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Suspensive Condition & Dynamic Epistemic Logic.


In line with [2], [12, 13, 14] carefully studies the Leibnizian notion of suspensive condition—notion that Leibniz sometimes names moral condition. Thiercelin points out Leibniz’ will to provide a rigorous definition of that kind of condition. Leibniz not only establishes a link between the legal notion of condition and the logical notion of condition, but he also grasps the problematic of suspensive condition through its epistemic and dynamic features. In this paper we start from Thiercelin’s reflections about Leibniz’ suspensive condition. Thiercelin’s work offers an inventory of different clauses that a logical conditional must fulfill to capture the legal meaning of suspensive condition. Our aim is to compare such a definition with the Public Announcement operator semantics ([16]) taking advantage of both its model theoretic semantics and its dialogical semantics (introduced for the first time in [5]). We show that the public announcement operator entails the same dynamic and epistemic features than the ones that Leibniz requires with its notion of suspensive condition.


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hal-01136330 , version 1 (27-03-2015)


  • HAL Id : hal-01136330 , version 1


Sébastien Magnier. Suspensive Condition & Dynamic Epistemic Logic.: A Leibnizian Survey. Past and Present Interactions in Legal Reasoning and Logic, 2015, ISBN 978-3-319-16020-7. ⟨hal-01136330⟩
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