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Communication Dans Un Congrès Année : 2008

Does Aversion to the Sucker's Payoff Matter in Public Goods Games?

Résumé

A usual explanation to low levels of contribution to public goods is the fear of getting the sucker's payoff (cooperation by the participant and defection by the other players). In order to disentangle the effect of this fear from other motives, we design a public good game where people have an assurance against getting the sucker's payoff. We show that contributions to the public good under this 'protective' design are significantly higher and interact with expectations on other individuals' contribution to the public good. Some policy implications and extensions are suggested.
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Dates et versions

hal-01072344 , version 1 (06-06-2020)

Identifiants

  • HAL Id : hal-01072344 , version 1
  • PRODINRA : 36600

Citer

Douadia Bougherara, Sandrine Costa, Gilles Grolleau, Lisette Ibanez. Does Aversion to the Sucker's Payoff Matter in Public Goods Games?. 10. Journées d'Economie Expérimentale, JEE, Association Française de Science Economique (AFSE). FRA., May 2008, Dijon, France. 9 p. ⟨hal-01072344⟩
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