
## Advancing Metropolitan Modeling for the Analysis of Urban Sustainability Policies


Land supply effects and drivers of town planning choices.

Some empirical observations in a metropolitan modeling perspective.


Laurence Delattre and Claude Napoléone INRA Ecodéveloppement AgroSup Dijon – UMR CESAER









Source: Terres d'Europe-Scafr d'après Safer sauf (a) Safer-SSP-Terres d'Europe-Scafr, (b) Maisons anciennes d'après la série INSEE-Notaires, et (c) Safer-SSP-Terres d'Europe-Scafr -INRA













### Issue

What is the impact of land use regulations on these prices?

Regulations make prices increase?

- increased scarcity (reduced supply);
- amenity effect (increased demand);
- spillover effect (shifted demand);

Empirical observations show this impact, in accordance with theoretical analysis of a pure competitive market.

Jaeger and Platinga (2007), Ihlanfeldt (2007), Glaeser and Gyourko (2006), Saiz (2010), McMillen and McDonald (2002), Tse (2001), Lecat (2006)...

### Issue


Does developable land supply increase (restriction) inevitably lead to developable land and housing price decrease (increase), as usually assumed?

### Issue

Does developable land supply increase (restriction) inevitably lead to developable land and housing price decrease (increase), as usually assumed?

- Materials and methods
- Results
- Implications and discussion

Materials: Study area = The Provence Alpes Côte d'Azur région



31 400 km<sup>2</sup> (2.8 times smaller than Greater LA), 5 million inhabitants spread over 963 municipalities

#### Municipal population in 1999:


1st quartile: 8-180 inhabitants

2<sup>nd</sup> quartile: 180-649 inhabitants

3rd quartile: 649-2805 inhabitants

■ 4<sup>th</sup> quartile: 2085-797491 inhabitants

Materials: Study area = The Provence Alpes Côte d'Azur région












Mountain



Materials: Study area = The Provence Alpes Côte d'Azur région 358 municipalities



Methodology: Difference in Difference

Treatment group: the municipalities that had created the greatest number or the largest area of developable plots (different indexes), generating a high developable land supply.

A control group: the municipalities with the same characteristics regarding the likelihood of having high land supply but that had not created a lot of developable plots.

Counterfactual: average property price that would have been expected if municipalities wouldn't have benefited from this level of supply.

## **Results**

									Balancing t-tests		
Options	N	$n_1$	$n_0$	ATT est.	Std.	T	p-val.	Effect	dist.	population	area
					Dev.			cor. %	pole		
GT1/NT1,	53	12	12	0,24071	0,0665	3,6178		17,17	0,17	0,078	0,175
M=1							0,0003***				
GT1/NT1,	53	12	60	0,1943	0,0584			16,40	0,21	0,003**	0,044*
M=5							0,0009***				
GT2/NT,	36	12	12	0,29136	0,0764	3,8125		18,05	0,66	0,051,	0,038*
M=1				l .			0,0001***				
GT2/NT2,	36	12	60	0,22925	0,0615	3,7274		16,98	0,32	0,049*	0,031*
M=5				l .			0,0002***				
GT3/NT3,	54	11	13	0,24172	0,0571	4,2302	2,3e-	17,20	0,79	0,113	
M=1							05***				
GT3/NT,	54	11	55	0,22996	0,0383	5,997	2,0e-09	17,02	0,94	0,070	
M=5							***				
GT4/NT,	29	9	9	0,33597	0,1009	3,3301		18,84	0,38	0,060	
M=1							0,0009***				
GT4/NT,	29	9	45	0,31122	0,0661	4,7094	2,5e-	18,43	0,76	0,048*	
M=5							06***				

## Implications and discussion

Higher developable land supply → higher prices.... upsloping demand curve.

### Possible explanation

Local supply but local and non local-demand, not focused on a particular location

+

Regulations (restrictions) could increase uncertainty and transaction costs, while zoning large new developable areas is a market signal for non-specific demand


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Impact on price at a regional level regardless of municipal characteristics

## Implications and discussion

- Connected/further research
  - Why do some municipalities keep increasing their developable area? → Drivers of land use policy decisions
  - Explanations previously mentioned 
     Theoretical model

# Thank you for your attention!



Evolution des prix du foncier entre 1997 et 2010, par sous-marché, base 100 en 1997

- ... land and housing markets can hardly be considered perfectly competitive (even when there are public regulations to address imperfections and failures)
- land and housing owners = monopolist? (Scotchmer and Thisse, 1993; Fujita and Thisse 2003).
- high level of uncertainty -> under- efficient speculative behaviors (Mills, 1981) and densities (Fujita and Kashiwadani, 1989)