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Article Dans Une Revue Ecological Economics Année : 1996

Bilateral or multilateral bargaining in the face of global environmental change?

Résumé

This model deals with the problem of the greenhouse effect—a problem of transfrontier pollution. It consists of determining, through the description of a bargaining process, the conditions under which it is preferable for the developing countries to speak with a united voice, and those conditions under which it is preferable for them to negotiate separately one from the other. In particular it is shown that the agreements arising from the bargaining cannot be equitable, and for that reason they include only a limited number of countries.
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Dates et versions

hal-01100892 , version 1 (07-01-2015)

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  • HAL Id : hal-01100892 , version 1

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Sylvain Zeghni, Gilles Rotillon, Tarik Tazdait. Bilateral or multilateral bargaining in the face of global environmental change?. Ecological Economics, 1996, 18 (2), pp.177-187. ⟨hal-01100892⟩
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