‘Do not eat fish more than twice a week’. Rational choice regulation and risk communication: uncertainty transfer from risk assessment to public
Résumé
Regulators try to change consumers’ behaviour by issuing advice. This regulatory approach is built on a particular, normative theory of social action that assumes that individuals are unable to make rational decisions when they have imperfect knowledge about risk, and that this deficiency can be overcome by advice that offers them proper information. This paper examines the question, can a regulatory tool based on rational choice theory be efficient in reducing risky behaviours? After considering the debate within the risk-communication community about the use of this kind of a regulatory tool, we analyse (using the example of fish consumption advice) the risk assessment that the advice is derived from. Then we analyse the public response to the advice through the implementation of a five-month experiment among 200 French households. We show that individuals did not change their consumption to comply with the advice. We conclude that the advice transfers the initial uncertainty onto consumers turning it into ambiguity and complexity.
La réglementation essaye de changer le comportement des consommateurs en diffusant des recommandations de consommation. Cette approche réglementaire présuppose que les individus puissent rationnellement modifier leur comportement après la révélation d’information. Les auteurs analysent la réaction à une recommandation révélée à 200 ménages français dans le cadre d’une expérience de cinq mois. Les auteurs montrons que les ménages ne changent pas leur consommation à la suite de la révélation de la recommandation. Ils concluent que la recommandation transfert l’incertitude initiale vers les consommateurs en amplifiant l’ambiguïté et la complexité de l’information scientifique.