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# An Approach to Automated Runtime Verification for Timed Systems: Applications to Web Services

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**Abstract**—Software testing plays an important role in verifying and assessing the quality of a software application. There are various testing approaches proposed for different application scenarios. In this paper, we propose a new passive testing approach to verifying a timed trace with respect to a set of constraints. With the extension of Nomad language, we are able to formally describe all constraints and combine conditions by logical operations AND and OR into expressions. By well organizing and evaluating the expressions, we are able to carry out runtime verification message by message in a timed trace. In addition to the theoretical framework, we have also developed a software tool known as RV4WS (Runtime Verification for Web Services) for the automation of our testing approach, and implemented all algorithms in the paper with this tool. We conduct a case study of web service composition to verify the effectiveness of our approach and tool.

**Keywords**—Runtime verification, Passive testing, Rule specification, Web services.

## I. INTRODUCTION

The activity of conformance testing focuses on verifying the conformity of a given implementation based on its specification. It can be classified into two categories, namely active testing and passive testing. (a) *Active testing* requires a tester to interact directly with the implementation under test (in short as IUT) and check the correctness of answers by the implementation. However, this method is not applicable to a running system due to some reasons like (1) testers do not have permission to access to the interface of a running system; (2) if testers use the active method to test functions like *create\_new\_account(...)* or *update\_debit(...)* of a banking system, it may incur errors like false accounts or updates in the database of the system; and (3) active testing does not allow us to check several security properties of a system that can only be captured at runtime or

when several sessions are executed in parallel. Moreover, because testing cannot find all faults, even if a system has passed an active test, we still need to verify its conformity at running time or to analyze its log files for improving the reliability of a system. (b) *Passive testing* collects the observable traces (i.e., the log files) of the running system by installing a probe and analyzes them based on a set of rules [8], [9], [21] or a formal specification [12]. Without a tester directly interacting with the IUT, passive testing does not effect the system running, and is widely adopted for system verification.

Passive testing can be carried out either on-line or off-line. The *on-line technique*, a.k.a. runtime verification technique, immediately checks an observable trace once an input/output event occurs so that potential damage can be prevented by terminating the system running whenever any fault is detected; whilst the *off-line technique* checks an observable trace after it is collected for a period of time, and does not usually require additional resources such as CPU, RAM or another computer to run both of the trace collection engine and checking engine in parallel.

For a complex system such as an SOA application or a cloud computing application, the communications across system components are carried out by signals, events, and messages, whose timed traces may be collected from a distributed environment and need to be well synchronized during verification. Therefore, we suggest to address the following factors when we define a set of constraints to verify a timed system.

- *Time constraint.* The passive testing verifies the message sequence in a trace. However, when a system is running, we do not know when the next message will arrive after the previous one. Thus we may have to set time constraint for each message. For example, we can set 10 seconds of time constraint for receiving a *loginResponse* after sending a *loginRequest*.
- *Condition on message content.* Sometimes we are only interested in some messages of which the contents satisfy some conditions. For example, we can identify the messages sent to or received from machine *A* by their contents (*SourceIP = A*) or

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( $DestIP = A$ ).

- **Data correlation.** For any observable trace mixed by several traces or sessions that are executed in parallel, we need to apply our constraints on the messages that belong to an individual trace or session. To do so, we firstly find the messages that have a correlation by their data values (known as data correlation), and then apply our constraints on these messages. For example, we can assign *sessionId* fields to messages belonging to different sessions running in parallel, can group these messages by the values of *sessionId* field before applying our rules for correctness verification.
- **Combination of conditions.** A constraint can also be represented by a combination of several conditions with logical operations such as AND, OR, and NOT.

In this paper we propose a new approach to passive testing either on-line or off-line for a timed system by verifying a timed trace based on a set of rules which contains the constraints on message sequence, the interval time between any two messages, and the contents of messages. To formally describe constraints for the specifying permissions and prohibitions, we propose to extend the Nomad [14] language by defining the constraints on each atomic action (fixed conditions) and a set of data correlations between the actions, so as to describe permissions and prohibitions both of which are atomic actions and should be applied immediately and obligations which are related to non-atomic actions within contexts and need a time duration to complete. For example, let  $x$  be a positive integer, a prohibition or a permission rule is evaluated to be *true* at time  $t$  if  $t \in [0, x]$ ; whereas an obligation rule is evaluated to be *true* at time  $t$  if  $t \geq x$ , meaning that the obligation needs at least a duration  $x$  to complete the work. Besides the theoretical framework, we develop a software tool known as RV4WS (Runtime Verification for Web Service) to implement the automation of our passive testing approach. In particular, the algorithms presented in this paper are fully implemented by this software tool. We also apply our tool to a case study of WebMov<sup>1</sup> project which provides design and composition mechanisms for web services.

The remaining sections are organized as follows. We first present some discussions about software testing and existing method for passive testing or runtime verification in Section II, and then introduce the syntax and semantics of our rules in Section III followed by an algorithm for verifying a timed system based on a set of rules in Section IV. In Section V, we introduce the RV4WS tool together with a case study in Section VI before concluding the paper in Section VII.

## II. DISCUSSION

### A. Software Testing

Testing is an important step to verify and assess the quality of a software application, and an appropriate testing type should be chosen for an individual application.

<sup>1</sup><http://webmov.lri.fr>




Fig. 1. Classification of testing types

We classify the types of testing into four categories based on the characteristics of the application, the phases of the development, the available information of specifications and the capability of application controls, and use a schema with four axes to show the classification as depicted in Figure 1.

#### 1) The characteristics:

- **Conformance testing.** It is used to test the conformance of an implementation based on its specification.
- **Robustness testing.** It is used to test the capability to deal with the unexpected data.
- **Performance testing.** It refers to the assessment of the performance of an application in different cases in terms of the speed and effectiveness.
- **Security testing.** It is a process to determine that an information system protects data and maintains functionality as intended. Some security concepts that need to be covered by security testing are listed as follows.
  - **Authentication**, which is the process of establishing the identification of a user.
  - **Authorization**, which is the process of determining that a requester is allowed to receive a service or perform an operation.
  - **Availability**, which is to assure information and communications services be ready for use upon requests or the information kept available to authorized users when they need it.
  - **Integrity**, which is a measure by which receivers can determine the correctness of the information provided by the system.
- **Reliability testing.** It evaluates the good functions under different conditions such as timing constraints, speed of network, etc.

#### 2) The phases of the development:

- **Unit testing.** It is to verify the operation of an individual component or module in isolation to the rest of the system.
- **Integrated testing.** It is to test the interactions

amongst components of a system. In other words, it tests a system at the interface level of each component.

- *System testing*. It is to verify the global behavior of the system.

### 3) *The accessibility:*

- *Black-box testing*. It allows testers to generate test cases from system specifications for functional testing without knowing the internal structure of system.
- *Gray-box testing*. It is used when some information of the internal structure are available for testers.
- *White-box testing*. It is used when testers know the internal structure of the system (i.e., the code) and allows testers to verify the structure by testing different paths in the code.

### 4) *The controllability:*

- *Active testing*. It allows testers to interact directly with the system under test by sending requests and receiving responses for analysis.
- *Passive testing*. It allows testers to assess a system from input/output events or log files without interacting with the system under test.

## B. *Passive Testing of systems*

Due to its side-effect to a system, passive testing is usually used as a monitoring technique to detect and report errors when we cannot use an active testing method. Another area of its applications is in network management for the detection of configuration problems, fault identification, or resource provisioning. This section reviews some passive testing approaches.

Bayse *et al.* [9] and Cavalli *et al.* [12] proposed a passive testing approach based on invariants of a Finite State Machine (FSM). They defined two types of invariants in the following for an FSM  $M = (\mathcal{S}, s_{in}, \mathcal{I}, \mathcal{O}, \mathcal{T})$  where  $\mathcal{S}$  is a set of finite states,  $s_{in}$  an initial state,  $\mathcal{I}$  the set of input actions,  $\mathcal{O}$  the set of output actions, and  $\mathcal{T}$  the set of transitions.

- *Simple invariant*. Trace  $i_1/o_1, i_1/o_1, \dots, i_{n-1}/o_{n-1}, i_n/O$  is a simple invariant of FSM  $M$  given that we necessarily get an output  $O$  where  $O \subseteq \mathcal{O}$  if we obtain the input  $i_n$  under the premise that each time the trace  $i_1/o_1, i_1/o_1, \dots, i_{n-1}/o_{n-1}$  is observed.
- *Obligation invariant*. It is used to express properties such as “if  $y$  happens then we must have that  $x$  had happened”.

They presented two algorithms to check from left-to-right and right-to-left a finite trace to give a verdict without considering the time constraints on the traces. TIPS [11] (Test Invariant of Protocols and Services) is an implementation tool of this approach.

To express temporal properties, Andrés *et al.* [1]–[3] introduced Timed Invariant as an extension of simple invariant with time constraints between an input and an output. There are some limitations of their Timed Invariant model as listed below.

- It only supports future times not past time. This is because its semantic is defined as “if we obtain a trace of the pair of input/output event (the interval time between an input and an output is also considered) and we continue to obtain an input (after this trace), then we must obtain an output after a fixed interval time”.
- It does not support combining several conditions into a Timed Invariant by the logical operations such as AND and OR.
- It does not consider the constraints on the content of each event, therefore the data correlation problem between the events is also not considered.
- Finally, the tool PasTe [1] that is implemented to check the correctness of a log w.r.t. a set of time invariant does not allow us to verify an execution trace in parallel with the trace collection engine, i.e., not supporting runtime verification or on-line checking.

Mallouli *et al.* [16] proposed the security rule using the Nomad language to express the constraints on a trace with *obligations*, *prohibitions* and *permissions*. That is, a prohibition or permission rule is granted and applied immediately to a trace; while a obligation rule delimits the completion deadline of a task. They also introduced an algorithm to check the correction of the trace following these security rules. Their approach solves the time constraints caused by invariant approach though, it does not consider the correlation of messages by its data values which is an important issue for passive testing.

Tabourier and Cavalli [22] proposed an approach to verify the traces which actually belong to the accepted specifications provided by an FSM. This method is composed of two stages:

- Firstly, passive homing sequence is applied to determine the current state. Initially, all states are put into a candidate list. When an input/output arrives, the current state will be updated by the destination state of the corresponding transition if it is the source state of the transition or otherwise removed from the candidate list. After a number of iterations, either a single current state is obtained and we move to the second step to detect the fault, or an input/output pair is not accepted by any candidate state. In the latter case, a fault is detected.
- Secondly, fault detection is carried out by applying the search technique to the current state and the current input/output pair. If a state which does not accept the following transition is reached, then there is an error; otherwise, then the end of the trace is reached, and no error is detected.

This method does not consider the time constraints on the traces and is not applicable to the case where the trace is collected from the execution of multi-sessions that run in parallel.

### C. Passive Testing of Web Services

In recent years, many methods have been proposed together with tools developed for passive testing of web services [4]–[6], [13], [17], [20]. These work focus on either checking the order of messages and/or its occurrence time on a trace file to give a verdict [13], [20], [21] or proposing a method for dynamic statistics [4], [6] of some properties of web services.

Dranidis *et al.* [17] proposed the utilization of Stream X-machines for constructing formal behavioral specifications of web services. They also presented a runtime monitoring and verification architecture and discussed how it can be integrated into different types of service-oriented infrastructures. However, they did not present an algorithm or a tool to verify an execution trace using the Stream X-machines specification of web services.

Baresi *et al.* [4], [5] presented a monitoring framework for BPEL orchestration which is obtained by integrating two approaches namely Dynamo and Astro, which are used for dynamic statistics of some properties of BPEL processes from single instance or multi instances. These work focus on the behavioral properties of composition processes expressed in BPEL rather than on individual web services. Moreover, an assessment (a verdict *true/false*) about service is not considered in this work.

Cavalli *et al.* [13] proposed a trace collection mechanism for SOA by integrating modules within BPEL engine and a tool [13], [16] that checks off-line execution traces. This approach uses the Nomad [14] language to define the security rule though, it does not allow us to check real-time (i.e., “on-line”) whenever a message happens. Moreover, this work does not consider the data correlation between the messages in the rules.

Li *et al.* [20], [21] presented the pattern and scope operators as the rule-based to define the interaction constraints of web services. The authors use FSM as semantic representation of interaction constraints. In this approach, the validation process runs in parallel with the trace collection. This approach is limited by the pattern number, while it does not consider the time constraints.

## III. RULE DEFINITION

### A. Syntax

In our work, we consider each message as an atomic action, and use one or several messages to define a formula with logical operations AND and OR. We also use the operation NOT to indicate that a message is not permitted to appear in the trace within a duration. During the formula definition, the constraint on message parameters values may be considered. Finally, from these formulas, the rule is defined in two parts, namely supposition (or condition) and context. The set of data correlations are included as an option.

**Definition 1. Atomic action.** An atomic action is either an input message or an output message, formally denoted as

$$AA := Event(Const)|\neg AA$$

where

- *Event* represents an input/output message name;
- $Const := P \approx V|Const \wedge Const|Const \vee Const$  where
  - $P$  are the parameters. These parameters represent the relevant fields in the message;
  - $V$  are the possible parameters values;
  - $\approx \in \{=, \neq, <, >, \leq, \geq\}$ ;
- $\neg A$  means *not*( $A$ ).

**Definition 2. Formula.** A formula is recursively defined as

$$F := start(A) | done(A) | F \wedge F | F \vee F | O^{d \in [m,n]} F$$

where

- $A$  is the atomic action;
- $start(A)$ :  $A$  is being started;
- $done(A)$ :  $A$  has been finished;
- $O^{d \in [m,n]} F$ :  $F$  was *true* in  $d$  units of time ago if  $m > n$ , and  $F$  will be *true* in the next  $d$  units of time if  $m < n$  where  $m$  and  $n$  are natural numbers.

**Definition 3. Data correlation.** A data correlation is a set of parameters that have the same data type where each different parameter represents a relevant field in a different message, for which the operator = (equal) is used to compare the equality amongst parameters. A data correlation is considered as a property on data.

**Example 1.** Let  $A(p_0^A, p_1^A)$ ,  $B(p_0^B, p_1^B, p_2^B)$  and  $C(p_0^C)$  be messages with  $p_i$  the parameters where  $p_0^A$ ,  $p_0^B$  and  $p_0^C$  have the same data type. A data correlation set that is defined based on  $A$ ,  $B$  and  $C$  is  $\{p_0^A, p_0^B, p_0^C\} \Leftrightarrow \{p_0^A = p_0^B = p_0^C\}$ .

By putting the time constraints into an interval, we support only two types of rules, namely *permission* and *forbidden*. Permission means that all traces must satisfy the constraints; whereas forbidden is the negation of a permission constraint.

**Definition 4. Rule with data correlation.** Let  $\alpha$  and  $\beta$  be formulas, and  $CS$  be a set of data correlations based on  $\alpha$  and  $\beta$  ( $CS$  is defined based on the messages of  $\alpha$  and  $\beta$ ). A rule with data correlation is defined as  $\mathcal{R}(\alpha|\beta)/CS^2$  where  $\mathcal{R} \in \{\mathcal{P}$ : Permission;  $\mathcal{F}$ : Prohibition;  $\}$ . The constraint  $\mathcal{P}(\alpha|\beta)$  or  $\mathcal{F}(\alpha|\beta)$  (where  $\mathcal{F}(\alpha|\beta) = \mathcal{P}(NOT \alpha|\beta)$ ) respectively means that it is permitted or prohibited to have  $\alpha$  *true* when context  $\beta$  holds within the conditions of  $CS$ .

**Example 2.** We create a new account on the services if we successfully logged in within maximal one day ago and have not yet logged out by now. The rule with data correlation for this event can be denoted as

$$\mathcal{P}(start(createAccountReq)|O^{d \in [1,0]} D done(loginRes) \wedge done(\neg logoutReq)).$$

In case we want to indicate the messages belonging to a session by using *sessionId*, we can denote it as

<sup>2</sup>CS is an optional part.

$$\mathcal{P}(\text{start}(\text{createAccountReq}) | O^{d \in [1,0]D} \\ \text{done}(\text{loginRes}) \wedge \text{done}(\neg \text{logoutReq})) / \\ \{\{\text{createAccountReq.sessionId}, \\ \text{loginRes.sessionId}, \text{logoutReq.sessionId}\}\}$$

### B. Semantics

A model of rules corresponds to a pair  $r = (P_r, C_r)$  where

- $P_r$  is a total function that associates every integer  $x$  with a propositional formula.
- $C_r$  is a total function that associates every integer  $x$  with a pairs  $(\alpha, d)$  where  $\alpha$  is a formula and  $d$  a positive integer.

Intuitively,  $\forall x, p \in P_r(x)$  means that proposition  $p$  is *true* at time  $x$ ; while  $(\alpha, d) \in C_r(x)$  means that context of formula  $\alpha$  holds (is evaluated *true*) at time  $t$  where

- $t \in [x, x + d]$  if we focus on future time.
- $t \in [x - d, x]$  if we focus on past time.

## IV. VERIFICATION

### A. Correctness of a System

The following definition is a formal description for the correctness of a system. That is, a system is correct if the execution traces obtained from the IUT satisfy the properties expressed by the rules, and a system fails if a rule is timeout or its content is evaluated to be *false*.

**Definition 5.** *Correctness of a timed trace w.r.t. a finite set of rules.* Let  $\sigma = \sigma_0.\sigma_1.\sigma_2\dots$  be an observable timed trace that is collected from a running system where  $\sigma_{i=0,1,2,\dots} = (m_i, t_i)$  denotes the message and its occurrence time, and let  $\Phi = \{\phi_0, \phi_1, \dots, \phi_n\}$  be a finite set of rules, define  $\sigma$  conforms to  $\Phi$  if and only if  $\forall \sigma_i, \nexists \phi_j$  such that  $\phi_j$  is timeout at  $t_i$  or the evaluation of  $\phi_j$  after updating its context is *false*.

### B. Checking Algorithm

In this section, we give the outline for the computation mechanism used to determine whether a rule holds for some given input/output sequence of events. Our algorithm verifies message-by-message the conformity with each rule without storing the message sequence. Here, we use two global variables, namely *currlist* and *rulelist*. *currlist* is a list of enabled rules that have been activated, while *rulelist* is the list of defined rules that are used to verify the system. Before introducing the detail of our algorithm, we present some functions running on the context of each rule.

- Function *correlation*. This function will return one of three values, namely either *undefined* or *true* or *false*. Value *undefined* is returned when a message is not defined in the set of data correlations of rule. If a message is defined in the set of data correlations of rule, then this function will query the corresponding value and return *true/false* after comparing it with the value of the previous messages.

- Function *contain*. This function verifies whether a message is contained by the context of a rule. It returns *true* if a message is found in the context of a rule and its conditions are validated (if they are defined). For example, given the context of the rule  $\text{msgA}(id = 5) \& \text{msgB}$ , when message  $\text{msgA}$  (with its value  $id = 4$ ) arrives, the function returns *false* because but its condition (i.e.,  $id = 4$ ) does not match that in the rule even if the message name is found; whereas when message  $\text{msgB}$  arrives, this function returns *true*.
- Function *update*. This function updates the value of context whenever a message arrives and is found in the context (verified by function *contain*). For example, the context of a rule is  $\text{loginResponse} \wedge \neg \text{logoutRequest}$ . When message  $\text{loginResponse}$  arrives, this context is updated as  $\text{true} \wedge \neg \text{logoutRequest}$ .
- Function *evaluate*. This function evaluates whether or not a context of rule holds (true) by returning one of three values, namely either *true* or *false* or *undefined*. The *undefined* value is returned if there is at least one message name in the context of the rule. For instance, context  $\text{true} \wedge \text{logoutRequest}$  is evaluated to be *undefined*. During the evaluation, a message with the function *NOT*<sup>3</sup> will be provisionally assigned as *true*. For example, at the time of evaluation, the expression  $\text{true} \wedge \neg \text{logoutRequest}$  will be evaluated as *true*.

As foregoing, there are two types of rules, namely future time and past time rules. To make this more clear, we will analyze the checking algorithm for each type.

#### 1) Rules with future time:

Given that each rule has two parts (i.e., the supposition and context parts), a rule will be evaluated as either *true* or *false* or *undefined* if its supposition has been enabled and the current message belongs to its context. At any occurrence time  $t$  of message  $\text{msg}$ , our algorithm checks the correctness of a rule by two steps.

- Step 1. Examine the list of enabled rules *currlist* to evaluate their context if the time constraints are valid. If the context of a rule is evaluated to be *true/false*, then it will be removed from the enabled list *currlist* and the corresponding verdict is returned. Otherwise (i.e., the context is *undefined*, meaning incomplete context), we wait for the arrival of the next message and return *true* to the verdict.
- Step 2. Examine the list of rules *rulelist* to activate them if their supposition contains the current message  $\text{msg}$ .

Algorithm 1 shows how to checks the correctness of a message with a set of future time rules, in which we assume that the rules are *Permission* (the *Forbidden* rules are the negation of the verdict of the *Permission* rules), and do not consider data correlation.

<sup>3</sup>This function only applies to atomic actions.

**Algorithm 1:** Checking algorithm for future time rules

**Input** : timed event:  $(msg, t)$   
**Output**:  $true/false$   
 $verdict \leftarrow true$

- 1) For each  $r \in currlist$ 
  - IF the time constraints of  $r$  at  $t$  are validation
    - IF  $msg$  belongs to the context of  $r$ 
      - \* Update context of  $r$  by  $msg$
      - \* IF the evaluation of the context of  $r$  is  $true/false$ 
        - Remove  $r$  from  $currlist$
        - $verdict \leftarrow verdict \wedge true/false$
    - ELSE:  $verdict \leftarrow false$
- 2) For each  $r \in rulelist$ 
  - IF  $msg$  belongs to the supposition of  $r$ 
    - Update the activated time for  $r$  by  $t$
    - Add  $r$  into  $currlist$  (activated)

2) Rule with past time:

For a rule with past time, the context part will happen before its supposition, meaning that the context part must be evaluated to be  $true/false$  whenever its supposition handles the current message. Upon the arrival of any timed event  $(msg, t)$ , our algorithm checks correctness of a rule with past time by two steps.

- Step 1. Examine the list of enabled rules  $currlist$  to check the correctness of current message  $msg$ . If  $t$  satisfies their time constraints and  $msg$  belongs to their supposition, then remove them from list  $currlist$ . At the same time, if their context is evaluated to be  $false/undefined$ , then a  $false$  verdict will be assigned; otherwise, a  $true$  verdict is admitted. On the other hand, if  $msg$  does not belong to their supposition and  $msg$  is found in their context, then we update their context by  $msg$  and wait the next message to evaluate these rules.
- Step 2. Examine the list of rules  $rulelist$  and activate them if their context contains the current message  $msg$ .

Algorithm 2 shows how to checks the correctness of a message with a set of past time rules under the assumption that the rules are *Permission*.

Be combining the above two algorithms, we give the complete checking algorithm as shown in algorithm 3. It verifies event-by-event and returns the verdict whenever a timed event happens. Two functions  $verify\_future()$  and  $verify\_past()$  called by algorithm 3 are shown in algorithms 4 & 5.

There is an exception that a *fail* verdict is returned if the algorithm finds a rule that is not satisfied and not applicable to current message. To identify which rule fails upon an arrival of message, we propose a graphic statistics to show the current test states.

**Example 3.** We have an execution of timed trace with

**Algorithm 2:** Checking algorithm for past time rules

**Input** : timed event:  $(msg, t)$   
**Output**:  $true/false$   
 $verdict \leftarrow true$

- 1) For each  $r \in currlist$ 
  - IF the time constraints of  $r$  at  $t$  are validation
    - IF  $msg$  belongs to the supposition of  $r$ 
      - \* Remove  $r$  from  $currlist$
      - \* IF the evaluation of the context of  $r$  is  $false/undefined$ 
        - $verdict \leftarrow verdict \wedge false$
    - ELSE IF the context of  $r$  contains  $msg$ 
      - \* Update the context of  $r$  by  $msg$
    - ELSE:  $verdict \leftarrow false$
- 2) For each  $r \in rulelist$ 
  - IF  $msg$  belongs to the context of  $r$ 
    - Update the activated time for  $r$  by  $t$
    - Add  $r$  into  $currlist$  (activated)




Fig. 2. Architecture of the RV4WS tool

the message name and its time occurrence as:  $(a_1,0), (a_2,2), (a_1,3), (b_2,8), (b_1,9), (a_2,12), (b_3,15), (c_1,16), \dots$

The security rules defined to assess the system are:

$$r_1 = \mathcal{P}(start(a_1)|O^{d \in [0,10]} done(b_1) \vee done(c_1)),$$

$$r_2 = \mathcal{P}(start(b_2)|O^{d \in [+ \infty, 0]} done(a_2) \wedge done(\neg c_2)).$$

The table 1 shows the results of the algorithm execution. In the table, a *false* verdict is returned at message  $(b_3, 15)$  due to the failure of rule  $r_1$  at time 15 of which the last enabled message is  $(a_1, 3)$ .

V. RV4WS TOOL

RV4WS (Runtime Verification for Web services) is a software tool implemented to verify a web service at runtime based on a set of constraints defined by the syntax in Section III. This tool receives a sequence of messages (message content and its occurrence time) via a TCP/IP port, then verifies the correctness of this sequence. The architecture of RV4WS is shown in Figure 2.

message	enabled rule list	verdict	add/remove (+/-)
(a <sub>1</sub> , 0)	$\{r_1^+ = \mathcal{P}(true O^{d \in [0,10]} done(b_1) \vee done(c_1))\}$	true	+r <sub>1</sub>
(a <sub>2</sub> , 2)	$\{r_1 = \mathcal{P}(true O^{d \in [0,10]} done(b_1) \vee done(c_1));$ $r_2^+ = \mathcal{P}(start(b_2) O^{d \in [+∞,0]} true \wedge done(\neg c_2))\}$	true	+r <sub>2</sub>
(a <sub>1</sub> , 3)	$\{r_1 = \mathcal{P}(true O^{d \in [0,10]} done(b_1) \vee done(c_1));$ $r_2 = \mathcal{P}(start(b_2) O^{d \in [+∞,0]} true \wedge done(\neg c_2));$ $r_1^+ = \mathcal{P}(true O^{d \in [0,10]} done(b_1) \vee done(c_1))\}$	true	+r <sub>1</sub>
(b <sub>2</sub> , 8)	$\{r_1 = \mathcal{P}(true O^{d \in [0,10]} done(b_1) \vee done(c_1));$ $r_1 = \mathcal{P}(true O^{d \in [0,10]} done(b_1) \vee done(c_1))\}$	true	-r <sub>2</sub>
(b <sub>1</sub> , 9)	$\{r_1 = \mathcal{P}(true O^{d \in [0,10]} done(b_1) \vee done(c_1))\}$	true	-r <sub>1</sub>
(a <sub>2</sub> , 12)	$\{r_1 = \mathcal{P}(true O^{d \in [0,10]} done(b_1) \vee done(c_1));$ $r_2^+ = \mathcal{P}(start(b_2) O^{d \in [+∞,0]} true \wedge done(\neg c_2))\}$	true	+r <sub>2</sub>
(b <sub>3</sub> , 15)	$\{r_2 = \mathcal{P}(start(b_2) O^{d \in [+∞,0]} true \wedge done(\neg c_2))\}$	false*	-r <sub>1</sub>
(c <sub>1</sub> , 16)	$\{r_2 = \mathcal{P}(start(b_2) O^{d \in [+∞,0]} true \wedge done(\neg c_2))\}$	true	

TABLE I  
AN EXAMPLE OF RUNTIME VERIFICATION

---

**Algorithm 3:** The detail of runtime verification algorithm

---

**Require:** *currlist* is the list of current rules that were enabled,  
*rulelist* is list of rules that are defined to verify the system.

**Input** : message *msg*, occurrence time *t*.

**Output** : *true/false*

```

1  res ← true;
2  list ← ∅; // a list;
3  // step 1: check in currlist to give a verdict;
4  foreach rule in currlist do
5      // if a rule is enabled many times, we just pick up the first one to consider and use a variable list to
      // handle this problem;
6      if rule.id ∉ list then
7          if rule is future time then
8              res ← res ∧ verify_future(rule, msg, t);
9          else
10             res ← res ∧ verify_past(rule, msg, t);
11             list.add(rule.id);
12 // step 2: check in rulelist to enable new rules;
13 foreach rule in rulelist do
14     if msg ∈ rule.supposition() ∧ rule.condition(msg) = true then
15         if rule is future time then
16             r1 ← rule; // create a new rule;
17             r1.active_time ← t; // set active time;
18             r1.getDataCorrelationValue(msg);
19             currlist.add(r1); // add into enabled list;
20             // the rule is not processed in the first step (rule.id ∉ list) if it is a past time rule;
21             else if rule.correlation(msg) ≠ false ∧ rule.evaluate() != true ∧ rule.id ∉ list then
22                 res ← false;
23             // the rule is not processed in first step (rule.id ∉ list) if it is a past time rule;
24             else if rule is past time ∧ rule.id ∉ list ∧ rule.context.contains(msg) then
25                 r1 ← rule; // create a new rule;
26                 r1.active_time ← t; // set active time;
27                 r1.update(msg) // update context;
28                 r1.getDataCorrelationValue(msg);
29                 currlist.add(r1); // add into the list of enabled rules;
30 return res;
```

---



**Algorithm 4:** *verify\_future(rule, msg, t)***Require:** *currlist*: is a global variable**Input** : *rule*: a rule, *msg*: a message, *t*: occurrence time**Output** : *true/false*


---

```

1 result ← true;
2 // the time condition is FALSE and the type of rule is Permission;
3 if verifyTime(t, rule.active_time) = false ∧ rule.type = ' P' then
4   | result ← false;
5   | currlist.remove(rule);
6 else if r.context.contain(msg) ∧ rule.correlation(msg) ≠ false then
7   | rule.update(msg) // update context;
8   | if rule.evaluate() = true then
9     | currlist.remove(rule);
10    | // the time condition is TRUE and the type of rule is Prohibition;
11    | if rule.type = ' F' ∧ verifyTime(t, rule.active_time) = true then
12    |   | result ← false;
13    | else if rule.evaluate() = false then
14    |   | currlist.remove(rule);
15    |   | // type of rule is Permission;
16    |   | if rule.type = ' P' then
17    |   |   | result ← false;
18 return result;

```

---

**Algorithm 5:** *verify\_past(rule, msg, t)***Require:** *currlist*: is a global variable**Input** : *rule*: a rule, *msg*: a message, *t*: occurrence time**Output** : *true/false*


---

```

1 result ← true;
2 if msg ∈ rule.supposition() ∧ rule.condition(msg) = true ∧
   rule.correlation(msg) ≠ false then
3   | currlist.remove(rule);
4   | if rule.evaluate() = true then
5     | // the time condition is TRUE and type of rule is Prohibition;
6     | if rule.type = ' F' ∧ verifyTime(t, rule.active_time) = true then
7     |   | result ← false;
8   | else
9     | // the type of rule is Permission;
10    | if rule.type = ' P' then
11    |   | result ← false;
12 else
13   | if verifyTime(t, rule.active_time) = false then
14   |   | currlist.remove(rule);
15   | else if rule.context.contain(msg) ∧ rule.correlation(msg) ≠ false then
16   |   | rule.update(msg);
17 return result;

```

---




Fig. 3. ParseData Interface of RV4WS

The checking engine in the architecture implements the runtime verification algorithm 3. It allows us to verify each incoming message without any constraint of order dependencies, and is applicable to both of on-line and off-line testing. Moreover, it verifies the validation of current message without using any storage memory. In order to use this engine for other systems, we define an interface *IParseData* shown in Figure 3 as an adapter to parse the incoming data for RV4WS if the data structure of input/output messages from another system is different from ours. The methods in *IParseData* are for gathering information from incoming messages. Method *getMessageName()* returns the message name from its content, while method *queryData()* allows us to query a data value from a field of message content. This interface is implemented for each application case. For example, its implementation is class *ParseSoapImpl* for a web service application. This engine has been designed as a java library and is controlled by a component known as Controller which receives a data stream coming from a TCP/IP port.

The input format for this tool is an XML file as defined in Figure 4. A rule with a *true* or *false* verdict respectively represents a permission or prohibition. The context of a rule will be expressed as an expression with three operators *AND*, *OR* and *NOT*. Each data correlation is defined as a property with some query expressions from different SOAP messages. For web service applications, we have developed a Graphic User Interface (GUI) that allows us to easily define a set of rules from WSDL files.

The checking algorithm returns a *fail* verdict if a rule is found not satisfied, meaning that this rule is not applicable to the current message. To identify which rule fails at an arrival of message, we have developed a Graphic User Interface (GUI) for visualizing some statistical properties that are calculated at any moment of testing process. Whenever a rule is activated which means that its conditions have been satisfied, a statistical property such as type counter will be used to compute the percentage of unsatisfying time when applying the rule to the input data stream. If the rule has been satisfied, we need to know the time duration from the activating moment to its context's holding moment. For each rule, we have three statistical properties about time, namely *time-min*, *time-max* and *time-average*.

Now we need to know the values of these statistical properties such as the failure percentage in proportion to its duration time or to others properties for a rule

```

<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
<rules>
  <rule applyProperty="true" id="1" name="" verdict="true">
    <if>
      <message> requestRequest[</message>
    </if>
    <then time_max="1" time_min="0" time_type="m" type="after">
      <context>
        <expression> xLoanConfirmRequest[</expression>
      </context>
    </then>
    <properties>
      <property name="correlation_Id" type="int">
        <query>requestRequest.requestInfo/id</query>
        <query>xLoanConfirmRequest.confirmIn/id</query>
      </property>
    </properties>
  </rule>
</rules>

```

Fig. 4. Rule format example

executing, and also visualize the relationships between them. If we had used a histogram view and applied it to each, we would not have been able to get this information because of the different scales of these properties. We built a visualized interface which is based on the idea of parallel coordinates scheme introduced by Inselberg [19].

In information visualization, parallel coordinates view is used to show the relationships between items in a multi-dimensional data set. Each axes in this view parallels to each other and a point in an *n*-dimensional space is represented as a polyline with verticals on these axes. Considering that the list of statistical properties of our testing process is a multi-dimensional data set, we have applied this visualization to RV4WS tool and made it possible to explore the result of our checking algorithms.

As foregoing, we have implemented the checking algorithms inside RV4WS tool which enables a user-tester to verify these conditions defined in rules. When the user-tester finds that rule's properties change over time, he/she may need a complete view of these traces of testing process. There are parallel coordinates views corresponding to rules. In Figure 5, each scheme of parallel coordinates represents a time-log of statistical values as these polylines crossing properties axes. Within each view, there is a single polyline per time instance. The lines of current time are always highlighted. This view enables the tester to quickly tell from the GUI whether or not these changes of executing rule's properties are interesting. This visualization does not have to be refreshed in real-time, rather, it can be refreshed after a duration.

## VI. A CASE STUDY

In this section, we present a real-life case study known as Product Retriever [23] from WebMov project, and tell how to apply our RV4WS tool to test Product Retriever. This case study is a BPEL process that allows users to automate part of the purchasing process. It enables users to retrieve one searched product sold by a authorized provider. The search is limited by specifying a budget range and one or more keywords characterizing the product. The searched product is done through the operation *getProduct* and the parameter *RequestProductType* that is composed of information about the user (first-name, last-




Fig. 5. The main GUI and checking analysis of RV4WS tool

name and department) and searched product (keyword, max price, category).

The process contains four partner services, namely *AmazonFR*, *AmazonUK*, *CurrencyExchange* and *PurchaseService*. They are developed by Montimage<sup>4</sup> and available online<sup>5</sup>. The overview behavior of the process is illustrated in Figure 6 and described as follows.

- 1) Receives a message from the client with the product and keywords of the characteristics of the product.
- 2) Contacts the *PurchaseService* partner to obtain the list of authorized providers for that product. In case there is not any authorized provider, an announcement is be sent to the client by a fault message response.
- 3) Depending on the authorized provider result, the process contacts either the *AmazonFR* or *AmazonUK* service to search a product that matches the price limit by Euro and the keywords.
- 4) Sends back to the client the product information and the name of the provider where the product was found, and the link from which it can be ordered. If a matching product is not found, a response with unsatisfied product will be sent back to the client.
- 5) After receiving the product information, the client can send an authorization request to confirm the purchase of the product within a certain duration of time (e.g., one minute).

The Product Retriever service is built with Netbeans 6.5.1 and deployed by a Sun-Bpel-engine within a Glassfish 2.1 web server.




Fig. 6. ProductRetriever - BPMN specification

#### A. Test Product Retriever by RV4WS tool

In this section, we present some preliminary results from our first experiment on the case study of Product

<sup>4</sup><http://www.montimage.com/>

<sup>5</sup><http://80.14.167.59:11404/serviceName>




Fig. 7. Testbed architecture

Retriever using RV4WS tool. SoapUI [24] is a well known test tool for web services. We use it in our experiment as a client of Product Retriever service, sending requests to activate the web service (i.e., BPEL process). To collect the communication messages between the Product Retriever service and its partners (including SoapUI), we have developed a proxy that allows us to forward a message to a specified destination. This allows us to receive and forward from/to some sources and destinations. Each connection is handled on a different port. Afterwards, this message and its time occurrence are also sent to our RV4WS tool, to check its correctness. SoapUI and Product Retriever service were configured to make connections through the proxy. The connection information (service name) is also sent to RV4WS to help this tool easily identify which message belongs to which service. Figure 7 shows our testbed architecture.

1) *Rule definition:* We can define many test purposes to verify the interaction order with partner services. Here we introduce three test purposes:

- During the execution of service, if the client receives a *ProductFault* message, then the Purchase service must have already returned a *ProviderFault* message. The time constraint for this test purpose is less important, so we can define the maximal time interval between two messages as 10 seconds.

$$\mathcal{P}(\text{start}(\text{ProductFault}) | O^{d \in [10,0]s} \text{done}(\text{ProviderFault}))$$

- If the Purchase service introduces the provider service *AmazonUK*, then the orchestration must contact the *CurrencyExchange* service within 10 seconds.

$$\mathcal{P}(\text{start}(\text{getProviderResponse}[\text{provider} = \text{AmazonUK}]) | O^{d \in [0,10]s} \text{done}(\text{getCurrencyRateRequest}))$$

- When the client sends an authorization request message to confirm the purchase of a product, then it

must have received a product response message with field *EmptyResponseProduct* being null one minute ago. In this rule, the data correlation is used by *userId*.

$$\mathcal{P}(\text{start}(\text{getAuthorizationRequest}) | O^{d \in [1,0]m} \text{done}(\text{getProductResponse} [\text{EmptyResponseProduct} = \text{null}])) / (\text{getAuthorizationRequest.userId}, \text{getProductResponse.userId})$$

2) *Checking results:* Figure 8 illustrates the checking analysis of the Product Retriever, which indicates

- The fault messages that are defined in rule 1 do not occur (see the percentage in *fail* column of rule 1).
- Message *getProviderResponse* with *provider* = *AmazonUK* appeared three times (see value in *enabled count* column of rule 2), however there are two times where the tool did not find message *getCurrencyRateRequest* within 10 seconds from the occurrence time of message *getProviderResponse*. In Figure 9, we found the interval time between them is 26 seconds for the first fail case and 42 seconds for the second fail case. Then the tool produces the fail verdicts (the *fail* column of rule 2).
- Message *getAuthorisationRequest* appeared two times (see value on *enabled count* column of rule 3). Before that, message *getProductResponse* also appeared with field *EmptyResponseProduct* being empty and the interval time between them less than one minute.

In Figure 9, a *false* verdict is returned when the *itemSearchResponse* arrives because at the occurrence time of *itemSearchResponse*, the time constraint of rule 2 (i.e., 10 seconds) is not satisfied.

## VII. CONCLUSIONS

This paper presents a passive test method for systems in particular for web services with (1) the definition of a language including logic expressions for constraints and (2) a verification method and a tool implementing the verification algorithm. This tool has been integrated in the WebMov tool chains. To verify the practicability of the proposed method on real systems, a real case study which is a web service composition known as Product Retriever has been extensively studied.

Extensions planned for this research include (1) a system for calculating the test coverage (corresponding to real need of the implementor of the web services), (2) an extension to test more complex distributed systems such as cloud computing architecture by integrating a set of distributed observers with recoveries of all the traces that need to be synchronized.

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


Fig. 8. Checking analysis of Product Retriever

true	2011-11-17 12:55:07 593	GetProductRequest[]
true	2011-11-17 12:55:07 624	GetProvidersRequest[]
true	2011-11-17 12:55:10 370	GetProvidersResponse[AuthorisedProvidersResponseType/provider=AmazonFR]
true	2011-11-17 12:55:10 401	itemSearchRequest[]
true	2011-11-17 12:55:22 616	itemSearchResponse[]
true	2011-11-17 12:55:53 51	GetProductResponse[productOut/EmptyResponseProduct=null]
true	2011-11-17 12:58:26 321	GetProvidersRequest[]
true	2011-11-17 12:58:26 321	GetProductRequest[]
true	2011-11-17 12:58:32 811	GetProvidersResponse[AuthorisedProvidersResponseType/provider=AmazonUK]
true	2011-11-17 12:58:32 842	itemSearchRequest[]
false	2011-11-17 12:58:58 691	itemSearchResponse[]
true	2011-11-17 12:58:58 707	CurrencyExchangeRequest[]
true	2011-11-17 12:59:05 540	CurrencyExchangeResponse[]
true	2011-11-17 12:59:35 960	GetProductResponse[productOut/EmptyResponseProduct=null]
2011-11-17 01:00:00 327 PurchaseAuthorisationRequest[]		
true	2011-11-17 01:00:00 296	GetAuthorisationRequest[]
true	2011-11-17 01:00:06 816	PurchaseAuthorisationResponse[]
true	2011-11-17 01:00:37 299	GetAuthorisationResponse[]
true	2011-11-17 01:02:37 856	GetProductRequest[]
true	2011-11-17 01:02:37 871	GetProvidersRequest[]
true	2011-11-17 01:02:46 46	GetProvidersResponse[AuthorisedProvidersResponseType/provider=AmazonFR]
true	2011-11-17 01:02:46 77	itemSearchRequest[]
true	2011-11-17 01:03:20 896	itemSearchResponse[]
true	2011-11-17 01:03:51 363	GetProductResponse[productOut/EmptyResponseProduct=null]
true	2011-11-17 01:07:08 500	GetProvidersRequest[]
true	2011-11-17 01:07:08 484	GetProductRequest[]
true	2011-11-17 01:07:18 905	GetProvidersResponse[AuthorisedProvidersResponseType/provider=AmazonUK]
true	2011-11-17 01:07:18 921	itemSearchRequest[]
false	2011-11-17 01:08:06 969	itemSearchResponse[]
true	2011-11-17 01:08:07 0	CurrencyExchangeRequest[]
true	2011-11-17 01:08:35 454	CurrencyExchangeResponse[]
true	2011-11-17 01:09:05 890	GetProductResponse[productOut/EmptyResponseProduct=null]
true	2011-11-17 01:09:43 595	GetAuthorisationRequest[]

Fig. 9. A part of collected trace of Product Retriever

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