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Journal Articles Economics Bulletin Year : 2014

The tax competition game revisited: When leadership may be optimal

Abstract

In this paper, we investigate the impact of leadership in a tax competition game. We show that leadership by a group of countries is pareto improving for each country (leaders and followers) compared to a Nash equilibrium outcome. In addition, a coalition of leaders is also pareto improving and this coalition is stable.
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hal-00968957 , version 1 (01-04-2014)

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  • HAL Id : hal-00968957 , version 1

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Jean-Pierre Vidal. The tax competition game revisited: When leadership may be optimal. Economics Bulletin, 2014, 34, pp.51-62. ⟨hal-00968957⟩
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