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Rigidity of the *Generalized Other*, narrowness of the *Otherness* and *demodernization*, in the framework of symbolic interactionism

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The main stance of modern human and social sciences, is centred on the *interactive* standpoint¹ that considers human being as unavoidably involved in the dialectic relationship individual-environment in which he or she grows up. This dual relation is meaningfully represented sketchily as follows

$$\mathcal{S}_{\Delta t}^J \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} \left(\text{genotype} \xrightarrow{\text{environment}} \text{phenotype} \right)_{\{\Delta t\}_J}$$

through which each individual J develops, along his or her life cycle $\{\Delta t\}_J$, thanks to the continuous and unavoidable (multiple) interactions with a (composed) environment \mathcal{E} that, broadly speaking, represents the *Other* with respect to J . The mapping

$$\text{genotype} \xrightarrow{\text{environment}} \text{phenotype}$$

simply expresses functionally the epi-ontogenetic transformation which undergoes each individual J along his or her life course Δt , while $\{\mathcal{S}_{\Delta t}^J\}_{J, \Delta t}$ represents the phylogenesis of the living species (or population) to which J belongs. So², the development $\mathcal{S}_{\Delta t}^J$ undergoes to the *necessity* by genotype, while undergoes to the *chance* (or *random*) by phenotype, and these two features having to be considered together, not separately of each other. Ethology has also suggested that human being has innate predispositions towards sociality, like other animal species³, so that the most distinct trait of human being is just her or his social feature, which therefore becomes an unavoidable aspect of her or his nature. Notwithstanding these biological bases for socialization, so potentially present, human being needs, since her or his childhood, to be led along this two-ways *process of socialization* just to exteriorize these her or his (social) potentialities or predispositions. In this process, it is possible, in turn, to descry two main sub-processes⁴: a *primary socialization* process, the most important one, established during the childhood⁵ and giving the early founding patterns for the next socializations, equipped with the related affective charges as provided by the primary significant adults (mainly,

¹ Cf. (Giovannini et al. 1982, Cap. II, § II.1.2.), where, in Chapter II, the interaction individual-environment is discussed exhaustively in depth.

² Cf. (Clegg 1968), (Lorenz 1971), in particular the preface due to Mario Zanforlin, (Mayr 1981) and (Monod 1970).

³ Cf. (Morpurgo 1975, Capp. 12, 13).

⁴ Cf. (Berger & Luckmann 1969).

⁵ Theoretically expressed by the main psychoanalytic theories, among which is the John Bowlby theory of attachment.

parents⁶), to which then follows a *secondary socialization* process, with which each individual gets in relation – without a strong affective involvement, like that of primary socialization – with other institutions and social groups, from youth onwards. Nevertheless, still there not exist unanimity on the theories about the crucial relationships between primary and secondary process, except the hypotheses that the former surely plays a fundamental role in the latter, as the primary relationships shape a prototype pattern for the relationships involved in the secondary process, and that all these relationships (amongst which is the language) are always characterized by intentionality, reciprocity and exchange. According to Peter L. Berger and Thomas Luckmann⁷, secondary socialization begins just when the so-called *Generalized Other* (see below) arises, that is to say, when – broadly speaking – the sense of *alterity* (or *otherness*) springs out, thanks to which then each individual may enter into society. All this, in passing, justifies the relevance of *symbolic interactionism* in studying socialization (Berger & Luckmann 1969; Giovannini et al. 1982, Cap. II).

So, at the end of the primary socialization, child should be able to participate actively to social life; after the main egocentric phase in which child does not distinguish between he or she and the external world, first elements of the *Self* start to appear, also thanks to the acquisition of a social reality mediated by parents (or other significant adults), through which he or she may distinguish between the *Self* and the physical-human environment (the *Other* – see below). Just at this point, when egocentrism (of primary socialization) is being invested by the new sense of *otherness* (mainly coming from the different viewpoints of other persons), the secondary socialization starts allowing the child to build up new relationships with the various institutions (and their persons) that characterize modern and contemporary societies. This, because the precocious entering of the child into various institutional sectors of contemporary society may be considered as a sociological aspect that enables to distinguish modern societies from the past ones. Indeed, until up modern period, just the ideas of upbringing and education were inexistent, in that child, after weaning (which besides took place later than now), entered directly into society as adults without any intermediate passages, that is to say, there did not exist adolescence period, differently from contemporary societies mainly characterized by the division of work which, among other things, has entailed a variegated and complex *categorization of society*. This has required a more or less long period of formation and development for young people after primary socialization, just said to be secondary socialization, which carries on during all the life course for the many cultural models that nowadays a human being may interiorize thanks to the categorization of society which, on its turn, has implied the possibility of many choices in regard to the social role to be adopted by each individual⁸ as well as to the social group to whom belong. This choice of social roles and memberships has, on the other hand, either a cognitive nature (in that every human being is aware of the role internalized and of the social group to whom he or she belongs) and an affective fashion⁹ (as, every individual tries feelings and emotions in belonging to certain groups rather than others), which will give rise to a certain *Weltanschauung* with respect the position of herself or himself in the world, so giving rise to

⁶ About the considerable importance of parent relationships and the related affective changes, see (Solinas 2010).

⁷ Cf. (Berger & Luckmann 1969).

⁸ As we will see next, this variety will imply a certain variation of the range of variability of the *otherness*, whose variability will be just the main feature took into account in this paper.

⁹ See the contribution of Henri Tajfel in (Palmonari 1976).

an own *social identity*¹⁰. As soon as the individual gets into relationship with even more *other* social entities, her or his personal social identity becomes wider, richer and more variegated, with a more accentuated critical and self-reflexive sense towards either herself or himself and the external world. Anyhow, according to psychoanalysis, during the childhood the formation of the *Ego* takes place contemporaneously to the formations of the *Other*, and vice versa¹¹, as each of these two agencies does not spring out without the presence of the remaining one¹². This entails that own *social identity* comes to build up necessarily with respect to the general social and physical environment in which each individual grows up and casts her or his own relationships¹³, so building up her or his own *alterity*. In these terms, one should look at the main fact that *social identity* is basically the outcome of an active *social construction* which is never static and definitive but continuously dynamic along all the life route (Ariès 1960; Berger & Luckmann 1969; Giovannini et al. 1982, Cap. II).

From a sociological viewpoint, then, if *modernization* and *demodernization* phenomena wish to be seen as components of a pair whose elements are one the inverse of the other, then it is need to consider a minimal but rigorous theoretical construct which includes and explains them as such. For instance, the psycho-sociological construct of *Generalized Other*, as originally formulated by George Herbert Mead within *symbolic interactionism* context, might be able to accomplish this end. To explain the fashion in which internal mental world is in relation with the external and social world of objects, events and persons, William James¹⁴ introduced the fundamental notion of *Self*, the primary datum of psychology, in which he identifies two main components or agencies, the *I* and the *Me*. The former refers to the aware subject, able to undertake own initiatives in regard to external reality besides to reflect on herself or himself; the latter is those parts of the *Self* which are known to the *I*, the objective and empirical aspects of the *Self*, what I see and perceive of myself, as well the manner in which I look to myself. The agency *Me* contains those constituent and real parts which build the known *Self*, including the material characteristics of the *bodily Me* (e.g., the perceived body and its self-representation by individual, the various things owned by subject, etc.), the social ones of the *extracorporeal-social Me* (how the subject sees herself or himself with respect to her or his relationships with others) and those spiritual of the *spiritual Me* (to be aware of herself or himself, able to think and reflect on herself or himself, to respond to given psycho-physiological mechanisms, to feel ethic and moral instances, and so forth). For James, everyone organizes her or his own *Me* according to a hierarchic structure which assigns different values and estimations to the various material, social and spiritual components constituting *Me*. James puts the *bodily Me* at the lowest level, the *Spiritual Me* at the highest level, and the *extracorporeal-social Me* at intermediary levels, so giving a rigid scheme to the *Self* construct. The rigidity or flexibility issues of the *Self* will be a central problem of the next social psychology. After James, Charles H. Cooley stated that only through social interaction the individual will develop the knowledge of herself or himself and the feeling of own identity. In this regard, Cooley introduced the notion of *looking glass self* to mean the basic idea according to which we are what we are observing the way in which others

¹⁰ Which, nevertheless, is quite different from the *personal identity*, that comes from the global image that an individual has of herself or himself, i.e. of the own *Self*, and therefore is not the simple sum of the various social identifications. This explains why social identity is a part of the *Self*.

¹¹ So, the *Ego* and the *Other* form an inseparable pair of opposites in dialectic interaction with each other.

¹² This point of view is also that of the psychologist Henri Wallon (1879-1962).

¹³ In agreement with existentialistic standpoints of philosophy (above all, that of Martin Heidegger).

¹⁴ Cf. (Luccio 2000), (Morabito 2007), (Schultz 1974), (Thomson 1972) and (Wertheimer 1983).

perceive us and work out an opinion upon us. Therefore, the awareness and esteem of ourselves arise in what we see mirrored from others, on the basis of the various appreciations, opinions, biases and presuppositions of the given membership group in which an individual lives, that is to say, of who is deemed to be relevant, important and meaningful (*significant others*), until up to mould our own sense of reality on the basis of their social-cultural models.

On the basis of James and Cooley ideas, Mead further deepens the social matrix of the development of Self. He stated that the configuration of consciousness (of own Self) may be thought as the result of the cooperative action of either the capability of producing and responding to the various symbols and the competence of undertaking the behaviours of others. According to Mead, the Self does not pre-exist at the birth, because the human mental functions begin to run only when two indispensable conditions occur, precisely when an individual is able to produce and respond to symbols, whence to symbolically appoint the objects of her or his environment, as well as when he or she is able to undertake behaviours and attitudes of others (*significant others*). Only when the individual is able to make reference to the objects of her or his own environment through symbols, then Self starts to have a private, autonomous existence. From this moment onwards, the Self is one of these objects, and its minimal required components are the *name* and the personal pronouns with their use, i.e., I, me, my, and so forth. Thanks to language, Self achieves its status of object. Indeed, with these basic linguistic terms, it will be possible to distinguish and identify the Self as one of the many objects of own world. Before acquiring real linguistic capabilities, every human performs reciprocal actions with others, mainly made by gestures which lead the accomplishment of the act. This gestural conversation has also a symbolic nature and precedes the proper language, becoming this latter when the symbolic meanings conveyed by gestures are commonly accepted and shared within a given social group according to an organized representational system which will structure the mind of each group member. So, the individual is able to give, through interpretation, a meaning to her or his own gesture and those of others, as well as forecasting consequences and controlling related actions and responses. Accordingly, when an individual may intentionally use the pre-existent¹⁵ symbolic systems commonly shared within social groups in which he or she is involved, then he or she has acquired a *Mind*, the chief mediating symbolic means between individual and others. The more the language enriches, the world of objects richer and enlarger, so comprising objects of everyday life, physical things and phenomena, relationships, and so on. Language is the chief tool allowing each individual to take part to a given *social action*. The social organization of the action is closely related to either the unavoidable dimension of social hierarchy¹⁶ and its control, and the subjective usage of social norms. Every object undergoes to valuations, comparisons, and expectations. This also concerns the Self that, in such a manner, it is the result of the various behaviours, evaluations, comparisons, expectations of others. These latter, who surround the child inside a certain social group where the main communication means is the language, adopt certain behaviours in her or his regard, and just these behaviours are the basis for the inferences that child performs with respect to the particular type of object who he or she is deemed to be. In this fashion, the child shall become more or less differentiated with respect either to the others and herself or

¹⁵ The social feature of a certain commonly shared system of symbols is the presupposition for the acquisition of their meaning in an equally manner and at an intersubjective level, by all the members of a given community or collectivity (Brede 1980).

¹⁶ Every social group, community or collectivity is always and anyhow characterized by a hierarchical ordering (Berruto 1995).

himself. The capability to develop further the Self depends both on the intrinsic meaning and organization of the family (or caregivers), of the social groups and of the community, all together considered.

Consciousness, therefore, is not a pre-social endowment that distinguishes humans from animals, but rather it is the result of the interpersonal interaction allowing both the communication through meaningful symbols and the capability of individual to identify oneself with others and looking herself or himself from that standpoint. This takes place through the sequential performance of two main processes: a *simple play* and an *organized game*. Through *simple play*, the child undertakes, one after the other, roles, attitudes and behaviours of the individuals who are in touch with her or him, learning and regulating the development of her or his own Self, introducing into herself or himself the organization made by the other personalities (so giving rise to the *Significant Others*). He or she plays to do mother, father, policeman or policewoman, teacher, fireman, doctor, and so on; often, also animal behaviours are imitated. In this first phase, for instance, the social role is loosely interiorized, starts to become an object of herself or himself as she or he sees herself or himself just from the role who she or he is undertaking, for instance playing to buy something that herself sells to her if, for instance, she has undertaken the role of mother. But, in this first phase, the interiorization of the given social role is only partial, that is to say, the child is able to build up only partial traits of her or his Self, not organically joined. In the second phase of the organized game, instead, the child acquires the capability to undertake all the possible roles (*role-taking*), attitudes and behaviours of all the others involved in a common activity with her or him. He or she will be able to coordinate the social task required by the role undertook by him or her. Differently from the first phase, in which the child undertakes all the roles, attitudes and behaviours in a sequential, automatic and indiscriminate manner, at most temporally ordered, in the second phase the child must possess, interiorize, at the same time, all these roles, attitudes and behaviours of others, which must be owned in herself or himself. In this last event, in some way, he or she should interiorize all these roles, attitudes and behaviours of all the participating members of the given game in which he or she is involved. Only in this latter phase, therefore, all the partial components of the Self, already acquired in the first phase, may be harmoniously organized to give rise a unitary, organic and ever more mature and structured Self in dependence on the related reactions and responses of the these others. In this manner, child will acquire and internalize in herself or himself the set of all the perceived roles, attitudes and behaviours of all the others who are in touch with her or him, so giving rise to the *Generalized Other*, say \mathcal{G}_O , that is to say, the individual expression of the explicit and structured responses of all the other members of the given social group, the universalization of the process of undertaking roles, attitudes and behaviours of the others, so the Generalized Other is the role, attitude and behaviour of the whole social group. Furthermore, once acquired this latter, he or she should be able, in dependence on his or her degree of free will, to intentionally choose some members belonging to his or her Generalized Other, to give rise the subset of the *Significant Others*, say $\mathcal{S}_O (\subseteq \mathcal{G}_O)$, for his or her. Therefore, the type, the qualitative and quantitative features and the related amplitudes either of \mathcal{S}_O and \mathcal{G}_O just depend on the modalities and forms of development of these two Meadian phases of simply play and organized game, with a particular attention to the second one. Mead defines Generalized Other as the community or the organized social group that, perceived by individual, allow her or him to build up and structure the unity of own Self. The constitution of the Generalized Other is a chief undertaking act of roles, attitudes and behaviours,

which is therefore realized in its widest universality. Thanks to this last universality feature, the individual acquires an objectivity skill: in fact, with this basic process of integration, inclusion and participation to a given community or social group, the individual is sure that world appears to others as it appears to her or him. In such a manner, he transcends her or his personal experience and, just thanks to various forms of communication (among which is language), he or she discovers that his or her experience is shared by others, and with reciprocal comparisons, he or she becomes able to distinguish his or her private experience from the public one. In a few words, undertaking roles, attitudes and behaviours of the Generalized Other, the individual becomes an organic, integrated and included aware member of the given communities or social groups with which he or she is in touch. The social life is thus founded, interpreted and established on the set of social interpersonal relationships and in the roles, attitudes and behaviours which it gives rise (Doise et al. 1980; Ferrarotti 2011; Palmonari 1989; Waters 1994; Palmonari et al. 2002; Gallino 2006).

Roles, attitudes and behaviours of others, organized and implemented into the Self, give rise the *Me*, that is to say, the 'rational' part of Self which reflects the social structure. The *I*, instead, is the creative and reconstructive part of the Self, built upon *Me*, the principle of personal action, thanks to which the individual is not fully alienated and uniquely determined by society, but he or she may acts upon the same social structure in which he or she lives, with an extremely variable degree of change depending on many variables. The Self springs out from the interactions between *I* and *Me*, which are its reciprocally correlated founding parts. The basic dialogue between these two agencies, is a transposition, at the individual level, of the various processes which link together the individual with the others and their reciprocal interactions. The manifestation of the Self, thus, always entails the presence, current or past, of some *other*, since it cannot exist any normal psychic experience of herself or himself simply provided by ourselves. In fact, vegetals and animals only react to their environment, without the possibility of making any experience of themselves. Furthermore, it is well-known to which severe pathological conditions of psychic destructuration every human being incurs when is subjected to extreme conditions of isolation. Indeed, in many case of psychoses, *Me* agency is quite frail, or not functioning or else not grasped by individual, with a net predominance of a non-controlled *I*. The *Me*, as is the personal reflection of society or community, becomes a convergence point of many and often contradictory social expectations, so that the crucial relations between *Me* and *I* lead to a mediation between conformism and innovation¹⁷, between impulsive responses and controlled ones. Mead furthermore claimed that both components of the Self, i.e., the objective (with censorship functions) *Me* and the subjective (individual action promoting under *Me* control) *I*, may be empirically picked up. The study of the *Me* is the comprehension of herself or himself as object, while the study of the *I* is the knowledge that every subject has of her or his own experiences of continuity, distinction, volition and reflection on herself or himself. Mead's work has casted the foundations for the psycho-social study of *Self* (Doise et al. 1980; Brede 1980; Conti & Principe 1989; Palmonari 1989; Waters 1994; Palmonari et al. 2002; Gallino 2006).

¹⁷ This agrees, and is closely coherent, with our main aim which is oriented toward a possible attempt to formally argue on modernization-demodernization phenomena.

For Mead, the consciousness has therefore a social origin¹⁸. The child observes and undertakes roles, behaviours and attitudes of the others, especially those showed toward herself or himself, so inferring to what classification type of individual he or she belongs, in respect to the eyes of others. As said above, the Self arises when the individual accrues the capability of becoming object to herself or himself. This takes place by means of the primary process of undertaking roles, attitudes, behaviours and perspectives of others. To be precise, as already said above, the configuration of consciousness may be thought as due to the *internalization* (so providing the Meadian *Me*) of: *i*) the attitudes and behaviours that living community, or its sectors, have manifested with respect to either her or him, and other subjects belonging or not to this community, but however in touch with her or him (*Generalized Other*); *ii*) the customs, norms and rules prescribed by the living community that human being has learned to accept and generalize by means of the development of different roles and behaviours as well as interpreting the roles and behaviours of other persons, and acting on her or him by the influence of a certain historical series of *Significant Others*, accordingly determined. The latter include every individual, or group of individuals, who, as inserted into a certain net of established social relations, plays, or has played in the past, a social-cultural role having special and remarkable importance and relevance for a given human being until up to be able to modify or shape her or his behaviours, and, in certain situations, the related social actions. As said above, the Generalized Other is meant, by Mead, as the whole community or all the organized social groups, which provide the Self's unity to each individual member; the attitudes and behaviours of the Generalized Other are nothing but the attitudes and behaviours of the whole community or social group. Undertaking the attitudes and behaviours of the Generalized Other (role-taking), together its related symbolisms, the individual becomes an organic, included and aware member of the society. Thanks to the Generalized Other, the social process influences the behaviour and attitude of the individuals involved in it, who, in turn, partially contributes subjectively to develop such a process. Thus, the Self is mainly a process which arises from the past (i.e., social-cultural memory, which is deeply rooted in every human being) and builds up with the interactions and contacts of the individual with other individuals belonging to her or his community, so mirroring ideas, judgements, social-cultural models, ideas and ethics that the given community or social group provides to her or him. As recalled above, the Self cannot yet manifest itself without the presence of some other, that is to say, its existence necessarily relies on the *Alterity* or *Otherness* (see later), precisely on the general reference frames provided by the society or community which is always symbolically present in the mind of every individual of it, through *Me* agency¹⁹. To be aware of herself or himself, an individual must interiorize the roles, attitudes and behaviours of others to control the actions who he or she is undertaking. Nevertheless, the (creative) *I* has either the individual function to subjectively face and reply to the *various*²⁰ social-cultural agencies, roles, manners and instances internalized through the *Me*, trying possibly to modify them, and imprinting a personal character to every member of a community or social group, who has internalized its roles, behaviours and attitudes by means of communication with others. As said above, the communication amongst members of a given social group, takes place thanks to the occurrence of the *language* which employs commonly shared organized symbols and which are understood just

¹⁸ For Mead, not only Self has social origins, but also every form of human knowledge, comprised science. The same dawning of human thought is made possible only thanks to a universal symbolism which emerges, is reproduced in (and interpreted by) every individual through the social processes which are in action.

¹⁹ Maybe partially acquired unconsciously by means of the mirror neuron system.

²⁰ This point will be retaken later when, for example, we shall discuss on the rigidity of the Generalized Other.

thanks to a mediated capacity to use symbols that Mead, as said above, calls *Mind* (Doise et al. 1980; Palmonari 1989; Assmann 1997; Palmonari et al. 2002; Gallino 2006).

Notwithstanding that, there may exist different social groups to which a given individual belongs or, however, to be in touch, which may often provide contradictory or antagonist roles, attitudes or behaviours, within Generalized Other, along the route of formation of the Self²¹. Mead has provided scant answers to this last question, to whose lack might perhaps supply psychoanalysis. Indeed, some psychodynamic notions, tools and concepts, amongst which is the *identification* – which is the primary affective adhesion or first attachment of the child to the others, while, for the adult, is the undertaking of a role, attitude or behaviour that leads to *introjection* (that is, introducing the other inside Self) and *projection* (that is, introducing Self into the other) – process, enable to understand and explain how an individual may conform or adhere to social-cultural models, customs and traditions. Likewise, the psychoanalysis, making appeal to certain defence mechanisms, may concur to explain in which fashions *institutional constraints*, besides to contain and restrain human drives, are able to produce heterogeneities and make distinguishing individual differences, which allow to go beyond conformism. But importantly Mead reconnects institutions to his concept of *Me*. Indeed, an *institution*, according to Mead, is meant as the collective organization of a certain set of attitudes and behaviours commonly shared and symbolically recognized by each member through her or his *Mind*, hence internalized by means of *Me* agency which will determine, regulate and control (often unconsciously) the consequent social action and conduct; accordingly, the *I*, in its relationships with the *Me*, will provide the awareness agency. In passing, we recall that the influence of culture and society in the formation of human personality, from a psychoanalytic standpoint, has been above all studied by neo-Freudians²², amongst whom are E. Fromm, V. Kardiner, K. Horney, R. Linton and M. Mead, for instance through the introduction and use of the central notion of *basic personality* and its multimodalities. Furthermore, many relationships amongst the theoretical construct of Generalized Other and the notion of Freudian Super-Ego exist, and, in this regard, particularly interesting and useful is, above all, Talcott E.F. Parsons interpretation and use of Freudian psychoanalysis in theoretical sociology²³. Along this line of thought, on the other hand, there also exist further strict relationships amongst the constructs of Generalized Other and Freudian Super-Ego, even to reach the ideological notion of national identity²⁴. For instance, due to the chiefly unconscious nature of the Meadian *Me*, a possible link between Freudian Super-Ego²⁵ and

²¹ Pathway which partially may be compared, by analogy, with the Jungian *individuation process*.

²² It was Erich Fromm (1992) and Karen Horney (1959) to have spoken first of a *social unconscious* mainly considered as a construct related not to repressed material but simply to those collective phenomena which individuals have not awareness. Rainer Funk considers it as intermediary means between the social-economical structure of a society and its ideologies (Funk 2011). Others scholars who support a social unconscious construct, are S.H. Foulkes and E. Hopper, according to whom it refers to all those social-cultural dispositions, habits and relations which are unaware to people but that greatly influence their existence and life (Hopper 2002; Hopper & Weinberg 2011-15). The relationships with collective unconscious as meant by C.G. Jung and C. Lévi-Strauss, are evident: in this regard, see also (Iurato 2015).

²³ On the possible relationships between Parson's and Mead's ideas, see for instance (Brede 1980, Chapter 5).

²⁴ Indeed, a human cluster becomes an ethnicity, a nation or a state mainly thanks to a common project established on an organizational aim based on an *alterity* principle which identifies a boundary us/them, with a full predominance of own people with respect the others (Aime 2008, Chapter 9, Section 4).

²⁵ As, for instance, collectively meant by Freud in his *Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego* (1921). On the other hand, following the last chapter of Freud (1949), around the end of childhood, a portion of external world is left out as an object and undertook by Ego through identification, becoming a part of own internal world, so giving rise to a new agency, called *Super-Ego*, which controls Ego, plays the functions of those individuals of external world around whom the child is growing, is intermediary between Ego and Es requirements. So, Super-Ego continues to play the role

Generalized Other might be, for instance, identified just through the Meadian *Me* agency upon which, as we have just seen above, relies the notion of social institution, so being able to justify its deep unconscious features as, for instance, claimed by Claude Lévi-Strauss, who had already spoken and treated of an unconscious structure of social institutions (Pagnini 1977; Mueller 1978; Doise et al. 1980; Brede 1980). In a few words, along the axis Parsons-Mead, just due to the close relationships between Generalized Other and Meadian *Me*, we are able to consider those deep and unavoidable unconscious features which join together Freudian Super-Ego, Generalized Other and *Me* agency in account for the possible unconscious relationships which link together collective (official and, above all, non-official) institutions and organizations with the formation of individual personality and its action, and vice versa. Since second half of 20th century, many studies of sociology have pointed out the relevance of certain unconscious aspects underlying institutions and laws. We are of the opinion that such possible unconscious aspects should not be fully negligible at a sociological level simply because social-political organizations, institutions and structures are however made by individuals who act and think according to their wills, desires and drives, even commonly and socially shared by a community (Bastide 1972; Turkle 1978; Collins 1980; Obholzer & Roberts 1994; Goodrich 1995; 1996; Goodrich & Carlson 1998; Armstrong & Obholzer 2005; Meloni 2005; Lanteigne 2012).

On the other hand, many of the above concepts, in first place those concerning the others, may be usefully related with the wider and complex notion of *Alterity* or *Otherness* \mathcal{O} , which refers to what is *other*²⁶ from that is given as one, as identical, as subject, and as person²⁷. Thus, Alterity is a basic and crucial notion, dating back to Aristotle, closely related to these latter and inseparable from them²⁸: with respect to what is given as one, it is indicative of multiplicity (*ontological alterity*); with respect to the identical, it is the opposite (*logical alterity*); with respect to the subject (Ego), it is the object (Alter) (*epistemological alterity*); and, with respect to the person (Ego), it is the other,

of external world for the Ego and Es agencies, even if it is part of internal world of the subject. Super-Ego acts inside us as a chief normative element, and imperiously acting on that part of our personality with which identify ourselves, that is, the Ego, which, strangely enough, it is also considered mostly unconscious. The Super-Ego, as ideal model to which everyone is inclined to model, is also called Ego's Ideal, leans on the action exerted by certain personal figures (above all the paternal one, the main intermediary between the subject and the society) who are considered to be relevant for the subject, by means of identification processes. From here, the close links with symbolic interactionism. Differently from his previous works, in the last part of his life, Freud seems to agree in identify collective features just in the Super-Ego agency, which will influence all the next life path of the individual. Indeed, he says that, in such an agency, there are not only all the parental influences of childhood which will act perpetually later on her or his education and upbringing, but also all the legacy of parents due to their social-cultural level, features, customs and traditions of the social group to whom they belong. Freud states too that traces of the past is settled into the Es (unconscious), as well as much of what owned by Super-Ego leaves out surely a trace in the Es. Freud says that, many actions experienced by child are the phylogenetic repetition of past events. Super-Ego, therefore, undertakes a kind of intermediary position between Es and external world, unifying in itself the influences of either past and present. With the resettlement of the Super-Ego agency, we have, so to speak, an instance how present converts in the past (Freud 1949, Part Three, Chapter 9). In such terms, last Freud Super-Ego is quite near to Meadian *Me*, for some respects identifiable among them. On the other hand, just from an historical viewpoint, we recall that Freud himself, starting from his studies on totemism, worked out his theory of psychic development centred on (Edipus complex, just taking into account the origin and development of social organization, precisely saying that the rising and structuration of human personality takes place in an analogous manner to the birth of society (Galimberti 2006).

²⁶ Etymology of the word brings back to the Greek ἀλλότριος [*állōtrios*], that is, belonging to another, estrange, hence to the Latin term *alter*, from a root *al-*, or from the root word *alius*, which basically refer to the diversity, and the comparative suffix *-tero*, which refers to the binary opposition, that is, one of the two.

²⁷ In this place, we do not consider the as much interesting and more complex Lacanian ideas on the other and alterity.

²⁸ See also (Pagnini 1977), (Laplanche 1999), (Abbagnano 2008), (Aime 2008), (Kilani 2011) and (Dei 2016).

or the Other (Alter) (*existential* or *transcendental alterity*). The polisemantics of Alterity \mathcal{O} gives rise, therefore, a founding problem of philosophy because such a term entails the difficult task of establishing all the possible relationships between the main constitutive terms of the Being, so that such a really crucial problem dialectically refers as well to the total unity of these last basic constitutive elements of Alterity, as well as to an integration of their various meanings²⁹. So, in rigorous terms, we might not separate sharply one type of alterity from the remaining ones (M.F. Sciacca). However, we are particularly interested in that Alterity's term which refers to the person, namely the *existential alterity*³⁰, in which the notion of *Self* is placeable, but in general the complex Meadian dynamics between the constitutive and inseparable elements *I* and *Me* within *Self*, reflects and comprises almost all the above terms of aspects of Alterity: for instance, the dialectic and inseparable relations between *I*, which is the subjective part of the Self, and *Me*, which is the objective part of the Self, reflects the epistemological alterity, while the attendance of the Generalized Other with respect to the Self reflects almost all the remaining aspects of Alterity \mathcal{O} that, as seen above, may have a pluralistic sense due to its wide meaning variegation whose aspects or terms are all potentially or implicitly, universally³¹ available, establishable and actualizable. What we wish to mainly point out in this contribution, is a possible correlation between Alterity \mathcal{O} and its semantic variegation on the one hand, this being meant as more or less 'institutionally' established, actuated and actualized, collectively and largely recognized, more or less equally guaranteed³² and suitably available, and the modernization-demodernization phenomena on the other hand, correlation which is established inside the symbolic interactionism framework. The Generalized Other, say $\mathcal{G}_\mathcal{O}$, is nothing but the set of those terms of Alterity \mathcal{O} which are, within a given social-cultural context considered, actualized, established and available in a certain historical moment considered together its legacy (i.e., its social-cultural memory), so that we may write

²⁹ See also (Cargnello 1977).

³⁰ The acquisition of ethics by humans takes place mainly when an individual becomes a *responsible* member of a given society or community accepting its rules, laws, norms, customs, attitudes and usual behaviours. Indeed, who is tied to a responsibility task, offers freely herself or himself to some *Other*, which is always a member or a *symbolic expression* of a *social institution*, so that a *private* duty is also, more or less tacitly, a *public* duty. As Ludwig Binswanger said, «when, so to speak, I take at her or his word a person, then I take her or him as a member of a given society or group, this last being meant as such for its customs, habits, usages». The taking of a *responsibility* entails the acquisition, the "catching" [via Meadian *Me*], of "another mode of being" which is "inauthentic" with respect to herself or himself: for instance, one promises to vowing, or to voting, for a given political party, and so on, often due to collective suggestions, fears, resentments, impressions, profits, advantages, and so forth, so becoming "some other one" (Cargnello 1977).

³¹ In this regard, a crucial problematic issue is whether \mathcal{O} is variable, and how it possibly varies, with time t . For example, Lévi-Strauss chiefly assigns an atemporality, ahistorical feature to \mathcal{O} in its forms and terms, but with a temporal variability in their contents and meanings. For those possible common points between Lévi-Strauss and Jung unconscious featuring \mathcal{O} , see (Iurato 2015).

³² Above all, in dependence on the current social hierarchization or stratification and on the degree of flexibility in changing socio-economical status. Indeed, in (Berruto 1995, Chapter 4) is besides stressed the great relevance and predominance of the social class membership with respect to the other social variables; moreover, a chief component of social stratification is the different accessibility and posses of cultural and intellectual resources (like the language), in coherence with our theses on narrowness of \mathcal{O} and the consequent rigidity of $\mathcal{G}_\mathcal{O}$. Nevertheless, the social classes, status, strata, and so forth, are all ideal, not observable constructs as result of abstract reification (hypostatization), and often subjectively and unconsciously recognized, while the real, objective and factual society is statistically distributed mainly along a continuous curve without gaps or jumps in correspondence to the different social classes, and drew on the basis of empirical sociological data (economy, finance, health, welfare, work, culture, environment, infrastructures, services, etc.). Nevertheless, to avoid psychological reductionism attempts, and even if what is observable in sociology is the action and behaviour of individuals, we should search any possible scientific root of sociological research in those collective features which characterize such sociological phenomenology (Collins 1980), and symbolic interactionism is one of the main trends which turns out to be quite suitable to this end.

$\mathcal{G}_O \subseteq \mathcal{O}$. Finally, the Significant Others, say \mathcal{S}_O , are then individually chosen, more or less freely and knowingly, among the possible elements of \mathcal{G}_O , even individualistically acquired (by *Me*) but at unconscious level, so that formally $\mathcal{S}_O \subseteq \mathcal{G}_O$. Therefore, $\mathcal{S}_O \subseteq \mathcal{G}_O \subseteq \mathcal{O}$. Every collectively organized social community or group is basically called *to institute*, or to establish, just by means of its *public institutions*³³, those elements of the set \mathcal{O} which will give rise to the individually available³⁴ \mathcal{G}_O (albeit unconsciously acquired by *Me*) from which, then, each individual member will choose, again more or less freely and knowingly, via Meadian *Me*, her or his set of the Significant Others \mathcal{S}_O , so allowing the acquisition of her or his social-cultural patterns with which her or his *I* will be in dialectic relationship to build up own *Self*. This last, as said above, builds up upon the acquired *Me*, with which the *I* will then enter in dialectic and inseparable relation, the former being just provided by \mathcal{G}_O that, in turn, arises from the available \mathcal{O} . From that, the primary importance of the latter for the rising and building of the *Self*, the number, nature, structure and the reciprocal interrelations of its subsequent components depending just on the variety of \mathcal{G}_O , hence of \mathcal{O} .

Thus, the range of the set of all the Significant Others \mathcal{S}_O enables the individual rising, acquisition and development of the more or less pluralistic sense of the *Otherness* (or *Alterity*) – as seen above – provided by public or collective institutions, in dependence on its amplitude, heterogeneity, diversification, flexibility and variety of composing elements considered together with their interrelations. The larger is the set of the institutionally recognized, actualized and made rightly available³⁵ terms of the Otherness \mathcal{O} , the wider is the series of possibilities can be individually chosen, via \mathcal{G}_O , to get \mathcal{S}_O . This set of Significant Others \mathcal{S}_O , may give rise therefore to a formal structure whose composition and dimensions might be formally characterized also in terms of dynamical system theory, for example following Lévi-Strauss' use of thermodynamic notions in working out his theory of *cold* and *hot societies*, and the related theory of progress (Remotti 1971;

³³ The simplest, primary and basic social institution being the nuclear family, that is to say, the “genome” of society (Donati 2013), in which takes place the so-called *primary socialization* (Berger & Luckmann 1969), while the most complex one is the State (cf. Maurice Hauriou). The traditional nuclear family is the basic key intermediary between individual and society, needful for a right psychological growth (Andreoli 2015).

³⁴ Above all, in dependence on the degree of accessibility to which every individual is enabled by public institutional constraints. This last aspect is then closely linked to the degree of social exchange within the social stratification in force in a given historical moment. Very important, in this regard, are the studies and researches of Zygmunt Bauman, with his celebrated metaphor of the *social liquidity*; see for instance (Bauman 2005; 2011).

³⁵ According to well-determined criteria which should respect and warrant the general right social equity, justice and parity allocation according to objective assignments in dependence on merits and needs which go beyond social strata, so minimizing non-objective discriminations and unilateral privileges, and promoting forms of social mobility which is one of the key factor for the modern development of a country, as recently pointed out by Joseph Stiglitz (2012; 2015) who has stressed the pernicious and deleterious effects and outcomes of an *inertia* in social mobility and justice as ever more increasingly present above all in USA, UK and Italy, many studies and researches of Stiglitz corroborating many points of this paper. But, in many respects, the modern (but, for what has just been said, not the contemporary one) history of USA and, above all, the contemporary history of Nord Europe countries, are some of the best instances of such an event, being mainly linked to the institutional establishment and recognition of the widest number of terms or aspects of the Otherness \mathcal{O} together their availability and usability according to certain innovative, factual and efficient criteria. On the other hand, solid and rich economic development and growing only, are not sufficient conditions for a modern general setting and wellness of a country or nation, as emblematically exemplified, for instance, by India (see, for example, the reports of the Planning Commission of the Government of India) and China (in general, the countries belonging to the so-called BRICS), where an high degree of social-cultural shortage still persist, also due to either the great basic human needs and rights lack, social status discriminations and income distribution disparities there present, and the big demographic expansion which is the supporting living basis for their increasing hard capitalistic economy whose two of the main noxious effects that it entails, is the environment pollution with severe global repercussions, and the maintenance of social stratification (hence, social inequality) through the inheritance of capital (Dobb 2013).

Nannini 1981). In any case, this formal internal parametric characterization of the Otherness (or Alterity) \mathcal{O} by means of the individual series of Significant Others \mathcal{S}_O , in turn may imply a further, possible formal characterization of the individual Generalized Other, say \mathcal{G}_O , as it contains the former, that is, $\mathcal{S}_O \subseteq \mathcal{G}_O (\subseteq \mathcal{O})$. So, we are inclined to think that modernization-demodernization phenomena might be influenced by this possible formal parametrization of the Generalized Other \mathcal{G}_O by means of the series of Significant Others \mathcal{S}_O . In this regard, we are also disposed to think that a *paucity* of the series of Significant Others \mathcal{S}_O , as well as a *rigidity* of the Generalized Other \mathcal{G}_O , or else a certain *narrowness* of the sense of Alterity (or Otherness) \mathcal{O} or a shrinkage of the set of its terms (as seen above), are at the early and deep structural bases of demodernization phenomena because, for example, such formal conditions may shrink the variety and nature of the dualistic and dialectic relationships between *I* and *Me*, i.e., the unavoidable basis for building up own *Self*, with a consequent flattening towards the latter (conformism), while a narrowness of the Otherness, anyway institutionally imposed, would surely entail a scant assortment of the Generalized Other (i.e., *Me*) individualistically acquirable, whence a shortness of the series of Significant Others, as for example surely implied by a social-cultural-political institutional lacking³⁶ just related with \mathcal{O} . Therefore, deficiency, rigidity or unilaterality of collective institutions would imply a narrowed sense of the already polisemantic Alterity (or Otherness) and vice versa³⁷, hence a rigidity of the Generalized Other, whence a pooriness of the series of Significant Others, whence demodernization pushes.

Often, restraints or limitations to modernization and progress rely on *unconscious* places³⁸, upon which, as said above, lean on public institutions themselves (C. Lévi-Strauss). On the other hand, possible unconscious phenomena may be also contemplated within this our framework just through the unconscious features of the Generalized Other, individually belonging to the Meadian *Me*, if one takes into consideration what has been said above on the relationships and the many common points between the latter agency and the last Freudian conception of Super-Ego agency. In this respect, as a first example, we would like to look at that particular sociological phenomenon of persistence, in the cultural memory (in the sense of Jan Assmann (1997)) of *local unconscious vestiges*³⁹ regarding

³⁶ On the other hand, as a matter of socio-economic fact, it is known that the more underdeveloped countries are those with a poorly organized institutional setting (Nafziger 2005, Chapter 4; Leeson & Coyne 2004). It is enough to recall that the most developed countries of the world have always been characterized by a wide and variegated Otherness, recognized at every socio-institutional level. This is confirmed too by the latest *Transparency International* corruption perceptions index 2014, if one considers just the close relations existing between socio-economic grow and institutional setting. *En passant*, from a historical viewpoint, we also recall that the identification of the primary connection between politic-juridical systems (chiefly characterized by the celebrated law of independence of powers) and socio-economic conditions dates back to Montesquieu, hence was a theme of anthropology as recalled by E. Evans-Pritchard (Assier-Andrieu 2001, p. 70).

³⁷ There would be a problematic issue regarding the nature of correspondence between Otherness \mathcal{O} and its public institutional counterpart, for instance asking which has had between them historical priority. In any case, as pointed out in (Viola & Zaccaria 1999, Chapter I, Section 9), since customary law (in close relation with \mathcal{O}) is strictly related with normative-legislative law (upon which relies public institutions), with both having a general relevance, very often the former is the basis for the development of the latter. See also (Assier-Andrieu 2001).

³⁸ As first pointed out by Lévi-Strauss who, thanks to his structural anthropology, has studied social-cultural phenomena in dependence on the unconscious structures underlying them (Remotti 1971; Nannini 1981). But also the structural-functionalistic trend of sociology has tried to go beyond the official institutions: in this regard, George Homans, a Parsons' pupil, stresses the importance to seek what there is of deepest in the constituted official institutions, their earliest origins, so finding the so-called *sub-institutional*, which is the basic social glue, what gives rise to social exchange and relationships (Demarchi et al., 1994).

³⁹ Also Freud, as early before Jung, in many points of his great work, considered aspects of a collective or transpersonal unconscious, for instance when he speaks of *archaic vestiges* in the Super-Ego (hence, in the Otherness as modeled by Meadian *Me* along the line that links together Super-Ego and *Me* agencies), as well as consciousness' acts which are

public institutions and general law, like that emblematic case study⁴⁰ provided by a South Italy not finite architecture custom, quite unsightly and unaesthetic, simply consisting in keeping unfinished some last upper parts of many buildings without any current reasonable motivation, if not the ones retraceable in a minor clause contained in an ancient norm of Bourbon tax system which exempted the building owner to pay fee just in case of uncompleted construction of an edifice. In such a case, which is today anachronistic and meaningless⁴¹, the actual lacking of a specific and apposite current norm regulating this last situation filled up only by truly old customs⁴² (hence, with an institutional deficiency of the Otherness, or a shortage of its flexibility and functionality to give suitable and efficient responses), has yet entailed, so to speak, the unconscious persistence of vestiges of ancient local norms (mainly by enculturation), with a consequent decline in the architectural style and sight aesthetics (i.e., a kind of urban demodernization⁴³). Likewise, as a second example of this type of sociological phenomena of demodernization which lay upon unconscious aspects, we now quote

influenced by archaic motifs, conscious traditions which may be unconscious in those individuals lacking of normative patterns and frameworks as provided by Super-Ego agency in ruling and guiding human action. Just in this last Freudian sense, we may understand such local unconscious vestiges (Jung 1992; Rosen et al. 1991). In this regard, the notable sociological work of Pierre Bourdieu (1983), inspired by C. Lévi-Strauss' structuralism and centred on the key notion of *habitus* acting in a given *social space*, also may be usefully laid out within a collective unconscious framework where, for instance, these *local unconscious vestiges* are nothing but those social-cultural traditions, usages, habits, customs and practices of a given people socially organized in a certain land, which are historically inherited symbolically (by means of the so-called Bourdieu's *symbolic violence*) just as a Bourdieu's *habitus* operating in a given *social space* according to field interactions and relationships which exist independently of single will and consciousness (in this, agreeing with Marxism), to give rise *social-cultural order* and warrant the *social-cultural reproduction* – hence, in particular, the social stratification – according to structuralism. As regard then juridical context, one of the first scholars who considered possible applications of deep psychology in studying foundations of law, was Giuseppe Vadalà Papale (1889; 1895), a jurist and philosopher of law, chancellor of the University of Catania (IT) in which he was too one of the first Italian academicians holders of a social psychology chair. In passing, we also recall that recent epigenetic researches may come in help of collective unconscious ideas if one appeals to the possibility of inheritance of previous genetic regulations (Shelburne 1988).

⁴⁰ See the interesting article: Eleonora Aragona, "Il non-finito. Un'architettura del Sud", *L'Indro. L'approfondimento quotidiano indipendente*, 10 Febbraio 2015.

⁴¹ The interesting acquisition process of traits of personal character from a suitable transformation of (individual and) collective customs and practices, has been recently studied, within juridical anthropology but without makes reference to unconscious constructs, by Louis Assier-Andrieu (1999; 2001). Cf. also (Scionti 2013, pp. 61-62) and (Viola & Zaccaria 1999, Chapter I, Section 9).

⁴² In fact, following (Assier-Andrieu 2001, p. 83), «[...] la notion de "norme" semble tendre, dans le vocabulaire des sciences du droit, à occuper le terrain apparemment laissé vacant par le concept de coutume. [...] Dans la façon dont le "social" interpelle le droit émerge un nouvel espace pour le concept de coutume. Sa faculté d'incarner la récurrence des modèles d'organisation sociale dans la longue durée se retrouve dans les sociologies actuelles des *temporalités du lien social*. [...] Lévi-Strauss avait opposé la place de la coutume au culte de la loi abstraite». The persistence of this architectural custom might then be brought back to the tendency or will to impose own group identity over time. Indeed, following (Viola & Zaccaria 1999, pp. 90-98), the main forms of juridical communication are custom, contract, law or norm and the self-regulation of behaviour. The law is generally meant as the formal language of social interaction, and just in the custom there is an original and inextricable mixture between the factual aspect and the normative one of the social interaction. Therefore, the custom law is at the basis of legislative law, as the custom is at the early origins of any form of social agreement, without which it cannot exist. Again following (Assier-Andrieu 2001, p. 87), «[...] si la lettre des textes législatifs ou réglementaires demeure globalement fidèle à l'idéologie fondatrice du corps social et politiques, les modalités réelles de leur mise en œuvre supposent ou favorisent la reconnaissance de groupes spécifiques. Au surplus, ils suscitent la formulation des revendications d'insertion *en termes de spécificités de groupes*, [...] comme [...] manifestent une *volonté d'appartenir*, c'est-à-dire qu'ils expriment un *sentiment préalable d'appartenance*». The custom and usage are spontaneous and widespread production manners of laws by means of repeated commonly shared social behaviours and attitudes.

⁴³ The case study here considered, may be also framed «dans un espace sociologiquement "coutumier": un ensemble de pratiques alternatives à la légalité surplombante, une théorie de l'appartenance au plus près du "peuple" et du territoire, l'affirmation d'une continuité normative. En attestant l'existence de "coutumes ancestrales" propres à un groupe culturel et en intégrant la nécessité de les préserver dans la définition de la solidarité [...]» (Assier-Andrieu 2001, p. 88).

that strange lacking of future tense in Sicilian speech (or dialect) which surely may be brought back to the frustration and pessimistic distrust that still characterize Sicilian temperament, which often seems even remember the ancient “lamentations” and human environment of Greek tragedies, likely due to the numerous, long and persistent foreign dominations which have interested a lot of time Sicily land and Sicilian people, along its millenary historical course. Also in this latter case, a narrowness of the Otherness (which has, as already said, a non-negligible unconscious extent) is explicated in linguistic terms as a kind of demodernization linguistic phenomenon due to certain space-time failures or gaps in the historical realization of the language in the Sicilian speech (or dialect⁴⁴), that is a typical feature of every dialect as recalled in the previous footnote, to which has

⁴⁴ Loosely speaking, we may consider a *speech* as an historical realization of a *language* which takes place in a given space-time range within a given social-cultural group or community in which certain signs, values and symbols, systemically organized, may historically determine such a speech. The variety of speeches is then provided by the various historical determinations of the language (Yule 1997). In this specific case study, we have the persistence of archaic unconscious material (by Freud called *archaic vestiges*, as recalled by Jung) produced, by repression, in occasion of certain meaningful, peculiar and incisive space-time events (*variants*) which have afterwards contributed, by re-emersion, to the formation and maintenance of specific and aspecific temporal modalities of verbal conjugations of the Sicilian speech to which inherent social-cultural institutions have yet precluded, for some reasons, any form of change. Indeed, following the work of William Labov, changes in language may occur when a variant spreads among a given social group, so passing from a manifestation of free variation to a symbol (conscious or unconscious) of the social values of that group, even to become an unconscious statement of the identity of the group itself (Berruto 1999). On the other hand, language is an important cultural and intellectual resource more or less socially and institutionally shared but whose access and posses may undergo to different opportunities in dependence on membership social class. Glauco Sanga too has just argued on the deep archaic nature of dialect – like the Sicilian speech – meant as the residual of surpassed social relations, that later will disappear when its social function will be definitively faded (Berutto 1999). In this our case study regarding Sicilian speech, the emergence of archaic unconscious vestiges (likely dating back to the previous foreign dominations against which Sicilian people wanted, above all symbolically – as in this case study regarding language – to impose the ever negated will of a never recognized Sicilian identity) is, for example, explainable by means of the basic psychoanalytic relationship between Freudian *thing* (unconscious) *representation* and *word* (conscious) *representation*, to be precise in the inseparable representation pair *thing representation-word representation* charactering the spoken (conscious) language, in which the implicit archaic unconscious vestiges brought by thing representation, and due to the repression of strongly unpleasant remembrances of past foreign domination events, is strictly linked with the word representation that, in such a case, is elicited as a pessimistic lacking of future tense in verbal conjugations of Sicilian speech. In this case, as stressed by Salga, this unconscious feature of Sicilian speech might be removed changing its specific and original social or institutional function, hence modifying the corresponding right term of Otherness deputed to this end (Freud 1915; Jung 1992; Correnti 1992; Camilleri 2002). On the other hand, we might speak of *local* unconscious vestiges just thanks to the correlations between the constructs \mathcal{S}_O , \mathcal{G}_O , \mathcal{O} , the latter in particular, the Meadian *Me*, and the Freudian Super-Ego, together their unconscious feature, of the latter in particular. Indeed, it is through the former set of constructs, in particular \mathcal{O} , that locality may be taken into account and individualistically implemented through \mathcal{S}_O and \mathcal{G}_O (hence *Me*), while through the Super-Ego agency and its unconscious nature, such a feature (i.e., the locality) may acquire unconscious nature. To corroborate further this, we appeal to what is said in (Hall 1968, Chapter XIV), that stresses the fact that humans cannot never eradicate themselves from their original culture which is so deeply rooted in our unconscious to be able to determine our perception of the world. Even if small fragments or pieces of this hidden framework (the unconscious) may become aware, it will be however very difficult to modify them, not only because they manifest only at an individualistic level, but above all because they lie at the early bases of culture and humans cannot act and interact without culture. In the same words of Edward T. Hall: «In the briefest possible sense, the message [...] is that no matter how hard man tries it is impossible for him to divest himself of his own culture, for it has penetrated to the roots of his nervous system and determines how he perceives the world. Most of culture lies hidden and is outside voluntary control, making up the warp and weft of human existence. Even when small fragments of culture are elevated to awareness, they are difficult to change, not only because they are so personally experienced but because people cannot act or interact at all in any meaningful way except through the medium of culture. Man and his extensions constitute one interrelated system. It is a mistake of the greatest magnitude to act as though man were one thing and his house or his cities, his technology or his language were something else. Because of the interrelationship between man and his extensions, it behoves us to pay much more attention to what kinds of extensions we create, not only for ourselves but for others for whom they may be ill suited. The relationship of man to his extensions is simply a continuation and a specialized form of the relationship of organisms in general to their environment» (Hall 1968, Chapter XIV, p. 234). Therefore, the well-known Hall’s theory called *proxemics*, basically meant as an anthropology of human spaces, contributes much to support the ideas claimed in

not corresponded any official institutional change to fill this linguistic gap or lacking whose latent meaning has an historical motivation, as we have seen. This is a simple, but emblematic, example, of how an institutional lack (in this case, at a linguistic level⁴⁵), i.e., a narrowness in the official actuation of the Otherness, has entailed a demodernization instance whose early origins should be retraced in the local history of the given region. On the other hand, just South Italy institutions, not by chance, still manifest an as much intricate, bogged down and extremely bureaucratic institutional system whose structure seems still keep privileges and harassments of the previous ‘foreign dominators’: see, for instance, the emblematic situation of the even more oppressing and often indiscriminate Italian fiscal system⁴⁶ in regard to efficiency, functionality, productivity and services to which citizens have access and disposability, and that, basically, in its main intentionality and real meaning, has little changed with respect to those of the previous foreign dominators⁴⁷, which seem behaviours, attitudes and usages now unconsciously taken by the current Italian ruling institutional classes from time to time in service. This situation is then more evident in South Italy,

this paper, above all in regard to the *local unconscious vestiges* we have mentioned above. On the other hand, it is well-known that already philosophy considered the strict link between human being and her or his environment, as pointed out, above all, by Martin Heidegger in his celebrated *Being and Time* (1917) who has highlighted what primary and basic ontological relationship there exists between every human and her or his environment. To be precise, Heidegger, in putting lived time as the typical, original and founding feature of the Being, stigmatizes the deep relation existing between the anthropological space, meant as a closed local system in which human lives, and the realization of her or his ‘authentic existence’ very far from the alienating derives of ‘inauthenticity’ just provided by globalization and extreme urbanization. Thus, as early Heidegger had understood what deep, atavistic and close ontological relationships held among lived time, anthropological space and human existence.

⁴⁵ The role of language considered as a chief means operating between the *implicit* (i.e., unconscious) component and the *explicit* one of a culture, is deeply discussed in (Kluckhohn 1962).

⁴⁶ Not by chance, from a recent Confartigianato market study, the South Italy regions are the most ill-treated countries of Italy in regard to fiscal imposition, where this reaches the highest levels but without a return in terms of social-cultural-economic modernization.

⁴⁷ This pernicious behaviour and custom of Italian political institutions against modernization (an emblematic instance of this simply being the ‘unreasonable’ – or unconscious – inability of Italian public institutions to handle, manage and invest European funds which often come back to Europe community headquarter), and even more stressed in South Italy, as recently claimed by latest OCSE statistics, European Central Bank, Svimez, Eurostat, Confindustria and Confartigianato study centre reports, might be clearly metaphorized, from an historical standpoint, by the celebrated quotation of the ‘impenetrable’ Tancredi Falconeri in *The Leopard* (of 1958) of Giuseppe Tomasi di Lampedusa, according to whom «If we want that things stay as they are, it is need that all have to change», to mean that if the higher social classes want to hold power and leadership, then it is need to surreptitiously change things in respect to the eyes of lowest and bourgeois classes that claim power and an higher social level. Tancredi reproaches to his uncle, the prince Fabrizio Salina, to join with the ‘tricksters and mafia’ of Garibaldi’s expedition. So, believing in this, the prince Salina regretfully rejects the offer by the Savoy’s functionary Aimone Chavalley, to become a senator of the new Italian Reign, replying that «for understanding this his choice, it would have been enough to stay in Sicily, among Sicilians, for at least one year to be aware that the main pity a Sicilian does not forgive, is ‘the doing’, ‘the making’» (Sciascia 1991; 1996; Tessitore 1997; ECB 2015; Svimez 2015). This tendency to do nothing, masked by the (Tancredian) institutional custom to manifestly change in the form for covering, hindering a substantial invariance in the contents, has been just named *leopardism*, as, for instance, recently recalled too by Tobias Jones (2003). Unfortunately, the recent social-cultural-economical studies and researches in this respect (among which are too the latest OCSE reports), seem to confirm these considerations. The jurist and historian of law Giovanni Tessitore, in his work (Tessitore 1997), stresses that the main, real problem which plagues Sicily is its truly secular, ‘historical immobility’, broadly meant, that is to say, according to our framework, the lacking of any form of actuation and institution of the Otherness \mathcal{O} . Tessitore points out that the causes and reasons for this atavistic situation have not been the numerous forms of ‘bad government’ of the various occurred foreign dominations but rather the ‘non-government’ and the consequent institutional empty, i.e., the full absence of any efficient and working form of established Otherness \mathcal{O} , or, at least, the strong inertia of those official institutions which wanted stand out, or appear, as such. Again in the words of Sciascia, the Sicilian history is the history of a long series of flops, defeats, and disappointments ..., above all, is the history of the failure of any good attempt of sane reason (Tessitore 1997). So, we are inclined to think that such sort of ‘atavistic pessimism’ of Sicilian people (extendible to almost all South Italy), the main cause of its *inertia*, has its deep roots in the singular long history of Sicily (Renda 2003).

which seems destined to an ever more demodernization trend as recently claimed by the latest official statistical reports of European Central Bank, Confindustria, Confartigianato, Eurostat and Svimez centre, in which, among other, just speaks of a ‘‘rigidity’’ behaviour of institutions (ECB 2015; Svimez 2015). All this seems enough to corroborate what has been proposed in this contribution about the pivotal role played by Otherness \mathcal{O} (with its related individualistic constructs $\mathcal{S}_\mathcal{O}$ and $\mathcal{G}_\mathcal{O}$) and its official institutional actuation and establishment, in trying to formally mould modernization-demodernization phenomena, although in a very elementary fashion.

In conclusion, therefore, the two case studies quoted above are simple but emblematic instances of the persistence of local unconscious vestiges in official institutions through the Otherness construct \mathcal{O} , which still persist and hand down in the social-cultural memory of a given organized collectivity, so influencing its nature, structure and further development, hence, through the related $\mathcal{S}_\mathcal{O}$ and $\mathcal{G}_\mathcal{O}$ individualistic constructs, contributing as well to affect the formations of the social character of every social member, from the standpoint of symbolic interactionism. This discussion is therefore carried out according to that trend of sociology which confides in the strong influence exerted by social factors, structures and relations in the constitution and development of human personality, just through the social-cultural memory operating via the institutional actuation, establishment and recognition of the Otherness (or Alterity) and its related constructs, meant according to (Meadian) symbolic interactionism. On the other hand, this last sociological trend cannot be fully neglected because otherwise, from an anthropological standpoint, those observed cultural diversities among various peoples and societies (even present at a local level) might not be explained except referring to genetic differences and racist motivations which does not have any scientific basis.

To summing up, we think that Otherness (or Alterity) \mathcal{O} with its related (individualistic) constructs $\mathcal{S}_\mathcal{O}$ and $\mathcal{G}_\mathcal{O}$, of (Meadian) symbolic interactionism, together with its various psychoanalytic features as provided by the last Freudian framework, may be usefully employed to try to formally explain modernization-demodernization phenomena. Moreover, the two case studies mentioned above show too what role may play the past institutional history in the current institutional setting, its structure and functioning, which might be explained only making reference to certain unconscious constructs, as recalled above (Super-Ego and Otherness), which are the humus for the various *automatisms* and *recurrences* of the past⁴⁸. From these two specific case studies, it seems that the history of past general institutions⁴⁹ (or collective social-cultural history) has a great influence (just unconsciously, through \mathcal{O}) on the present state, structure and development of the current institutions, social-cultural orders and their functioning, in certain cases (as those seen above) hindering⁵⁰ modernization

⁴⁸ For instance, a recurrent historical phenomenon is the imperialistic tendency of the nations.

⁴⁹ Maybe, those nations which have a very long and troubled history are more liable to demodernization phenomena just due to the great and heavy historical legacy which seems to restrain progress; the recent events occurred in Middle East and Islamic countries, comprised those of Mediterranean area (see also Greece), seem to lead toward these suppositions. In this regard, as early Lévy-Strauss has pointed out these aspects in his theory of *hot* and *cold* societies, which roughly are respectively in favour and against history and, above all, social-cultural-economical differentiation if one takes as main estimate parameter for modernization the western ethnocentric standpoint centred on technological progress. For cold societies, the historical time is simple felt as a mere repetition, while, for hot societies, historical time is a continuous becoming (Remotti 1971, Chapter VI; Nannini 1981, Chapter XII). The above example regarding the nullification of future tense is a metalinguistic artifice to try to abolish linear and irreversible time, as is typical in hot societies, in favour of a cyclic time, as is typical in cold societies (Nannini 1981, Chapter XII, Section 2). However, already P.L. Berger and T. Luckmann have pointed out, among other things, the crucial role of history in the sociology of knowledge and institutions (Berger & Luckmann 1969).

⁵⁰ As it were due to the unconscious action of a kind of *collective compulsion to repeat* mechanism (as meant by Freud), with its typical conservative and inertial nature (Galimberti 2006), to which the so-called *modern* and *primitive* societies

processes, or social changes, when suitable and functional norms or other juridical tools and means, have not been planned to face and adequately reifies it and its irruption, as for Peter L. Berger and Thomas Luckmann (1969), according to whom the *reality*, meant as the set of all external things which lie outside our own voluntary control, is due to the interrelationships with the other, and does not exist without this latter. Such a reality is independent of us, is intersubjectively shared by all individuals through *language* (the most important symbolic system) and *sign systems*, and is immediately manifested and showed by the interactions with the other, above all through the so-called *common sense*. According to Berger and Luckmann, in order to an *institution* there exists, two main conditions have to occur, namely, that it has either a historical development and schemata of behaviours (conventions and typings) and patterns of actions; they hold thanks to cultural memory (Assmann 1997) and different *symbolic systems* historically built up and in reciprocal interaction among them, ruled and ordered by certain *norm systems*. According to Berger and Luckmann, a generic institution arises from the ‘‘crystallization’’ of customs, habits, typings and practices, in certain collectivities or social groups (Bourdieu *habitus*), which have proper historical routes providing patterns of behaviours and attitudes. This typical process of institutionalization is the basis for any further form of social relation. Once established this, an institution undertakes an objective status as *historically* created and inherited by humans through symbolic systems, and playing the role of reciprocal integration within society; in turn, humans are moulded by these institutions (*homo socius*⁵¹) just according to symbolic interactionism, while such symbolic systems become meaningful through systems of *collective legitimization*. In any case, the variation of the Otherness \mathcal{O} is closely related with the *social change* which, in turn, is based on *social reproduction* processes which are like those biological processes guarantying the life maintenance of a living organism, without which it is destined to die, so that also a given society, to remain in life, must undergo to these social reproduction processes ruling social change according to those modalities and aims politically prevailing (Gallino 2006). As each human individual has an her or his own (personal) unconscious ruling her or his life, so any society has an its own (collective) unconscious ruling its life (Barel 1974; Robertson 1991).

differently react: the former, mainly with an even more increasing technological progress, the latter, on the contrary, chiefly staying on mythologies and scotomizing history, and this in accordance with the above Lévy-Straussian theory of *hot* and *cold* societies whose related bifurcation took place in concomitance with the so-called *totemic empty*, that is to say, the lacking of totemism’s traces above all in the great Asiatic and European, in coherence with some theories on the appearance of symbolic function (culture) and general fetishistic degenerations (materialistic consumption) from totemic practices (Iurato 2013).

⁵¹ Cf. (Høgh-Olesen 2010).

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