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Emmanuelle PUJEAU

*Preveza in 1538: The background
of a very complex situation*

Introduction

BETWEEN PREVEZA AND ACTIUM, the Story seems to repeat itself. When the fleet of Mark Antony united with Cleopatra's forces is defeated by Augustus¹ in 31 B.C. off the Ambracy gulf, the events are seen as a victory of the Occident over the Orient. In this way, when a new campaign is planned in 1537, it is to reaffirm the superiority of the Occident at sea. This point of view considering the Ambracy sector as a determining place could be the proof of its strategic situation for relations between East and West. This quality is expressed in so many discourses of the time which propose itineraries to reconquest the Holy Land, suggesting passing through Preveza or its area. But, in 1538, the Christians let escape a very great promise of victory and the possibility to vanquish definitively a very important enemy, the pirate Khairaddin Barbarossa. Why was this campaign not a success but on the contrary a defeat for the Christendom? This failure for the whole of Christendom gives a good illustration of the mentality of the time.

Sources

Researching on Paolo Giovio² and the turkish question, I have studied at length the Preveza events of 1538, writing a long article for the *Studi Veneziani*: «La Préveza (1538) entre idéologie et histoire»³ exploring and studying the facts through versions of upholders of the different powers involved in this campaign. In this way, I have used the texts of different contemporary authors to discover the true stakes.

In this manner, the account of the venitian official historiographer, Paolo Paruta⁴ proposes his political analysis of the campaign, basing his reflection on official and secret documents. Very well informed of the details by the venitian annals, he can provide a thorough presentation of the events. As a member of the Venitian government, he has a political point of view,

¹ The emperor Octavian found Nicopolis to celebrate his victory. See KONSTANTAKI et al. 2001.

² For my doctorate in History. See PUJEAU 2006a.

³ See PUJEAU 2006b, 155-204. A paper proposing more information about the different authors, actors of the events, the reconstruction of the campaign of 1538 and of its preparatives and the analyse of the various accounts following different aims to serve different goals.

⁴ See PARUTA 1703, and the modern edition BENZONI & ZANATO 1982.

that is clearly appreciable in his *Della perfezione della vita politica* (1579) or in his *Discorsi politici* (1599) showing his political vision about the conflict between reason of State and moral sense. So, with such a mentality, his account of the Preveza battle would be following the rules of the *ars historica* «without any alteration of the truth»⁵ or at least his evocation will try to keep a neutral position⁶ with maybe some nationalist feeling, urging the author to incorporate the venitian history into the European vision. Furthermore, the Venitians are knowledgeable by an abundant information, as Burckhardt has written: «in foreign countries, each Venitian was a zealous spy for his government»⁷ and there were effectively different types of informants: «spies, scouts, confidants and secret agents»⁸ and others like the tradesmen or the captains, in sum all the Venitian expatriates. As official historiographer of Venice, Paruta⁹ needs to convey a glorious presentation of his city all over the world. At the same time, the work of Paruta, dedicated to the Venitian history, is also a diplomatic exercise. It must be the illustration of the official position of Venice about the recorded events. We must specify that this relation is written some forty years¹⁰ after the facts, so much time after, that acrimony does not exist any more.

The Genoese point of view about the Preveza campaign is revealed in the texts of two biographers of Andrea Doria. The work of the biographer is quite similar to the historiographer's office, with the difference that the subject is limited to a person instead of an entire city. By definition, the biography tells the story of a life and this sort of subject gets a new reality in the Renaissance time: the *Vite* have a great success for the readers. They like to read the antique lives of past figures like Cesar or August. The publishers offer them antique writings of this manner and new lives of modern heroes. They are seen as examples to follow. Studying the Renaissance *Lives*, two different types appear clearly: on one hand, there is the account inspired by an amical and continuous meeting with the portrayed person and on the other hand the text can be an impersonal story of a life written like a chronicle with an external documentation. The first sort can be a personal commission of the interested party or one of his familiars. If the great advantage of this first type is the certainty to know better the subject and maybe to discover his intimacy, the reported events can be twisted like it occurs sometime in the autobiography. The second sort may offer a neutral account with no personal confusion. The work of the Genoese Lorenzo Capelloni,¹¹ who can be considered as a quite close relation of Doria, proposes a very well informed account of his life in the *Vita del principe Andrea Doria* based on many meetings with *Il Principe*. Capelloni is considered as the first Doria's biographer. The *Della vita e fatti di Andrea Doria Principe di Melfi* of Carlo Sigonio¹² provides interesting information too. This biography of the second sort is based on more external elements but records the essentials of the events. Sigonio is not a Doria's com-

⁵ See GAETA 1980, III, t. III, 515.

⁶ GAETA 1980, III, t. III, 90-01.

⁷ BURCKHARDT 1906, I, 86.

⁸ PRETO 1994, 39-50.

⁹ We can observe that Paolo Paruta, as *Cavaliere di San Marco*, wants to serve the Venitian prestige too using all his personal capacities like he writes in his dedicace to Domenico Nicolino of the *Historia vinetia*.

¹⁰ We observe an important interval between the facts and their writing by the official historiographer. At the moment of the events (1538), it's Pietro Bembo who is in office from 1530 (for his high literary quality), but his *Historiae Venetae* relates the period from 1487 to 1513. The next will be elected in 1577.

¹¹ See CAPELLONI 1565.

¹² See SIGONIO 1598.

patriot¹³ and he proposes a more detailed account of the Preveza events, introducing precisions and analyses when Capeloni is more synthetic in his telling. Despite the failure of the campaign, the authors have reported the Preveza disaster in their biography. They succeed in transforming this very unfortunate episode into a demonstration of the Doria's qualities, proving by the record of such a catastrophe the Venitians' responsibility in particular and finally giving a better part to Doria. In this way, the information needs to be scrutinized very carefully. If some of Doria's thoughts are expressed in those presentations, a possibility of distortion of the facts due to an incomplete account of the events could be observed.

For that reason, an historian could provide a more neutral presentation of the campaign. The historian Girolamo Borgia¹⁴ seems to fulfil this role. Using among others the papal information, and maybe representing the papal point of view, he writes his latin *Historia de bellis italicis*, in which the Preveza episode is quite laconically reported showing the Doria fault and deducing useful analysis for the entire Christendom. This main work of Borgia describes important wars involving the Italians in a very polish latin (quite pedantic according to some people). If his language is very complex sometimes, the ideas are clear and precise. The Pope Paul III, related to pope Borgia as Girolamo Borgia and considered as the «last Renaissance pope»,¹⁵ is elected in 1534 for his independence from the Empire and the French kingdom. During his papacy, the papal network improves with the permanent nunciatures.¹⁶ A very good illustration of this new information source is given by the *Correspondance des nonces de France* for example. The letters of the nunci of the time which were written to different ecclesiastics, help to follow the exchanges of the news between Rome and the kingdom of France during different events. With such material and other documentation, Girolamo Borgia writes his story of the italian wars. It is quite surprising to see that the African victory of Charles V in 1535 is reported at length by Borgia, recording each minimal event and troop movement, when the Preveza battle is painted only in few pages. Nevertheless, it is not a digest of the events. There are explanations impossible to find in other historians' texts. For example, he presents the composition of the Christian fleet and precises that the Knights of Saint John represent the papal forces. Looking down on less important facts, he focuses his account on the most important facts according to his opinion, they are noteworthy facts! So, the secondary moments, reported by other authors and not by Borgia, do not need to be recorded. His objective is a general analysis of the events and second the European point of view. The structure of his text is clear and shows the essential of the enterprise. Borgia seems to be neutral in his presentation, even if sometimes he gives his personal opinion about some attitudes.

Another historian could offer a different vision of the Preveza campaign. With very abundant information and many contacts with different powers, Paolo Giovio appears as a quite independent historian. Bishop of Nocera, has excellent relations with different popes from Leo X to Paul III. But at the same time, we can find some friendship with imperial representents or Venitian people. And his correspondence reveals many different contacts in various contries and groups. His information about the Preveza events would come from an eyewitness, Giovanni Gallego, that is mentioned in a letter to Bernardino Maffei of the 24th January 1540: «as

¹³ His neutrality could be discussed if we do consider his dedication to the marquis of Torriglia, general captain for the Catholic Majesty of the genoese galees and the text is printed at Genoa in 1598.

¹⁴ In an unpublished manuscript, XVIth century, Marciana Library of Venice, Lat X 98 (3506), book XVIII, 264v-266.

¹⁵ CECCOLI 1999, 82.

¹⁶ FELDKAMP 1998, 49. About the nunci's sectors see 59-61.

told me Io. Gallego, who was at Preveza».¹⁷ According to T.C. Price Zimmermann, Giovio has also personally met Doria and Capello, but «Doria never explained his strategy to Giovio's satisfaction».¹⁸ His voluminous work proposes two different accounts of the Preveza campaign. If Giovio is very careful in his official version, the *Story of his time*¹⁹ reporting the essential facts without giving or suggesting his opinion, he is more critical in his *Praise of Vincenzo Capello*,²⁰ revealing new prospects and details. To determine the time of their writing is important in order to appreciate more accurately the differences between both texts. The first printing of the *Historiarum sui temporis* is in 1550 by Torrentino in Florence and for the *Elogia virorum bellica virtute illustrium* is in 1551 by the same publisher. So, the elaboration of the text can not be subsequent to this time. As the writing is obviously later than the recorded events, we can affirm that the elaboration of the Capello's praise cannot be previous 1541, because Giovio records Capello's prestige in the view of the Venitians after his death. On the other hand, the book XXXVII containing the Preveza account is probably written about 1540.²¹ Further more, Giovio writes in a letter of the 24th January 1540 to Rodolfo Pio di Carpi that he would like to put in his work the conclusion of a holy peace and a turk enterprise. More closer to the events (only ten years after) and very well informed, he can offer good testimonies. The official *Story of his time* as his masterpiece is an official and neutral version proposing the essential. He is always looking for a generous patron for his work, so he needs to handle carefully the men in power: no direct criticism or excessive praise of a rival prince! Those constraints guarantee equilibrium and neutrality. But Giovio introduces some criticism in his work. In particular, in his praise, the literary counterparts of his personal collection of portraits²² at Como offers a more critical vision. Due to the less important reputation of Vincenzo Capello compared with the Andrea Doria's fame (the still powerful captain when Giovio writes his praises), Giovio takes advantage of it to offer a more critical account of the Preveza enterprise in his *elogium*. The aim of the Giovio's praises is stylistic composition, the practise of the literary *otium* with the most elaborated latin for exercices of virtuosity. The *elogium* is an application of antique rules to sum up the life of the portrayed figure and to furnish examples to follow or not. The Andrea Doria's praise (Book VII, praise VI) is simply eulogistic and for that reason cannot mention the unfortunate campaign of Preveza. On the contrary, in Capello's praise, instead of telling principally his fortunes like his feat²³ against a genoese vassel in 1504, Giovio focuses almost only on the failed campaign of the Preveza, building his text as an *ekphrasis*²⁴ of the Capello's portrait. His account describes the actions of Doria and Capello, joined in the criticism to offer another presentation of the events. In the conclusion, Giovio chooses very strong words²⁵ to condemn their behaviour and as we can observe in other texts, Capello is not the real Giovio's target. Further more, Giovio offers anecdote and tactic details, giving many other elements helping his reader to make up his mind about the subject.

¹⁷ GIOVIO 1956, 233.

¹⁸ ZIMMERMANN 1995, 158.

¹⁹ GIOVIO 1553, fol. 208-211 verso.

²⁰ GIOVIO 1551, 289-292.

²¹ T.C. Price. Zimmermann proposes this datation in ZIMMERMANN 1995, 182.

²² For the description of the Giovio's museum see CARUSO 1999 and more precisely 33-40 and the description 50-69, see also ZIMMERMANN 1995, 159 sqq.

²³ About the particulars see PUJEAU 2006b, 162 and OLIVIERI 1975, 827-830.

²⁴ See PUJEAU 2006a, 105-106.

²⁵ For example: *pudor* «shame», *mutuam ignominiam* «mutual dishonour» or *infamia* «infamy».

To be perfectly complete and to get opinions on both sides, I have also taken a version of the Turkish camp: the poetic *R'azaouat*.²⁶ This Turkish text written by Seyyid Murad, is translated in Castilian in the Sixteenth century by a Turkish slave. A manuscript of this translation is in the Biblioteca Comunale di Palermo with the title *La vida y historia de Hariadin Barbaroxa, traduzida de lengua turquesca en español castellano*. This story would be the result of the Sulaiman's order²⁷ to write all the events of his time. And Khairuddin would have given this work to Seyyid Murad. For Henri de Grammont,²⁸ this explanation is not true. According to the French translation²⁹ of an Arab version of the text, he concludes that the text is a compilation of a *mufti* or an *ulema* who has written from the archives a half-fantastic half-historical story, because the fantastic element in it is very important. Effectively, inspired dreams explain many episodes of the story. It is not so surprising, because in «holy enterprises» the divine must help to understand the events. For example, during the Preveza campaign, at a crucial moment the wind stops suddenly, providing a great advantage for the Turks. Seyyid Murad explains that it is Barbarossa who has thrown overboard two pages of the Koran! The interesting point to notify is that at a certain time the wind fell unexpectedly during the fight, which the Christian versions explain too. In another place, we can read that Barbarossa has visions about the continuation of the campaign, that represents a very bad point to trust the Murad's text. In this manner, the author recounts a strange dream of marvellous fishing where the fishes would represent the Christians' vessels that the Turks take and destroy. And the story connects the dream and the destruction of Christian boats. Such elements seem to confirm that the text is not only an historical presentation of the facts, but contains elements building a slanted interpretation of the enterprise to improve the Ottoman reputation. It is one of the characteristics of the Ottoman historiography «telling the past events, bringing to the fore the feats and the greatness of the Ottoman princes»³⁰ but the problem is that these texts «are far from telling the whole truth».³¹ Nevertheless, some true elements are really exposed in these books, the major problem is the interpretation and the exact part of the sycophantic manner. In spite of it, this text is really interesting to study in order to control the events and to confirm the broad lines of the Preveza episode. Because, if the both sides are in agreement about certain facts, it can prove the reality of what happened in the Preveza area. Why choose this text rather than an official Turkish chronicle?³² Precisely, because ever since the sixteenth century this text was translated in Castilian and so potentially understandable to European authors such as Paolo Giovio who had relations with Spanish people.

So, as I was reflecting about how the different Christian powers worked to take advantage of this failed campaign through their intellectuals, telling the events in a certain manner, I can affirm that the different authors that I have studied, have not modified the reality but they have shrewdly selected the facts in order to propose a positive appearance of their camp. I have also reflected about a «made-to-measure truth»,³³ instrumenting the Preveza events to serve different goals.

²⁶ The original name would be *gazavat-name* «book telling holy enterprises» and it would be written by Seyyid Murad. For the text see BONAFFINI 1993.

²⁷ See GALLOTTI 1970, 145.

²⁸ See GRAMMONT 1873.

²⁹ See RANG & DENIS 1837.

³⁰ HITZEL 2001, 177.

³¹ HITZEL 2001, 177.

³² For a detailed presentation of the Turkish sources see TOLEDO MANSILLA, in this volume, 139-167.

³³ In my paper, PUJEAU 2006b, I observe the different versions and their different aims in the part intitled «Le

The Preveza campaign

With such a material, it is possible to reconstitute more accurately the facts of 1538. The place is known with a certain precision by the authors, as it is possible to read in the Paruta's description: «The fortress of Preveza is located on the Attic promontory, just inside the mouth of the Arta gulf, formerly called *sinus Ambracia*, covering sixteen miles. This mouth is very narrow and shallow, for the mudbanks of the Arta river flowing in the vicinity, Arta of which the city and the gulf take the name, so much so that to lead men through this way, who would try to make an assault on the castle, could not ascertain to get a great safety, because it was impossible for large vassels or light galleys to enter at the same time and with some danger».³⁴ And Paruta precises that «the castle was built according to the antique style and it was not fortified, but it was appreciated for its location. The Turks guarded it with ordinary troops».³⁵

Circumstances can explain what is at stake in the battle. The Christians have already lost superiority in land war at Essek, suffering a great disaster in 1537. So, at Preveza the naval superiority or *maris possessione* «possession of the sea» would be the center of the preoccupations. For a long time, Venice and Genoa have been rivals. Venice has had great problems with its naval forces. The Zonchio battle of 1499, seen as the end of the Venitian superiority at sea, confirms this impression. Further more, Venice is attacked by land and by sea on its territories by the turkish troops. Sulaiman intensifies his war against the Christians and the attack of Corfou proves that the Turks want to seize the Italy and the Venitian empire. Consequently, the Christians react: the emperor, the pope and the Venitians plan a new campaign. During winter, there are many meetings between the Christian powers with the aim of organizing their forces. Finally, a joint campaign is planned unifying strategic and economic points of view. On 8th February, Paul III in a consistory at the Vatican prepares a league with Don Giovan Manrico, as representant of the Empire and Marco Antonio Contarini for Venice. The result can be appreciated in the *Capitula sanctissimi foederis initi inter summum Pont., Caesarem-que Maiestatem, & Venetos, Contra Turcos* preparing all the details of the military enterprise, Setton describes it as «offensive as well as defensive action against the Turks».³⁶ So, there would be two hundred vessels in total. The papal vessels would be made in Venice and the Pope would provide the campaign with sailors and soldiers. The emperor and the Genoese would convey the troops and provisions. The captains are Andrea Doria for the imperial army, Vincenzo Capello for the Venitians, Marco Grimani for the papal fleet with Paolo Giustinian as coadjutor. Don Ferrante Gonzaga, viceroy of Sicily, is the general of the land troop. It was also decided to give back the territories taken in Greece, in the islands or in the Dalmatia to Venice (because they were in its possessions before the Ottoman conquest). About the victuals, the wheat would be supplied by the emperor from Sicily (it is the *tritici Siculi*) and it is precised at *aequo pretio* without *vectigal* or *portiorum*, so at a right price without any tax or duty.

This information reminds the different recommendations expressed in *advices*³⁷ of the time. For example, Giovio who has written the *Consiglio di Monsignor Giovio al modo di far*

témoignage des auteurs, idéologie ou histoire», 169-195, and the strategical stakes in «Les enjeux stratégiques dévoilés par les récits», 195-199.

³⁴ See PARUTA 1703, 418.

³⁵ PARUTA 1703, 418.

³⁶ See SETTON 1984, 434.

³⁷ For a point about the *Consilii* or *Advices* see PUJEAU 2009a.

*l'impresa contra infideli, secondo le consulte fatte da Papa Leone Decimo*³⁸ «Advice of His Lordship Giovio about the campaign against the Infidels, according to the Pope Leo's consultations» explains and justifies different suggestions for the next military enterprise. As the money is the sinews of war, after appraising the expenditure, Giovio suggests how to get money from whom with quite modern logic, precisising: «it will be just to share out the expenses in proportion to income».³⁹ He also explores different arguments as the constitution of the troops, the distribution of the next won territories, all the logistics because «a great campaign could miscarry in the end for the failure of very little details»⁴⁰ or also the discipline and the nature of the next enterprise –an offensive war– defined as naval and land campaign. In fact as counsellors like *consultatori* or *provveditori*, Giovio thinks of three campaigns with different itineraries. One by land, one by sea and one half-land half-sea. To begin with the route⁴¹ was from Brindisi by sea to Kotor or Corfu, l'Arta and the gulf of Lepanto, after the troop would continue to Korinth through the strategic Morea and so on to Constantinople. It was also possible to follow the river Akheloos from Preveza, but it was quite dangerous for the army because the enemies could see the Christian troops and attack them. These suggestions show the strategic situation of the Preveza area. On the other hand, the advisers think that this enterprise will effectively liberate old Christian territories from the Ottoman yoke and it will be a success. In their mind, Preveza represents only a stop but not the end of the campaign. What has modified the conditions in order to modify radically the situation?

During the Christian preparation, the Turks learning about the Holy League and a possible campaign by sea, make their arrangements too. In this manner, Sulaiman orders Khairuddin to prepare his fleet to swoop down on the enemies. In this way, Crete is the center of the struggle between Khairuddin and the Venitians. At this moment, the situation seems to be quite simple: a war will happen in the very next future, and all is quite ready for that. However, this expedition very simple in the beginning, will become in little time quite a crisis. The Christian forces, far bigger than the Turkish ones, will not succeed in vanquishing them easily and the possibility catching the enemy Barbarossa will be lost!

The first problem is the disorderly arrival of the Christian forces at Preveza. The Venitian and the papal fleets arrives first (respecting the suggested date of the *Capitula*). On the 10th August, Grimani tries an attack upon the Preveza fortress. But his badly prepared attempt fails and he reembarks with quite heavy losses. At this moment, Khairuddin is still in Modon. Learning that, he comes as fast as possible at Preveza to stop the Christian fleet, as was required by Sulaiman. At last, the generalissimo of the campaign, Andrea Doria, arrives at Corfu. The exact moment is difficult to precise: for Sigonio and Capelloni, it would be at the end of August, for Paruta not before the 7th September! The motive is officially because of preparations and unofficially owing to the mutiny of Spanish soldiers. Thus, «more than a month of good weather and various opportunities for a united attack had been lost».⁴²

The different Christian commanders reflect on the tactics. Ferrante Gonzaga proposes a land battle blockading the Ambracy gulf to lock the Turks in. According to him, sinking a boat full of rocks in the mouth and three galleons with important artillery would be sufficient to defeat the enemies. But Doria does not agree. The reinforcements would come from Lepanto and an autum-

³⁸ See GIOVIO 1608. For the detailed presentation of the *Consiglio* see PUJEAU 2006a, 437-466.

³⁹ See GIOVIO 1608, 99.

⁴⁰ See GIOVIO 1608, 97.

⁴¹ See GIOVIO 1608, 93-94.

⁴² See SETTON 1984, 446.

nal storm could deprive the landed troops of any support. He preferred to attack Lepanto to press the Turks to leave the gulf. So, they decide to assault Preveza by sea. The Turks hesitate fighting in the open sea or staying in the protective gulf? The narrowness of the strait is a protection for them and a danger for the Christians, because of the fire power of the fortress. But, after reflection, Barbarossa chooses to leave the gulf in order to discover the Christians' project. In this way, he sends fifty galleys to test the Christians' courage, when they come back to Leucada. Nevertheless, the allied forces turn round and attack the Turks. Capello, now in the vanguard with his heavy artillery, chases away the Turks. The Grimani's vessels, which are occupying the shore to take the advantage of the place (*commoditas litoris*), might turn the bows against the enemies to disembark the troops to improve the Christian defence in case of attack. So, seeing the Turks, Grimani wants to cut off their line of retreat, but curiously Doria orders him to abandon his position and to join the other Christians forces. And when the Turks are nearly at the mercy of the Christians, Doria orders the general withdrawal under threat of great punishment. The Christians leave the place.⁴³

Then, new heated debates at Leucade urge Doria to order attack again and the fleet comes back to Preveza. So, the Christian forces fall upon the Turks, frightening some of them who surrender.⁴⁴ As a brave chief, Barbarossa spurs on his troops. The Christian captains, as Capello who has recognized Turgut amongst enemies, precisely in the vanguard of the fast galleys, wants to begin the fight, and so he comes to Doria's boat to offer to fight in the first place saying «either I will vanquish with glory, or I will succumb with dignity».⁴⁵ But Doria orders him to wait for his signal before doing anything, because he is preparing another tactic: to let the Turks come nearer to destroy them in one go with the artillery. The captains urge him to fight again, The Turkish mastery in manoeuvring the fleet is very impressive: when the center turns the *cornua* «wheeling flanks» sail so perfectly that the manoeuvres are like an eagle spreading its wings. Doria delays again. But the Christian captain wants to fight. The patriarch comes on Doria's board to obtain the famous signal. But Doria refuses once again. Suddenly, the wind dies down, immobilizing the great sailing ships. They are delayed and need to be towed to come to the right place where the Turks are already with their rowing galleys. The sea is so calm that it seems to be a plain. This dead calm would have surprised Doria, seen as an expert in meteorology! Thus, the great vessels arrive in the theatre of operations later than the enemies. Then, Doria tries a new tactic: assembling the enemies in the same sector to attack them in one go. The great vessels are surrounded by allied ships describing large circles,⁴⁶ to manoeuvre the enemies without their knowing it. Doria thinks that the Turks would prefer to fight on equal terms and so would protect themselves from the great vessels, seen as floating fortresses. Thus, he lets the enemy come nearer ordering his captains to await his signal (a great opened out standard). The Turks manoeuvre in order to keep the bows pointed at the Christians, in this manner their cannons (which cannot be moved) threaten the Christian fleet.

But, to escape, after many unfortunate endeavours of outflanking, unable⁴⁷ to do another thing, Barbarossa goes straight through the Christian lines. Sinking a ship, the Turks take fresh

⁴³ The authors don't report exactly the same thing about the Christian retirement.

⁴⁴ See PARUTA 1703, 423 and BONAFFINI 1993, 226.

⁴⁵ See GIOVIO 1553, 210.

⁴⁶ According to some authors, it would be because of the panic, on the contrary, others think that is a skilful manoeuvre or like Giovinio analyzes as *ea ratione faciebat*, in GIOVIO 1553, 210 v.

⁴⁷ For Besbelli, Barbarossa attempts a new tactic: going through the enemies' lines to attack the galleys. This tactic will be used by Piyale Pacha in 1560 against the Christian fleet at Djerba. In BESBELLI 1980, 100 and 107 (plans of the battle of Preveza). This manoeuvre reminds also the Bartolomeo Colleoni's tactics in land fights, See PUJEAU 2005, 45.

heart and cause harm to the Christian fleet. The Christians show their bravery as on the galleon on fire, a little separated from the others to bombard the enemies easily. A Turkish cannonball sets fire to a powder cask on the deck, but the brave captain saves his crew from danger. Vessels are attacked with huge destructions such as a broken mast, burnt sails and many men killed. Some Christians are captured and others escape by skiff or swimming to allied boats. The captain of the barge uses his huge artillery on the enemies, inflicting heavy losses on the Turks. A terrible storm gets up, with great gusts of sirocco. With the wind blowing again, some Christians want to escape to Corfu, but some vessels are slow in manoeuvring. New destruction happens and two ships are finally captured by Salech at twilight after a long and brave resistance. At night, the obscurity «hiding the anxious trouble [of the allied troops] muddles the mind and the sight of the barbarians»,⁴⁸ Doria orders a quite shameful falling back in the darkness extinguishing the great lanterns. The Turks follow them until about 9 o'clock, when Barbarossa decides to quit because of the total dark: «it was impossible to see each other, there were only the noise of the oars and nothing else but the voice to recognize one another».⁴⁹ The wind becoming stronger, the fleet goes straight to Corfu.

The next day, Barbarossa tries to provoke the Christians at Paxos, but they lose so much time in debates, that Khaireddin turns back owing to the threatening weather. To make up this failure, they want to attack Durazzo, but Capello knowing those territories, suggests Castelnovo. Seizing the fortress in within a few days, the allied army does not take advantage of the situation in order to continue the enterprise. Not following the resolutions of the *League*, holding that the territory, as old Venitian possession, would be given back to Venice, Andrea Doria and Ferrante Gonzaga decide to install four thousand Spanish veterans⁵⁰ to guard the place, under Francesco Sarmiento's command. But during the winter, they are expelled *terra marisque* by the Turks in a sector under Ottomans' authority.

So, from a great opportunity for the Christians in the Preveza events of 1538, in which Barbarossa could not be able to escape safely from the Gulf of Ambracia, the situation is entirely reversed. Arriving late in Corfu, a long time after the Venitian and the papal fleets, having hesitations during the fights, ordering illogical retreats in moments of Christian advantage and probably meeting secretly Barbarossa, Doria has changed a certain victory over Barbarossa into shame for himself and a potential danger for the whole Christendom. Important doubts exist about the Doria's sincerity. Helping the Turks, Doria was certain to weaken the Venitians, his atavistic enemies, which was a very good thing for Charles V, his master. On the contrary, if this campaign was a success, the Venitian State could recover, thwarting the emperor's plans.

Through the events: the mentalities of the time

Those last arguments open the question of the mentalities to explore in order to find explanations about the different behaviour during the Preveza campaign. In the Renaissance time the

⁴⁸ See Marciana, Lat X 98, 265 v.

⁴⁹ See BONAFFINI 1993, 228.

⁵⁰ The aim is to keep those men far from Italy. But during the winter, a part of them will go at Brindisi and the other part in Sicily.

human being gets a new reality in the center of the universe, it's the anthropocentrism. The Preveza campaign, with the different persons taking part in the enterprise, illustrates perfectly this turning point.

This moment is traditionally seen as the dawn of the individual identity. But this point of view is not approved unanimously, because the schematic distinction between the Middle Age lead by common interest and the Renaissance discovering the «human» would not be exactly right. In fact, the notion of an individual has existed as reality before the Renaissance, but the matter is how to express it before this time. The writings of the Middle Age propose ideals regarding the community: the *chanson de geste* glorifies the war exploits of a group second the code of honour of the knights, the courteous literature brings fame to the moral perfection and the satirical denounces the moral and religious misbehaviour showing the absurdities. These written works urge the community to live in good harmony. On the contrary, the Renaissance would be focused on the «Human» as one person.

Thus, Humanism and Renaissance appear «inseparable, mixed with each other».⁵¹ The humanism puts the individual in the center, his role is to dominate the world and to understand it by his mind. About the idea of the domination of the human, we can mention that the point of view to consider the man as the «summit of the Creation» appears without a doubt yet in the Holy Bible, exactly from the beginning in the Book of Genesis: after the creation of the world and all the creatures, «God said: let us make the human in our own image, as our resemblance, and let the humans dominate the fishes of the sea, the birds of the sky, the livestock, all the wild animals and all the creatures crawling on the earth»⁵² precising their role in the Creation: «fill the earth, subject it, dominate the fishes of the sea, the birds of the sky and the animals crawling on the earth».⁵³ In the Renaissance, the human wants to understand the world. For Delumeau, there would be also «a cultural transformation in Renaissance [...] the fixedness of Aristotle contrasts with the plasticity of a world transformable by the human»⁵⁴ because the human has an influence by his own actions and he is conscious of it. The consciousness and the observation of the human action is one of the activities of the Renaissance time. One of the most famous representants of the Humanism, Giovanni Pico della Mirandola (1461-1494) has also written: «There is nothing more admirable than the Human» in the preface of the *Orazione sulla dignità dell'uomo* (1487) observing that the man could do the best or the worst. This remark shows the importance of the potentialities of humanity. To complete this philosophical approach, the historical definition of the specialist of the Renaissance, Eugenio Garin, could help to delimitate the question. As we can read: «to a statical moment succeeds a dynamic one. The new man, the modern human, was a man who made and constructed himself and was also conscious of this creation. He was precisely the „man of the Renaissance“».⁵⁵ So, the actions are very important to observe and know better the Human being. This opinion could explain the interest of the time for the *Lives* recording famous historical persons, seen as example to study.

Connected to the Antique literature, the Renaissance uses its rhetoric with its figures as the *mimesis* and the *catharsis*. Effectively, the *Lives* offer examples to follow (*mimesis*) or better to surpass and propose also examples in order to frighten (*catharsis*) so as to disgust to have such a wrong attitude. Imitating models and perhaps outmatching them, the Renaissance man

⁵¹ See BATKIN 1990, 10.

⁵² *Gen.* 1.26.

⁵³ *Gen.* 1.28: «God would give them also the grasses and the trees with seeds as food».

⁵⁴ See DELUMEAU 1994, 124-125.

⁵⁵ See GARIN 1990, 12-13.

can become an example at his turn. And this possibility could lead him to look for personal glory. In fact «the theme of glory and honour is one of the arguments the most frequent of the humanistic and renaissance writings»⁵⁶ as Carlo Varotti observes, it is also the following of the conceptions of the knighthood too, but the achievements are not yet considered principally according to the common interest, but in the particular point of view of one person. This is egocentricity. A very interesting illustration of this situation is given by the cosmography. Apparently, the aim is to describe the universe. But if we observe carefully the texts, those descriptions are influenced by the point of view of the author, who exposes his own vision of foreign countries and people. A touch of condescension⁵⁷ could even exist in such texts. But the most important point to notify is the new importance of the human considered as individual. The biographers help to illustrate this aim with a clever choice of the beautiful and brilliant feats sweetening eventual harshness⁵⁸ in order to build marvellous models. Urging to glory in order to encourage people to do good deeds and to improve their attitude is a good thing. All the community takes advantage of such a thing. The problem is when the interests are divergent. As Burckhardt has written, the individualism progresses continuously, and to get glory⁵⁹ different solutions are used, up to and including monstrous actions,⁶⁰ without thinking necessarily of the common interest.

Therefore, the common interest is at stake during the Preveza campaign. How could the mentalities of the time help to understand the background of this failure?

In this transitional time, the Venitian commander, Vincenzo Capello, appears as an old-fashioned man, showing during all the fight to be principally preoccupied by the common interest. He never disobeys an order, despite the desire to confront the enemies. When he goes to Doria to present his different point of view urging him to attack the Turks, he respects the hierarchy. All his behaviour shows a respectful attitude to the Venitian Republic, made of submission to interests of Venice and the Christendom. He respects so much his orders that he always waits to receive the *senatusconsultum* (the order of the Venitian Senate) before doing anything. Nevertheless, his behaviour is not void of ambition. In his ambiguous praise, Giovio let the reader believe that during the Preveza campaign the Capello's role is really minor: he comes on a frail barque to meet Doria and obeys his orders, almost as a servant without any piece of initiative. But, the conclusion shows another side to him: «however, Capello supported honourably the reputation of his name with many arguments and he was very eloquent».⁶¹ So, maybe Capello is dependent of his own hierarchy with the right behaviour. And the honour of the family and the service of the State represent the «supreme merit of the po-

⁵⁶ See VAROTTI 1998, 108.

⁵⁷ To describe to fellow countrymen foreign particularities, the cosmographers use familiar terms to explain them with some elements to help the reader to get an opinion about the subject, and often propose personal comments. If the cosmopolitan Postel wants to propose examples «apres bonne et diligente inquisition» of «vices et vertus» of the Turks in POSTEL 1560, 1 verso, he also mentions the «folles superstitions des Mores en leur mariage» quite ironically. Other authors use voluntary depreciative terms in their descriptions, e.g. talking about «vain gods» like if their faith would be like the mythology!

⁵⁸ FRIGO 2001, 279.

⁵⁹ Jacob Burckhardt explores all the different ways to get glory in Renaissance time in «La gloire moderne» see BURCKHARDT 1906, I, 177-190.

⁶⁰ Carlo Varotti observes the relation between literature and ideology, VAROTTI 1998, 105-204, reflecting about the individual seen as exceptional (123) but thinking to the morality too (205sqg)!

⁶¹ See GIOVIO 1551, 291-292.

litical ethics for the Venitian aristocracy». ⁶² This «meaning of the State» ⁶³ during the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries explains that the loyal and deserving subjects must be rewarded. Andrea Zannini ⁶⁴ precises that the servant of the State if he must be modest and moderate does not present weakness of character or inability to reach a decision. His zeal does not come from to stubbornness and if he respects the law, he must adapt his attitude to the situations. This capacity was expected from Venitians who were sent in mission as we can read in the *Ducale*. For example, in the Loredano Loredan's *Ducale* of 18th May 1509, we can read: «and to get the required result, you will employ any art and cleverness» ⁶⁵ offering the possibility to adapt the behaviour to the situation. So, the interest of the Venitian Republic is the most important thing. In this way, the common interest is essential and has the edge on personal interest.

The other Venitian native chief of the campaign, Marco Grimani, the patriarch of Aquileia behaves quiet differently, he seems to be more preoccupied by his personal glory. His *cursus honorum* confirms this impression. Firstly, he uses his money to buy official charges in Venitian administration. Failing in different elections he enters upon the ecclesiastical career. Using trickery, ⁶⁶ he becomes legate *a latere* and commands the papal fleet. The best illustration of his attitude is his attempt to get the Preveza fortress before Doria's arrival in Corfu to take all the glory for the success. Alleging to participate to the recognition with the *Provveditore* Pasqualigo, stealing into the Gulf of Ambracia, he disembarks his soldiers with the artillery, and tries to assault immediately the Preveza fortress without constructing the famous *ripari*. ⁶⁷ Consequently, the Turkish reinforcements encircle them rapidly. The Christian soldiers manage to escape with a huge loss of life and abandoned cannons. Showing again his opportunist behaviour, at his return, Grimani turns this failure in a preliminary exploration allowing him to participate in the debate with Doria, at last arrived, to plan the common attack. Everything is good to take some glory. Nevertheless, when he perceives a danger for the Christendom, he does his duty without reflection. For example, before the campaign in 1531, as he was visiting Constantinople, introduced by Alvise Gritti, ⁶⁸ to Suleiman, he learns his project to attack Italy. Immediately, he does his best to come back in Italy to meet as quickly as possible Clement VII in Rome to warn him of the danger. Even, if he is very interested in his own glory, the Christian interest is also very important to him. It is probably for that reason that he made such an accurate preparation before the campaign, attending to the preparation of the papal fleet in the naval dockyard of Venice and thinking of a religious part of the enterprise organizing a pilgrimage with his crew to Lorette. His own glory plays a good part in his attitude but it does not eclipse the christiandom interest in the end.

The general-in-chief Andrea Doria is indeed an important figure in the Preveza enterprise. His attitude isn't so easy to understand. Remembering the ambiguous facts: when he arrives very late in Corfu after delayed preparations and mutiny cases, he holds a meeting and reflects on how to preserve the Christian forces avoiding any danger for the troops, that is a good attitude in order to research the advantage for the Christians. But he delays and loses time in such councils. Then, under the captains' pressure, he finally orders the attack on Preveza by sea.

⁶² See ZANNINI 1996, 427.

⁶³ See TENENTI 1996, 329-330.

⁶⁴ See ZANNINI 1996, 427.

⁶⁵ See LOREDAN 1509.

⁶⁶ He would have menaced the pope to use compromising letters.

⁶⁷ To guard the troops against the enemies.

⁶⁸ He is the son of the Venitian, Andrea Gritti.

One element important to consider is that Khairreddin Barbarossa and Doria have known each other for years, and this including their reciprocal tactics. In this situation, the Turks hesitate⁶⁹ so much reflecting about what are the Christians plans. They know examples of difficulties between the Christians and there are also secret meetings⁷⁰ between the Christians and Barbarossa. So, to test the Christian forces and perhaps to understand their attitude, and when the fifty Turkish galleys sail away, Doria is surprised. During the fight, when the Christians are nearly successful, he orders the withdrawal, so has to save the Turks. He also prevents the action of his allies when it could be determinant for the final victory. He is astonishingly surprised by the change in the weather, a point particularly remarkable for an expert in the observation of the sky, who is very good in meteorology, seen as unique of his kind! So, different elements soil Doria's attitude:⁷¹ he is surprised by things that he knows perfectly, he gives wrong orders helping almost the enemies, like if he wouldn't catch Barbarossa. Is it because of secret agreements between them? On the other hand, in his opinion, he doesn't want to risk all the Christian forces in such a fight, in case of defeat, it would be very dangerous to stay without any defenses! The common interest seems to play an important part for him. But what interest is really at stake in this campaign? Is it the common interest or a particular interest? Doria's action has at the end bad results for the Christendom, because the promised victory becomes quite a disaster. And the conquest of Castelnuovo, an action that would change the situation, does not have fructuous continuation. Is he moving skilfully for his own glory? He has effectively the intention to support his reputation, like in the general final retirement in which he wants to get the last place: «Doria wanted to be among the last to leave with his galee, thinking to show by this way or more bravery or a better advice for the safety of the fleet».⁷² But this is more bragging than gallantry, because «all knew that his confidence came not from his own moral strength or his will to succeed in the service, but because he knew the speed of his galee that could save him from any danger».⁷³ However, such an attitude reveals his desire for glory or at least of saving his reputation. The unfortunate campaign of Preveza has put it in great peril. Why has Doria, the famous captain, accepted to risk so much? Because he is devoted to the interest of another person. He does all in his power to satisfy the emperor, Charles V.

The emperor's part is very interesting to analyse too. In fact, Doria seems to be above all faithful to Charles V, in fact, he sacrifices his own reputation and serves the emperor's interests before everything else. Not in person at the Preveza battle, Charles V plays a very important part, because it is obviously his opinion which influences the events of Preveza. All is apparently done to satisfy his expectations. He offers a very good illustration of the mentality of the time, in the extreme: his empire puts him effectively in the center of the universe, this «empire on what, according to Ariosto, „the sun never goes down“».⁷⁴ Whereas Charles V has

⁶⁹ For Barbarossa they must stay in the gulf to preserve the Turkish forces, and for some adventurers, they need to leave it with all the fleet to fight the Christians. Many Christian attacks have fallen for internal disagreements.

⁷⁰ According to Gianmatteo Bembo (*provveditore* of Kotor in Dalmatia) in a letter of 1539, Doria's messengers would have met secretly Barbarossa «two days before the arrival of our fleet», ZILETTI 1581, III, 66.

⁷¹ In this unfortunate campaign, he seems to lose his old reputation of a brave captain.

⁷² PARUTA 1703, 426.

⁷³ PARUTA 1703, 426.

⁷⁴ HERMANN 2002, 183.

a great ambition for glory, he regards himself as the «king-messiah» or «promised king»⁷⁵ presented in the Bible by: «in these days fairness will blossom and great peace until the end of the moons, he will dominate from the sea to the sea, from the river to the fringes of Earth».⁷⁶ Effectively, his empire stretches from the sea to the sea and the description «from the river to the fridges of the Earth» records his motto *plus ultra*. So, as a good representative of his time, Charles V is looking for his own glory. The description of the Bible is for him a prophecy of his role on Earth and offers him by this way a religious support. It is only an interpretation,⁷⁷ but it is enough to maintain his ambition. So to be equal to the situation, everything must be done. In this opinion, all seems good to increase his power and to weaken his rivals, because if he wants to be THE emperor, quite as the master of the world (or at least the first prince of the West), every rivalry must be destroyed. He wants to establish an universal monarchy second the opinion: «un monarca, un imperio y una spada».⁷⁸ The Venitians with their sprawling dominion disrupt his project. So, in this aim many actions in order to weaken them will be done. According to Venitians' supporters, during the fight, when Grimani, close to the enemies, makes preparations to be able to sail away very fast in case of wind to save his troops, Doria is very displeased with this possibility of rescue, almost as if he wishes that the Turks would destroy them. Another example of actions probably against the Venitians stands in the following of the campaign. After the storming of Castelnuovo, despite the *Capitula* giving back the reconquisted old Venitian territories to Venice, the city is guarded by Spanish troops, not fulfilling the agreement. Another surprising point is that the continuation of the enterprise is purely and simply abandoned. It is not only for the winter season avoiding any fight in this Mediterranean sector, but by others interests. We know that Andrea Doria has got a theory to vanquish the Turks. He thought to part their forces: Sulaiman and the land troops on one side and Barbarossa and the naval forces on the other side. So, the negotiations, inspired by Charles V, try to separate Barbarossa and his sultan. In this idea, negotiations would be organized with Khaireddin and the Mediterranean domination is also separated: the West under the Christian power and the East under the Ottoman one. If for the East part, it is only the observation of the contemporary situation, enterprises like the «African war» of 1535 leaded by Charles V to show his domination on this sector, as the end of the campaign demonstrates; after the Christian victory on Tunis, «proud of his own part in the fighting, the emperor reinstalled Muley Hassan as his vassal».⁷⁹ In the Charles V's eyes, this campaign is his greatest brave deed almost as the «repetition of the enterprise of Granada in 1492, accomplished by his ancestors, the Catholic kings, Isabel and Ferdinand»⁸⁰ and for that reason, he wants to spread the fame of this achievement. And during the campaign, he takes with him among others the poet Garcilaso de la Vega⁸¹ and the Dutch painter Vermeyen,⁸² to exalt the imperial feat.

⁷⁵ Psalm dedicated to Salomon, pacific and equitable king. The Jewish and the Christian tradition saw in this text the forward portrait of the messianic king. See *Psalm 72(71)*.

⁷⁶ *Psalm 72(71)*.

⁷⁷ In reality, in the Bible the expression describes the ideal Palestine, presented elsewhere as «from the torrent of Egypt (la Araba) to the Great River (the Euphrates)» or «from Dan to Bersabee», the Book of Judges, 20-1. The other description seems to consider the Earth as circular and flat (opinion from VIth century b.C. in KUPČIK 1981, 14) and maybe as a confined space. But in the Charles V's opinion thinking to the contemporary world, this definition was good for him.

⁷⁸ This is the text of Hernando de Acuña in LYNCH 1992, 87.

⁷⁹ See ZIMMERMANN 1995, 143.

⁸⁰ See GEROSA 1992, 278.

⁸¹ Garcilaso de la Vega (1503-1536) is severely injured during the siege of Tunis.

Proud of this enterprise, Charles V thinks that he deserves to be glorified for it. As representative of the contemporary mentality, he wants to reach some glory. As Giovio writes in his *Histories*,⁸³ the emperor, himself, invites him to sing a new imperial exploit⁸⁴ as we can read: «Giovio, prepare your quill to write exactly in the histories the events, because with all those movements, indeed you will have to compose a great work about a new campaign».⁸⁵ So, the emperor appreciates a lot Giovio's way of telling his exploits, and knows that he can do so much for his glory. Further more, according to Alfred Morel-Fatio, Charles V has a great taste for the «tympanisation de ses hauts faits».⁸⁶ This remark seems to show the emperor with a quite conceited personality for his pleasure taken in hearing (that would translate the neologism *tympanisation*) the telling of his exploits! It would be why he is so much interested by the version of Giovio «what the contemporary greatest builder of reputation writes in his book,⁸⁷ seen as a very important literary production of the time and an almost official consecration of the contemporary glories».⁸⁸ Despite his great interest about the Giovio's work, Charles V is not generous with him or the artists glorifying his actions, because giving something would be paying for the compliments, as he argues!

So, Charles V is looking for glorious actions to improve his glory and for opportunities to increase his power. The Preveza campaign is for him very profitable for different motives. Firstly, in case of victory, it would be a success of the Christian troops led by the imperial captain Doria. And during all the enterprise, he gets also a very good advantage against Francis I, because if the French army doesn't participate in the enterprise, there is a truce ensuring peace between them and liberating the emperor from the French rivalry. And that is a marvelous possibility to make preparations without any French reaction. He also gets an opportunity to reinforce his authority on the Christian Republic, because during the campaign he can weaken the Venitian forces, during the fight by sending Spanish support units⁸⁹ on the Venitian boards and in case of defeat, those territories won't come back to the Venitian domination. The result will be that immediately after this clamorous action of giving Castelnuovo in guard to a Spanish squadron, Venice enters in negotiations with the Turks to get a separated peace! The Venitians explain to the Turks that the decision to participate in the enterprise has been taken with only two voices. Effectively, during the winter before the campaign, important debates stood in the Venitian Senate: Marcantonio Cornaro was the representant of the opposition to the Turks' proposition of peace⁹⁰ and Marco Foscarini, one of the Sages, was the defender of the Turkish peace.⁹¹ If, before the campaign they choose the Christian camp, with some mistrust⁹² about Charles V, it is before they refuse to abandon the Christian Republic.

⁸² Jan Cornelisz Vermeyen (v.1500-1559) would made from the expedition of Tunis cartoons for tapestries about the main events with great panache.

⁸³ In the Book XLIII of GIOVIO 1553.

⁸⁴ It is the enterprise of the Flanders in 1543. Giovio tells it in the Book XLIV of GIOVIO 1553.

⁸⁵ See GIOVIO 1553, 303v.-304.

⁸⁶ See MOREL-FATIO 1913, 115.

⁸⁷ It is the *Historia sui temporis*, about the letters and different movements about the Giovio account. See PUJEAU 2006a, 20-63.

⁸⁸ See MOREL-FATIO 1913, 115.

⁸⁹ This is a very great problem for the christian troops during the campaign, because the Venitians refuse to let the Spanish veterans reinforce their crew!

⁹⁰ The speech is printed by Paolo Paruta in PARUTA 1703, 394-397.

⁹¹ The speech is also printed by Paolo Paruta in PARUTA 1703, 397-401.

⁹² About their doubts see also PUJEAU 2006a, 68-72.

The Venitians never ally themselves with the Turks in a military alliance, participating in common battle side by side, but they secure their situation with them through truce or peace. It is also very interesting for the Turks who are sure in this way not have this dangerous enemy at sea against them.

Conclusion

Part of the contemporary historians show in their books the Preveza campaign as the end of the Christian domination at sea.⁹³ The interests at stake were very divergent⁹⁴ and those different objectives have created a very complex situation in which curiously the Turks have very little part. The Christian writings show them practically as witnesses and not as actors.

If this campaign and its accounts offer a very good testimony of the strategical approach of the time, we have also appreciated different types of mentality. Those mentalities are representative of the changing time, they are made of personal ambition, sometimes dangerous for the Christendom, but often preoccupied by the common interest. This campaign has perhaps put also in evidence a change in the relationship between the East and the West. The religious dimension decreases dangerously in the minds of some of the most powerful men despite their epithet «roi très chrétien» for Francis I or Charles V son of the «Catholic Kings». The Turks are not yet considered as implacable enemies of the Christian faith, but practically only as an opposition force. Francis I seems to use them to liberate himself of the emperor menace,⁹⁵ and Charles V tries to lean on some of them to reinforce his domination on the Christendom. Thinking to separate the Turkish power (Barbarossa on one hand and Suleiman on the other), Doria and Charles V unconsciously play into the Ottomans' hands. The background of this very complex situation confirms that the Christian division is a great peril for the whole Christendom. The discords ruin the alliance of the Christians and more particularly in this campaign the disunity allows Barbarossa to escape safely instead of being caught by the Christians. So, the only hope to vanquish the powerful Turks is to reach the union. And yet the integrity of the Christian Republic –as the whole European people opposed to the Muslims mainly represented by the Turks– is significantly diminished. In this manner, the Protestants' action is destructive like in the fact of preparing campaigns against other Christians in place of the enemies of the Christian faith! Therefore, the Christian Republic⁹⁶ is not any longer exactly a reality but it is gradually becoming only an ideal. The Christian Republic seen as principle or concept has an unifying quality and it will continue to be efficient to convince of the necessity to go on crusade. So many texts⁹⁷ of the time use this argument to persuade the readers.

⁹³ After the Essek defeat of 1537 on dry land, the end of the christian landing domination. E.g. Paolo Giovio in the *Historiarum sui temporis*, GIOVIO 1553.

⁹⁴ Charles V wanted to get the universal monarchy, Venice would like to restore his empire and his sea power and maybe Doria, Capello or Grimani were looking for a personal glory.

⁹⁵ PUJEAU 2009b.

⁹⁶ Jacques Bainville dates the end of the *Christian Republic* when Francis I sent his ring to Suleiman in the evening of Pavia. The relationship between France and Turks is already sealed: «Cette alliance avec l'Infidèle, c'était cependant la fin de l'idée de chrétienté [...] la conception de la République chrétienne était abolie», in BAINVILLE 1924, 126.

⁹⁷ Among others: see PUCCIUS 1518; or ANONYMOUS 1518; or ERASME 1992, 955-974; or AGRICOLA 1538; or also GIOVIO 1608.

In this manner, the complex events of the Preveza campaign have also inspired different authors who have reflected about so many arguments in order to learn lessons from it. New unified enterprises will offer examples of the fulfilment of the project to defend the Christian Republic from its enemies. The concept of «Christian Republic» will have a long posterity, maybe in the guise of more modern definitions, and this still today in a certain way.

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
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Symbol of the Symposium: Clock tower of Preveza (1752). Drawing of the south façade

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