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Conference Papers Year : 2010

A New Security Model for Authenticated Key Agreement

Augustin Sarr
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  • PersonId : 867693
Philippe Elbaz-Vincent


The Canetti–Krawczyk (CK) and extended Canetti–Krawczyk (eCK) security mo-dels, are widely used to provide security arguments for key agreement protocols. We discuss security shades in the (e)CK models, and some practical attacks unconsi-dered in (e)CK–security arguments. We propose a strong security model which en-compasses the eCK one. We also propose a new protocol, called Strengthened MQV (SMQV), which in addition to provide the same efficiency as the (H)MQV protocols, is particularly suited for distributed implementations wherein a tamper–proof device is used to store long–lived keys, while session keys are used on an untrusted host machine. The SMQV protocol meets our security definition under the Gap Diffie– Hellman assumption and the Random Oracle model.
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Dates and versions

hal-01099279 , version 1 (02-01-2015)



Augustin Sarr, Philippe Elbaz-Vincent, Jean-Claude Bajard. A New Security Model for Authenticated Key Agreement. Seventh Conference on Security and Cryptography for Networks (SNC), Sep 2010, Amalfi, Italy. pp.219 - 234, ⟨10.1007/978-3-642-15317-4_15⟩. ⟨hal-01099279⟩
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