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Pré-Publication, Document De Travail Année : 2013

On the Existence of Approximated Equilibria and Sharing-Rule Equilibria in Discontinuous Games

Résumé

New relaxations of the Nash equilibrium concept are shown to exist in any strategic game with discontinuous payoff functions. The new concepts are used (1) to show the equivalence between Reny's better-reply security condition [28] and Simon-Zame's endogenous tie-breaking rule equilibrium concept [32], (2) to obtain conditions for the existence of approximated equilibria in a class of discontinuous games that naturally extends Reny's better-reply secure games, and (3) to show the existence of approximated equilibria in a large family of two-player games that contains all standard models of auctions.
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Dates et versions

hal-00846143 , version 1 (18-07-2013)

Identifiants

  • HAL Id : hal-00846143 , version 1

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Philippe Bich, Rida Laraki. On the Existence of Approximated Equilibria and Sharing-Rule Equilibria in Discontinuous Games. 2013. ⟨hal-00846143⟩
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