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Conference Papers Year : 2012

ROSETTA for Single Trace Analysis

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Christophe Clavier
DMI
Benoit Feix
  • Function : Author
  • PersonId : 883791
DMI
Georges Gagnerot
  • Function : Author
  • PersonId : 918159
DMI
Christophe Giraud
  • Function : Author
  • PersonId : 1102992
  • IdHAL : cgiraud
Mylène Roussellet
  • Function : Author

Abstract

In most efficient exponentiation implementations, recovering the secret exponent is equivalent to disclosing the sequence of squaring and multiplication operations. Some known attacks on the RSA exponentiation apply this strategy, but cannot be used against classical blinding countermeasures. In this paper, we propose new attacks distinguishing squaring from multiplications using a single side-channel trace. It makes our attacks more robust against blinding countermeasures than previous methods even if both exponent and message are randomized, whatever the quality and length of random masks. We demonstrate the efficiency of our new techniques using simulations in different noise configurations.
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Dates and versions

hal-00776817 , version 1 (16-01-2013)

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Christophe Clavier, Benoit Feix, Georges Gagnerot, Christophe Giraud, Mylène Roussellet. ROSETTA for Single Trace Analysis. Indocrypt 2012, Dec 2012, Kolkata, India. pp.140-155, ⟨10.1007/978-3-642-34931-7_9⟩. ⟨hal-00776817⟩
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