Public beliefs and corruption in a repeated psychological game - Archive ouverte HAL Access content directly
Journal Articles Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization Year : 2011

Public beliefs and corruption in a repeated psychological game

Abstract

This paper investigates the role of guilt aversion for corruption in public administration. Corruption is modeled as the outcome of a game played between a bureaucrat, a lobby, and the public. There is a moral cost of corruption for the bureaucrat, who is averse to letting the public down. We study how the behavior of the lobby and the bureaucrat depend on perceived public beliefs, when these are constant and when they are allowed to vary over time. With time-varying beliefs, corruption is more likely when the horizon of the game is relatively long and when public beliefsare initially low and are updated fast.
Fichier principal
Vignette du fichier
PEER_stage2_10.1016%2Fj.jebo.2010.12.007.pdf (285.9 Ko) Télécharger le fichier
Origin : Files produced by the author(s)
Loading...

Dates and versions

hal-00978259 , version 1 (14-04-2014)

Identifiers

Cite

Loukas Balafoutas. Public beliefs and corruption in a repeated psychological game. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 2011, 78 (1-2), pp.51. ⟨10.1016/j.jebo.2010.12.007⟩. ⟨hal-00978259⟩

Collections

PEER
38 View
223 Download

Altmetric

Share

Gmail Facebook Twitter LinkedIn More