"
(06) end if;
(07) RB_broadcast VALID( $i, aux_i$ ).

for  $1 \leq j \leq n$  VB-delivery background task  $T_i[j]$ :
(08) wait until (VALID( $j, x$ ) and INIT( $j, v$ ) RB-delivered from  $p_j$ );
(09) if ( $x =$  "yes") then wait ( $\#equal(v, rec_i) \geq n - 2t$ );  $d \leftarrow v$ 
(10)   else wait ( $\#differ(v, rec_i) \geq t + 1$ );  $d \leftarrow \perp$ 
(11) end if;
(12) VB-deliver( $d$ ) at  $p_i$  as the value VB-broadcast by  $p_j$ .

```

Algorithm 3: VB-broadcast on top of reliable broadcast ($t < n/3$, code of p_i)

In the first part, a process p_i first invokes `RB_broadcast` `INIT`(i, v_i) and waits until it has `RB-delivered` messages from at least $n - t$ processes (lines 01-03). The values `RB-delivered` are deposited in a multiset denoted rec_i . Then, if value v_i has been `RB-delivered` from at least $n - 2t \geq t + 1$ processes (which means that it was `RB-broadcast` by at least one non-faulty process), p_i validates it by assigning "yes" to aux_i . Otherwise p_i sets aux_i to "no" at line 05 (in this case, v_i is not validated). Then, p_i issues a second `RB-broadcast` (line 07) to disseminate aux_i to all processes.

The second part is made up of n tasks, which execute in the background. The task $T_i[j]$ is associated with the VB-delivery of the message from p_j . It starts by the wait statement for both the value v `RB-broadcast` by p_j and the value x `RB-broadcast` also by p_j (x indicates the validation status attached to v by its sender p_j). Let us remember that each time a message `INIT`($-, w$) is `RB-delivered` to p_i , the corresponding value w is added to rec_i , which means that, after the predicate $|rec_i| \geq n - t$ has become true at line 03, the set rec_i still keeps on being updated when new messages `INIT`() are `RB-delivered` to p_i .

- If $x = \text{“yes”}$, as p_j can be Byzantine, v was not necessarily validated by a non-faulty process. Hence, p_i has to check it. To that end, p_i waits until the predicate $\#equal(v, rec_i) \geq n - 2t$ becomes true (line 09). When this predicate becomes true (if ever it does), it follows from $n - 2t \geq t + 1$ that $\#equal(v, rec_i) \geq t + 1$. If this occurs, v is VB-delivered to p_i as being the value VB-broadcast by p_j .
- Similarly, if $x = \text{“no”}$, p_i waits until rec_i contains more than t occurrences of values different from v (the value RB-delivered from p_j), which means that at least one non-faulty process did not validate v . When this occurs (if ever it does, line 10), p_i VB-delivers \perp as the value VB-broadcast by p_j .

It is possible that the waiting predicate used at line 09 or line 10 never becomes satisfied. When this occurs, the corresponding sender process p_j is necessarily a faulty process. The waiting condition becomes always satisfied when p_j is a non-faulty process, and can become satisfied for some faulty senders p_j .

As two instances of RB-broadcast are used, the algorithm requires $2 \times 3 = 6$ communication steps, and as VB-broadcast is an all-to-all abstraction (n invocations for each instance of RB-broadcast), the algorithm uses $2n^2(2n + 1)$ messages, that is $O(n^3)$.

Theorem 3. *Algorithm 3 implements the validated broadcast abstraction in the system model $\mathcal{BZ_AS}_{n,t}[t < n/3, \text{UB}]$.*

Proof Proof of the VB-Termination property. This property states that, if a process p_i is non-faulty and VB-broadcast m , then all the non-faulty processes eventually VB-deliver the same message m' from p_i , where m' is m or \perp .

As there are at least $n - t$ non-faulty processes, and each of them VB-broadcasts a value, we eventually have $|rec_j| \geq n - t$ at every non-faulty process p_j . Hence, no non-faulty process can block forever at line 03 and will RB-broadcasts message $\text{VALID}()$ at line 07. We now consider two cases.

- The non-faulty process p_i RB-broadcasts $\text{VALID}(i, \text{“yes”})$. It follows from line 09 that (a) $d = v_i$ (the value VB-broadcast by p_i), and (b) rec_i contains at least $n - 2t$ copies of $v = v_i$, i.e., p_i has RB-delivered messages $\text{INIT}(-, v)$ from $n - 2t$ different processes. Due to the RB-Uniformity of RB-broadcast, each non-faulty process p_j eventually RB-delivers both these $n - 2t$ messages $\text{INIT}(-, v)$, and the message $\text{VALID}(i, \text{“yes”})$ from p_i . It follows that p_j eventually VB-delivers $v = v_i$ at line 09.
- The non-faulty process p_i RB-broadcasts $\text{VALID}(i, \text{“no”})$. It follows from the termination property of RB-broadcast that each non-faulty process p_j RB-delivers $\text{VALID}(i, \text{“no”})$ from p_i . Moreover, it follows from the test line 04 that, if p_i RB-broadcast $\text{VALID}(i, \text{“no”})$, that, among the $n - t$ values in rec_i , less than $n - 2t$ values are equal to v_i , i.e. more than t values are different from v_i . Hence due to the RB-Uniformity property of RB-broadcast, every non-faulty process p_j eventually RB-delivers at least $t + 1$ values different from v_i , and consequently VB-delivers \perp at line 10.

Proof of the VB-Uniformity property. This property states that, if a non-faulty process p_i VB-delivers a message from p_j –possibly faulty–, then all the non-faulty processes eventually VB-deliver the same message from p_j . Let p_i be a non-faulty process that VB-delivers a value d from p_j . This means that p_i has previously RB-delivered a message $\text{INIT}(j, v)$ and a message $\text{VALID}(j, x)$ from p_j at the latest in its delivery task $T_i[j]$. The proof of this property is very similar to the previous one.

Hence, p_i has RB-delivered (1) a message $\text{VALID}(j, x)$ and a message $\text{INIT}(j, v)$ from p_j , and (2) a multiset rec_i of values that satisfies some property (depending on the value of x). As p_i is non-faulty, it follows from the RB-Uniformity property of RB-broadcast, that every non-faulty process p_k eventually RB-delivers (1) both $\text{VALID}(j, x)$ and $\text{INIT}(j, v)$, and (2) a multiset rec_k of values such that eventually $\text{rec}_k = \text{rec}_i$. As the value x RB-delivered to p_i and p_k is the same, it follows from the waiting condition (used at line 09 or line 10, according to the value of x) that p_k eventually VB-delivers at line 12 the same value d as p_i .

Proof of the VB-Obligation property. This property states that if all the non-faulty process VB-broadcast the same value v , each of them VB-delivers v as the value VB-broadcast by each of them. As each non-faulty process p_j VB-broadcasts the value v , it follows that it RB-broadcasts $\text{INIT}(j, v)$ (line 07). Consequently this value v eventually appears at least $(n - 2t)$ times in the multiset rec_i of every non-faulty process p_i . Hence, each non-faulty process p_i VB-broadcasts the message $\text{VALID}(i, \text{“yes”})$ and (from the RB-termination property) each non-faulty process p_k RB-delivers the message $\text{VALID}(i, \text{“yes”})$. Consequently, each non-faulty process p_k executes the task $T_k[i]$ with respect to each non-faulty process p_i (and possibly also with respect to faulty processes). The waiting predicate of line 09 is then eventually satisfied at p_k , and this is true for value v only. When this occurs, each non-faulty process p_k VB-delivers v as the value VB-broadcast by the non-faulty process p_i .

Proof of the VB-Justification property. This property states that, if the VB-delivered value m is such that $m \neq \perp$, there is at least one non-faulty process that invoked $\text{VB_broadcast MSG}(m)$. If $m \neq \perp$ is VB-delivered by a non-faulty process p_i as the value VB-broadcast by p_j , this value appears at least $(n - 2t)$ times in rec_i (waiting predicate of line 09). As $n - 2t \geq t + 1$, it follows that at least one non-faulty process has VB-broadcast m . $\square_{\text{Theorem 3}}$

3.5 Comparing the broadcast abstractions

Table 1 compares the costs of the three previous broadcast abstractions. Considering one broadcast instance, the second column indicates the broadcast type (1-to- n or n -to- n). The third column indicates the length of the longest sequence of causally-related messages generated by the corresponding algorithm. The fourth column presents the size of the additional control information that each message has to carry (the $\log_2 n$ comes from the fact that the identity of the process that broadcasts a message has to be sent together with it when forwarded by another process). The fifth column indicates the number of implementation messages used by the corresponding algorithms. Finally, the last column states the constraint on t required to implement the abstraction in $\mathcal{BZ_AS}_{n,t}[\emptyset]$.

<i>broadcast</i>	<i>x-to-y type</i>	<i>#com. steps</i>	<i>message size</i>	<i>#messages</i>	<i>resilience (t)</i>
UB	1-to- n	1	constant	n	$n > t$
ND	1-to- n	2	$\log_2 n$	$n(n + 1)$	$n > 3t$
RB	1-to- n	3	$\log_2 n$	$n(2n + 1)$	$n > 3t$
VB	n -to- n	6	$\log_2 n$	$2n^2(2n + 1)$	$n > 3t$

Table 1: Costs and constraints on the broadcast abstractions

4 Intrusion-Tolerant Byzantine Consensus and Underlying Enriched Model

4.1 Byzantine consensus

Byzantine consensus The consensus problem has been informally stated in the Introduction. Assuming that each non-faulty process proposes a value, each of them has to decide on a value in such a way that the following properties are satisfied.

- C-Termination. Every non-faulty process eventually decides on a value.
- C-Agreement. No two non-faulty processes decide on different values.
- C-Obligation (validity). If all the non-faulty processes propose the same value v , then v is decided.

Intrusion-tolerant Byzantine (ITB) consensus In Byzantine consensus, if not all the non-faulty processes propose the same value, any value can be decided. As indicated in the Introduction, we are interested here in a more constrained version of the consensus problem in which a value proposed only by faulty processes cannot be decided. This consensus problem instance is defined by the C-Termination, C-Agreement and C-Obligation properties stated above plus the following C-Non-intrusion property (which is a validity property).

- C-Non-intrusion (validity). A decided value is a value proposed by a non-faulty process or \perp .

The fact that no value proposed only by faulty processes can be decided gives its name (namely *intrusion-tolerant*) to that consensus problem instance.

Binary consensus The consensus is *binary* when only two different values (e.g., b and \bar{b}) can be proposed. Interestingly, binary Byzantine consensus has the following property.

Property 1. *The ITB binary consensus problem is such that it is always possible for a correct process to decide a value proposed by a correct process.*

Proof It follows from the C-obligation property that any correct process decides b when all the correct processes proposed b . Otherwise, at least one correct process proposed \bar{b} , and then any value b or \bar{b} may be decided by a correct process without violating the C-Non-intrusion property. $\square_{\text{Property 1}}$

4.2 Enriched model for multivalued ITB consensus

Additional power is required It is well-known that Byzantine consensus cannot be solved when $t \geq n/3$ in synchronous systems [13, 22]. Moreover, consensus cannot be solved in asynchronous systems as soon as even only one process may crash [11], which means that Byzantine consensus cannot be solved either as soon as one process can be faulty. Said another way, additional computational power is needed if one wants to solve Byzantine consensus in an asynchronous system.

Such an additional power can be obtained by randomization (e.g., [2, 9, 12, 23, 28]), failure detectors (e.g., [18]), additional synchrony assumptions (e.g., [10, 14, 16, 17]), or even the assumption that there is a binary consensus algorithm that is given for free by the underlying system (e.g., [9, 21, 29]).

Enriched model for multivalued ITB consensus In the following, BBC denotes any algorithm that solves the Byzantine binary consensus problem. (Such algorithms are described in [3, 9, 12, 28]. A novel BBC algorithm based on the VB-broadcast abstraction is presented in Section 7). Let $\mathcal{BZ}\text{-}\mathcal{AS}_{n,t}[\text{XX}, \text{BBC}]$ denote the system model $\mathcal{BZ}\text{-}\mathcal{AS}_{n,t}[\emptyset]$ enriched with BBC (which adds computational power) and the broadcast abstraction XX (which provides a higher abstraction level than send/receive).

As announced in the Introduction, the aim is to design a generic multivalued ITB consensus algorithm on top of $\mathcal{BZ}\text{-}\mathcal{AS}_{n,t}[\text{XX}, \text{BBC}]$.

5 Generic Consensus Based on the UB or ND-Broadcast Abstractions

This section presents a generic multivalued ITB consensus algorithm that can be instantiated with UB-broadcast or ND-broadcast. It uses two rounds for each process to compute a value it proposes to the underlying binary consensus. The instance based on UB-broadcast requires $t < n/5$, while the one based on ND-broadcast requires $t < n/4$.

5.1 Principles and description of the algorithm

Algorithm 4 is a generic algorithm. A process invokes $\text{propose}(v_i)$ where v_i is the value it proposes to the consensus. It terminates when it executes the statement $\text{return}()$ (line 17), which supplies it with the decided value. (In order to prevent confusion, the operation of the underlying binary consensus is denoted $\text{bin_propose}()$.)

```

operation propose( $v_i$ ) is
(01) XX_broadcast EST1( $v_i$ );
(02) wait until (EST1(-) messages XX_delivered from  $n - t$  proc.);
(03) let  $\text{rec1}_i$  = multiset of values carried by the EST1 messages;
(04) if ( $\exists v : \#\text{equal}(v, \text{rec1}_i) \geq n - 2t$ )
(05)   then  $\text{aux}_i \leftarrow v$  else  $\text{aux}_i \leftarrow \perp$  end if;
(06) XX_broadcast EST2( $\text{aux}_i$ );
(07) wait until (EST2(-) messages XX_delivered from  $n - t$  proc.);
(08) let  $\text{rec2}_i$  = multiset of values carried by the EST2 messages;
(09) if ( $\exists v \neq \perp : \#\text{equal}(v, \text{rec2}_i) \geq n - 2t$ )
(10)   then  $\text{bp}_i \leftarrow 1$  else  $\text{bp}_i \leftarrow 0$  end if;
(11) if ( $\exists v \neq \perp : v \in \text{rec2}_i$ )
(12)   then let  $v$  = most frequent non- $\perp$  value in  $\text{rec2}_i$ ;
(13)      $\text{res}_i \leftarrow v$ 
(14)   else  $\text{res}_i \leftarrow \perp$ 
(15)   end if;
(16)  $\text{b\_dec}_i \leftarrow \text{bin\_propose}(\text{bp}_i)$ ; % underlying BBC algorithm %
(17) if ( $\text{b\_dec}_i = 1$ ) then  $\text{return}(\text{res}_i)$  else  $\text{return}(\perp)$  end if.

```

Algorithm 4: Generic intrusion-tolerant Byzantine multivalued consensus

In order to reduce the Byzantine consensus problem to its binary counterpart to benefit from BBC, the processes first exchange the values they propose. If a process sees that a value v has been proposed “enough” times, it proposes 1 to BBC, otherwise it proposes 0. Then, if 1 is decided from BBC, the non-faulty processes decide the value v that has been proposed “enough” times, otherwise they decide \perp (lines

11-17). For this to work, if a process p_i proposes 1 to the underlying BBC algorithm because it has seen enough copies of a value v , it must be sure that any other non-faulty process p_j will be able to decide v even if it has proposed 0 to BBC (because it has not seen enough copies of v).

This issue is solved by two asynchronous rounds executed before invoking the underlying BBC algorithm (lines 01-15). The messages of the first round and the second round are typed EST1 and EST2, respectively. Interestingly, we will state below two properties $PR1$ and $PR2$ that are the same as the properties used in [18, 24] to solve consensus on top of an asynchronous system enriched with any of Chandra and Toueg’s failure detectors [8].

It is important to remark that, at the abstraction level of the consensus algorithm, a message carries only a type (EST1 or EST2) and a proposed value or \perp . Hence, considering that proposed values have constant size, the size of the messages of the algorithm is $O(1)$ (no message is required to carry array-like data structures whose size would depend on n).

5.2 First additional round

The aim of this round (lines 01-05) is to direct each process p_i to define a “new” proposed value aux_i in such a way that the values aux_i of the non-faulty processes satisfy the following property (Lemma 2):

$$PR1 \equiv \forall i, j \in \mathcal{C} : ((aux_i \neq \perp) \wedge (aux_j \neq \perp)) \Rightarrow [(aux_i = aux_j = v) \wedge (v \text{ has been proposed by a non-faulty process})].$$

Hence this round replaces (for the non-faulty processes) the set of values they collectively propose by a non-empty set including at most two values (namely, a value v proposed by a non-faulty process and \perp).

From an operational point of view, this is obtained as follows. The processes first exchange (with the help of the underlying broadcast facility) the values they propose (lines 01-02). The values delivered at p_i are kept in the multiset $rec1_i$. Then, if there is a value v in $rec1_i$ such that $\#equal(v, rec1_i) \geq n - 2t$, v is assigned to aux_i . Otherwise $aux_i = \perp$.

5.3 Second additional round

The aim of the second round (lines 06-15) is to establish the following property denoted $PR2$ (Lemma 3) in order the result of the underlying BBC algorithm can be safely exploited as described previously (lines 16-17). The local variable bp_i contains the value proposed by p_i to the underlying BBC algorithm, and res_j contains the non- \perp value that any non-faulty process p_j will decide if the default value \perp is not decided. Let us recall that \mathcal{C} denotes the set of processes that are non-faulty in the considered execution.

$$PR2 \equiv (\exists i \in \mathcal{C} : bp_i = 1) \Rightarrow (\forall j \in \mathcal{C} : res_j = res_i = v \neq \perp).$$

Operationally, this is obtained as follows. With the help of the underlying broadcast abstraction the non-faulty processes exchange the values of their aux_i variables. The values delivered at p_i are saved in the multiset $rec2_i$. (This multiset contains $n - t$ values, and, due to $PR1$, those can be \perp , a non- \perp value v proposed by a non-faulty process, and at most t arbitrary values sent by faulty processes.)

If there is a non- \perp value v such that $\#equal(v, rec2_i) \geq n - 2t$, p_i proposes $bp_i = 1$ to the binary consensus BBC. Otherwise, p_i has not seen enough copies of a value $v \neq \perp$ and consequently proposes $bp_i = 0$. In all cases, p_i defines res_i as the most frequent non- \perp value it has received. As the proof of Lemma 3 will show, if a non-faulty process p_i invokes `bin_propose(1)`, each non-faulty process will have the same non- \perp value in its local variable res_j .

5.4 Proof of the algorithm

Lemma 2. *PR1 holds in both system models $\mathcal{BZ_AS}_{n,t}[t < n/5, \text{UB}]$ and $\mathcal{BZ_AS}_{n,t}[t < n/4, \text{ND}]$.*

Proof Let p_i and p_j be two non-faulty processes such that $aux_i = v \neq \perp$. We consider separately each case stated in the lemma assumption.

Case 1: $t < n/5$ and the non-faulty processes use the UB-broadcast abstraction.

As $aux_i = v \neq \perp$, it follows that $\#equal(v, rec1_i) \geq n - 2t$ (line 04). Hence, due to the UB-broadcast, among the $n - t$ messages it has UB-delivered (from different processes), at least $n - 2t$ are `EST1(v)`. As at most t processes are faulty, it follows that at least $n - 3t$ non-faulty processes have UB-broadcast a message `EST1(v)`. Consequently, at most $n - (n - 3t) = 3t$ processes may send $w \neq v$ to p_j . As $3t < n - 2t$, p_j never assigns w to aux_j .

Finally, the proof that v has been proposed by a non-faulty process follows from the observation that v has been sent by at least $n - 2t > t$ non-faulty processes.

Case 2: $t < n/4$ and the non-faulty processes use the ND-broadcast.

In that case, p_i has ND-delivered at least $(n - 2t)$ messages `EST1(v)`, from different processes, and p_j has ND-delivered at least $n - 2t$ messages `EST1(w)` from different processes. As $n > 4t$, it follows that there is a process p_x such that p_i has ND-delivered `EST1(v)` from p_x and p_j has ND-delivered `EST1(w)` from p_x . But, be p_x faulty or non-faulty, this is impossible due to the ND-duplicity property (if a non-faulty process ND-delivers a value from a process p_x , any other non-faulty process either ND-delivers the same value from p_x or does not ND-deliver a message from p_x). It follows that we have $v = w$.

Finally, similarly to the previous case, the proof that v has been proposed by a non-faulty process follows from the observation that v has been ND-broadcast by at least $n - 2t > t$ non-faulty processes. $\square_{\text{Lemma 2}}$

Lemma 3. *PR2 holds in both system models $\mathcal{BZ_AS}_{n,t}[t < n/5, \text{UB}]$ and $\mathcal{BZ_AS}_{n,t}[t < n/4, \text{ND}]$.*

Proof Let p_i be a process such that $bp_i = 1$. It follows from lines 07-10 that the multiset $rec2_i$ contains $n - t$ values (including \perp). From lines 09-10, we also have $(bp_i = 1) \Rightarrow (\exists v \neq \perp : \#equal(v, rec2_i) \geq n - 2t)$, from which we conclude that p_i has delivered at least $n - 2t$ messages `EST2(v)`. Moreover, due to Lemma 2, the values sent by non-faulty processes are only v or \perp . Let us consider separately each case stated in the lemma assumption.

Case 1: $t < n/5$ and the non-faulty processes use UB-broadcast. As there are at most t faulty processes, at most t messages `EST2(v)` UB-delivered by p_i are from faulty processes. Consequently, at least $n - 3t$ non-faulty processes have UB-broadcast `EST2(v)` to p_j . As p_j waits for $n - t$ messages, it can miss at most t messages `EST2(v)` from non-faulty processes (this is because, in the worst case, the t messages missed by p_j are from non-faulty processes that UB-broadcast `EST2(v)`). Consequently, p_j UB-delivers at least $n - 4t$ messages `EST2(v)` from non-faulty processes. As $n > 5t$, we have $\#equal(v, rec2_j) > n - 4t \geq t + 1$. Let

us finally notice that, as at most t processes are faulty, p_j UB-delivers at most t messages $\text{EST2}(-)$ carrying values different from v and \perp . Hence, $\forall w \neq \perp$ we have $\# \text{equal}(v, \text{rec2}_j) > t \geq \# \text{equal}(w, \text{rec2}_j)$, which proves the lemma.

Case 2: $t < n/4$ and the non-faulty processes use ND-broadcast. In that case, due to ND-broadcast, no two non-faulty processes can ND-deliver different values from the same faulty process. The worst case is then when (a) t processes are faulty and ND-broadcast the same value $w \notin \{v, \perp\}$, and (b) p_j ND-delivers these t messages $\text{EST2}(w)$. We trivially have $t \geq \# \text{equal}(w, \text{rec2}_j)$. On another side, as $\# \text{equal}(v, \text{rec2}_i) \geq n - 2t \geq 2t + 1$, and p_j misses at most t messages $\text{EST2}(v)$, we have $\# \text{equal}(v, \text{rec2}_j) \geq t + 1$. Hence, we have $\# \text{equal}(v, \text{rec2}_j) > t \geq \# \text{equal}(w, \text{rec2}_j)$, which concludes the proof of the lemma. $\square_{\text{Lemma 3}}$

Theorem 4. *Algorithm 4 solves the ITB multivalued consensus problem in both $\mathcal{BZ}\text{-AS}_{n,t}[t < n/5, \text{UB}, \text{BBC}]$ and $\mathcal{BZ}\text{-AS}_{n,t}[t < n/4, \text{ND}, \text{BBC}]$. The termination property is the one inherited from the underlying BBC algorithm (deterministic: C-Termination), or randomized: see Section 7.1).*

Proof Proof of the Termination property (every non-faulty process decides). As at most t processes are faulty, no non-faulty process blocks forever at line 02 or line 07. Due to the termination property of the underlying binary consensus algorithm BBC, every non-faulty process decides.

Proof of the C-Agreement property (no two non-faulty processes decide differently). If BBC returns 0, all the non-faulty processes decide \perp , and C-Agreement trivially follows. Hence, let us consider that BBC returns 1. It then follows from Property 1 of BBC that there is a non-faulty process p_i such that $bp_i = 1$. Hence, due to Lemma 3, any non-faulty process p_j is such that $\text{res}_j = v$, and all the non-faulty processes decide v .

Proof of the C-Obligation property (if all the non-faulty processes propose the same value, that value is decided). Let us assume that all the non-faulty processes propose value v . Let p_i be any non-faulty process. We then have $\# \text{equal}(v, \text{rec1}_i) \geq n - 2t$ at each non-faulty process p_i , and consequently each of the (at least) $n - t$ non-faulty process sends $\text{EST2}(v)$ (line 06). So, each non-faulty process delivers at least $n - 2t$ of these messages and we have $\# \text{equal}(v, \text{rec2}_i) \geq n - 2t$. Hence, any non-faulty p_i is such that $bp_i = 1$ and sets res_i to v . Due to the C-obligation property of BBC algorithm, value 1 is decided, and consequently all the non-faulty processes decide v .

Proof of the C-Non-intrusion property (a non- \perp value proposed only by faulty processes cannot be decided). If a non- \perp value is decided, it follows from Property 1 of the underlying BBC that a non-faulty process p_i has proposed 1. Hence, we have $bp_i = 1$, and consequently $\# \text{equal}(v, \text{rec2}_i) \geq n - 2t$. As there are at most t faulty processes, it follows that non-faulty processes have broadcast $\text{EST2}(v)$, which in turn implies that $n - 2t$ processes have broadcast $\text{EST1}(v)$, i.e., at least $n - 3t \geq t + 1$ processes have broadcast $\text{EST1}(v)$, from which we finally conclude that v has been proposed by non-faulty processes. $\square_{\text{Theorem 4}}$

6 A Consensus Algorithm Based on the VB-Broadcast Abstraction

This section presents an intrusion-tolerant Byzantine consensus algorithm based on the VB-broadcast abstraction. Algorithm 5 requires $t < n/3$ and has consequently an optimal resilience. It requires a single round (instead of two as in Algorithm 4). As it is based on VB-broadcast, this round requires six communication steps.

Principles and description of the algorithm After it has VB-broadcast its value, a process p_i waits for EST() messages from $n - t$ processes and deposits the corresponding values in the multiset rec_i . Then, p_i checks if (1) (in addition to \perp) it has VB-delivered exactly one non- \perp value v , and (2) v has been VB-broadcast by at least $n - 2t$ processes (line 04). If there is such a value, p_i proposes 1 to the underlying binary consensus, otherwise it proposes 0 (line 05).

Finally, p_i decides \perp if the underlying binary consensus BBC returns 0 (lines 11). Differently, if 1 is returned, p_i waits until it has VB-delivered $(n - 2t)$ messages EST() carrying the very same value v (line 09) and then decides that value (line 10). Let us notice that, among these $(n - 2t)$ messages, some have been already VB-delivered at line 02. The important point is (as shown in the proof) that the net effect of (a) the VB-broadcast, (b) the predicate used at line 04, and (c) the predicate used in the wait statement at line 09, ensures that if a non-faulty process invokes bin_propose(1), then all the non-faulty processes eventually VB-deliver $(n - 2t)$ times the same value v and decide it.

```

operation propose( $v_i$ ) is
(01) VB_broadcast EST( $v_i$ );
(02) wait until (EST(-) messages VB_delivered from  $n - t$  proc.);
(03) let  $rec_i$  = multiset of values  $v$  s.t. EST( $v$ ) is VB_delivered to  $p_i$ ;
(04) if ( $\exists v \neq \perp : \#equal(v, rec_i) \geq n - 2t$ )
       $\wedge$  ( $rec_i$  contains a single non- $\perp$  value)
(05)   then  $bp_i \leftarrow 1$  else  $bp_i \leftarrow 0$ 
(06) end if;
(07)  $b\_dec_i \leftarrow$  bin_propose( $bp_i$ ); % underlying BBC consensus %
(08) if ( $b\_dec_i = 1$ )
(09)   then wait until ( $\exists v \neq \perp : \#equal(v, rec_i) \geq n - 2t$ );
(10)     return( $v$ )
(11)   else return( $\perp$ )
(12) end if.

```

Algorithm 5: Intrusion-tolerant Byzantine consensus algorithm based on VB-broadcast ($t < n/3$)

On the predicate “ rec_i contains a single non- \perp value” used at line 04 The aim of this predicate is to ensure that, if $bp_i = bp_j = 1$ (where p_i and p_j are two non-faulty processes), then the multisets rec_i and rec_j contain only instances of the same value v (plus possibly instances of \perp).

To motivate this predicate, let us consider that the predicate of line 04 is restricted to its first part, namely, “ $\exists v : \#equal(v, rec_i) \geq n - 2t$ ”. Assuming $n = 10$ and $t = 3$, let us consider the case where, at line 01, four processes VB-broadcast the message EST(v), while six processes VB-broadcast the message EST(w). Moreover, let us consider the following execution:

- On the one side, p_i VB-delivers $n - t = 7$ messages EST(), four that carry v and three that carry w . As $\#equal(v, rec_i) = 4 \geq n - 2t = 4$, the restricted predicate is satisfied for v , and p_i assigns 1 to bp_i .
- On the other side, p_j VB-delivers $n - t = 7$ messages EST(), four that carry w and three that carry v . As $\#equal(w, rec_i) = 4 \geq n - 2t = 4$, the restricted predicate is satisfied for w , and p_j assigns 1 to bp_i .

It follows that we have $bp_i = bp_j = 1$ (p_i and p_j being non-faulty processes), while v is the value that will be decided by p_i if the underlying BBC algorithm returns 1, and the value decided by p_j will be $w \neq v$. It is easy to see that the second part of the predicate of line 04 prevents this bad scenario from occurring.

Theorem 5. *Algorithm 5 solves the ITB multivalued consensus problem in the system model $\mathcal{BZ}_{\perp}AS_{n,t}[t < n/3, \text{VB}, \text{BBC}]$. As in Theorem 4, the termination property is the one inherited from the underlying BBC algorithm.*

Proof Proof of the C-Termination property (every non-faulty process decides). If the underlying BBC algorithm returns 0, termination is trivial. Hence, let us consider that 1 is returned. Due to Property 1 of BBC, there is a non-faulty process p_i such that $bp_i = 1$, which in turn implies that, at line 02, p_i has received at least $(n - 2t)$ messages $\text{EST}(v)$. Due to the VB-Uniformity property of VB-broadcast, any non-faulty process eventually VB-delivers these $(n - 2t)$ messages $\text{EST}(v)$. Hence, no non-faulty process p_j blocks forever at line 09, which concludes the proof.

Proof of the C-Agreement property (no two non-faulty processes decide differently). The proof is similar to the previous one. If BBC returns 0, agreement is trivial. If 1 is returned, it follows from $n - 2t > t$ and the fact that—at any non-faulty process p_i —there is no $w \neq v$ such that $w \in \text{rec}_i$ (second predicate of line 04), that the value v the processes are waiting for at line 09 is unique, which completes the proof of the agreement property.

Proof of the C-Obligation property (if all the non-faulty processes propose the same value, that value is decided). If all the non-faulty processes propose the same value v , it follows from the VB-Obligation property that v is necessarily validated, and from the VB-Termination property that all the non-faulty processes VB-deliver at least $(n - 2t)$ messages $\text{EST}(v)$. Moreover, as $n - 2t > t$, there is a single such value v . Due to VB-Justification property, a value VB-broadcast only by faulty processes cannot be validated and consequently no non-faulty process can VB-deliver it. This means that only v , \perp or nothing at all can be VB-delivered from a faulty process. It follows that, at each non-faulty process p_i , the predicate of line 04 is satisfied and p_i proposes $bp_i = 1$. Due to the C-Obligation property of BBC, they all decide 1 and consequently decide the same proposed value v .

Proof of the C-Non-intrusion property (a non- \perp value proposed only by faulty processes cannot be decided). If a value w is proposed only by faulty processes, it follows from the VB-Justification property that no non-faulty process p_i VB-delivers it. If the underlying BBC algorithm returns 0, w is not decided. If BBC returns 1, we have seen in the proof of the C-Agreement property that the processes decide a value v such that at least $(n - 2t)$ messages $\text{EST}(v)$ have been VB-delivered. As $n - 2t > t$, it follows that w cannot be decided. $\square_{\text{Theorem 5}}$

A discussion on additional properties of ITB consensus in deterministic vs non-deterministic scenarios can be found in [20].

7 A Randomized VB-Based Byzantine Binary Consensus Algorithm

This section presents a particularly simple randomized Byzantine binary consensus algorithm (that can be used as the underlying BBC algorithm on which rely the multivalued Byzantine consensus algorithms previously described). The additional power needed to solve consensus is given here by random coins. This algorithm, which is optimal from a resilience point of view ($t < n/3$), is based on the validated broadcast abstraction. More precisely, each round requires one VB-broadcast instance.

When looking at Byzantine consensus algorithms that are optimal from a resilience point of view (i.e., algorithms able to cope with up to $t < n/3$ faulty processes), the best consensus algorithm we are aware of has rounds made up of three communication steps [7]. Moreover, this algorithm is based on signatures (public key cryptography). As far as signature-free algorithms are concerned, the best resilience-optimal algorithm we are aware of, that uses control information whose size is only $O(\log_2 n)$, is the one described in [28], which requires five communication steps per round. Algorithm 6 is signature-free and requires only six communication steps per round.

7.1 Randomized model

Common coin The asynchronous system is equipped with a *common coin* as defined by Rabin [23], and improved in [7] in order to get rid of the trusted dealer. Such an oracle is denoted CC. The corresponding enriched –from a computational power point of view– system model is consequently denoted $\mathcal{BZ}\text{-}\mathcal{AS}_{n,t}[t < n/3, \text{CC}]$. A common coin can be seen as a global entity that delivers a sequence of random bits $b_1, b_2, \dots, b_r, \dots$ to processes (each bit b_r has the value 0 or 1, with probability 1/2).

More precisely, this oracle provides the processes with a primitive denoted `random()` that returns a bit each time it is called by a process. In addition to being random, this bit has the following global property: the r th invocation of `random()` by any non-faulty process p_i returns it the bit b_r . This means that the r th invocations of `random()` by any pair of non-faulty processes p_i and p_j return them b_r , whatever the times at which each of these invocations occur. It is important to notice that the network has no access to the common coin (the reader interested in the implementation of a common coin can consult [7].)

On randomized consensus When using additional computing power provided by random coins, the consensus termination property can no longer be deterministic. *Randomized consensus* is defined by C-Validity (Obligation), C-Agreement, plus the following termination property [2, 23]: Every non-faulty process decides with probability 1. For round-based algorithms, this termination property can be re-stated as follows. For any non-faulty process p_i : $\lim_{r \rightarrow +\infty} (\text{Probability}[p_i \text{ decides by round } r]) = 1$.

7.2 The algorithm

Underlying principles and description of the algorithm. In Algorithm 6, a process p_i invokes `bin_propose(v_i)` where v_i is the value it proposes. It decides when it executes the statement `decide(v)` (line 08). The design of this algorithm is close to an algorithm proposed in [12]. Its fundamental difference is that it is resilience-optimal ($t < n/3$), while the one described in [12] requires $t < n/5$.

The local variable est_i of a process p_i keeps its current estimate of the decision value (initially, $est_i = v_i$). The processes proceed by consecutive asynchronous rounds. Thus, the pair (r_i, est_i) of a non-faulty process p_i describes its current state (r_i is p_i 's current round number). The first part of the algorithm (lines 01-04) is devoted to communication occurring during a round. The second part (lines 05-10) defines the management of the local estimate est_i and the decision rule. There is one VB-broadcast instance per round. To distinguish the messages `EST()` associated with different VB-broadcast instances, these messages are tagged by their round number, namely `EST[r](v)` denotes a round r message carrying the value v . More precisely, we have the following.

- At every round r_i , each non-faulty process p_i VB-broadcasts `EST[r_i](est_i)`, and waits until it has VB-delivered `EST[r_i]($-$)` from at least $n - t$ processes (lines 02-04).

- In the second part, p_i first computes the random number s associated with the current round r_i (line 05). Then, p_i checks if (a) it has received a non- \perp value v from at least $n - 2t$ different processes, and (b) v is the only non- \perp value in rec_i (line 06). If this predicate holds, p_i adopts v as new estimate (line 07) and decides the random value s if $v = s$ (line 08). If the predicate is false, p_i updates its estimate est_i to the random value s . In all cases, p_i starts a new asynchronous round.

The statement `decide()` allows the invoking process to decide but does not stop its execution. Hence, a process executes rounds forever. This facilitates the description of the algorithm. Using techniques such as the one developed in [12] allows a process to both decide and stop.

Remark It is possible to add the following test after line 04:

if $(\exists v : \#equal(v, rec_i) \geq n - t)$ **then** `decide(v)` **end if**.

This allows to always terminate in a single round whatever the value of the common coin when no process commits Byzantine failure and all processes propose the same value. (This scenario is likely to happen in actual executions.)

```

operation bin_propose( $v_i$ ) is
 $est_i \leftarrow v_i; r_i \leftarrow 0;$ 
repeat forever
(01)  $r_i \leftarrow r_i + 1;$ 
(02) VB.broadcast EST[ $r_i$ ]( $est_i$ );
(03) let  $rec_i =$  multiset of values  $est$ 
           such that EST[ $r_i$ ]( $est$ ) has been VB.delivered to  $p_i$ ;
(04) wait until  $(|rec_i| \geq n - t);$ 
(05)  $s_i \leftarrow random();$ 
(06) if  $(\exists v \neq \perp : \#equal(v, rec_i) \geq n - 2t)$ 
            $\wedge (rec_i \text{ contains a single non-}\perp \text{ value})$ 
(07) then  $est_i \leftarrow v;$ 
(08) if  $(v = s) \wedge (p_i \text{ has not yet decided})$  then decide( $v$ ) end if
(09) else  $est_i \leftarrow s$ 
(10) end if
end repeat.

```

Algorithm 6: Randomized binary Byzantine consensus based on VB-broadcast ($t < n/3$)

7.3 Proof

Lemma 4. *Let $t < n/3$. Consider the situation where, at the beginning of a round r , all the non-faulty processes have the same estimate value v . These processes will never change their estimates, thereafter.*

Proof As all the non-faulty processes VB-broadcast the same value v at the beginning of round r (line 02), it follows from the VB-obligation property of VB-broadcast, that the only values that can be VB-delivered are v (VB-broadcast by each of them and possibly from Byzantine processes) and \perp (from Byzantine processes). Moreover, as each non-faulty process p_i waits for $n - t$ messages (line 04), it will VB-deliver at least $n - 2t$ values v ; as $n > 3t$, at most t of them can be VB-broadcast by Byzantine processes (due to the VB-validity property, a value $w \neq v$ VB-broadcast by a Byzantine process p_j cannot be validated, and consequently \perp or no value at all is VB-delivered from such a process p_j). Hence, the predicate of line 06 is satisfied, and p_i sets est_i to v (line 07), which concludes the proof of the lemma. □_{Lemma 4}

Let $COND(v, i)$ be the predicate that p_i tests at line 06.

Lemma 5. *Let $n > 3t$. If two non-faulty processes p_i and p_j are such that both $COND(v, i)$ and $COND(w, j)$ hold at round r , then $v = w$.*

Proof By the VB-Uniformity property of VB-broadcast, no two non-faulty processes VB-deliver different values from the same process. Hence, if $COND(v, i)$ holds for some non-faulty process p_i , no other non-faulty process p_j can VB-deliver a value $w \neq v$ from the set of $(n - t)$ processes whose VB-broadcasts built the set rec_i . Consequently, if p_j VB-delivers a value $w \neq v$, the number of occurrences of w is necessarily at most $t < n - 2t$, and consequently $COND(w, j)$ cannot be satisfied. $\square_{Lemma\ 5}$

Lemma 6. *Let $t < n/3$. If all the non-faulty processes propose the same value v , then no value $v' \neq v$ can be decided.*

Proof This lemma is an immediate consequence of Lemma 4. As all estimates of the non-faulty processes remain equal to v , it follows from line 08 that no value $v' \neq v$ can be returned by a non-faulty process. $\square_{Lemma\ 6}$

Lemma 7. *No two non-faulty processes decide different values.*

Proof Let r be the first round during which non-faulty processes decide. If two processes p_i and p_j decide at round r , they decide at line 08 the value s computed by the common coin for that round. Moreover, before deciding during round r , a process updated its estimate to the decided value s . Hence, all processes that decide during round r decide the same value s , and have their estimates equal to the decided value.

Let us now consider the case of a processes p_x for which, during round r , (a) the predicate of line 06 is satisfied (i.e., $COND(w, x)$ is true), (b) while the decision predicate at line 08 is not. As the predicate of line 06 is satisfied for both p_x and any process p_i that decides at line 08 (i.e., both $COND(w, x)$ and $COND(i, v)$ are true), it follows from Lemma 5 that $w = v$, which means that it is not possible that the decision predicate of p_x be false. Hence, p_x decides during round r , exactly as p_i .

Let us finally consider the case of a non-faulty process p_k such that $COND(-, k)$ does not hold at line 06 during round r . It follows from line 09 that p_k updates its estimate to the random value s associated with round r . Hence, all such processes p_k start round $r + 1$ with their estimates equal to the decided value s .

It then follows from Lemma 4 that, from round $r + 1$, the estimates of all the non-faulty processes keep forever the same value (namely, the decided value). Hence, no value different from this estimate value can be decided. $\square_{Lemma\ 7}$

Lemma 8. *Each non-faulty process decides with probability 1. (Proof in [20].)*

Theorem 6. *Algorithm 6 solves the randomized binary consensus problem in the system model $\mathcal{BZ_AS}_{n,t}[t < n/3, \text{VB}, \text{CC}]$.*

Proof Follows from lemmas 6, 7 and 8. $\square_{Theorem\ 6}$

Theorem 7. *Let $t < n/3$. The expected decision time is constant.*

Proof As indicated in the proof of Lemma 8, termination is obtained in two phases. First, all the non-faulty processes adopt the same value v . Second, the outcome of the common coin has to be the same as the commonly adopted value v .

It follows from the proof of Lemma 8 that there is only one situation in which the non-faulty processes do not adopt the same value. This is when the predicate of line 06 is satisfied for a subset of non-faulty processes and not for the other non-faulty processes. Thus, the expected number of rounds for this to happen is 2. As for the second phase, here again, the probability that the value output by the common coin is the same as the value held by all the non-faulty processes is $1/2$. Thus, the expected time for this to occur is also 2. Combining the two phases, the expected termination time is 4 rounds (i.e., a small constant).

□*Theorem 7*

8 Conclusion

Considering distributed message-passing systems made up of n processes, and where up to t processes may commit Byzantine failures, the aim of the paper was to present in a simple and homogeneous way (a) existing and new broadcast and agreement abstractions, and (b) algorithms implementing them. These broadcast abstractions are UB-broadcast (unreliable broadcast), ND-broadcast (no-duplicity broadcast), RB-broadcast (reliable broadcast), and VB-broadcast (validated broadcast). They have been used to design three multivalued intrusion-tolerant Byzantine consensus algorithms. Moreover, all these algorithms are signature-free. As we have seen, the intrusion-tolerance property means that no value proposed only by Byzantine processes can ever be decided. As a consequence, a default value can be decided when the same value is not proposed by enough processes

The intrusion-tolerant consensus algorithm based on VB-broadcast has several noteworthy features: it is optimal from a resilience point of view ($t < n/3$), each round requires only a single VB-broadcast instance, which costs six communication steps, and the size of control information attached with each message is $O(\log_2 n)$. The paper has also presented a novel randomized binary Byzantine consensus algorithm that is resilient-optimal and, in a very interesting way, is also based on the VB-broadcast abstraction.

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